Suchergebnisse

A GRASP OF CRISIS FORECASTING REQUIRES A WORKING KNOWLEDGE OF (1) INTERNATIONAL CRISIS RESEARCH-INCLUDING CRISIS ESCALATION AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT; AND (2) GENERAL FORECASTING. CRISIS FORECASTING OF LEVELS OF CONFLICT, OF WAR AND VIOLENCE, AND OF CRISES PER SE.

Many analysts argue that public opinion creates pressure on Chinese leaders to act coercively in territorial disputes, and that it also limits their options to de-escalate once crises have broken out. Evidence suggests, however, that Chinese leaders may prefer having more flexibility rather than less in a crisis. Using original data generated by a survey experiment conducted in China in 2015, this article examines several strategies that Chinese leaders could use to reduce public pressure so as to make concessions in a crisis easier. These strategies include pledging to use economic sanctions instead of force; invoking China's "peaceful identity"; citing the costs of conflict to China's development; accepting United Nations mediation; and backing down in the face of U.S. military threats. In all cases except one, approval for the leader increases over a baseline level of support for making concessions. The exception is if the leader backs down in the face of U.S. military threats. Here, approval drops below the baseline level of support, especially for nationalists and hawks. The findings suggest that if one assumes that Chinese leaders are constrained by public opinion, a U.S. cost-imposition strategy to compel China to back down in crises may have the opposite effect—tying Chinese leaders' hands even tighter.

This article investigates the relationship between the borrowing activity of Russian households and their current conumer expendatures in the period of escalation of the social and economic crisis. The analysis was conducted on the basis of data provided by the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, RLMS-HSE for 2015. The paper proposes and implements an approach that makes it possible to assess the impact of borrowings on inequality in consumption and poverty among households. It was revealed that the need of repayment results in saving on food, medical treatment and other vital needs for an overwhelming number of households. This is especially acute among families being beyond the poverty threshold. ; peer-reviewed

This work stresses the importance, in making any choice of strategies-including the decision to use or refrain from using nuclear weapons-of gauging the intent behind the opponent's military moves. Dr. Brodie also suggests that the use or threat of use of tactical nuclear weapons may lead to de-escalation, that is, may check rather than promote the expansion of hostilities. The author applies his ideas about escalation to several imagined situations, examining them in relation to experiences in Europe, in the second Cuba crisis, and in Asia. Originally published in 1966. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

States form defensive alliances hoping to deter adversaries and avoid war. However, scholars and policy analysts often worry that if an alliance fails to deter the promise of military support will encourage escalation, pushing disputants closer to war. We show that in many cases this concern is unwarranted. We use a game-theoretic model of alliance reliability and crisis bargaining to show that the same factors that indicate unreliability and provoke disputes also encourage alliance members to make concessions rather than risk war. We test this hypothesis using a sample of militarized disputes initiated against members of defensive alliances, where recent shifts in military capabilities represent changes in challengers' estimates of alliance reliability. Less-reliable alliances are less likely than reliable allies to deter disputes, but they also decrease the probability of escalation relative to reliable alliances. Unreliable alliances need not encourage war; rather, they can discourage it.

States form defensive alliances hoping to deter adversaries and avoid war. However, scholars and policy analysts often worry that if an alliance fails to deter the promise of military support will encourage escalation, pushing disputants closer to war. We show that in many cases this concern is unwarranted. We use a game-theoretic model of alliance reliability and crisis bargaining to show that the same factors that indicate unreliability and provoke disputes also encourage alliance members to make concessions rather than risk war. We test this hypothesis using a sample of militarized disputes initiated against members of defensive alliances, where recent shifts in military capabilities represent changes in challengers' estimates of alliance reliability. Less-reliable alliances are less likely than reliable allies to deter disputes, but they also decrease the probability of escalation relative to reliable alliances. Unreliable alliances need not encourage war; rather, they can discourage it.

This article draws attention to the danger that deliberate escalation will transform into compulsory escalation. According to Clausewitz' philosophy, the use of violence is an instrument of policy. Nuclear deterrence would have brought an end to that philosophy, since the costs of nuclear war always exceed the benefits. However, Clausewitz also suggests the possibility that a war may escalate beyond the break-even point (where cost is equal to benefit) if a nation expects to lose unilaterally. In the nuclear era, the limited use of nuclear weapons may very easily escalate into absolute war because the target feels that its survival is at stake. This argument closely resembles Riezler's theory of bluff developed on the eve of World War I and the possibility that escalation may become uncontrollable in a Krieg aus Not (war from necessity). Just as in 1914, a third world war might break out not on the basis of a calculation that the benefits of warfare are greater than the costs, but as a consequence of compulsory escalation of a crisis or a limited war in which one side perceives that its existence is threatened. Since planning for limited nuclear war and deliberate escalation enhances the probability of compulsory escalation, a nuclear posture of minimum deterrence should be preferred.

The de-escalation of a nuclear crisis is one of the major issues facing humankind. This book examines how nations in crises might successfully move back from the brink of nuclear war and how confidence-building measures might help and hinder the de-escalatory process

This article examines the nexus between international crises and civil wars. Based on the premise that not all simultaneous civil and international conflicts are related, the study aims to explore the circumstances in which civil wars affect violent escalation in international crises. The study identifies 'composite' crises – where the civil war is the core issue of the international dispute – as a unique subset of international crises. These crises are distinguished from 'unrelated-civil war' situations, in which the issues in the internal and international conflicts are separate. Using data from the ICB, COW, and UCDP/PRIO datasets, the article tests a dual-conflict argument, positing that interconnected issues and interactions between actors in composite situations inhibit moderate crisis management and aggravate interstate behavior. The findings show that while civil war in composite situations has a negative impact on crisis escalation, unrelated-civil war has an inverse impact on interstate relations in crisis.

This article examines the nexus between international crises and civil wars. Based on the premise that not all simultaneous civil and international conflicts are related, the study aims to explore the circumstances in which civil wars affect violent escalation in international crises. The study identifies 'composite' crises – where the civil war is the core issue of the international dispute – as a unique subset of international crises. These crises are distinguished from 'unrelated-civil war' situations, in which the issues in the internal and international conflicts are separate. Using data from the ICB, COW, and UCDP/PRIO datasets, the article tests a dual-conflict argument, positing that interconnected issues and interactions between actors in composite situations inhibit moderate crisis management and aggravate interstate behavior. The findings show that while civil war in composite situations has a negative impact on crisis escalation, unrelated-civil war has an inverse impact on interstate relations in crisis.