Since 2003, Peru has emerged as an open, rapidly growing economy. Over the review period of 2003-09, successive governments adopted policy platforms aimed at maintaining macroeconomic stability, furthering the private sector supply response, broadening participation in growth, improving social service delivery, and strengthening public institutions. The World Bank Group (WBG) supported each of the three pillars of the government's poverty reduction strategy, namely: (i) broad-based economic growth that engaged a higher share of the population; (ii) enhanced human development through improved social service delivery; and (iii) strengthened public sector institutions. Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) recommends that the WBG: (i) tailor its strategy to support long-term integration of Peru's three distinct regions; (ii) seek opportunities to support large-scale infrastructure development; (iii) develop a more strategic approach to helping improve public sector management; (iv) seek further innovations in International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD's) instruments against a backdrop of declining demand for its financial resources; (v) seek to help develop a strategic planning function in Peru; (vi) build a close strategic partnership with development partners that provides concessional finance in the social sectors to optimize synergies with IBRD policy lending and analytic and advisory activities; (vii) develop a strategic focus for International Finance Corporation (IFC) around employment- generating industries in emerging sectors; (viii) maintain IFC's additionality by supporting lower-tier and more regionally dispersed private companies; and (ix) leverage the strong country presence of IBRD and IFC to enhance Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency's (MIGA's) marketing and risk assessment functions.
This update considers new findings since the initial Stocktaking report, substantiating the contribution of the private sector, and of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in particular, for new jobs and investment. These findings further illustrate the key role access to finance plays in SMEs abilities and willingness to add jobs including the special circumstances of fast-growing SMEs, or gazelles. The new findings further detail availability and gaps in SME financing, including for specific subsectors such as women-owned firms and agri-enterprises. New trends include progress made in recent years to improve financial markets infrastructure, and expanded lending in countries such as China, which have made progress in this area. The findings also include key private sector innovations pioneered by the SME Finance Challenge winners and other private sector institutions, focusing on key sector opportunities (such as agribusiness and energy), product innovation (such as expanded local currency options), and risk management alternatives. The new findings and trends highlight the potential of collaborative platforms that have emerged from the G-20/GPFI (Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion) process to combine resources to improve SME access to finance, and some of the major outstanding issues and obstacles these platforms might address. The conclusion provides recommendations for priority issues and work areas for G-20/GPFI attention.
This report is organized into three main sections. Section one sets out the context by describing the particular challenges and opportunities related to financing agriculture, followed by defining the target group of agricultural SME s. Section two describes a set of innovative financing models. Section three then provides a framework for an indicative assessment of these models by gathering and forming observations from the case studies. The model observations are then highlighted in three types of country contexts in which bankers in developing countries may find themselves. Preliminary assessment results are presented. The report concludes with key lessons learned on innovative agricultural financing, relevant case studies, and an outlook on further work in this area. Annexes present methodologies and case studies representing the various models.
Chile could well have space to increase its growth potential by 2 percentage points of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per year. To do this, it would need to pay more attention to new sources of growth in natural resources, manufacturing, and services. In an increasingly globalized world, first-mover advantages have become more numerous and larger. Chile risks losing out, as a few recent high-profile cases suggest. Chile's total factor productivity growth can be raised by driving within-firm technological change closer to the global best-practice frontier more rapidly, especially in manufacturing. This would encourage the diversification of exports and boost Chile's supply response to global demand changes. Chile confronts obstacles in its processes of innovation, human capital accumulation, and investment. To overcome them, deep institutional changes are needed to develop a national innovation system, stronger and more equitable educational achievement, more flexible labor markets, and focused public investments that crowd in private business. Such an inclusive growth strategy is likely to yield better social outcomes than a strategy that attempts to confront social inequities head-on through more equitable access to public services without paying adequate attention to the demand for labor and generation of income. Chile could also try a new policy towards innovation, but it would need to be bolder in terms of the institutional design to maximize the chances of success.
In this paper, authors first review the literature on the relation between finance and growth. Theory provides ambiguous predictions concerning the question of whether financial development exerts a positive, causative impact on long-run economic growth. The second part of this paper reviews the literature on the historical and policy determinants of financial development. Governments play a central role in shaping the operation of financial systems and the degree to which large segments of the financial system have access to financial services. The authors discuss the relationship between financial sector policies and economic development. The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Sections one and two review theory and evidence on the relation between finance and growth. Section three turns to an examination of financial sector policies, and section four concludes.
Several developing economies have recently introduced conditional cash transfer programs, which provide money to poor families contingent on certain behavior, usually investments in human capital, such as sending children to school or bringing them to health centers. The approach is both an alternative to more traditional social assistance programs and a demand-side complement to the supply of health and education services. Unlike most development initiatives, conditional cash transfer programs have been subject to rigorous evaluations of their effectiveness using experimental or quasi-experimental methods. Evaluation results for programs launched in Colombia, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Turkey reveal successes in addressing many of the failures in delivering social assistance, such as weak poverty targeting, disincentive effects, and limited welfare impacts. There is clear evidence of success from the first generation of programs in Colombia, Mexico, and Nicaragua in increasing enrollment rates, improving preventive health care, and raising household consumption. Many questions remain unanswered, however, including the potential of conditional cash transfer programs to function well under different conditions, to address a broader range of challenges among poor and vulnerable populations, and to prevent the intergenerational transmission of poverty.
Although the link between improved infrastructure services and economic growth is uncertain, it is clear that reforms aimed at creating competition and regulating natural monopolies establish an environment conducive to private sector participation, incentives for companies to strive for efficiency savings that can ultimately be passed on to consumers, and greater provision of services (such as faster roll-out of infrastructure or innovative solutions to service delivery for customers not connected to an existing network). In determining the form that infrastructure restructuring might undertake or the design of a regulatory agency, policymakers can generally benefit from a review of the experiences of other countries. A key element of any decision making process should be a review of how the various types of reform will affect the efficiency of the sector and whether they will increase private financing of its significant investment needs.
У теорији постоји сагласност да тероризам представља политички мотивисано насиље и да у том смислу представља један од облика насилне политичке борбе. Специфична разлика тероризма у односу на друге облике политичког насиља је примарна усмереност ка стварању, одржавању и експлоатацији страха ради застрашивања противника и јачања подршке међу присталицама. Суштинска одступања од теоријских и правних критеријума при одређивању тероризма постоје у пракси Савета безбедности. Општа оцена деловања Савета безбедности приликом доношења резолуција о тероризму јесте да прати владајући политички дискурс у коме су најпре државе биле одговорне за тероризам, да би потом "слабе", "неодговорне" и "репресивне" државе биле одговорне за омогућавање деловања међународних терористичких организација на својој територији. Савет безбедности усвајао је резолуције у којима је терористичке акте одређивао спрам природе акта, али и спрам извршиоца чиме су сви акти претходно одређене терористичке организације квалификовани као терористички акти. Истраживањем је утврђено и да је приликом усвајања појединих резолуција политичка сврсисходност утицала да се истоврсна понашања не квалификују увек као терористички акти. На основу изведених закључака утврђено је да сложеност борбе против тероризма представља последицу првенства политичке сврсисходности при квалификовању акта насиља као терористичког акта, а не због тешкоћа у дефинисању тероризма. Промене у концепцији тероризма у резолуцијама Савета безбедности и њихова усклађеност са владајућим јавним дискурсом одвијају се истовремено са настојањем САД и других западних држава да преобликују међународну заједницу и успоставе нови светски поредак. У таквим околностима тероризам почиње да егзистира као офанзивно политичко средство хибридног ратовања, при чему се негативна конотација тероризма експлоатише на два начина. Прво, тероризам постаје политичка оцена нечијег деловања без обзира на природу тако означене активности. Друго, тероризам се употребљава као насилно политичко средство које, у зависности од интереса онога ко цени одређено понашање, неће у свакој ситуацији бити означено као тероризам, већ понекад и као легитиман облик политичке акције. Офанзивни карактер одлуке истовремено води занемаривању научних критеријума у корист политичке сврсисходности при квалификацији неког понашања као терористичког акта. Доминација политичког критеријума при квалификовању терористичког акта утиче на инструментализацију тероризма и његово претварање у ефикасно средство хибридног ратовања. Садржај хибридног ратовања није последица неограниченог избора средстава односно оружја нити њихове софистицираности, већ способности безбедносног менаџмента да у свакој конкретној ситуацији независно од организационог нивоа примени такву комбинацију различитих, али међусобно компатибилних појединачних начина ратовања којом се остварује синергијски ефекат ради реализације претходно постављеног циља. Управо због тога тероризам као облик сложеног политичког насиља постаје предмет експлоатације у сврху хибридног ратовања. На основу резултата истраживања описана су три модела експлотације тероризма у сврху хибридног ратовања. Први модел експлоатације тероризма изведен је из политичке праксе САД да државе за које САД сматрају да користе тероризам као политичко средство ставе на Листу спонзора тероризма. Имајући у виду политички и сваки други утицај који САД имају, овакава пракса и њене последице формално или неформално су прихваћене широм света. Основне последице стављања на Листу спонзора тероризма су санкције, дискредитација у међународној јавности и легитимисање мера против таквих држава, док се у исто време таквом праксом врши притисак на државе које нису на Листи да ускладе своју политику са интересима великих сила. Други модел експлоатације тероризма у сврху хибридног ратовања манифестује се кроз организовање, финансирање, опремање, обуку и усмеравање сурогат снага против влада држава са којима није остварена компатибилност интереса, при чему су сурогат снаге представљене у јавном дискурсу као борци за слободу. Предмет експлоатације у Другом моделу јесте насиље које испуњава теоријске критеријуме да буде означено као тероризам, али је због политичке сврсисходности квалификовано као борба за слободу, отпор против угњетавања и сл. Експлоатација насиља у Другом моделу врши се у циљу промене носилаца политичке власти, стварање аутономних регија односно држава које би биле кооперативне са политиком државе која примењује Други модел или као део шире стратегије управљања безбедносним процесима. Трећи модел експлоатације тероризма у сврху хибридног ратовања подразумева организовање и управљање сурогат снагама које су квалификоване као терористичке организације или се врши инфилтрација појединаца у изворне и самосталне народне побуне ради преузимања руководећих места и управљања њиховим деловањем у складу са интересима државе која предузима Трећи модел. Предмет експлоатације у Трећем моделу јесте насиље које је квалификовано као тероризам, при чему је циљ експлоатације вишеструк: 1. Путем насиља и страха који настаје као последица вршења терористичких аката управља се безбедносном ситуацијом у држави која је мета агресије или у региону који је потребно политички и територијално контролисати, са или без физичког присуства оружаних снага државе која примењује Трећи модел; 2. Стварање страха код одређеног или унапред неодређеног броја држава од потенцијалних напада терористичких организација ради вршења латентног политичког притиска на државе да буде кооперативне, и 3. Стварање разлога за војну интервенцију ради присуства и политичке контроле одређене државе или региона. На основу претходно изнетих резултата истраживања изведен је закључак да први корак у спречавању експлоатације тероризма против наше државе представља отклањање или смањивање потенцијала за друштвене сукобе који настаје услед стварања или продубљивања друштвених противречности. Из тог разлога извршена је анализа нормативно – политичког и институционалног оквира у релевантним областима друштвеног живота. Истраживањем је утврђено да у Републици Србији постоји добар основ за ангажовање и интегрисање свих ресурса друштвене моћи на плану остваривања националне безбедности, али и да постоји потреба да се актуелни политички и безбедносни институционални оквир усклади са таквим могућностима. Као резултат истраживања предложене су три групе мера чија примена треба за резултат да има: отклањање и смањивање опасности од стварања потенцијала за друштвене сукобе; успостављање ефикасног и интегрисаног институционалног оквира за супротстављање политичком насиљу које евентуално проистекне из постојећих противречности и отклањање и смањивање штетних последица таквог политичког насиља. ; U teoriji postoji saglasnost da terorizam predstavlja politički motivisano nasilje i da u tom smislu predstavlja jedan od oblika nasilne političke borbe. Specifična razlika terorizma u odnosu na druge oblike političkog nasilja je primarna usmerenost ka stvaranju, održavanju i eksploataciji straha radi zastrašivanja protivnika i jačanja podrške među pristalicama. Suštinska odstupanja od teorijskih i pravnih kriterijuma pri određivanju terorizma postoje u praksi Saveta bezbednosti. Opšta ocena delovanja Saveta bezbednosti prilikom donošenja rezolucija o terorizmu jeste da prati vladajući politički diskurs u kome su najpre države bile odgovorne za terorizam, da bi potom "slabe", "neodgovorne" i "represivne" države bile odgovorne za omogućavanje delovanja međunarodnih terorističkih organizacija na svojoj teritoriji. Savet bezbednosti usvajao je rezolucije u kojima je terorističke akte određivao spram prirode akta, ali i spram izvršioca čime su svi akti prethodno određene terorističke organizacije kvalifikovani kao teroristički akti. Istraživanjem je utvrđeno i da je prilikom usvajanja pojedinih rezolucija politička svrsishodnost uticala da se istovrsna ponašanja ne kvalifikuju uvek kao teroristički akti. Na osnovu izvedenih zaključaka utvrđeno je da složenost borbe protiv terorizma predstavlja posledicu prvenstva političke svrsishodnosti pri kvalifikovanju akta nasilja kao terorističkog akta, a ne zbog teškoća u definisanju terorizma. Promene u koncepciji terorizma u rezolucijama Saveta bezbednosti i njihova usklađenost sa vladajućim javnim diskursom odvijaju se istovremeno sa nastojanjem SAD i drugih zapadnih država da preoblikuju međunarodnu zajednicu i uspostave novi svetski poredak. U takvim okolnostima terorizam počinje da egzistira kao ofanzivno političko sredstvo hibridnog ratovanja, pri čemu se negativna konotacija terorizma eksploatiše na dva načina. Prvo, terorizam postaje politička ocena nečijeg delovanja bez obzira na prirodu tako označene aktivnosti. Drugo, terorizam se upotrebljava kao nasilno političko sredstvo koje, u zavisnosti od interesa onoga ko ceni određeno ponašanje, neće u svakoj situaciji biti označeno kao terorizam, već ponekad i kao legitiman oblik političke akcije. Ofanzivni karakter odluke istovremeno vodi zanemarivanju naučnih kriterijuma u korist političke svrsishodnosti pri kvalifikaciji nekog ponašanja kao terorističkog akta. Dominacija političkog kriterijuma pri kvalifikovanju terorističkog akta utiče na instrumentalizaciju terorizma i njegovo pretvaranje u efikasno sredstvo hibridnog ratovanja. Sadržaj hibridnog ratovanja nije posledica neograničenog izbora sredstava odnosno oružja niti njihove sofisticiranosti, već sposobnosti bezbednosnog menadžmenta da u svakoj konkretnoj situaciji nezavisno od organizacionog nivoa primeni takvu kombinaciju različitih, ali međusobno kompatibilnih pojedinačnih načina ratovanja kojom se ostvaruje sinergijski efekat radi realizacije prethodno postavljenog cilja. Upravo zbog toga terorizam kao oblik složenog političkog nasilja postaje predmet eksploatacije u svrhu hibridnog ratovanja. Na osnovu rezultata istraživanja opisana su tri modela eksplotacije terorizma u svrhu hibridnog ratovanja. Prvi model eksploatacije terorizma izveden je iz političke prakse SAD da države za koje SAD smatraju da koriste terorizam kao političko sredstvo stave na Listu sponzora terorizma. Imajući u vidu politički i svaki drugi uticaj koji SAD imaju, ovakava praksa i njene posledice formalno ili neformalno su prihvaćene širom sveta. Osnovne posledice stavljanja na Listu sponzora terorizma su sankcije, diskreditacija u međunarodnoj javnosti i legitimisanje mera protiv takvih država, dok se u isto vreme takvom praksom vrši pritisak na države koje nisu na Listi da usklade svoju politiku sa interesima velikih sila. Drugi model eksploatacije terorizma u svrhu hibridnog ratovanja manifestuje se kroz organizovanje, finansiranje, opremanje, obuku i usmeravanje surogat snaga protiv vlada država sa kojima nije ostvarena kompatibilnost interesa, pri čemu su surogat snage predstavljene u javnom diskursu kao borci za slobodu. Predmet eksploatacije u Drugom modelu jeste nasilje koje ispunjava teorijske kriterijume da bude označeno kao terorizam, ali je zbog političke svrsishodnosti kvalifikovano kao borba za slobodu, otpor protiv ugnjetavanja i sl. Eksploatacija nasilja u Drugom modelu vrši se u cilju promene nosilaca političke vlasti, stvaranje autonomnih regija odnosno država koje bi bile kooperativne sa politikom države koja primenjuje Drugi model ili kao deo šire strategije upravljanja bezbednosnim procesima. Treći model eksploatacije terorizma u svrhu hibridnog ratovanja podrazumeva organizovanje i upravljanje surogat snagama koje su kvalifikovane kao terorističke organizacije ili se vrši infiltracija pojedinaca u izvorne i samostalne narodne pobune radi preuzimanja rukovodećih mesta i upravljanja njihovim delovanjem u skladu sa interesima države koja preduzima Treći model. Predmet eksploatacije u Trećem modelu jeste nasilje koje je kvalifikovano kao terorizam, pri čemu je cilj eksploatacije višestruk: 1. Putem nasilja i straha koji nastaje kao posledica vršenja terorističkih akata upravlja se bezbednosnom situacijom u državi koja je meta agresije ili u regionu koji je potrebno politički i teritorijalno kontrolisati, sa ili bez fizičkog prisustva oružanih snaga države koja primenjuje Treći model; 2. Stvaranje straha kod određenog ili unapred neodređenog broja država od potencijalnih napada terorističkih organizacija radi vršenja latentnog političkog pritiska na države da bude kooperativne, i 3. Stvaranje razloga za vojnu intervenciju radi prisustva i političke kontrole određene države ili regiona. Na osnovu prethodno iznetih rezultata istraživanja izveden je zaključak da prvi korak u sprečavanju eksploatacije terorizma protiv naše države predstavlja otklanjanje ili smanjivanje potencijala za društvene sukobe koji nastaje usled stvaranja ili produbljivanja društvenih protivrečnosti. Iz tog razloga izvršena je analiza normativno – političkog i institucionalnog okvira u relevantnim oblastima društvenog života. Istraživanjem je utvrđeno da u Republici Srbiji postoji dobar osnov za angažovanje i integrisanje svih resursa društvene moći na planu ostvarivanja nacionalne bezbednosti, ali i da postoji potreba da se aktuelni politički i bezbednosni institucionalni okvir uskladi sa takvim mogućnostima. Kao rezultat istraživanja predložene su tri grupe mera čija primena treba za rezultat da ima: otklanjanje i smanjivanje opasnosti od stvaranja potencijala za društvene sukobe; uspostavljanje efikasnog i integrisanog institucionalnog okvira za suprotstavljanje političkom nasilju koje eventualno proistekne iz postojećih protivrečnosti i otklanjanje i smanjivanje štetnih posledica takvog političkog nasilja. ; There is a consensus in security studies that terrorism is a politically motivated violence and, therefore, it represents one of the forms of violent political struggle. What distinguishes terrorism from other forms of political violence is its primary focus on creating, maintaining and exploiting fear in order to intimidate opponents and strengthen support among allies. Fundamental deviations from theoretical and legal criteria in determination of terrorism are identified in the pratice of the Security Council. The general assessment of the Security Council's actions related to terrorism is that the Council has been following the prevailing political discourse in which, initially, states in their entirety were responsible for terrorism, and later the blame was put on "weak", "irresponsible" and "repressive" states for enabling international terrorist organizations to operate on their territories. The Security Council passed resolutions in which it classified terrorist acts according to the nature of the act but also to the nature of the perpetrator, which resulted in treating all acts of a previously designated terrorist organization as terrorist acts. The research also determined that during the adoption of certain resolutions, political expediency influenced the fact that similar behaviors do not always qualify as terrorist acts. Based on the previously derived conclusions, it could be said that the complexity of fight against terrorism is a consequence of the primacy of the political criterion in designation of an act of violence as a terrorist act, and not because of the difficulties in defining the notion of terrorism. Changes in the concept of terrorism in the Security Council Resolutions and their harmonization with the prevailing public discourse coincides with the efforts of the United States and other Western countries to reshape the international community and establish a new world order. In such circumstances, terrorism becomes an offensive political tool of hybrid warfare, with the negative connotation of terrorism being exploited in two ways. First, terrorism has become a political assessment of one's actions, regardless of the nature of the such activities. Second, terrorism has become a violent political tool which, depending on the interests of those in the position to evaluate certain behaviors, will not be labeled as terrorism in each situation, but rather as a legitimate form of political action at times. Offensive character of the decision leads to the neglect of scientific criteria in favor of political expediency in the process of terrorist act designation. Dominance of the political criterion in designation of a terrorist act influences the instrumentalisation of terrorism and its transformation into an effective means of hybrid warfare. Content of hybrid warfare is not a consequence of an unlimited variety of weapons used, nor their sophistication, but the ability of security management to apply such combinations of different, yet mutually compatible types of warfare in order to achieve a previously determined aim. These are reasons why terrorism, as a form of complex political violence, is exploited in hybrid warfare. Based on the results of the research, three models of exploitation of terrorism for the purposes of hybrid warfare are described. The First Model of exploitation is derived from the political practice of the United States to put countries on the U.S list of state sponsors of terrorism. In accordance with the political and any other influence that the United States has, this practice and its consequences are formally or informally accepted around the world. The main consequences of being placed on the List are sanctions, discredit on the international level and legitimization of measures against such states, while at the same time putting pressure on countries that are not on the List to harmonize their policies with the interests of great powers. The Second Model of exploitation of terrorism for the purpose of hybrid warfare consists of organizing, financing, equipping, training and directing surrogate forces against the governments of countries with whom compatibility of interests has not been achieved, where surrogate forces are presented in the public discourse as freedom fighters. The subject of exploitation in the Second Model is violence that meets the theoretical criteria to be designated as terrorism. However, due to its political expediency it is qualified as a fight for freedom, resistance against oppression etc. The exploitation of violence used in the second model is done with the intention of shifting political power in order to create autonomous regions or states that would be cooperative with the policy of the state that applies the Second Model or as a part of a broader strategy for managing security processes. The Third Model of exploitation of terrorism for the purposes of hybrid warfare implies organization and managing of surrogate forces that are qualified as terrorist organizations or infiltrating individuals into original and independent popular uprisings in order to take leadership positions and manage their actions in accordance with the interests of the state which apply the Third Model. The subject of exploitation in the Third Model is violence that is qualified as terrorism, with multiple goals: 1. Violence and fear that arises as a result of terrorist acts allows crisis management in the country targeted by aggression or in the region in need of political and territorial control, with or without the physical presence of the armed forces of the State applying the Third Model; 2. Creating fear of potential terrorist attacks in order to exert latent political pressure on states to be cooperative, and 3. Creating reasons for a military intervention which results in physical presence and political control of a certain state or region. Based on the previously presented research results, it may be concluded that the first step to prevent terrorist exploitation against our country should be to eliminate or reduce the potential for social conflicts driven by social contradictions. For this reason, an analysis of the normative - political and institutional framework in the relevant areas of social life was conducted. The research has determined that in the Republic of Serbia there is a good basis for engaging and integrating all resources of national power in terms of achieving national security. In addition, there is a need to harmonize the current political and institutional framework for national security with such possibilities. As a result of the research, three groups of measures have been proposed: elimination or reduction of the potential for social conflicts; establishment of an effective and integrated institutional framework for countering political violence that may arise from the aforementioned contradictions, and elimination and reduction of harmful consequences of such political violence.
El Ecuador, como país intercultural y plurinacional recoge en su memoria social todas las costumbres, mitos, leyendas y tradiciones que transforman en direccionamientos para el desarrollo del país en todas sus áreas, ya que compila en el Derecho Consuetudinario de los pueblos originarios del Ecuador su forma de actuar, ya hoy en día gracias a la revolución ciudadana, lo podemos socializar y aplicar, mismos que deben ser cumplidos en forma coercitiva porque ese es su modo de vida, que con toda seguridad lo manifiesto, es la base para llegar al Sumak Kausay. El presente trabajo explica en resumen la historia de nuestros pueblos originarios, mismos que para llegar a la vida republicana y la colonización han sufrido un proceso de expansionismo y dominación incaica – española, en su debido orden, para luego entrar en la capitulación por las grandes empresas de conquistas, organizadas técnicamente en Centro América y expandirse hacia América del Sur e ingresar al proceso de formación del amerindio, que en el tránsito de Inca a indio y campesino, ha sufrido discriminaciones en todo sentido, llegando a ocultar toda la sabiduría ancestral que luego fue catalogado como actividades paganas en contra de Dios de acuerdo a la Biblia que nos trajeron del viejo mundo (Vera, 1989) En este proceso, el amerindio pasa por un período de tamizaje en donde se cumplió con el gran objetivo de la conquista; que desaparezca de una vez por todas los rasgos culturales de la cosmología andina, que el runa y la huarmi tengan vergüenza de sus ancestros, sus etnias y culturas; de este modo, terminaron con su vestimenta, culto, creencias, mitos, leyendas y tradiciones (Derecho Consuetudinario). Conscientes estamos que toda la memoria ancestral se resume en el Derecho Consuetudinario de los pueblos originarios del Ecuador, pero no se puede desarrollar, preservar y socializar sino existe un proceso de enseñanza básica para que sea transmitida de generación en generación, caso contrario, toda esa riqueza cultural quedaría en el olvido. Razón por la cual los maestros cumplen un papel importante en el proceso de enseñanza aprendizaje, ya que son los responsables del conocimiento histórico real del antes y el después de las comunidades y pueblos del Ecuador. Para que un docente pueda transmitir los conocimientos ancestrales inéditos a las futuras generaciones, debe dominar la norma y la sociología jurídica ya que nos da la sabiduría y todas las herramientas para hacerlo con eficiencia, efectividad, y eficacia de todos los conocimientos ancestrales en prácticas diarias; es así como, en la vida republicana, hasta la década de los 90 los educadores no podían realizar prácticas educativas reales en forma clara, transparente y cierta, porque los contenidos científicos se basaban sólo en conocimientos extranjeros o currículos de otros países y en el mejor de los casos al catecismo. Es la Sociología Jurídica, la filosofía y el Derecho Consuetudinario especialmente la danza el teatro y los juegos populares las únicas actividades que de una u otra manera utilizan legalmente los educadores para realizar el proceso de enseñanza aprendizaje con saberes ancestrales plasmados en mensajes a través de corografías, obras teatrales y juegos lúdicos o populares. Tanto en el Ecuador como en el resto de América Latina, existe un nuevo escenario político en la cual la: multi-pluri-inter-culturalidad está ganando espacio y legitimidad. Esta nueva coyuntura incluye el reconocimiento por parte de los estados sobre la diversidad étnica y cultural, así también la necesidad de reconocer derechos específicos, colectivos y de la naturaleza, lo que algunos autores llaman el nuevo "constitucionalismo multicultural", que está enfocado en una nueva forma de solución de conflictos, ya sea por la conciliación, mediación, arbitraje, pero principalmente la justicia indígena (Van, 2000) y su relación con la ciudadanía "étnica" "cultural". (Montoya, 2002). Ratifican la aplicación de los Métodos Alternativos y Solución de Conflictos (MASC) mismos que están amparados por la Constitución ecuatoriana en su Artículo 190. Como bien sabemos, a diferencia de otros países de la región, en el Ecuador este reconocimiento oficial es de mayor jerarquía; reflejo y resultado de luchas y demandas del movimiento indígena, de sus procesos de fortalecimiento identitario como actores sociales, políticos y culturales y de su cuestionamiento de los modelos existentes de ciudadanía, democracia, estado y nación liderados por los movimientos indígenas en sus diversas organizaciones de la costa, sierra y oriente. Las demandas de reconocimiento cultural de los pueblos indígenas y pueblos originarios del Ecuador, han puesto en duda la vigencia de un sistema jurídico mono cultural, aun teniendo en cuenta el escenario del multiculturalismo constitucional que recorrió las reformas constitucionales latinoamericanas desde la aprobación del Convenio No. 169 por parte de la Organización Internacional de Trabajo en 1989. En el Ecuador este proceso es primordial y de sumo interés, razón por la cual con la aprobación del referéndum de la nueva Constitución en el 2008, en la que se define como Estado Plurinacional de Derechos, reconociendo la coexistencia de una diversidad de sistemas jurídicos. Los países de la región, como Bolivia y Venezuela, entre otros, han transitado procesos similares, cuestionando la permanencia del denominado monismo jurídico quien plantea que las crisis son una precondición para el surgimiento de nuevas teorías y referentes para la solución de conflictos. El reconocimiento por parte del Estado de los sistemas jurídicos, no implica que las autoridades de los pueblos y nacionalidades indígenas tengan el objetivo de crear algo nuevo, sino el reconocimiento de una realidad histórica de ejercicio de derechos consuetudinarios, que en el marco de la construcción colonial de la dominación estatal fueron invisibilizados, negados y perseguidos, como prácticas al margen de la ley. El pluralismo jurídico no es una "alternativa" del derecho, sino un proceso de construcción de otras formas jurídicas que identifiquen al derecho con los sectores mayoritarios de la sociedad, y de respuestas institucionales a procesos de transición de una sociedad marcada por la colonialidad hacia una construcción social y estatal de carácter intercultural y plurinacional, en donde se compila todas las costumbres, tradiciones, leyendas y mitos ancestrales. Tal como lo plantea (Coutinho, 1990), "un pluralismo de sujetos colectivos fundado en un nuevo desafío: construir una nueva hegemonía que contemple el equilibrio entre el predominio de la voluntad general, sin negar el pluralismo de los intereses particulares". En los últimos cuatro años de vigencia de la nueva carta magna del Ecuador, la coexistencia de la justicia ordinaria y la justicia indígena no ha estado exenta de conflictos respecto de los alcances de la jurisdicción de la administración y justicia indígena, de la adaptación de procesos a los derechos humanos, de los mecanismos de coordinación entre autoridades estatales y autoridades indígenas, entre otros. En ciertos casos se alcanzan situaciones en las que las autoridades comunitarias fueran sometidas a la justicia ordinaria por exceder su jurisdicción (Ref. Caso La Cocha), así como fuertes reclamos por parte de las autoridades comunitarias respecto de la intervención no solicitada de operadores de justicia al margen de sus derechos colectivos. Razón por la cual sociólogos, filósofos e investigadores para dar jerarquía a toda la memoria, filosofía ancestral y la cosmovisión andina, enfocan como Derecho Consuetudinario para llegar al cumplimiento de la armonía comunitaria. ; Ecuador, as an intercultural and multinational country in its social memory, collects all customs, myths, legends and traditions that become the country's means for development in all areas, as compiled in the customary law of the indigenous peoples of Ecuador that nowadays, thanks to the citizen's revolution we can socialize and apply, these should executed as an imperative because that is their way of life, which I can surely say, is the foundation to achieve the Smac Kausay. In this paper we explain in brief the history of our people, whom to reach the republican status and colonization have undergone a process of expansionism and Inca- Spanish domination, thereafter entering the capitulation by the big companies conquests, technically organized in Central America to expand into South America and enter the process of formation of the Amerindian going from Inca to Indian and peasant, has suffered discrimination in every way; thus hiding all ancient wisdom since it was listed as pagan activities against God and the Bible that were brought from the old continent. In this process the Amerindian goes through a period of screening where he meets the great object of conquest, disappearing once and for all the cultural traits of the Andean cosmology, the run and huarmi are ashamed of their ancestors, their ethnicities and cultures; in this way the screening process finished with their costume, religion, beliefs, myths, legends and traditions. It is known that all the ancestral memory is summed up in the customary law of the indigenous peoples of Ecuador, however, it is not possible for it to develop, preserve and socialize, unless through a process of basic education to be transmitted from generation to generation; otherwise, all this cultural richness would be forgotten. This is why teachers play an important role in the teaching-learning process since they are responsible for the actual historical knowledge before and after the communities and people of Ecuador. For a teacher to transmit to future generations unpublished ancestral knowledge, you must 22 master the art, as only art gives us the wisdom and all the tools to do it with efficiency, effectiveness, and expertise of all ancient knowledge in daily practices; the reason being is that during the republican period until the 90s, educators could not make real educational practices in clear, transparent and authentic ways, because scientific contents are based only on foreign expertise or curricula of other countries. Performing arts are especially theater and dance popular games the only activities that one way or another legally used educators for the teaching-learning process with ancestral knowledge embodied in messages through choreographies, plays and recreational or popular games. Both in Ecuador and in the rest of Latin America, there is a new political scenario in which the multi- -inter-culture is gaining ground and legitimacy. This new bias includes the States recognition over ethnic and cultural diversity, and also the need to recognize personal and common rights, as well as those of nature, for which some authors call the new "multicultural constitutionalism." Van Cott (2000) and its relation to the cultural ethnicity. Montoya (2002). In relation to what is the Alternative Dispute Resolution mean (ADR) which are covered by the Constitution in Article 190. As we know, unlike other countries in the region, in Ecuador this official recognition is of major prominence; reflection and result of struggles and demands of the indigenous movement in the processes of strengthening identity and social, political and cultural actors and their questioning of existing models of citizenship; democracy, state and nation led by indigenous movements in their various organizations through the coast, mountains and east. The demand for cultural recognition of indigenous peoples and indigenous people of Ecuador have questioned the validity of a mono cultural legal system, even taking into account the stage of the constitutional multiculturalism that swept Latin American constitutional reforms since the adoption of Convention No. 169 by the International Labor Organization in 1989. In Ecuador this process is essential and of great interest, thus with the approval of the referendum on the new Constitution in 2008, which is defined as multinational State of Rights, recognizing the coexistence of a variety of legal systems in it. The countries of the region such as Bolivia, Venezuela and others, have passed similar processes, questioning the permanence of the so-called legal monism who argues that crises are a precondition for the emergence of new theories and relating to conflict resolution. The recognition by the State of legal systems does not imply that the authorities of the indigenous people and nationalities have the goal of creating something new, but the recognition of a historical reality exercise of customary rights, which under the colonial domination were invisible, denied and persecuted, and practices outside the law. We do not consider the legal pluralism as an "alternative" use of law but as a process of construction of other legal forms identifying the law with the majority sectors of society and institutional responses to processes of transition from a society marked by colonialism moving towards a social state characterized as intercultural and multinational where all the customs, traditions, legends and ancient myths are compiled. As stated by Coutinho (1990), "a pluralism of collective subjects based on a new challenge: to build a new hegemony that considers the balance between the dominance of the general will, without denying the pluralism of individual interests". In the last 4 years of validity of the new Constitution of Ecuador, the coexistence of ordinary justice and indigenous justice, has not been free of conflict over the scope of the jurisdiction of the administration and indigenous justice, the adaptation of cases to human rights, the mechanisms of coordination between state authorities and indigenous leaders, among others. Reaching in some cases, situations where the Community authorities were subjected to regular courts to "exceed" its jurisdiction (Ref. Case La Cocha) and strong complaints from the Community authorities regarding the unsolicited intervention of justice operators regardless of their collective rights. 24 In this research all cultural features of the main communities and indigenous nationalities of the three regions of Ecuador are also being analyzed, which have gone unnoticed in the social context and in the best case, taken as isolated activities, put in practice or socialized in the main festivities of the people. This is the reason for us as educators for basic education, to give all the memory hierarchy, ancient philosophy and the Andean world we take it as customary law to take into action with the community may it be as a voluntary act or coercively. Part of the study of this paper is also to extent the responsibility to the State-Government, to maintain all the values and principles of the ancestral memory and cultural heritage of the indigenous people of Ecuador in an intact and unchanged way, to transmit to future generations; goal which you can achieve only with the education and training of teachers in different areas, but mainly in performing arts ; as well, on how to handle: customs, traditions, ethnic and folk legends, which is part of the standard of living of the indigenous people and peasants, and serves as a relevant issue to the development of basic education curriculum. This research with proposed development schedule was fulfilling the objectives, analyzing the extent to which cultures of indigenous people of Ecuador are present in the teaching of basic education, teacher training, and the level of positioning in the absence the arts, the presence of popular traditions in the curriculum and teacher preparation for teaching and its impact on society, and only then get to know the cultures of indigenous people of Ecuador in basic education. A study on the contribution of arts and popular traditions in the curriculum of basic education to achieve the implementation of the common system of legal pluralism with coarse principles based on Andean philosophy. The methodology, as an instrument for the operationalization of variables and objectives of the research is based on the paradigm of functionalism and constructivism, with field research (indigenous community leaders, members of councils, cultural promoters, educational authorities, elders of the different communities , basic education teachers) as descriptive, bibliographic and documentary scientific contributions in the areas of study, collecting data with the technique of the survey, interview and observation, and tools such as questionnaire. Interview guide and observation sheets, which allowed establishing the relationships between variables and approving the alternative hypothesis. Thus affirm that in our country, knowledge of the cultures of the indigenous people of Ecuador have not been involved, but rather have been marginalized and forgotten, where only basic education devoted to teaching general knowledge and specified in the area of mathematics and language, which is why there is a lack of 80% of the current population, and especially of teachers, both Ecuadorian reality as ethnicities and cultures of our ancestors.
Almost two years since his election, as Obama's popularity continues to sink, many are left wondering what went wrong with his presidency. But before that question can be answered, a more careful consideration of the situation he inherited seems in order: two unwinnable wars, the Guantánamo legal limbo, a badly damaged international reputation and an economic crisis of a magnitude not seen since the Great Depression, during which close to ten million jobs were lost. That was the state of the country when he came to power in 2008. In two years Obama has not solved any of these problems completely, but has made headway in many of them. In the context of a slow and jobless economic recovery, and faced with a vociferous opposition which has turned down every chance at bipartisan cooperation, the question should perhaps then be how Obama's level of support among the population remains this high (43%).The President still has the backing of Democratic voters, but has lost the support of Independents. Even those who would never consider abandoning him are suffering from an "enthusiasm gap" that may affect their turnout in the November 2 mid-term elections. With unemployment still hovering around 9.5% and with little prospect of change in the near future, the disillusionment of the electorate is understandable (43% support Obama today, compared with 60% in early 2009). But it is worth pondering how much of this discontent against the party in power is derived from the failure of policy and how much from the divisive political game played by the opposition.In all fairness to Obama, shrill accusations of socialism and big government were raised against him as soon as he came to power and had to immediately address the banking, mortgage and automobile meltdowns. Acerbic Republican opposition to any measure adopted by the Executive since then, has dominated the political discourse and made it almost impossible for the Administration to present evidence that, without its actions, the economic recovery would have taken even longer. It is hard to prove a negative proposition. Republicans have had a receptive audience in the low, mostly white middle class, many of who have taken to the streets under the Tea Party banner, to fight in one voice both against government "take over" of health care and (incongruously) in defense of Medicare (the government-sponsored health program for senior citizens).There is rich irony in hearing the word "socialist" hurled as the ultimate insult to a President who has bailed out the big financial institutions and the two largest automobile industries without nationalizing them, and who has signed a health care reform bill that does not include the controversial public option, which had been the centerpiece of his planned reform but was deemed too liberal by members of his own party. But reason and logic have no role to play in the polarized political atmosphere that we are experiencing today. Emotion and fear are much more productive in the views of the opposition, to help them re-take the House and perhaps even the Senate in this fall election.Timid Democrats in the House and Senate, afraid to lose their newly acquired seats in states and districts that voted for McCain in the 2008 presidential election are also abandoning the president. A posse of four or five of Senate "Blue Dog" Democrats has helped dilute the health care legislation by removing the public option from the bill, and have taken off the table legislation to curb carbon emissions and promote green energy sources. There are different hypotheses of why Obama has been unable to maintain high support rates in spite of having had important legislative victories (TARP, Stimulus spending package, extension of unemployment benefits, health care and financial reform). Former (Clinton's) Labor Secretary Robert Reich and NY Times columnist and Nobel Prize winner Paul Krugman argue that Obama's stimulus was ridiculously small, given the state of the economy in January 2009. They blame the President for not using the majorities in the House and Senate to pass bolder legislation. By compromising, Obama disappointed the liberal wing of his party, but more importantly, lost the Independents at the center, who simultaneously believed the Republican rhetoric about "Big government Socialist take over" but resented Obama's bailout of Wall Street. Contrary to the fear-mongering claims of the deficit hawks about the debt, Krugman points out that "far from fleeing US debt, investors are eagerly buying it, driving interest rates to historic lows". Reich insists that Obama missed an opportunity to push the limits of politics, establish a new framework of redistributive policies and regulations, and become a transformative president. Although this view undoubtedly has some merit, it ignores the brutal backlash against government spending that affected every Democrat in the House and Senate and made them fear for their jobs. A larger stimulus would have faced even stronger opposition from among the party's own ranks and seen some defectors. Obama is a pragmatic leader who governs as best he can, given the huge constraints of the current political context.Jay Cost from Real Politics offers a different explanation: Obama's geographic coalition was never broad enough because he failed to win the hearts and minds of middle and rural America. It is from those sectors that Independents have abandoned support for the administration in droves. In other words, Obama's major constituencies were in the major cities on the two seaboards and from the suburbs, and included Blacks, youth and university educated white professionals. Even in those cases in which they voted for Obama, white rural America, and blue collar workers never were quite convinced that he would fight for them, and the Wall Street bailout confirmed their suspicion. Underlying it all, there is, of course, the prevalent racism that permeates most sectors of American society and emerges in the form of distrust toward the Commander in Chief: Obama has to prove his loyalty to the country in ways not demanded from others. He has to pay the price of being the first Black president.A third hypothesis that is circulating among pundits is that Obama's focus on health care was misplaced, that he should have concentrated all his attention on economic recovery and job creation instead. Indeed, it was during the 2009 summer of discontent that the electorate became irreconcilably divided and that Republican-launched corrosive ads dominated the airwaves, and rumors about death panels and "pulling the plug on grandma" pervaded City Hall meetings. A general distrust of the federal government and of all incumbents inside the DC belt, while nothing new among the American electorate, re-emerged with new virulence.It is in this context that the Tea Party movement cut its teeth and started dominating the headlines. Spurred by the GOP with the intention of mobilizing the population around anti-tax, anti-federal government sentiments, the Tea-partiers launched national campaigns against all incumbents, and in the process became a voice for the profound anger, fear and frustration that the poor state of the economy and the sustained unemployment rate has caused in the population. Pleased at the frenzy stirred up by the movement, Republicans have complacently let it lead the way, exercising no restraint on their wildest propositions (see below) and allowing it to do the work for them as the voice of the opposition. This is already having unwanted consequences, as extremist Tea-party –fielded candidates from outside party ranks are challenging party insiders in gubernatorial as well as Congressional primary races.Like the eponymous rebellion that took place in Boston in 1773, the Tea Party's main philosophical thrust is against taxes, centralization of power and government overreach. Unlike it, it is also anti-immigrant. Because of the prevalent uncertainty about the economy, their discourse resonates with the electorate. To fight the federal government initiatives, they are finding their best institutional allies in the State governments, courts and legislatures. Indeed, judging by the poisonous political environment, the polarization of the electorate, and the state-based challenges to the federal government, at times it seems that only a Lincolnian figure can save America from another civil war.The so- called "States Revolution" is visible in many fronts. Five states have passed legislation against parts of the federal health reform law, and around 20 states are challenging its constitutionality through the court system. Several states legislatures are getting ready to pass laws modeled after the anti-immigration law in Arizona, which was deemed unconstitutional by a district court but has broad support in the population. It will probably end up in the Supreme Court, as challenges and counter-challenges continue. Interestingly, Obama is in fact deporting more undocumented workers than any of his predecessors, but his reform proposal would give a pathway to citizenship to these workers if they have a job, register with the US government, and pay a fine and back taxes. Immigration has been a thorny issue, with allies and foes on both sides of the aisle. After all, it was Ronald Reagan who gave amnesty to all illegal immigrants in 1986, and George Bush's proposal in 2006 was very similar to Obama's. This is hardly a philosophical issue on which the two parties diverge; it is just a populist cause that is being used by Republicans to stoke the flames of right-wing populism and racism prevalent in main sectors of the population.The backlash against undocumented workers is of such magnitude that it has come to encompass all immigrants. It has now taken the unlikely form of a movement to abolish or amend the 14th Amendment, a foundational provision dating from 1868 which grants citizenship to all born in the United States. The changing of the birth right rule is "worth considering" according to House Minority leader John Boehner (R-Ohio) because "it gives an incentive for people to come to the United States illegally to give birth here." This is outrageous pandering by the Republican Party who has always fathomed itself to be the staunchest defender of the Constitution, which they consider a sacred text to be read literally, with minimal interpretation. Such is the spirit of the times. Republican Senators Lindsay Graham and John McCain, the two most important and moderate voices on Immigration Reform have changed their positions (Mc Cain because he is facing a tough primary in his state of Arizona, against, who other, but a Tea Party candidate!) and have both agreed that it is worth a debate. This is not only unprincipled on their part, but also terrible long-term politics, since by taking this stance on immigration they are removing the possibility of regaining the support of the largest growing group of voters, namely the Hispanic or Latino population for years to come.Given the strong anti-incumbent and anti-Washington sentiment prevalent in the population, the results of the mid-term election are hard to predict because some Republicans may lose seats, too. However, the current projections of the Center for Politics at the University of Virginia give the Republicans a net win of 32 seats in the House, 7 seats in the Senate (they would need 10 to become the majority) and 6-7 governor seats. The coming mid-term election is being compared to the 1994 "revolution" led by Newt Gingrich which gave Republicans a majority in both the House and Senate. Just like Obama, Clinton was an "outsider" who was handed the presidency partly thanks to his charisma, but mainly because people were disappointed at George Bush Senior, and did not re-elect him. Clinton made health care reform the centerpiece of his first term but failed to get it through Congress. He did manage to pass a controversial crime bill that included a ban on assault weapons, which the Right traditionally opposes. He also raised taxes. Republicans attacked him with an abrasive campaign in favor of lower taxes, second amendment rights and smaller government, and won. Two years later, however, with a brighter economic outlook and a pledge to balance the budget, Clinton was re-elected.But the parallel should not be exaggerated since there are many differences as well. First, Obama did pass health care reform, and that should count have some weight among his supporters, hopefully enough weight to bring them to the polls November 2. Second, the Republican Party's image was not as tarnished in 1994 as it is today, mainly because they hadn't had a majority in Congress for a long time. A New York Times/CBS News poll this past February found that 57% of those polled has negative views of the Republicans this time. The anger is aimed at Washington as a whole and this may help Democrats. The main concern of Democrats in the House and Senate today is the demographics of mid-term elections: older (over 60) white voters, who are the core group of the Tea Party movement and the most outspoken against Obama and this Congress, are also the most likely to vote in mid-term elections. And the "enthusiasm gap" on the Left may induce many Obama supporters to stay home. On the other hand, the Democratic Party learned the lesson of 1994 and is better prepared for the fight: they have been raising money from early on, setting up voters' registration campaigns and trying to mobilize the same base that brought Obama to power two years ago. They stress his activist legislative agenda and its accomplishments: financial reform, health care, extension of unemployment benefits, an energy bill that came short of cap and trade but will meet some green energy goals. More importantly, they are framing the election as a choice between going back to the policies that got the country into the Great Recession, or moving forward with the new policies of corporate responsibility, accountability and more federal supervision of financial institutions in order to avoid similar crises.However, what is clear is that the anemic state of the economy and the high and sustained unemployment rate make all other tactics irrelevant. Uncertainty rules supreme in the minds of the electorate and with it, a fear of what the future may bring and a lack of confidence in the federal government. The Republican opposition is united and vociferous and its message simple and clear: no more taxes, no more deficits, no more government intervention, close borders to immigrants and focus on private job creation through tax cuts; what the federal government won't do, states will. The President should probably counterattack in kind and engage in this ideological battle, but he is not temperamentally suited for it. He dislikes ideological arguments because he wants to be the President of all Americans, as he pledged during his campaign. The next big decision Obama needs to make is whether to let the Bush tax cuts expire after Labor Day or to extend them for two or three years. He has announced his intention to maintain them for the middle class but to end them for the wealthiest individuals, those in the highest 2% income bracket. It would bring their income tax up from 35% to 39%, not a dramatic raise but one that will be resisted strongly by the opposition. Although Obama has a good argument to make (that the $700 billion dollars thus raised would help him reduce the deficit dramatically), there is fear in Congress Democrats that a two- week debate about tax cuts will help Republicans. In a perversely cynical way, perhaps a Republican win in the congressional elections may not be a bad thing after all, and may yet help Obama: let the Republicans make his case for him, that he himself is reluctant to make. Let them stand the public scrutiny and let the public judge if they can provide better, more novel solutions to job creation, to Afghanistan, to immigration reform. A weak performance by a Republican-dominated 112th Congress, an economy that is bound to recover as it enters its next cycle, and a Palin-Huckabee ticket may still get Obama re-elected in 2012.Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia
Why did Wilsonian ideals influence AEF actions in the First World War, and how did that affect the United States' involvement in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation? Wilsonian ideals influenced the AEF's actions in the First World War because most American leaders and soldiers shared Wilson's concepts of Progressivism and believed that the United States should play a role in saving Europe. Even if some did not agree with Wilson's politics, most doughboys shared his ideas of American Exceptionalism, and these views affected United States involvement in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation. In merging the two topic areas of Wilson's ideologies and AEF involvement in the war, this essay will attempt to answer how the American doughboy found motivation in the same principles that guided President Wilson. ; Master of Arts in Military History ; Week 11 Final Paper Wilsonianism in the First World War: Progressivism, American Exceptionalism, and the AEF Doughboy Brian P. Bailes A paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts in Military History Norwich University MH 562B Dr. John Broom August 16, 2020 Bailes 2 While the duration of American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) involvement in First World War combat operations remained short compared to the armies of the European powers, the experience had a lasting impact on the United States' status as a global power. President Woodrow Wilson's mediation in the European affair throughout American neutrality, his integration of the AEF into Allied operations, and his contribution to the post-war peace process cast him as a central figure of the conflict as well as a harbinger of United States interventionist foreign policy. Through the more than a century since the end of the war, historians have analyzed and debated various facets of United States belligerency. Historians have explored President Wilson's ideologies and the decision making that ultimately led to him making his April 1917 appeal to Congress for American belligerency. Additionally, historians have expanded on AEF actions in Europe and argued how General Pershing's adamancy on maintaining an independent American command created tension with the Allied leaders. Historians have not connected these two topics to analyze how a reader can conceptually link Wilson's ideas and doughboy exploits in Europe. Why did Wilsonian ideals influence AEF actions in the First World War, and how did that affect the United States' involvement in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation? Throughout the historiography of United States involvement in the First World War, specific themes reoccur as significant areas of consensus. The historiography presents two primary arguments in which historians agree. Historians agree that Wilson's peace objectives drastically differed from those of the Allies, and historians agree that these differences motivated Wilson's decisions regarding how the United States would enter the war. Historians also agree that friction existed between General Pershing and the Allied Commanders once the AEF arrived in Europe and began combat operations. These two commonalities in the historiography remain Bailes 3 relatively constant throughout the past 50 years of historical research, and even when portraying more positive sentiments expressed between AEF and Allied soldiers, historians still note some tension between Pershing and the Allied commanders. Historians agree that Wilson's peace objectives differed significantly from those of the Allies. David Woodford argues that the gap between British imperial interests and Wilson's peace objectives affected the alliance between the United States and England throughout the war.1 William Widenor argues that Wilson failed in achieving his goals during the Versailles Peace Settlement because he attempted to make too many concessions for enduring peace, and he claims that Wilson grew at odds with the Allied leaders at the peace conference.2 George Egerton argues that British policymakers were closely monitoring the dispute within the United States Senate during the Treaty of Versailles conference, and he suggests that British leadership remained skeptical of Wilson's League of Nations.3 Historians capture Wilson's opposing peace aims throughout the European conflict, and they seemingly agree on how these aims influenced Wilson's policies and actions. Some historians cite the most significant gap in peace aims as existing between the United States and France. David Stevenson argues that French leaders were continually at odds with Wilson throughout the war as the French war aims focused much more on their national security, which they saw as requiring the destruction of Imperial Germany.4 Stevenson points out that while Wilson's peace aims differed from England as well as France, many French objectives 1 David R. Woodward, Trial by Friendship: Anglo-American Relations, 1917-1918 (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1993), 7-25, 35-43, 77-80, 125-9, 208-20. 2 William C. Widenor, "The United States and the Versailles Peace Settlement," Modern American Diplomacy, eds. John M. Carroll and George C. Herring (Lanham: SR Books, 1996), 46-59. 3 George W. Egerton, "Britain and the 'Great Betrayal': Anglo-American Relations and the Struggle for United States Ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, 1919-1920," The Historical Journal 21, no. 4 (December 1978): 885-911, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2638973. 4 David Stevenson, "French War Aims and the American Challenge, 1914-1918," The Historical Journal 22, no. 4 (December 1979): 877-894, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2638691. Bailes 4 were more aggressive against Germany as they involved reclaiming land lost to Germany in previous wars, specifically the 1870 Franco-Prussian War.5 Stevenson highlights the fact that Wilson could not get French officials to see the "two Germanys" concept that prevailed in American thinking at the time. While the American public generally saw two Germanys – the autocratic ruling party dominated by the Prussian elite and the German people living under that oppressive regime – Stevenson argues that France only saw Imperial Germany as a total enemy.6 Robert Bruce explains that during the post-war occupation period, the American doughboys perceived Frenchmen as distrustful and hateful toward German soldiers, and this sullied the alliance between France and the United States.7 In line with Wilson's ideology, historians cite Wilson's desire for Europe to achieve a "peace without victory" as he attempted to serve as a mediator during the United States period of neutrality. These historians ultimately conclude that Wilson believed any of the European powers achieving their aims through victory would lead to a continuation of balance of power politics in Europe. They argue that Wilson thought merely putting an end to the fighting would be the only way to achieve lasting peace. Ross Gregory argues that Wilson acted as a persistent mediator throughout the war as he strove for a "peace without victory."8 Arthur Link explains that Wilson believed a "peace without victory" and a "draw in Europe" proved the best solution for establishing a new system to replace the broken power structure in Europe.9 Ross Kennedy portrays Wilson as advocating the United States as a neutral mediator striving for a "peace 5 Stevenson, 884, 892-4. 6 Stevenson, 885. 7 Robert B. Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms: America & France in the Great War (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 2003), 286-95. 8 Ross Gregory, The Origins of American Intervention in the First World War (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1971), 115-6. 9 Arthur Link, "Entry into World War I," Progress, War, and Reaction: 1900-1933, eds. Davis R.B. Ross, Alden T. Vaughan, and John B. Duff (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, Inc., 1970), 141. Bailes 5 without victory" before the U.S. entered the war, then as an advocate of "just peace" after they entered the war.10 Kennedy argues that Wilson blamed the international system that led to power politics and wanted to have a separate voice in the peace process to shape a new diplomatic and global political order.11 Historians point to Wilson's ideology as a reason for his differing peace objectives, and historians point to Wilson's Christian faith as a significant motivation for his progressive philosophy. Lloyd Ambrosius highlights Wilson's four tenets of national self-determination, open-door economic globalization, collective security, and progressive history as the framework in which he envisioned a global order shaped by American democratic ideals that would bring the world to peace.12 Ambrosius examines Wilson's embrace of "American Exceptionalism" and looks at how his Anglo-American bias clouded his vision and prevented him from seeing the various cultural factors throughout the world.13 Ronald Pestritto examines Wilson's progressive form of history while arguing that Wilson saw democracy emerging within society as a phenomenon only natural to specific groups of people, and he only saw a few civilizations as "progressed."14 Pestritto notes Wilson's Christian inspiration, referencing early manuscripts written by Wilson titled "Christ's Army" and "Christian Progress."15 William Appleman Williams argues that Wilson maintained a Calvinist idealism that intensified the existing doctrine 10 Ross A. Kennedy, "Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and American National Security," Diplomatic History 25, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 15, 29, https://doi.org/10.1111/0145-2096.00247. 11 Kennedy, "Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and American National Security," 2-3. 12 Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy in American Foreign Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 2-47. 13 Ambrosius, Wilsonianism, 125-34; Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 33-49; Lloyd E. Ambrosius, "World War I and the Paradox of Wilsonianism," The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era 17 (2018): 5-22, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537781417000548. 14 Ronald J. Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), 6-61. 15 Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism, 23, 40. Bailes 6 based on God's supposed ordination of American influence and expansion in the world.16 Richard Gamble explains that Wilson's vision and rhetoric nested with many of the Christian messages of progressive religious leaders in the United States during the First World War who saw the war as a Christian crusade to spread American ideals.17 Historians seem in unanimous agreement that Wilson's separate peace aims formed the primary impetus for him seeking an independent American presence in the war effort. David Esposito argues that Wilson wanted to have an American presence in the war because he realized that to establish a dominant American voice in the post-war peace talks, the United States needed to make a significant contribution to Allied victory.18 Edward Coffman details the United States' experiences in the First World War by explaining Wilson's desire to gain an independent voice in the peace process.19 David Trask maintains that Wilson wanted to "remain somewhat detached from the Allies" in defeating Imperial Germany to provide Wilson leverage so that he could directly influence the post-war peace process.20 Arthur Link explains that Wilson did see the benefit of not joining the Entente but keeping the United States independent of "any political commitments" with the Allies as providing a chance to ensure an American presence at the peace conference.21 Thomas Knock argues that Wilson faulted the "balance of power" politics of Europe and saw the United States as the actor to save Europe and create a new system of 16 William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1959; New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009), 67-112. Page references are to the 2009 edition. 17 Richard M. Gamble, The War for Righteousness: Progressive Christianity, the Great War, and the Rise of the Messianic Nation (Wilmington: ISI Books, 2003), 22-3, 86-208, 254-5. 18 David M. Esposito, "Woodrow Wilson and the Origins of the AEF," Presidential Studies Quarterly 19 no. 1 (Winter 1989): 127-38, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40574570. 19 Edward M. Coffman, The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1968), 5-8. 20 David F. Trask, The AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 1917-1918 (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1993), 2-6. 21 Link, "Entry into World War I," 141. Bailes 7 diplomacy.22 Overall, historians agree that President Wilson desired very different peace outcomes for a post-war Europe, and this influenced him as he made decisions regarding United States actions throughout the war. In addition to the agreement that Wilson's peace aims differed from the Allies, historians also agree that once the United States did enter the war and the AEF arrived in Europe, friction quickly developed between General Pershing and the Allied commanders. David Trask argues many instances of "increasing friction" existed between Pershing and the French and British command. Trask includes a case where the Allies "attempted to bypass Pershing" by working directly with Wilson even though Wilson had appointed Pershing as Commander in Chief of the AEF.23 Trask argues that Pershing believed that the preceding few years of trench warfare had "deprived the French and even the British of offensive spirit," and he maintains that with Pershing's "open warfare" tactics, his methods of training drastically differed from the Allies.24 Michael Adas cites disagreement between Pershing and the Allied commanders immediately after Pershing arrived in France due to Pershing's unwillingness to listen to the experienced French and British leaders as they tried to suggest ways to employ the AEF.25 Adas argues that Pershing's desire to pursue "open warfare" did not take into account the realities of trench warfare and resulted in costly casualties.26 Russell Weigley cites frequent tensions between Pershing and the Allied commanders, including an example in September of 1918 in which AEF 22 Thomas J. Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest For a New World Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), 30-69. 23 Trask, AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 38-9. 24 Trask, AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 19. 25 Michael Adas, "Ambivalent Ally: American Military Intervention and the Endgame and Legacy of World War I," Diplomatic History 38 no. 4 (September 2014): 705-7, http://doi.org/10.1093/dh.dhu032. 26 Adas, "Ambivalent Ally," 710. Bailes 8 "traffic congestion" caused a significant disturbance in a visit from Georges Clemenceau.27 Weigley explains that Pershing's belief in "open warfare" would not work due to the enormous American divisions built for the trenches, arguing that Pershing would need "smaller, maneuverable divisions" if he wanted his open warfare to work.28 All historians agree that the issue of AEF amalgamation with the French and British forces served as the primary reason for the friction between the military leaders. David Woodford cites the notion that AEF amalgamation would "undermin[e] the significance of the American military role." Hence, Pershing remained adamant in his stance not to let the Allies use American soldiers to fight under French or British flags.29 Woodward notes that Pershing felt his AEF superior to the Allies as he "believed that the Americans had almost nothing to learn from French and British officers."30 Woodford explains that war aims and peace objectives formed the basis of a fractured Anglo-American relationship that finally crumbled during the peace conference.31 Mitchell Yockelson argues that despite tension between Pershing and the Allied leaders regarding the question of amalgamation, the 27th and 30th Divisions contributed significantly to the Allied effort under British command. Yockelson highlights a fascinating illustration of Pershing's stubbornness in noting that Pershing did not follow the exploits of these divisions even though they proved instrumental in the offensive against the Hindenburg Line.32 As an enduring theme throughout the amalgamation debate, historians point to Pershing's desire for the United States to deliver the decisive blow against Germany with an independent 27 Russell F. Weigley, "Strategy and Total War in the United States: Pershing and the American Military Tradition," Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914-1918, eds. Roger Chickering and Stig Förster (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 333. 28 Weigley, "Pershing and the American Military Tradition," 341-2. 29 Woodward, Trial by Friendship, 57-8. 30 Woodward, 88. 31 Woodward, 7-80, 112-220. 32 Mitchell A. Yockelson, Borrowed Soldiers: Americans Under British Command, 1918 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008), 92-228. Bailes 9 American army. Allan Millett argues that Wilson gave Pershing the explicit directive to keep the AEF separate from the Allies and allowed Pershing the freedom to make decisions on how to integrate the AEF.33 Millett cites Pershing's initial plan to use an AEF offensive on Metz as the critical blow that would decide the war and establish an American contribution to defeating Imperial Germany. Pershing would not have his AEF ready to carry out this offensive until 1919, and his stubbornness in dealing with the requests for amalgamation in the interim "frustrated the Allies."34 Bullitt Lowry narrates Pershing's attempt to shape the post-war peace terms by arguing that Pershing wanted to force Germany into an "unconditional surrender." While Lowry concludes that Pershing's effort to influence the political realm failed, he believed that the only way to "guarantee victory" would be to crush Germany in battle.35 David Woodward argues that Pershing believed that the AEF would decide the war by becoming "the dominant role in the war against Germany."36 Woodward cites Pershing's ideas regarding "the aggressive American rifleman, whose tradition of marksmanship and frontier warfare" could rid the Western Front of trench warfare and execute a great offensive against Germany.37 Historians cite the notion throughout the ranks of the AEF that the United States should remain independent from the Allies, and historians point to the fact that many doughboys saw themselves as superior soldiers to the Allies. Robert H. Zieger argues that "virtually the entire military establishment" agreed with Pershing's desire to have an independent American 33 Allan R. Millett, "Over Where? The AEF and the American Strategy for Victory, 1917-1918," Against All Enemies: Interpretations of American Military History from Colonial Times to the Present, eds. Kenneth J. Hagan and William R. Roberts (Westport: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1986), 237. 34 Millett, "Over Where?," 239. 35 Bullitt Lowry, "Pershing and the Armistice," The Journal of American History 55 no. 2, (September 1968): 281-291, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1899558. 36 Woodward, Trial by Friendship, 81. 37 Woodward, 89, 207. Bailes 10 command.38 Still, Zieger does note that this separate American command relied heavily on the Allies for logistics support, and the AEF "misunderstood the military dynamics of the Western Front."39 Richard Faulkner argues that Pershing's doctrine rested on his belief that the "superior American rifle marksmanship, aggressiveness, and skilled maneuvering" could win the fight for the Allies.40 Faulkner argues that American soldiers saw themselves as intervening in the war effort to help the failing French and British, taunting their British partners by claiming AEF stands for "After England Failed." He devotes a chapter named as such to explain the AEF belief in the superiority of the American fighting man.41 Harold Winton argues that Pershing believed that the United States soldier was superior to his European counterpart.42 Jennifer Keene argues that issues such as the treatment of African-American soldiers and disagreements about which nation contributed the most to the Allied victory created rifts between the two allies.43 In her full text, Keene narrates AEF interactions with their French Allies, and she claims that doughboys saw themselves as superior fighters who could help turn the tide of war.44 Michael Neiberg explains that United States citizens and soldiers came away from the conflict with the belief in the "inherent superiority" of the American system over that of Europe.45 38 Robert H. Zieger, America's Great War: World War I and the American Experience (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), 92-102. 39 Zieger, America's Great War, 96. 40 Faulkner, Pershing's Crusaders: The American Soldier in World War I (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2017), 285. 41 Faulkner, 281-304. 42 Harold Winton, "Toward an American Philosophy of Command," The Journal of Military History 64, no. 4 (October 2000): 1059, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2677266. 43 Jennifer D. Keene, "Uneasy Alliances: French Military Intelligence and the American Army During the First World War," Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 1 (January 2008): 18-36, https://doi.org/10.1080/02684529808432461. 44 Jennifer D. Keene, Doughboys, the Great War, and the Remaking of America (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 105-11. 45 Michael S. Neiberg, The Path to War: How The First World War Created Modern America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 23. Bailes 11 Even when historians convey a more positive relationship between the AEF and their Allied counterparts, they still address the tension between Pershing and Allied leadership. Robert Bruce portrays a much more positive partnership between the doughboy and his French ally. Bruce documents Marshal Joseph Joffre's visit to the United States after Congress declared war against Germany to muster American support for the French. By comparing France's visit to Britain's, Bruce argues that Joffre established the framework for an intimate Franco-American partnership.46 Bruce maintains that the French respected the American soldier and viewed the entry of the AEF into the war as the saving grace of the Allies. Bruce narrates a bond between doughboys and French troops that increased as they trained and fought together.47 Despite this positive portrayal by Bruce of the French and AEF bond, Bruce still highlights the tension in Pershing's interactions with French commanders as well as noting the general perception amongst French commanders that Pershing thought "he knew everything there was to know about modern warfare."48 Bruce adds that different peace aims and post-war sentiments towards Germany created disagreements amongst American and French soldiers that fractured the relationship built during the war.49 Of note, Bruce suggests that the doughboys harbored what they saw as a "perceived lack of aggressiveness in the French."50 After synthesizing the historiography, the question remains regarding how these two arguments can be linked. Why did Wilsonian ideals influence AEF actions in the First World War, and how did that affect the United States' involvement in the nation's first large-scale 46 Robert B. Bruce, "America Embraces France: Marshal Joseph Joffre and the French Mission to the United States, April-May 1917," Journal of Military History 66 no. 2 (April 2002): 407-441, http://doi.org/10.2307/3093066; Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 32-59. 47 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 86-121. 48 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 128, 143. 49 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 286-95. 50 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 122. Bailes 12 coalition operation? Wilsonian ideals influenced the AEF's actions in the First World War because most American leaders and soldiers shared Wilson's concepts of Progressivism and believed that the United States should play a role in saving Europe. Even if some did not agree with Wilson's politics, most doughboys shared his ideas of American Exceptionalism, and these views affected United States involvement in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation. In merging the two topic areas of Wilson's ideologies and AEF involvement in the war, this essay will attempt to answer how the American doughboy found motivation in the same principles that guided President Wilson. Perhaps a reader will identify that the AEF demonstrated trends in Europe that highlight an "American way of war" that still resonates in United States coalition operations today. When President Wilson brought the United States into the First World War in April of 1917, he sold it as an effort to make the world safe for democracy. In Wilson's war address to Congress, Wilson called Imperial Germany's resumption of their unrestricted submarine campaign "warfare against mankind."51 Wilson maintained that Imperial Germany had given the United States no other choice but to declare war when they resumed their submarine attacks on merchant ships in the early spring of 1917. Still, Wilson furthered his justification for war by appealing to the broader ideal of fighting to defeat the Imperial German autocracy. Wilson described the "selfish and autocratic power" against which a free people needed to wage war.52 Later in his address, Wilson stated that he found hope in what he saw as the restoration of power to the people demonstrated in the Russian Revolution. Wilson saw a pre-Lenin revolution as 51 Woodrow Wilson, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress Calling for a Declaration of War" in "President Wilson," Essential Writings and Speeches of the Scholar-President, ed. Mario R. DiNunzio (New York: NYU Press, 2006): 399, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qfgbg.15. 52 Wilson, "Declaration of War," 400. Bailes 13 bringing democracy to the people of Russia, and it opened the door for the realization that the Allies fought because "the world must be made safe for democracy."53 Arthur Link comments on Wilson's initial optimism on hearing of the Russian Revolution overthrowing Czar rule.54 While the Russian Revolution took a different turn in the following years, the initial news of the Russian people revolting against the Czar gave Wilson confidence that democracy could spread in Europe since now the Allies truly represented a democratic system. Wilson had spent the first years of the war trying to mediate peace in Europe through United States neutrality, and he tried to negotiate an end to the fighting without a victory for any of the imperial belligerents. Wilson did not see a lasting peace coming to Europe if any of the imperial powers achieved their peace objectives, so he attempted to mediate a truce. Kendrick Clements narrates how Wilson's desire to keep the United States neutral grew at odds with his economic support for the Allies. War for the United States rose to be more likely as Imperial Germany became increasingly aggravated with the United States for supplying aid to France and Britain while professing neutrality.55 Fraser Harbutt argues that at the initial outbreak of war in Europe, leaders as well as citizens of the United States concerned themselves with the economic impacts of the war primarily, and the United States benefited economically by supporting the Allies, specifically in the steel trade.56 Imperial Germany's resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, as well as the capture of Germany's Zimmerman Telegram in January 1917, soliciting an alliance with Mexico, prompted Wilson to support waging war on Imperial Germany. Now American entry into the conflict presented Wilson with some new options for shaping the post- 53 Wilson, "Declaration of War," 401-2. 54 Link, "Entry into World War I," 122-3. 55 Kendrick A. Clements, "Woodrow Wilson and World War I," Presidential Studies Quarterly 34, no. 1 (March 2004: 62-82, https://www.jstor.org/stable/27552564. 56 Fraser J. Harbutt, "War, Peace, and Commerce: The American Reaction to the Outbreak of World War I in Europe 1914," An Improbable War? The Outbreak of World War I and European Political Culture Before 1914, eds. Holger Afflerbach and David Stevenson (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 320-1. Bailes 14 war world. Thomas Knock describes how even though the United States entry into the war meant the essential failure of Wilson's "Peace Without Victory," the international community had seemingly bought into Wilson's concept of "collective security."57 In the previous few years of American neutrality, Wilson had advocated for creating a collection of democratic nation-states to band together to prevent war, and by 1917 the international community seemed interested. Wilson would use American belligerency to shape his new world order for peace. Russia's withdrawal from the war in March of 1918 made the need for a United States presence all the more significant for the Allies. The American soldier would be a crusader of sorts, attempting to cure Europe of the diplomacy of old that had brought her to destruction. The European July crisis of 1914 that erupted in a full-scale war the following month proved to be the culmination of decades of the European balance of power diplomacy that led to rival alliances and an armament race between the feuding dynasties.58 European power politics had dominated the continent for centuries, which inevitably escalated into a world war, and the United States soldier would have the opportunity to save the nations from which most of their ancestors had descended. Michael Neiberg argues that by 1917, the American people felt an obligation to enter the war to save Europe. While the people of the United States supported neutrality initially, Neiberg explains that public opinion swayed over time toward a desire to save Europe from the terror of Imperial Germany.59 The United States Secretary of War from 1916-1921, Newton Baker, published a text almost two decades after the armistice in which he maintained that the United States went to war to stop Imperial Germany and make the world safe for democracy. Baker took issue with the 57 Knock, To End All Wars, 115. 58 James Joll and Gordon Martel, The Origins of the First World War, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2013), 9-291. 59 Neiberg, The Path to War, 7-8, 31-3, 235. Bailes 15 historians of the 20s and 30s who claimed that economic interest influenced the United States entry into the war, and he argued they ignored the necessity of U.S. involvement to stop Germany. Baker explained that the American public remained overwhelmingly critical of the German autocracy and desired to intervene to save the European people.60 Private Alexander Clay of the AEF's 33rd Division demonstrated this sense of duty as he wrote regarding his 1918 deployment to France. As Clay's ship passed the Statue of Liberty while leaving the New York harbor, he thought to himself of the French leader Lafayette's role in securing United States victory during the American Revolution. He wrote that the AEF went to France to "repay the debt of our gratitude to your country for your country's alliance with our country in obtaining liberty from an oppressor England."61 For the United States to effectively reshape the world, there needed to be an independent American command that would ensure the United States contributed to the victory over Imperial Germany, which would give Wilson his seat at the post-war peace talks. In a January 22, 1917 address to the Senate in which he articulated his vision for peace in Europe, Wilson claimed that the warring European nations could not shape a lasting peace. While Wilson still did not advocate for United States intervention at this point, he did state that to achieve peace "[i]t will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of the permanency of the settlement so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected that no nation, no probable combination of nations could face or withstand it."62 In this speech, Wilson advocated for a "peace without victory" because he did not envision a peaceful 60 Newton D. Baker, Why We Went to War (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1936), 4-10, 20, 160-3. 61 Private Alexander Clay in American Voices of World War I: Primary Source Documents, 1917-1920, ed. Martic Marix Evans (Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 2001; New York: Routledge, 2013), 19, Kindle. 62 Woodrow Wilson, "Essential Terms for Peace in Europe" in "President Wilson," Essential Writings and Speeches of the Scholar-President, 393. Bailes 16 outcome if any of the imperial powers achieved victorious peace terms.63 Wilson reiterated his stance that the United States should play a decisive role in shaping post-war Europe and ensuring that "American principles" guided the rest of the world.64 When the United States declared war against Imperial Germany a few months after this speech, it essentially put Wilson's vision into motion. Diplomatic historian William Widenor argues that Wilson realized that the United States needed to participate in the war "rather than as an onlooker" to achieve his visions for peace.65 Widenor notes Wilson's desire for the United States to enter the war as an "associate" to the Entente as opposed to an "ally," and Widenor maintains that Wilson desired to change the world and "democratize and also, unfortunately, to Americanize it."66 The late international historian Elisabeth Glaser captures the Wilson administration's balancing between maintaining an economic relationship with the Entente powers while attempting to remain "an independent arbiter in the conflict."67 Wilson appointed General Pershing to lead the American effort, and Wilson gave him the simple instruction to keep the American Expeditionary Forces as a command separate from the Allies. In 1928, the Army War College published The Genesis of the American First Army, which documented the details surrounding how the War Department created an independent army of the United States. The text includes a caption from Secretary of War Baker's memorandum to Pershing. Baker informed Pershing of Wilson's order to "cooperate with the forces of the other countries employed against the enemy; but in so doing the underlying idea must be kept in view that the forces of the United States are a separate and distinct component of 63 Wilson, "Essential Terms for Peace in Europe," 394. 64 Wilson, 396-7. 65 William C. Widenor, "The United States and the Versailles Peace Settlement," 42. 66 Widenor, 42-3. 67 Elisabeth Glaser, "Better Late than Never: The American Economic War Effort, 1917-1918," Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914-1918, eds. Roger Chickering and Stig Förster (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 390. Bailes 17 the combined forces, the identity of which must be preserved."68 The President did give Pershing the authority to decide how the AEF would integrate into Allied operations. Upon Pershing's June 13, 1917 arrival in Paris, he began making decisions regarding AEF employment as it pertained to logistics, training, and an initial American area of operations on the Western Front. With a plan of achieving a force of 1,328,448 men in France by the end of 1918, Pershing needed to ensure his troops were able to build combat power and prepare for war while simultaneously ensuring that he maintained a distinct American command.69 The following 17 months of conflict with American boots on the ground in Europe saw significant political and diplomatic friction between Pershing and the Allied commanders. Pershing attempted to keep his AEF intact while satisfying Allied requests for American soldiers to replace French and British casualties, especially when Germany launched their Spring 1918 offensives. Pershing described in his memoirs that the French and British requested American soldiers to fill their gaps on the front lines when they had each sent diplomatic missions to America shortly after the United States entered the war. Pershing maintained his adamancy against the United States "becoming a recruiting agency for either the French or British," and he recounted that the War Department retained his position as well.70 While Allied leaders ostensibly supported having an independent American army participate in the war effort, the need to replace casualties in the trenches proved to be their immediate concern. Russia withdrawing from the conflict allowed Germany to reinforce their strength on the Western Front and mount a series of offensives. Germany knew they had a limited window of time for victory 68 Army War College (U.S.) Historical Section, The Genesis of the American First Army (Army War College, 1928), Reprints from the collection of the University of Michigan Library (Coppell, TX, 2020), 2. 69 The Genesis of the American First Army, 2-9. 70 John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, vol. 1 (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1931), 30-3. Bailes 18 with the United States continuing to build combat power, so they surged in the early months of 1918. Pershing faced a strategic dilemma of trying to support the Allies and get his troops in the fight while simultaneously attempting to build an independent American army. Ultimately, Pershing gave the Allies some of his army divisions as much needed replacements, and he made an effort to ensure that these divisions remained as intact as possible. Pershing endeavored to organize these divisions under a U.S. corps level command, but this corps command proved mostly administrative rather than tactical.71 By the time Pershing activated his independent American First Army, it only spent a few months in combat. The temporarily amalgamated doughboys Pershing gave to the Allies to meet their requests had contributed more to the defeat of Imperial Germany than Pershing's independent army. Mostly because Pershing had interspersed his divisions throughout the French and British fronts to meet the Allied requests for replacements, the American First Army did not activate until August of 1918. The September 20-25 Meuse-Argonne offensive would be the first significant operation for Pershing's independent army.72 David Trask concludes his critique of Pershing by recognizing the contribution that the American soldier played in providing manpower to the Allies. Trask commends the bravery of the American doughboy, but he argues that the amalgamated U.S. divisions contributed more to victory than the American First Army.73 In a similar vein, Mitchell Yockelson contends that the 27th and 30th Divisions who remained under British command throughout the war benefited over the rest of the AEF from extensive training led by the experienced British troops, and they contributed significantly to the Allied 71 The Genesis of the American First Army, 9-46. 72 John J. Pershing, Final Report of Gen. John J. Pershing: Commander-in-Chief American Expeditionary Forces. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919), 37-8; The Genesis of the American First Army, 45-58. 73 Trask, The AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 174-7. Bailes 19 victory.74 Pershing detailed his plans to capitalize on the initiative gained with his Meuse-Argonne offensive to deliver his decisive blow against Germany. The November 11 armistice came before he could achieve his grand vision.75 While the American doughboy played a critical role in providing an Allied victory over Imperial Germany, Pershing never realized his concept of an independent American command autonomously crushing the German army. The American soldier contributed most significantly to the Allied victory by taking part in offensives planned and conducted under the control of French and British Generals. Understanding American motivation during the war effort requires understanding the Progressive Movement taking place in the early-twentieth-century United States. Michael McGerr writes a detailed account of the cause and effect of the Progressive Movement. McGerr describes the wealth disparity brought about by Victorian society and the Gilded Age, and the class conflict emerging from this gave birth to a social and political movement that attempted to enact massive change in the American system.76 McGerr claims that the Progressive Movement attempted such major reform that no social or political action since has tried "anything as ambitious" due to the adverse reactions of such massive change.77 The Progressive Movement engulfed American society and brought about changes in family structures, race relations, and governmental powers. Herbert Croly illustrated the drive for monumental change rooted in the Progressive Movement with his text Progressive Democracy. In his narrative, Croly advocated for a complete overhaul of the American system to achieve freedom and alleviate wealth disparity. Croly saw governmental reform as the method for spreading democracy to all 74 Yockelson, Borrowed Soldiers, 213-23. 75 Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, vol. 2, 355-87. 76 McGerr, A Fierce Discontent, 3-146. 77 McGerr, 315-9. Bailes 20 citizens.78 In describing American public opinion during the time of United States entry into World War I, David Kennedy argues that for those Americans who championed progressive ideals, "the war's opportunities were not to be pursued in the kingdom of commerce but in the realm of the spirit."79 While the United States maintained a formidable economic link with the Allies throughout American neutrality, Wilson appealed to American ideals to garner public support for the war. United States entry into the war did not come as the natural development of the Progressive Movement. Still, the American public's reason for supporting the war certainly borrowed progressive sentiments. Wilson championed progressive initiatives that had ingrained themselves in the national mood of early-twentieth-century America. Wilson ran for President in 1912 on the principles he codified the following year in his text The New Freedom. Wilson argued that the Jefferson era of United States democracy had long ended. Wilson maintained that because of the new complexities found in American society, a "reconstruction in the United States" needed to occur to achieve real economic and social freedom.80 Ronald Pestritto articulates Wilson's vision for a governmental system as it relates to a society's history and progress. According to Wilson, the method of government that works for people depends on how far that population has progressed. In that manner, the government should always change to reflect the progression of its people best.81 Pestritto argues that a major theme found in Wilson's 1908 text Constitutional Government in the United States rests in the idea that: [T]here are four stages through which all governments pass: (1) government is the master and people are its subjects; (2) government remains the master, not through 78 Herbert Croly, Progressive Democracy (New York: Macmillan, 1914; New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers; Second printing 2006), 25, 103-18. 79 David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 39. 80 Woodrow Wilson, The New Freedom: A Call for the Emancipation of the Generous Energies of a People (New York and Garden City: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1913), www.philosophical.space/303/Wilson.pdf. 81 Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism, 34-42. Bailes 21 force but by its fitness to lead; (3) a stage of agitation, when leaders of the people rise up to challenge the government for power; and (4) the final stage, where the people become fully self-conscious and have leaders of their own choosing.82 Wilson epitomized the Progressive Movement's ideals regarding the government adapting to the changes of the people to create a more representative system of government. He would appeal to these principles in advocating for United States intervention in Europe. An underlying sentiment existed within the Progressive Movement that sought to bring about massive change, and this energy extended into the war effort. Lloyd Ambrosius explains the rise of the United States as an imperial power during the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. The outcome of the American Civil War created a more powerful central government, and economic growth during the following decades allowed more opportunity for global expansion.83 As the United States extended its global presence, the ideals that formed the nation began to influence foreign policy. David Kennedy writes about the shift in prominent progressives toward support of the war effort. Kennedy references John Dewey as a significant advocate for utilizing the war to satisfy progressive initiatives. According to Kennedy, progressives found appeal in Wilson's reasons for American belligerency in Europe as "a war for democracy, a war to end war, a war to protect liberalism, a war against militarism, a war to redeem barbarous Europe, a crusade."84 Michael McGerr states that the First World War "brought the extraordinary culmination of the Progressive Movement."85 Regardless of the typical progressive view of war, progressives could find merit in Wilson's justification for United States involvement. 82 Pestritto, 37. 83 Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism, 26-32. 84 Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society, 50-3. 85 McGerr, A Fierce Discontent, 280. Bailes 22 Even though a vast segment of the United States population did not support going to war in Europe, the notion of saving Europe still permeated throughout American society. In a series of essays published in the July 1917 edition of The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, multiple thinkers of the time expressed the necessity of the United States entering the war to save Europe. Miles Dawson argued the importance of the United States' mission in the war by documenting the five "fundamentals" that made the United States unique, and he explained the importance of spreading those principles globally. Dawson advocated for the spreading of American ideals throughout the rest of the world.86 George Kirchwey argued that the United States must go to war to defeat Imperial Germany and secure peace. Kirchwey suggested that the war was a fight against an autocratic empire and a crusade to make the world safe for democracy. Kirchwey maintained that the United States needed to lead the effort in creating a world order for peace.87 Samuel Dutton saw the purpose of the United States as transcending party lines. Dutton suggested that the aim of defeating autocratic Imperial Germany needed to be a united American mission.88 Emily Greene Balch wrote that the United States "enters the war on grounds of the highest idealism, as the champion of democracy and world order."89 Walter Lippman argued that once the United States entered the war, they were obligated to fight to make the world safe for democracy. Lippman placed the blame for the war squarely on Germany and their aggression in Belgium and unrestricted submarine warfare. Similar to Wilson in his war address, Lippman drew parallels to the Russian Revolution and the 86 Miles M. Dawson, "The Significance of Our Mission in This War," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 72 (July 1917): 10-13, http://www.jstor.com/stable/1013639. 87 George W. Kirchwey, "Pax Americana," Annals, 40-48, http://www.jstor.com/stable/1013645. 88 Samuel Dutton, "The United States and the War," Annals, 13-19, http://www.jstor.com/stable/1013640. 89 Emily Greene Balch, "The War in Its Relation to Democracy and World Order," Annals, 28-31, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1013643 Bailes 23 importance of it signaling that the Allies truly represented democracy.90 Wilson's reasons for war had found a voice in the academic circles of the United States, and they nested well with the progressive message. Wilson's goals for peace illustrate how Progressive initiatives manifested into the global sphere. In his August 18, 1914 address advocating for the American population to remain neutral during the European conflict, Wilson maintained that the United States held a responsibility "to play a part of impartial mediation and speak the counsels of peace and accommodation, not as a partisan, but as a friend."91 Similarly, when addressing the Senate over two years later communicating his persistent intent of mediating peace in Europe through American neutrality, Wilson criticized the demands for peace submitted by the Entente that sought revenge over Imperial Germany rather than a lasting peace. Wilson instructed that "peace must be followed by some definite concert of power which will make it virtually impossible that any such catastrophe should ever overwhelm us again."92 In line with his progressive ideology, Wilson believed in United States intervention in the European conflict that would fundamentally improve their diplomatic system entirely. The United States would intervene in Europe to not only end the conflict but restructure the political climate in a more peaceful, progressive manner. Kendrick Clements argues that Wilson's economic and diplomatic decisions throughout United States neutrality drew him into the war gradually as he continued to side with the Allies. Wilson attempted to maintain his ideals for peace as the United States continued to get closer to belligerency.93 When the United States entry into the war proved virtually inevitable, Wilson 90 Walter Lippman, "The World Conflict in Its Relation to American Democracy," Annals, 1-10, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1013638. 91 Woodrow Wilson, "An Appeal for Neutrality in World War I," 390. 92 Woodrow Wilson, "Essential Terms for Peace in Europe," 392. 93 Clements, "Woodrow Wilson and World War I," 63-81. Bailes 24 ensured that the reasons for fighting aligned with the progressive energy that moved within American society. A religious vigor inspired military action that can be seen as a product of the Progressive Movement as well. Richard Gamble narrates the origin of the opinion that the United States represented a light for the rest of the world, and he describes how this concept brought the nation into the war. Gamble argues that these Christian ideals drove the political climate as Wilson's vision echoed the religious sentiment, and they prompted men to fight.94 Gamble describes the "social gospel" movement that had energized progressive Christians in the United States as extending into the international realm. The same energy that had influenced Christians to enact domestic change had transcended into a desire to improve the world, and Wilson ensured these sentiments carried over into United States foreign policy.95 Ronald Pestritto argues Wilson's religious conviction and explains that Wilson linked his faith with his duty to help shape the rest of the world. Pestritto explains the belief that "America was a key battleground in the victory of good over evil."96 Richard Gamble's mention of literature such as Washington Gladden's 1886 "Applied Christianity" highlights the popular message of progressive faith that nests with Pestritto's argument.97 Wilson illustrated the linkage of religion and progressive reform when he spoke in Denver, Colorado, in a 1911 build-up to his run for the Presidency. Wilson commented that "liberty is a spiritual conception, and when men take up arms to set other men free, there is something sacred and holy in the warfare."98 Wilson went on to champion the necessity of finding truth in the Bible's message, and he concluded by warning against believing "that 94 Gamble, The War for Righteousness, 5-87. 95 Gamble, 69-87. 96 Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism, 40-3. 97 Gamble, The War for Righteousness, 49-67. 98 Woodrow Wilson, "The Bible and Progress" in "On Religion," Essential Writings and Speeches of the Scholar-President, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qfgbg.7, 54. Bailes 25 progress can be divorced from religion."99 To Wilson, Christianity taught the spiritual duty of working toward social progress, and most progressive men of faith believed in these same sentiments which carried over toward United States actions in France. At the core of this Progressive energy and Wilson's peace aims were the sentiments surrounding an idea of American Exceptionalism. Many of the same ideas found in the religious aspect of the need to work for social progression catered to a sense of American Exceptionalism. In the same May 7, 1911 address in Denver, Colorado, Wilson spoke of the greatness of the United States as a direct correlation to the religious zeal and Biblical principles with which the founders had established the nation. According to Wilson, "America has all along claimed the distinction of setting this example to the civilized world."100 Wilson believed that the United States should serve as the model of Christian values for the rest of the world as "America was born to exemplify that devotion to the elements of righteousness which are derived from the revelations of Holy Scripture."101 In his text In Search of the City on a Hill, Richard Gamble describes how the United States narrative utilized an interpretation of divine providence to create an image of a nation built on religious principles that should serve as an example for the rest of the world.102 Lloyd Ambrosius describes the prevalent belief in the early twentieth-century United States that considered the United States a "providential nation" as citizens attempted to justify global expansion.103 If the United States existed as a providential manifestation of God's will, then that could rationalize the spread of the American system into the international realm. 99 Wilson, "The Bible and Progress," 53-9. 100 Wilson, 56. 101 Wilson, 59. 102 Richard M. Gamble, In Search of the City on a Hill: The Making and Unmakng of an American Myth (London: Continuum International Publishng Group, 2012), 6-119. 103 Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and Ameriam Internationalism, 33. Bailes 26 Men of faith found a divine message in the need for the United States to intercede in the global sphere to mold the world in her image. Wilson's brand of progressive history nested well with his idea of American Exceptionalism. Lloyd Ambrosius explains Wilson's fundamental belief that "primitive peoples moved toward greater maturity over the generations."104 Wilson applied this to the history of the United States. As Ronald Perstritto describes, Wilson believed that "the history of human progress is the history of the progress of freedom."105 As people progressed, they, in turn, developed a governmental system that allowed for more representation for its citizens. According to Ambrosius, Wilson believed that "the United States represented the culmination of progressive historical development."106 The American people had achieved real progression in Wilson's historical model, and democracy achieved through the American Revolution solidified his theory. Wilson certainly made this point evident in his writings regarding history. Wilson suggests that "the history of the United States demonstrates the spiritual aspects of political development."107 The United States embodied the ideal form of Wilson's progressive history. Wilson saw it as the responsibility of the United States to spread its exceptional personification of progressive history with the rest of the world. Wilson acknowledged his views on the uniqueness of the United States in his New Freedom. While arguing for progressive reform in the states, Wilson stated that "[t]he reason that America was set up was that she might be different from all the nations of the world."108 Indeed, Wilson believed in the providential nature of the United States, and he desired to shape the rest of the world. 104 Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism, 236. 105 Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism, 37. 106 Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism, 236. 107 Woodrow Wilson, "The Historian," Essential Writings and Speeches of the Scholar-President, 216, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qfgbg.10. 108 Wilson, The New Freedom, 16. Bailes 27 Early in the war during the period of United States neutrality, Wilson's reasons for remaining neutral stemmed from his belief in the exceptional nature of the American system and his desire for the United States to stay clear of European affairs. Even in American neutrality, Wilson still sought to mediate a peace in Europe because he perceived a chance to spread the democracy of the United States to Europe. Wilson believed that he needed to mediate in the European conflict because "mere terms of peace between the belligerents will not satisfy even the belligerents themselves," and he questioned whether the Entente and Central powers fought "for a just and secure peace, or only for a new balance of power."109 Wilson's peace aims were in sharp contrast to the Allied leaders, which illustrated his emphasis that the United States should mold a post-war Europe, and this tied directly to American Exceptionalism. While the British leadership concerned themselves with imperial interests, the French sought revenge on Germany from the 1870 Franco-Prussian War. Wilson made it clear in his war address that the United States had "no quarrel with the German people."110 Wilson's vision for a post-war world remained focused on a lasting peace rather than what he perceived as selfish imperial gains or senseless revenge. American Exceptionalism formed the foundation for the interventionist foreign policy of the Progressive Era, and it profoundly motivated Wilson as well as the bulk of American society. Diplomatic historian William Appleman Williams details the rise of the United States as a global power. Williams argues that most Americans in the early twentieth-century United States agreed not only with "Wilson's nationalistic outlook," but they also agreed that the nation should serve as an example for the rest of the world.111 As mentioned previously, Miles Dawson contributed 109 Woodrow Wilson, "Essential Terms for Peace in Europe," 393. 110 Woodrow Wilson, "Declaration of War," 401. 111 Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, 86. Bailes 28 to the July 1917 The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science to voice the justification of United States intervention in France. In his text, Dawson defined the five uniquely American fundamentals as: 1. The inalienable right of every man to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness – not as a mere dead saying, but as a living reality. 2. The right of local self-government, within territories possessing or entitled to claim such right, embracing every power of government not expressly granted to the union. 3. The guaranty to each state of a forum for the redress of grievances of one state against another with full power to enforce the verdict of that forum. 4. The guaranty of a republican form of government to each constituent state. 5. The right and duty to maintain the union.112 To thinkers like Dawson, this unique set of traits not only provided United States citizens with a system of government that separated them from the rest of the world, but it inherently gave them a duty to spread the American ideology to the rest of the world. Fundamentally, the idea that the world should take the lead from the United States exemplified the broad theme of American Exceptionalism inspiring AEF actions in the war. With Progressivism and American Exceptionalism at the root of the war effort, the citizen-soldier of the AEF found inspiration in the same rhetoric. Nelson Lloyd described the "melting-pots" of the army cantonment areas in which soldiers who were born outside of the United States "have become true Americans. They have learned the language of America and the ideals of America and have turned willing soldiers in her cause."113 Michael Neiberg argues that a lasting legacy of United States involvement in the war became a unified American mission superseding any cultural allegiance, and "disagreements would no longer be based on ethnicity 112 Dawson, "The Significance of Our Mission in This War," 11. 113 Newson Lloyd, How We Went to War (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1922), 58, https://archive.org/details/howwewenttowar00lloyrich/page/n7/mode/2up. Bailes 29 or religion."114 United States entry into the war gave the American citizen-soldier a reason for fighting to preserve a democratic system in Europe, and Wilson's belief that the United States would play a central role became widespread amongst the ranks of the AEF. Lieutenant Willard Hill of the Transport Division and 94th Aero Pursuit Squadron claimed when hearing of the United States entry into the war "that this war is not over yet and that the U.S. troops will play a very decisive factor."115 The purpose of United States entry into the war inspired an idealism that would unify soldiers and champion a belief that the AEF would save Europe from the autocracy of Imperial Germany. Private Willard Newton of the 105th Engineers, 30th Division, exclaimed his joy during the September offensives by stating, "[a]t last we are at the beginning of a real battle between Prussianism and Democracy! And we are to fight on the side of Democracy that the world may forever be free from the Prussian peril!"116 The sentiments of these soldiers expressed a voice that echoed Wilson's desire to utilize an American army to bring peace to Europe, and Pershing dutifully followed his instructions. Pershing's stubbornness in not giving in to the Allies' request to amalgamate troops remained the most significant source of friction between him and the Allied military leaders. Still, Pershing's belief that the doughboy remained a superior warrior to the French and British soldier intensified Pershing's negative feelings toward his Allied counterparts. Pershing did not hide his views regarding coalitions when he wrote early in his memoirs that "[h]istory is replete with the failures of coalitions and seemed to be repeating itself in the World War."117 Russell Weigley argues that Pershing believed "that only by fighting under American command would 114 Michael S. Neiberg, "Blinking Eyes Began to Open: Legacies from America's Road to the Great War, 1914-1917," Diplomatic History 38, no. 4 (2014): 812, https://doi:10.1093/dh/dhu023. 115 Lieutenant Willard D. Hill (Cleburne, Texas) in American Voices of World War I, 47. 116 Private Willard Newton (Gibson, North Carolina) in American Voices of World War I, 140. 117 Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, vol. 1, 34. Bailes 30 American soldiers retain the morale they needed to fight well."118 This assertion proved incorrect as those American doughboys who fought under French and British command performed extraordinarily.119 David Trask maintains that Pershing's "presumption that the American troops were superior to others in the war helps explain his stubborn insistence on an independent army even during the greatest crisis of the war."120 Although the German Spring Offensives of 1918 put the Allies in desperate need of replacements, Pershing held his ground in resisting amalgamation. He only agreed to temporary amalgamation after much deliberation. Pershing's plan required maintaining a separate and distinct American force if the United States was to play a critical role in defeating Imperial Germany. This plan did not always synchronize with General Foch's overall plan for the Allied strategy for defeating Imperial Germany. Mitchell Yockelson describes an instance in late September 1918 in which a newly established AEF officers' school near Pershing's headquarters pulled a bulk of American officers from the front lines, which "affected the AEF First Army divisions that were about to attack in the Meuse-Argonne operation."121 United States political leadership back home undoubtedly noticed the friction between Pershing and the Allied leaders. David Woodward mentioned that at one point, Wilson and Secretary Baker intervened to plead with Pershing to be more accommodating to the Allies. According to Woodward, "Pershing proved as immovable as ever when it came to wholesale amalgamation and introducing Americans to trench warfare before he deemed them ready for combat."122 118 Weigley, "Pershing and the U.S. Military Tradition," 335. 119 Weigley, 335. 120 Trask, The AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 61. 121 Yockelson, Borrowed Soldiers, 127. 122 Woodward, Trial by Friendship, 168-9. Bailes 31 Pershing's doctrine of "open warfare" proved predicated on a firm belief in the exceptional quality of the American fighting man. In his memoirs, Pershing documented his view that the results of the Battle of the Marne had placed the opposing forces in a trench defensive that had taken away their aggression and ability to fight an offensive battle. Pershing maintained that "victory could not be won by the costly process of attrition, but it must be won by driving the enemy out into the open and engaging him in a war of movement."123 Sergeant-major James Block of the 59th Infantry, 4th Division, wrote after an offensive near Belleau Wood that his troops "had proven to ourselves that we were the Hun's master, even in our present untrained condition. The Hun could not stand before us and battle man to man."124 David Trask argues that Pershing's reliance on the rifle and bayonet under his open warfare doctrine limited the AEF's ability to adapt to the combined arms fight as quickly as did the French and British.125 In his Final Report, Pershing praised the Allied training system that prepared his inexperienced troops for combat on the Western Front. Although he admitted that his soldiers needed to learn from the experiences of the combat tested French and British, he stated that "[t]he long period of trench warfare had so impressed itself upon the French and British that they had almost entirely dispensed with training for open warfare."126 Pershing relied heavily on his infantrymen, and he saw the rifle and the bayonet as the superior weapon. He did not factor advances in the machine gun, tanks, and artillery to integrate all lethal assets onto the battlefield. According to Richard Faulkner, Pershing planned on using his troops – who he believed were 123 Pershing, 151-4. 124 Sergeant-major James W. Block (Marquette, Michigan) in American Voices of World War I, 108. 125 Trask, The AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 19. 126 Pershing, Final Report, 13-5. Bailes 32 better suited for offensive warfare – to "force the Germans from their trenches into open terrain where the Allies' greater resources would then destroy the unprotected enemy army."127 Perhaps nothing exhibited Pershing's obtuse attitude toward his Allied counterparts more than his desire to beat the French in seizing Sedan from the Germans. Pershing outlined his wishes that his "troops should capture Sedan, which the French had lost in a decisive battle in 1870."128 Russell Weigley comments on Pershing's intent "to try to snatch from the French army the honor of recapturing the historic fortress city of Sedan, where the Emperor Napoleon III had surrendered to the Prussians on September 1-2, 1870."129 Sergeant-major Block described the fierce German resistance during the late September Allied offensives. Still, he claimed that "[o]nce the Americans penetrated that line, their advance northward would be comparatively easy. Sedan would fall next."130 The AEF performed well during the offensives in early November, and the crumbling Imperial German army made Sedan easily attainable for either Pershing's Second Army or the Franco-American armies.131 David Trask points out the diplomatic issue that would ensue if Pershing were to "deprive the French army of this honor."132 The new commander of the American First Army, General Liggett, ultimately did not carry out the attack, which undoubtably prevented a political and diplomatic disaster.133 Russell Weigley maintains that Liggett changed plans after "the offended French" updated him of Pershing's plans on November 7.134 The idea that Pershing wished to take away French retribution by giving 127 Faulkner, Pershing's Crusaders, 285. 128 Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, vol. 2, 381. 129 Weigley, "Pershing and the U.S. Military Tradition," 342. 130 Sergeant-major Block in American Voices of World War I, 135. 131 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 282-3. 132 Trask, The AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 174. 133 Trask, 174, 134 Weigley, 343. Bailes 33 his troops a decisive victory and morale boost demonstrated his disconnect from the sentiments of his Allied counterparts. Pershing's belief in the superiority of the American soldier to his French and British counterpart extended to the lower ranks of the AEF. While perhaps sensationalizing his account, Scout Corporal Edward Radcliffe of the 109th Infantry, 28th Division wrote regarding actions around St Agnon "that the French of the 10th or 6th army had fallen back, their officers being shot by our men when they ordered them to retreat."135 In a post-World War I survey, Sergeant Donald Drake Kyler of the 16th Infantry, 1st Division answered a question about what he learned about America and Americans from the war. Sergeant Kyler stated that "Americans are inclined to brag about their systems and accomplishments which may or not be superior to those of other peoples or cultures."136 In many of the accounts of AEF actions in Europe, General Pershing and his doughboys showcased American Exceptionalism. Richard Faulkner devotes a chapter of his text to argue that most of the AEF doughboys perceived inferiority in the French way of life compared to the United States. The majority of white AEF soldiers came away from the war, believing that, in terms of technology as well as general health and welfare, American society remained superior to that of France and England.137 Faulkner makes note that "with the notable exception of the African Americans, the soldiers generally believed that their society was markedly superior to anything they encountered in Europe."138 Sergeant-major Block wrote a letter home to his parents during the post-war occupation period. He wrote of the perception that "Paris makes up for the backwardness of the rest of France."139 135 Corporal Edward Radcliffe in American Voices of World War I, 94. 136 Sergeant Donald Drake Kyler (Fort Thomas, Kentucky) in American Voices of World War I, 196. 137 Faulkner, Pershing's Crusaders, 188-93. 138 Faulkner, 189. 139 Sergeant-major Block in American Voices of World War I, 191. Bailes 34 While the bond formed between the French and British soldiers and the AEF doughboy proved strong, there still seemed to be a sentiment of American superiority amongst the AEF ranks. Tasker H. Bliss, who served as Army Chief of Staff from September 1917 to May 1918, documented the challenge of absent unified Allied command in a 1922 essay. Bliss wrote a detailed piece in which he criticized the lack of a unified Allied mission while praising General Foch and championing his eventual selection as "Allied Commander-in-Chief."140 Bliss condemned the Allied leaders for waiting so long before establishing any sort of unified command, and he argued that for the first years of the war, they fought for their national goals only. Bliss maintained that this hindered United States integration into the war effort as well.141 Charles Pettit wrote an account of his time on the Western Front. Initially serving in the British army, Pettit joined the AEF once they arrived and concluded his 42 months of combat with the Rainbow Division. Pettit commented that "[w]e know why the French and English didn't win the War. They was waiting for us."142 Robert Bruce expands on the relationship between the American and French soldiers during the post-war occupation period. The doughboys believed that the Allied victory had eliminated the threat of autocratic Imperial Germany. At the same time, the French soldiers still demonstrated distrust of the German for fear of a future war. According to Bruce, "Americans did not want to hear about the need to prepare for a future war with Germany. They believed that victory in the Great War and the conversion of Germany to a democracy was enough to end the menace; Americans were unwilling to do more."143 For the AEF doughboy, the United States' actions in the war had saved Europe from the threat of the 140 Tasker H. Bliss, "The Evolution of the Unified Command," Foreign Affairs 1, no. 2 (December 1922): 1-30, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20028211. 141 Bliss, 7-30. 142 Charles A. Pettit in Echoes From Over There: By the Men of the Army and Marine Corps who Fought in France, eds. Craig Hamilton and Louise Corbin (New York City: The Soldiers' Publishing Company, 1919), 107-9. 143 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 289. Bailes 35 Imperial German autocracy. United States' involvement in its first large-scale coalition operation had solidified the dominance of the American soldier and the system for which he fought. The American doughboy contributed significantly to the Allied victory over Imperial Germany. Without American boots on the ground in France, Imperial Germany may have defeated the Allies. Allan Millett argues that Pershing's independent army did not achieve all that Pershing had hoped. Still, Millett maintains that an accurate assessment of the war would be that the "Allies might have lost the war without the American Expeditionary Forces."144 With the Russian withdrawal from the war and Germany's surge in the Western Front in the Spring of 1918, the Allies desperately needed more boots on the ground. AEF actions in Cantigny, Belleau Wood, and the attack on the Hindenburg line proved the value of the doughboys to the Allied victory over Imperial Germany and the Central Powers. Acknowledging the contribution of the American soldier to the Allied victory should remain a critical focus of any study of United States involvement in the war. While the presence of American troops on the ground benefited the Allies and did give Wilson his seat at the post-war peace talks, Pershing did not realize his grand vision of an independent American army crushing Imperial Germany. Bullitt Lowry documents Pershing's desire to capitalize on increasing the United States combat power to continue pressing a weakening German army and deliver a crushing blow.145 The Germans signed the armistice before Pershing could make this happen. While Wilson gained his seat at the peace conference and Pershing did not get his chance to win a tactical victory, the French and British still received their original desires and delivered Germany "harsh armistice terms."146 144 Millett, "Over Where?," 251. 145 Lowry, "Pershing and the Armistice," 286-91. 146 Lowry, 291. Bailes 36 With the eventual collapse of the League of Nations, Wilson never achieved his vision of a new world order for peace. Still, the United States government had established its importance and commenced its entry into the realm of global powers. United States involvement in the First World War helped solidify a national identity as well as establish an American presence on the international stage. Theodore Roosevelt Jr. wrote a letter on May 15, 1919, in which he documented the benefit of the war and what he saw as "Americanizing and democratizing" the soldiers through military service.147 Roosevelt commented that through service in support of the war effort, "love of the men for their country has been deepened, that their sense of real democracy has been sharpened and steadied and that insofar as any possible bad effect goes, the men are more than ever ready and determined to see order and fair play for all."148 In a similar vein, Italian born AEF Sergeant Morini wrote that the war provided him a chance "to make good on my Americanism."149 To Morini, fighting in the war provided him with "the right to the name Yankee all right."150 While the United States' efforts in the war were in support of the Allies, the war became a chance for the nation to claim its identity. A country that had been torn apart by civil war half a century before utilized the war effort to continue to unify and recover its self-proclaimed providence. The war ostensibly became an effort to Americanize its own citizens. The historiography of United States involvement in the First World War presents various arguments. Some historians such as David Trask and Russell Weigley remain critical of General Pershing and his decision making. While some scholarly history shows a narrative less scathing of Pershing, most of the description found in popular history showcases valiant actions of 147 Theodore Roosevelt in Echoes From Over There, 95. 148 Roosevelt, 95. 149 Sergeant Morini in Echoes From Over There, 115. 150 Morini, 115. Bailes 37 Pershing and his efforts in maneuvering the American Expeditionary Forces to achieve victory for the Allies against Imperial Germany. The fact remains that while the doughboys contributed significantly to the Allied victory, they helped the most when they were not fighting Pershing's fight. In his Final Report, Pershing highlights the benefit that the Allies provided to the American forces. In terms of training as well as logistics, the Allies provided the doughboys with the resources they needed to defeat Imperial Germany and the Central Powers effectively.151 Pershing recognized what the Allies had supplied him and his men, but his stubbornness and arrogance still clouded his vision to a degree. While Pershing did build a trusting relationship with the Allied commanders, and his troops were efficient, he did not always operate per their same vision. At times, Pershing's desire to maintain an independent American army superseded his desire to enable the Allied strategy. Pershing strived to meet Wilson's intent of keeping a distinct American command. The question remains if, in carrying out his President's instructions, Pershing prolonged the war and delayed the defeat of the Central Powers. Secondary and primary source literature from the First World War showcases both Wilson's peace aims – which were shaped by his ideology – as well as General Pershing and AEF actions while attempting to remain an independent command in the war. When war broke out in August 1914 in Europe, Wilson tried to mediate a peace while maintaining United States neutrality. When continued trade with the Allies brought the United States into the war in April of 1917, he seized the chance to shape a new world order by establishing an independent American command to defeat Imperial Germany. Primarily because of the Progressive Movement in the United States and the concepts surrounding American Exceptionalism, the American soldier embraced Wilson's ideologies for fighting and fought valiantly to defeat the 151 Pershing, Final Report, 90. Bailes 38 Imperial German autocracy. The Progressive Movement had established itself in American society by the time the citizen-soldier went to war in France, and the principles of American Exceptionalism permeated in virtually every facet of American culture. The American doughboy carried both of these concepts with him to France. Despite Pershing not attaining his decisive blow against the German army, and Wilson not achieving his vision for a new world order, the United States still met a significant amount of Wilson's original intent for entering the war. Wilson's ideologies influenced how the AEF fought in France. As the First World War shaped the United States standing as a global power, it also demonstrated the critical nature of maintaining relationships with coalition partners. Hew Strachan begins the conclusion to his history of the war by stating that "[t]he First World War was a coalition war."152 The American doughboy established a positive relationship with his French and British counterparts. The ability of the American soldier to learn from the experiences of the combat tested Allies, to adapt to the rigors of trench warfare, and to perform well in battle fighting beside his international partners shows the success of the AEF's performance in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation. Despite these successes, the AEF doughboy exhibited American Exceptionalism in the First World War. As the United States built its presence in the international realm over the following century, and the need for maintaining partnerships with allied nations continued to increase, the precedent set by the AEF in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation would be essential. 152 Hew Strachan, The First World War (New York: Viking Penguin, a member of Penguin Group, 2004; New York: Penguin Group, 2013), 303. Bailes 39 Bibliography Secondary Sources Adas, Michael. "Ambivalent Ally: American Military Intervention and the Endgame and Legacy of World War I." Diplomatic History 38 no. 4 (September 2014): 700-712, http://doi.org/10.1093/dh.dhu032. Ambrosius, Lloyd E. Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy in American Foreign Relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. Ambrosius, Lloyd E. Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017. Ambrosius, Lloyd E. "World War I and the Paradox of Wilsonianism." 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The Situation In The Middle East This Record Contains The Text Of Speeches Delivered In English And Of The Translation Of Speeches Delivered In Other Languages. ; United Nations S/PV.8195 Security Council Seventy-third year 8195th meeting Wednesday, 28 February 2018, 10.35 a.m. New York Provisional President: Mr. Alotaibi. . (Kuwait) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Inchauste Jordán China. . Mr. Wu Haitao Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Ms. Guadey France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Tumysh Netherlands. . Mr. Van Oosterom Peru. . Mr. Meza-Cuadra Poland. . Ms. Wronecka Russian Federation. . Mr. Nebenzia Sweden . Mr. Orrenius Skau United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Mr. Allen United States of America. . Ms. Eckels-Currie Agenda The situation in the Middle East Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) and 2393 (2017) (S/2018/138) This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-05507 (E) *1805507* S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 2/22 18-05507 The meeting was called to order at 10.35 a.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. The situation in the Middle East Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) and 2393 (2017) (S/2018/138) The President (spoke in Arabic): In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Mr. Mark Lowcock, Under-Secretary- General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, and Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, Under- Secretary-General for Political Affairs. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to draw the attention of the members of the Council to document S/2018/138, which contains the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) and 2393 (2017). I now give the floor to Mr. Lowcock. Mr. Lowcock: We have received a lot of questions about resolution 2401 (2018), which the Security Council adopted on Saturday, 22 February, and its demand for a cessation of hostilities without delay for at least 30 consecutive days throughout Syria. I want to start today by answering the questions we have received. Is the United Nation ready to deliver to people who need humanitarian assistance? Yes. We have convoys ready to go to 10 besieged and hard-to-reach locations, including a 45-truck convoy with aid for 90,000 people to Douma and eastern Ghouta. Are you ready to support medical evacuations from eastern Ghouta? Yes, we are working very closely with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Syrian Arab Red Crescent and other health partners on that. Has resolution 2401 (2018) been implemented? Is there a ceasefire in Syria? No, and no. Have you got any inter-agency cross-line convoys through to hard-to-reach or besieged areas? No. Have you been given permission to access any of those locations? No. Have you received the necessary facilitation letters for convoys? No. Have there been any medical evacuations? No. Have any civilians left eastern Ghouta? No. Is there any actual improvement in the humanitarian situation in eastern Ghouta since the adoption of the resolution demanding, as it did, unimpeded access? No. Can you deliver assistance in eastern Ghouta during a humanitarian pause between 9 a.m. and 2 p.m. local time? To quote the ICRC Middle East Director, who spoke about that yesterday: "It is impossible to bring a humanitarian convoy in five hours." Agencies now have years of experience in that area, and it can take a day simply to pass checkpoints, even when the parties have agreed. The goods then have to be offloaded. If there has been no humanitarian access since the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018) on Saturday, what has happened in the past few days? More bombing, fighting, death, destruction, maiming of women and children, hunger and misery — in other words, more of the same. On 26 February, two days ago, airstrikes, barrel bombs and artillery shelling were reported across eastern Ghouta, including in Harasta, Shafuniyeh, Otaya, Hosh Eldawahreh, Al-Ashari, Jobar, Beit Sawa, Hazerma, Hannnura, Nashabiyeh, Sagba and Douma. Reports indicate that at least 30 civilians, including women and children, were killed. In Shafuniyeh, 14 people, including three women and four children, were reportedly killed and many others injured by airstrikes. Eighteen civilians, including drivers of ambulances, women and children, were reportedly received at health facilities in Shafuniyeh with difficulties breathing, consistent with the use of chlorine. One child reportedly died as a result. On the same day, two workers from local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were reportedly killed as a result of shelling on the besieged enclave. It was also reported that two health-care facilities in Saqba were taken out of service by airstrikes. In the past few days, shells have also reportedly continued to fall on Damascus city from eastern Ghouta. Since 18 February, more than 580 people are now reported to have been killed due to air and ground strikes in eastern Ghouta, with many more than 1,000 people injured. At the same time, hundreds of rockets fired from eastern Ghouta into Damascus have reportedly killed 15 people and injured more than 200. I now want to update the Security Council on the situation in other parts of the country. 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 3/22 In Idlib, fighting continues to kill and injure civilians, destroy civilian infrastructure and result in large population movements. Since December, an estimated 385,000 people have been displaced, with many civilians moving north. Half of Idlib's population was already displaced. People are being forced to move yet again, with each disruption increasing their vulnerability. Civilians are concentrated in an ever-smaller area. Many are forced to live in makeshift camps or in the open air. Formal camps are overwhelmed, operating at up to 400 per cent of their capacity. The response is being stretched to its limits. We are receiving reports of civilian deaths and injuries and of restriction on the movement of many civilians as a result of military operations in Afrin. Those who risk moving continue to be stopped at exit points by the local authorities in Afrin, preventing them from accessing safer areas. We believe that, so far, approximately 5,000 people have reached the surrounding villages and Aleppo city. Tens of thousands are believed to be displaced within Afrin. The Turkish authorities have emphasized to us their willingness to facilitate humanitarian access. We would like to see aid convoys operated from Damascus. However, to date that has not been agreed by the Syrian side. In Raqqa city, conditions remain unsafe for the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Among those trying to return home, 637 people have been injured and more than 125 killed by unexploded ordinance since last October. Medical and other essential services are absent and access for humanitarian workers to the city remains precariously limited because the conditions are so dangerous. As I have said before, demining activities need to be accelerated as a matter of urgency. Humanitarian access for the United Nations and its implementing partners in Hasakah was limited for much of January due to the increased restrictions placed by the local authorities. United Nations convoys were blocked from travelling to the northeast from elsewhere within the country. The delivery of aid already in local warehouses was also blocked. While an agreement to resume humanitarian deliveries was reached on 30 January, that agreement will end in March. NGO partners continue to deliver goods and services across the north-east. However, sustainable access for the United Nations is critical. Any protracted interruption of humanitarian assistance and services in the IDP sites may drive the displaced people back to areas where they are not safe. Earlier this month, the United Nations received clearance for the first assessment visit to Deir ez-Zor after it had been under the control of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) for three and a half years. More than 100,000 people live in the town despite that fact that it is estimated to be 80 per cent destroyed. The infrastructure is almost completely destroyed, particularly in the central and the eastern areas, where ISIL was in control. In coordination with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent, the United Nations has dispatched 78 trucks carrying food, health, nutrition, protection, shelter, education, water and sanitation items since last September, when ISIL was driven out. Finally, we remain concerned about the tens of thousands of people stranded in Rukban, in south-eastern Syria. We continue to seek the necessary agreements for convoys of life-saving assistance to them. As I said last week (see S/PV. 8186), there was a severe reduction, of nearly 40 per cent, in cross-line access to besieged and hard-to-reach areas in 2017 as compared to 2016. On average in 2017, over the entire 12-month period, we reached 165,000 people a month with cross-line convoys. That was completely inadequate. So far this year, we have reached a total of only 7,200 people through a single small convoy earlier this month. In other words, we were reaching more than 50 times as many people in besieged and hard-to-reach areas last year as to date this year. The main reason for the reduction in the number of convoys has been the consistent refusal by the Government of Syria to provide the necessary approvals and facilitation letters to support delivery. As the Secretary-General's report (S/2018/138) details, while we continue to reach millions of people in urgent need in areas controlled by the Government of Syria and through the cross-border programmes mandated in resolution 2393 (2017), assistance across conflict lines to millions of people in hard-to-reach and besieged areas has completely collapsed in recent months. Unless that changes, we will soon see even more people dying from starvation and disease than from the bombing and shelling. The United Nations remains focused on reaching those most in need throughout the country, including the 5.6 million people considered to be in acute need. The needs-based approach means that the United Nations will continue to seek to deliver aid and to S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 4/22 18-05507 provide services to millions of people in a principled manner regardless of where they are located. More than half of those in need are in Government-controlled areas. However, millions more people are not. What the Syrian people need has been made abundantly clear — protection, access to basic goods and services, an end to sieges and respect for international humanitarian law and international human rights law. The Security Council has unanimously supported all such needs in adopting resolution 2401 (2018). I started today by answering questions that we have received regarding resolution 2401 (2018). I would like to end with a question for the Security Council. When will the resolution be implemented? The President (spoke in Arabic): I thank Mr. Lowcock for his briefing. I now give the floor to Mr. Feltman. Mr. Feltman: I am grateful for this opportunity to brief the Security Council following the comprehensive briefing by Under-Secretary-General Mark Lowcock. In two weeks, we will mark the beginning of the eighth year of the Syrian conflict. There are no words to express our frustration over the collective failure of the international community to end this war, but that frustration is nothing compared to the suffering and destruction visited ceaselessly upon the Syrian people. We are here again today because the brief respite that the Council unanimously demanded only days ago in resolution 2401 (2018) has not materialized, as Mr. Lowcock just described. The air strikes, shelling and ground offensives continue. There are even reports of yet another chlorine gas attack. What we need is the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), and that is not happening. Nearly seven years since the peaceful protests in Dar'a and the reaction that set in motion what would eventually become all-out war, we are still grasping for a political solution, which is the only way to end the bloodletting. The Secretary-General has called eastern Ghouta a hell on Earth. The United Nations will continue to work with Syrians and the international community to help bring about a durable political solution. We will also continue to demand that all the parties involved in the conflict respect international humanitarian law — the rules of war — and protect civilians. We will continue to demand the release of those who have been arbitrarily detained and the end of enforced disappearances. We will continue to forcefully call for justice and accountability. Those responsible for the catalogue of horrors that mark daily life in Syria, including chemical and terrorist attacks, torture and sexual violence, sieges and attacks on hospitals, schools and other civilian infrastructure, must be held accountable. Those outrages continue in large part because the perpetrators have so far enjoyed impunity. As the Secretary-General said earlier this week, "Security Council resolutions are only meaningful if they are effectively implemented". The United Nations acknowledges Russia's announcement of a daily five-hour pause for eastern Ghouta. In addition to Mr. Lowcock's briefing and what the International Committee of the Red Cross has stated, we respectfully remind all parties that resolution 2401 (2018) demands the sustained delivery of humanitarian aid for a minimum of 30 consecutive days. The Secretariat and relevant agencies are united and pulling in one direction towards the immediate and continuous cessation of hostilities that can be sustained beyond 30 days for unimpeded aid delivery. We also urgently need to get humanitarian aid and services in and the sick and critically wounded evacuated from besieged eastern Ghouta and other locations. We are ready to deliver. The Secretary-General has repeatedly reminded parties of their absolute obligation under international humanitarian law and human rights law to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure. Earlier this month, Emergency Relief Coordinator Lowcock told the Council (see S/PV.8186) in no uncertain terms that that is an obligation, not a favour. He has just updated us all on the humanitarian situation and provided an update on the United Nations readiness to deliver aid and services, and the tireless efforts of humanitarians to reach all in need, wherever they are. But right now we must address the particular needs of those in besieged eastern Ghouta. Resolution 2401 (2018) affirms that the cessation of hostilities shall not apply to military operations against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Al Qaida, the Al-Nusra Front, and "all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida or ISIL, and other terrorist groups, as designated by the Security Council". (resolution 2401 (2018), para. 2). In our view, that rightly maintains the parameters set out in resolution 2254 (2015), but there must be 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 5/22 a frank assessment of what that means in relation to the humanitarian tragedy that we are witnessing in eastern Ghouta. First, we condemn all violations of international law by all parties, including shelling from eastern Ghouta, which has injured or killed civilians in Damascus. The scale of the Government's indiscriminate military attacks against eastern Ghouta — an area with a civilian population of 400,000 — cannot be justified based on targeting Jabhat Al-Nusra fighters. Efforts to combat terrorism do not supersede obligations under international humanitarian law and human rights law. Secondly, the United Nations has not seen any confirmation by the Government of Syria of its commitment to implement resolution 2401 (2018), although at the resolution's adoption Syria's Permanent Representative to the United Nations said, "As a State, we bear a responsibility towards our citizens and we have a sovereign right to counter terrorism" (S/PV.8188, p. 12). Thirdly, yesterday the Head of the Syrian Negotiations Committee transmitted to the Secretary- General a letter on behalf of the three major non-State armed opposition groups — Jaysh Al-Islam, Faylaq Al-Rahman and Ahrar Al-Sham — and civil groups in eastern Ghouta regarding their full commitment to the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). Specifically, they committed to ensuring the necessary environment for United Nations humanitarian access as well as, "to expel all elements of Hay'at Tahrir Al-Sham, Jabhat Al-Nusra and Al-Qaida and all who belong to these groups from eastern Ghouta". Fourthly, the United Nations has no independent verified reports that those three non-State armed opposition groups in eastern Ghouta created a coordination centre, as has been alleged regarding Jabhat Al-Nusra, nor has the United Nations seen any public announcement by those groups of such a centre. Jaysh Al-Islam has denied that claim. What the United Nations can verify is that non-State armed opposition groups in eastern Ghouta, over the past 24 hours, have expressed their readiness in writing to evacuate Jabhat Al-Nusra fighters. Previous negotiations on that issue among those groups and key members of the International Syrian Support Group humanitarian task force in Geneva and Damascus have not resulted in success. Alleviating the tragic situation in eastern Ghouta has the Council's full attention. Yet we cannot forget that resolution 2401 (2018) demands a cessation of hostilities throughout Syria. Violence continues in Afrin, Idlib and the eastern part of the country. Council members have heard about the humanitarian challenges and suffering of the people in those areas as well. I would like to take this opportunity to emphasize that developments in those areas will undoubtedly render the situation in Syria even more complex. There will be no sustainable solution if the Council's resolutions are not implemented. That will require that the parties step back from the brink and fulfil their obligations to end the fighting in Syria. All our efforts will be in vain if there is no serious investment in a political solution. As Council members are aware, resolution 2401 (2018) calls on all Member States to use their influence with the parties to ensure the implementation of the cessation of hostilities. The United Nations calls for a renewed commitment by all concerned Member States to work seriously to implement the cessation of hostilities. The United Nations also cautions against drawing the Organization into monitoring exercises. That has been tried in the past without success — not for lack of trying — but in the absence of political will among Member States to underpin United Nations efforts. Member States, especially those working within the Astana and Amman arrangements, should use their resources and clear influence over the parties to ensure the implementation of a sustained cessation of hostilities throughout Syria. The conflict in Syria continues to threaten regional and international stability because the warring parties believe there is a military solution. There is not. The United Nations remains convinced that a political solution is the only way forward. Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura is pressing forward on facilitating the establishment of a constitutional committee in Geneva, as part of the overall intra-Syrian political process towards the full implementation of resolution 2254 (2015), for which the United Nations requires the positive and constructive engagement of both negotiating delegations. Special Envoy De Mistura will need the full support of the Council and the international community as a whole if the United Nations efforts are to have a chance of reinvigorating a serious and meaningful political process. I trust that he will have that support. S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 6/22 18-05507 The President (spoke in Arabic): I thank Mr. Feltman for his briefing. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements. Mr. Orrenius Skau (Sweden): I make my remarks today on behalf of Sweden and Kuwait as co-penholders for the humanitarian track of the Security Council's work on the situation in Syria. I would like to thank Mr. Mark Lowcock once again for a very sobering update. We share his sense of urgency following the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018) last weekend to fully take advantage of the 30- day pause so that the United Nations and its partners can dispatch life-saving aid convoys and begin medical evacuations. Since the resolution's adoption, we have been asked, as penholders, when the resolution would take effect and to whom it would apply. We are very clear: the resolution took effect upon its adoption and applies to all parties across the entire country. The clock is ticking. There is no time to lose. Let me also sincerely thank Mr. Jeffrey Feltman for his briefing today. We share his deep concern concerning reports of the flagrant lack of compliance with the ceasefire in eastern Ghouta. We would like to extend our sincere appreciation to all members of the Council for their constructive cooperation, which enabled the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018). The resolution represents decisive and meaningful action by the Council in response to the calls from the United Nations, the humanitarian community and, above all, the civilian population in Syria. However, the value of a resolution is not in its adoption, but in its implementation. We must now all build on the spirit of cooperation that led to the resolution's adoption and work together to ensure that it is enforced. Compliance with the resolutions of the Security Council is not optional; it is an obligation of all Member States. The humanitarian community stands ready to do its part. Having adopted this resolution, the Council must do its part. For the next few weeks, let us seize the opportunity that this resolution represents and focus on its implementation. We would like to make four concrete recommendations on the way forward. First, existing de-escalation agreements must be complied with most urgently in eastern Ghouta. We call on the three Astana guarantors to spare no effort to achieve this end. Resolution 2401 (2018) clearly demands that all parties cease hostilities; air strikes, the ground offensive and shelling must stop. We take note of the initial positive indications from armed opposition groups in eastern Ghouta that they are ready to comply with the resolution. We also note their commitment to expel the Al-Nusra Front from the area. We must build on this, and we call on those with influence over armed opposition groups to secure their commitment to the cessation of hostilities. Clearly the Council has demanded in resolution 2401 (2018) that the Syrian Government cease all military operations without delay. Secondly, as Mr. Lowcock has told us, the United Nations and its implementing partners in the field are ready to commence life-saving convoys and medical evacuations. We urge the Syrian authorities to immediately issue facilitation letters for the convoy to Duma to proceed this week as a necessary first step. It can no longer be business as usual; the Council has demanded weekly convoys to all areas and populations in need. Thirdly, existing structures to strengthen compliance with and monitoring of the cessation must urgently be activated. We look to the Chairs of the Task Force on the Ceasefire of the International Syria Support Group to undertake more frequent meetings, which are needed at least on a weekly basis. The Amman operations room should also be utilized. We see merit in making a clearer link between monitoring mechanisms and the Security Council. Fourthly, the Council must remain actively seized of this matter. Sweden and Kuwait will request an open briefing from the incoming presidency on the Secretary-General's report on implementation and compliance that is due 15 days after the resolution's adoption. We should also stand ready to meet and take appropriate action at any time necessary so as to ensure implementation of this resolution. Finally, we welcome any efforts to de-escalate violence and to allow and facilitate humanitarian access in Syria, but let us be clear — resolution 2401 (2018) demands a 30-day, nationwide ceasefire, with immediate access for weekly convoys and medical evacuations. A five-hour ceasefire does not meet the requirements of the resolution. The resolution is not primarily about the evacuation of civilians, but demands humanitarian access to civilians and medical evacuations. The 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 7/22 cessation of hostilities must be implemented fully and without delay. It is imperative that all parties uphold their obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law at all times. Last Saturday's unanimous action reinforced the legitimacy and credibility of the Security Council (see S/PV.8188). Today's briefings demonstrate that there is no time to rest on the laurels of this achievement. We must now move without delay to ensure our action here last Saturday is translated into the relief and assistance expected by the millions of people affected by this conflict. It is now incumbent on all the parties and all those with influence over the parties to spare no effort and use all channels available in order to advance the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): First of all, I want to thank Mark Lowcock and Jeffrey Feltman for their very clear briefings. I would like today to focus my remarks on our shared road map, namely, the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), which we adopted unanimously last Saturday (see S/PV. 8188). On behalf of France, I would like to express three main messages today. My first message is that we must not pay lip service. The situation on the ground remains dramatic and has not improved in recent days. Since the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), the offensive against the eastern Ghouta has continued relentlessly. France, of course, strongly condemns these indiscriminate bombings, which affect inhabited areas and civil infrastructure. In this context, the disastrous humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate. No United Nations convoy has been able to reach the eastern Ghouta or any of the other besieged areas, no emergency medical evacuation has been carried out, no siege has been lifted. The Syrian regime is maintaining its stranglehold on the civilian population and is methodically pursuing its policy of destruction. More than 400,000 people remain under siege in eastern Ghouta, including 130,000 children. The demand sent by the United Nations to authorize a priority convoy for Duma, the main city in eastern Ghouta, has not received any response from the Syrian authorities to date. My second message is this. The resolution adopted by the Security Council on 24 February makes very specific demands on the parties. Hostilities must cease without delay in order to establish a lasting humanitarian truce for at least 30 days, in order to allow both the delivery of humanitarian aid and the evacuation of the wounded and sick. Let me stress this point. These demands are perfectly clear and cannot be distorted or reinterpreted. Contrary to what some would have us believe, the demands made by the resolution are absolutely clear. Our responsibility today is to implement, fully and in their totality, the provisions that we have unanimously adopted. If we do not that, what credibility can be given to our commitments? What credibility can be given to Security Council resolutions? The United Nations and its partners tell us that they are ready to deliver aid to the people of eastern Ghouta and other priority areas. There is therefore not a minute to lose because every minute that passes can turn lives upside down. At the conclusion of difficult negotiations, the Council managed to unite in the face of the gravity of the humanitarian situation and the escalation of the Syrian conflict in recent months. We must now work together, in the same spirit of unity, to effectively implement on the ground the resolution we unanimously adopted. This is my third message. Following yesterday's meeting in Moscow with French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian and his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, France is putting forward four concrete proposals for making progress and for doing so without delay. The first is to ensure that all parties implement the cessation of hostilities that resolution 2401 (2018) demands. I note that the three main opposition groups present in eastern Ghouta as well as Nassar Al Hariri, head of the High Negotiations Committee of the Syrian opposition, have written to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Council to state that they would respect the truce. It is therefore urgent in the extreme — if I can put it that way — that the Damascus regime also unambiguously express its willingness to respect the Council resolution and to formalize it in writing. We have taken note of the Russian proposal of a daily five-hour humanitarian truce. It is a positive first step, but it is insufficient. We must go further. Resolution 2401 (2018) demands of the parties a minimum period of 30 consecutive days of cessation of hostilities. Respecting that demand is non-negotiable. That goal requires more than just symbolic declarations or political posturing. At a minimum, it requires that humanitarian personnel be allowed to do their work. S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 8/22 18-05507 These workers are used to taking risks on a daily basis, but the parties must allow them to do their work. Given that the opposition groups have formally committed to doing just that, the regime must do so as well, and without delay. To that end, supporters of the regime, beginning with Russia, must bring the necessary pressure to bear. Our second proposal, by way of a demand, pertains to the need to immediately open the relevant, clearly identified checkpoints — beginning with Wafideen — in order to allow the access of priority convoys of the United Nations. We therefore demand that the Syrian authorities submit without delay the necessary letter to facilitate the deployment of humanitarian convoys. Thirdly, it is extremely urgent to allow medical evacuations for the most critical cases, giving priority to children. The Syrian Arab Red Crescent indicates that 1,065 people need emergency medical evacuations. We have not a minute to lose. Finally, France considers it essential to create a monitoring mechanism to ensure the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) and compliance with the resolution by the parties. We are working diligently to establishing that mechanism now. Those are the French proposals to address the urgent need to put an end to the bombing and protect civilians, who beyond resolution 2401 (2018), are protected under international humanitarian law. It is also crucial to intensify our efforts to reach a political solution in the framework of the Geneva process and resolution 2254 (2015). It is the only way out of the conflict and the only way to prevent a looming escalation of tensions. France will not deviate from that path. The overall credibility of the Security Council and the responsibility of each of its members are crucially at stake today in the context of the Syrian tragedy. Mr. Allen (United Kingdom): I would like to thank Under-Secretary-Generals Lowcock and Feltman for their clear, factual briefings and for reiterating to all of us on the Security Council the ongoing horror of the conflict in Syria — and in particular in eastern Ghouta, because that is where it is clear the situation is most dire by a huge order of magnitude. It was five days ago (see S/PV.8188) that we sat in this Chamber and all of us raised our hands in support of a 30-day ceasefire, which we hoped would provide some relief to Syria's people. That was a desperately needed step, one that came too late for many. In eastern Ghouta alone, Médecins Sans Frontières reported that at least 630 people were killed and 3,000 injured in the week before resolution 2401 (2018) was adopted, with women and children representing nearly 60 per cent of the wounded and 50 per cent of the deceased. We also continue to condemn attacks on Damascus from eastern Ghouta. Let us recall the demands of our resolution. It called for at least a 30-day ceasefire without delay to allow for the delivery of humanitarian aid and medical evacuation. "Without delay" means right now, immediately — that there should be no delay. We all voted for those demands and we committed to using our influence to ensure that. In response, Russia has declared a five-hour daily humanitarian window. That is not what the Council demanded, nor what Russia agreed to use its influence to ensure. A five-hour window has not delivered and cannot deliver any meaningful improvement on the ground. Under-Secretary-General Lowcock has made clear that the United Nations cannot get humanitarian convoys in and out within that time frame, as has the International Committee of the Red Cross. Humanitarian pauses of a few meagre hours are no substitute for a sustained ceasefire, which is vital to ensuring the delivery of life-saving humanitarian assistance and medical evacuations. If Russia is able to deliver a five-hour pause, let it deliver a 24-hour pause, as it agreed on Saturday. Let us now take stock of the situation in Syria, and specifically in eastern Ghouta, where the situation is at its most desperate. Let us review if any real change has occurred in the past five days. Has the resolution been implemented? Has there been a ceasefire? Has there been any delivery of humanitarian aid or any medical evacuations? Has the adoption of the resolution brought any relief to the people of Syria? The fighting has not stopped. All of the main armed opposition groups have committed to the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). The Al-Assad regime has not, and has in fact ignored the resolution we adopted. Reports of attacks and air strikes by pro-regime forces continue. Twenty-two air strikes reportedly took place even during Russia's so-called humanitarian pause. And, as if it could not get any worse, there have been disturbing reports of the use of chlorine gas. Doctors in eastern Ghouta reported to the Syrian-American Medical Society that 16 patients, including six children, were suffering from symptoms 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 9/22 indicative of exposure to chemical compounds, following an alleged regime attack on Sunday — only one day after the resolution was adopted. Since Saturday not a single aid convoy has been able to access eastern Ghouta to provide relief to the desperate civilians. The World Health Organization estimates that 1,000 people are now in need of medical evacuation from eastern Ghouta. None have been evacuated since the resolution was adopted. The consequences of the failure to implement the resolution are clear: the casualties continue to rise and the horror continues. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reports at least 14 civilians, including three children, were killed on Sunday. In short, in the words of one doctor from eastern Ghouta, "Nothing has changed." It is the responsibility of us all to ensure that resolution 2401 (2018) is enacted in full. In the words of my Foreign Secretary, the Al-Assad regime must allow the United Nations to deliver humanitarian aid, in compliance with resolution 2401 (2018), and we look to Russia and Iran to make sure this happens, in accordance with their own promises. I implore all those with influence over the Syrian regime to act now to ensure that the ceasefire that they supported in the Chamber is implemented in full and immediately. To do anything less is an affront to the Council, the United Nations and the international system that we live by. We will continue to monitor the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) and commit to returning to the Council regularly until we see it respected. Ms. Eckels-Currie (United States of America): Every time the Security Council attempts to address the humanitarian crisis in Syria, we take a small leap of faith. I say "we" in reference to the Security Council. I speak of faith because all Council members and most States Members of the United Nations still genuinely try to uphold the responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations, including abiding by and fully implementing Security Council resolutions. Despite the grim updates we heard today, we must maintain the hope that we can help the Syrian people. If we do not have that hope, we are wasting our time here. Just four days ago, the Security Council took another leap of faith. We adopted resolution 2401 (2018), demanding a 30-day ceasefire for all of Syria, unimpeded and sustained humanitarian access to deliver desperately needed food and medical supplies, and immediate and unconditional medical evacuations based on need and emergency. Our goal was clear and simple. The Al-Assad regime and its supporters have been pummelling eastern Ghouta, where 400,000 people live under siege and constant bombardment. Resolution 2401 (2018) demanded that the assault stop. That was the Council speaking in one, clear voice. The opposition groups operating in eastern Ghouta have made clear their commitment to the ceasefire. The Free Syrian Army, Jaysh al-Islam, the Al-Rahman Legion and Ahrar al-Sham all committed to implementing resolution 2401 (2018). Against all odds, we hoped that Mr. Al-Assad might respect the resolution, cease hostilities and allow unfettered humanitarian access to all those who need it. Against all odds, we hoped that Russia would use its influence to ensure Mr. Al-Assad's commitment to resolution 2401 (2018). Once again, that hope has been crushed because so far, for the people of eastern Ghouta, nothing has changed. Despite the unanimous call for a ceasefire, the regime's attacks continue unabated. Hundreds of Syrians have been killed or injured since we adopted the resolution on Saturday. What is worse is that less than 24 hours after we demanded the ceasefire, there were reports that the Al-Assad regime again used chlorine gas as a weapon. Such attacks demonstrate Syria's complete and utter contempt for the Council and the United Nations. On Monday one human rights organization reported 18 attacks that defied the Council's demands. On Tuesday another organization reported at least 23 air strikes and four barrel bombs in eastern Ghouta. Syrians on the ground are reporting that Tuesday was worse than Monday with regard to strikes from the regime. How can that be? On the humanitarian front, as Mark Lowcock stated, the Al-Assad regime has allowed no deliveries of assistance into eastern Ghouta — not one. Opposition groups in the area have expressed their commitment to allowing aid in, but the Al-Assad regime still says no. Since we adopted resolution 2401 (2018), Russia has announced a daily five-hour humanitarian pause in the aerial bombing of civilians in eastern Ghouta, which is cynical, callous and in flagrant defiance of the demands of resolution 2401 (2018). The cessation of hostilities is for at least 30 days — every day, all day. Russia does not get to unilaterally rewrite the terms of the resolution. It negotiated it and voted for it. Russia, S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 10/22 18-05507 Iran and the Al-Assad regime are not even trying to hide their intentions. They are asking civilians to leave eastern Ghouta on the false premise that they can then attack anyone left in the area as much as they would like. Let us call the actions what they are. Mr. Al-Assad and his allies want the civilians of eastern Ghouta to walk into the arms of a regime that has been attacking and starving them for the past seven years. That is not a humanitarian gesture. They do not care if the 400,000 people of eastern Ghouta suffer, as long as they can continue to pursue their military and political objectives. We know what Iran, Syria and the Al-Assad regime are doing because they have done the same thing in the past. It is the same playbook they used for Aleppo in 2016. Once again, we, including Russia, demanded in the Security Council Chamber that Mr. Al-Assad stop the bombing, and yet Russia, Iran and Mr. Al-Assad continue their attacks, defying the wishes of the Council and of the international community. Because we have been through this before, we know what Russia will say today. It will say that there are terrorists in eastern Ghouta so that the Al-Assad regime can bomb as ferociously and indiscriminately as it wants and kill as many civilians as it wants. That defies the principles governing the laws of war. The Al-Assad regime should not be allowed to bomb and starve its own people into submission under the guise of counter-terrorism. That Russian argument makes a mockery of the Council and of international law. Russia also accuses the United States of somehow being responsible for humanitarian crises in Syria, but such accusations are ludicrous. The United States does not block humanitarian aid in any area. In fact, the United States has provided more than $7 billion in humanitarian aid in response to the crisis. The Council must not fall for Russia's misdirections. When the ceasefire was adopted unanimously on Saturday, including by the Russians, Ambassador Haley stated that our resolve to stand by our demands in the resolution would be tested. It has come to pass. Despite everything that has happened since Saturday, we are not casting aside the ceasefire in Syria; just the opposite. We would like to redouble our efforts in the Security Council to implement it, but the only way to change the situation on the ground is for all of us — every single one of us — around the table and each State Member of the United Nations to speak the truth about what is happening. The past four days should show us that when it comes to demanding a ceasefire, it is not enough to say that all parties should show restraint or commit to the ceasefire because in eastern Ghouta there is only one party dropping barrel bombs, gassing the Syrian people and denying deliveries of food and medical assistance. It is the Al-Assad regime, operating with the full support of Russia and Iran. On Saturday we stated that the only way to restore the credibility of the Council was to make the ceasefire a reality. Russia, Iran and the Al-Assad regime have not complied with the Council's demands and have not silenced their guns. Unless we take action, they will stop at nothing to destroy eastern Ghouta and we will again fail to help the Syrian people. Mr. Van Oosterom (Netherlands): First, let me thank Under-Secretaries-General Lowcock and Feltman for their briefings. In my statement I will address three points: implementation, implementation and implementation. First, I will speak about the implementation of the cessation of hostilities. Since the Council adopted resolution 2401 (2018) on Saturday, civilians are still dying in eastern Ghouta and elsewhere in Syria. The humanitarian disaster continues worsen. We need a full, nationwide cessation of hostilities and we need it now. The Russian proposal for a humanitarian corridor and pauses of five hours per day cannot be a substitute for a humanitarian pause of 30 consecutive days, as demanded in resolution 2401 (2018). Those five hours do not meet the obligations under the resolution and are not enough for the United Nations to be effective in delivering aid to the entire area of Ghouta, as Under- Secretary-General Lowcock just stated. We call upon the parties to the conflict and on those with influence on the parties to show decisive action and stop the violence. As Under-Secretary- General Feltman stated, three armed opposition groups in eastern Ghouta have announced that they are committed to fully implementing resolution 2401 (2018). We expect the regime to do the same. The air strikes, the shelling and the shooting must stop. For the credibility of the Council, it is crucial that its resolutions be fully implemented. That is the obligation of all States Members of the United Nations, under the Charter. 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 11/22 The Kingdom of the Netherlands repeats the call made by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, to the Astana guarantors. She called on the Foreign Ministers of Russia, Iran and Turkey to "take all necessary steps to ensure that the fighting stops, the Syrian people are protected and that urgent humanitarian access and necessary medical evacuations are taking place". My second point is about the implementation of humanitarian access. Resolution 2401 (2018) calls for sieges of populated areas, including eastern Ghouta, to be lifted immediately, and demands safe, unimpeded and sustained access for humanitarian convoys. As Under-Secretary-General Lowcock just explained, the United Nations stands ready with 45 trucks to deliver essential aid to eastern Ghouta. But the necessary facilitation letters are still lacking, and the security conditions do not permit those deliveries. At this point, more than 1,000 people are in urgent need of medical care, but they are still trapped in eastern Ghouta. If they are not given the care they need in hospitals in Damascus or elsewhere, they may die. The United Nations and the Security Council have consistently pleaded for these medical evacuations, and yet there are still no developments with regard to them. We also need to see access to aid for those fleeing the fighting in Afrin. More generally, there should be delivery of humanitarian aid to the areas that are not under Government control. As Mr. Feltman just said, we should reach all who are in need, wherever they are. My third point is about implementing the protection of civilians. The exception on the cessation of hostilities in paragraph 2 of the resolution allows targeted action against terrorists who are designated as such by the Council. However, that does not mean that absolutely anything is allowed. International humanitarian law applies to all military combat operations and counter-terrorism actions. The principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution must be respected in all circumstances. The civilians in the conflict must be protected. There is talk of humanitarian corridors for civilians who want to leave eastern Ghouta, but evacuations should always be voluntary. We are concerned about the possibility that humanitarian corridors will be used for forced population transfers. Civilians cannot be forced to leave, and neither should they be forced to stay. If voluntary evacuations do take place, we will call on the United Nations to monitor them. Currently, the most urgent humanitarian situation is in eastern Ghouta and Idlib, but needs remain high elsewhere in Syria as well. We welcomed the January delivery of aid to Rukban, but we want to stress the importance of sustained access and a durable solution. As others have said today, the demining activities in Raqqa should be increased, and the Kingdom of the Netherlands is doing its part in that regard. The media coverage of the issue of the exploitation of Syrian women in exchange for aid is very disturbing. There should be no tolerance of such behaviour, as the Secretary-General and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs have already said. The probity of any United Nations implementing parties should be beyond any doubt. In conclusion, we must ensure that resolution 2254 (2015) is fully implemented. There can be no military solution to the conflict, and we call on all the parties to engage seriously in the United Nations-led political process as a matter of urgency. The suffering of the people of Syria has lasted for more than seven years. For the sake of the millions of women, children and men trapped in this horrendous war, it is high time that all parties started putting the protection, interests and well-being of the Syrian people on the top of their agenda. Yesterday, my Minister, Ms. Sigrid Kaag, said that humanitarian access and the protection of civilians are cornerstones of international humanitarian law. They are part of our shared values and shared humanity. The Security Council must do justice to those values and to our shared humanity. Mr. Meza-Cuadra (Peru) (spoke in Spanish): We thank you for convening today's meeting, Mr. President, and for the briefings by Mr. Lowcock and Mr. Feltman on the situation in Syria. On Saturday, when we adopted resolution 2401 (2018) after long and complex negotiations, we highlighted the commitment that Council members have shown to achieving a humanitarian ceasefire in Syria. As we said at the time, it will be crucial to closely monitor its proper implementation and to maintain the Council's unity with regard to its responsibility to protect the civilian population, in line with international law and international humanitarian law. Four days in, we are still being forced to lament and condemn the attacks on civilians and to reiterate S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 12/22 18-05507 our calls for the immediate and comprehensive implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). As the Secretary-General has pointed out, Council resolutions make sense only if they are effectively implemented. The credibility of the Security Council as a whole, and of those of its members with the greatest potential influence on the ground in particular, is at stake. In the light of this, we want to emphasize that the cessation of hostilities that the Council has demanded clearly covers the whole of Syrian territory, including eastern Ghouta and Afrin, and should last for a minimum of 30 days. If we are to ensure that, in our view we should mobilize the International Syria Support Group's Ceasefire Task Force. It is essential to ensure that all the parties to the conflict comply with the ceasefire provided for in resolution 2401 (2018), and that the Council is able to closely monitor that compliance. In that regard, we support the four recommendations outlined by Sweden and Kuwait. We must remind the Syrian authorities of their responsibility to protect their people, and we firmly condemn the military operations in eastern Ghouta and other areas of the country that have continued even after the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018). However, we welcome the strenuous efforts of the Organization, and of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in particular, to prepare 45 trucks carrying supplies and ready to enter eastern Ghouta as soon as the necessary permits are granted. The first report on the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) will be presented in less than two weeks, and we hope that it will be able to inform us that the humanitarian crisis caused by the Syrian conflict has been alleviated, because we cannot wait any longer. It is the Security Council's duty to continue working relentlessly to achieve what we have all unanimously agreed on. Ms. Wronecka (Poland): I very much appreciate today's clear and informative briefings by Mr. Lowcock and Mr. Feltman, and I would like to share a few thoughts from Poland's point of view. Since the Council's adoption on Saturday of resolution 2401 (2018), we have been seeing yet more extremely worrying developments on the ground. As I said in my last statement on the subject (see S/PV.8188), the heavy fighting in Syria has unfortunately not only continued but is increasing. In that context, we should persist in our efforts to take every possible action to ensure the resolution's full and safe implementation. We call on all to work to alleviate the suffering of civilians, including children, by giving them free and safe access to humanitarian assistance. That should include voluntary evacuation, which should be strictly overseen by the United Nations and its implementing partners and based solely on medical need, in order to ensure that the process is genuinely voluntary. We would like to stress that all the relevant actors should use all their influence to help to improve the conditions on the ground immediately. We urgently call for a cessation of hostilities throughout all of Syria for 30 days, as stipulated in resolution 2401 (2018). In that context, it is also important to note that the cessation of hostilities may also offer an opportunity for the talks being held under United Nations auspices in Geneva to gain momentum, so that a political solution can finally be reached. For that reason, we call on all parties to fulfil their commitments to the existing ceasefire agreements. It should be emphasized that the implementation of the ceasefire announced by resolution 2401 (2018) should ensure the safe entrance and stay of humanitarian and medical personnel without prejudice to their health or life. When such personnel enter hard-to-reach areas, we should know precisely how long they can stay while delivering assistance under the ceasefire, otherwise their lives could also be in danger. In conclusion, let me stress the importance of maintaining the unity of the Council on the question of the implementation of humanitarian resolutions. The unanimous adoption of the resolution is just the beginning of the process. We call on all actors with influence on the ground to take all steps necessary to ensure that the fighting stops, that the Syrian people are protected and, finally, that urgent humanitarian access is enabled and that the necessary medical evacuations can take place. Mr. Inchauste Jordán (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): We thank Mr. Lowcock, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, and Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, for their respective briefings. Once again, we would like to say how appalled we are at the terrible situation suffered by the Syrian people, as the past two months have been the most violent since the start of the conflict, and civilians, primarily women and children, are the ones that are suffering the gravest consequences of this intensification of the war. We call the attention of the Security Council to the continuing 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 13/22 violations of international law, especially international humanitarian law and international human rights law, as these attacks have targeted civilian infrastructure such as hospitals, schools and homes. My delegation would like to express once again its gratitude to the delegations of Sweden and Kuwait for their work in promoting the unanimous adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), which imposes a cessation of hostilities throughout Syria, which is as urgent as it is necessary. We urge the parties to implement the resolution immediately in order to speed up access of humanitarian assistance without any restrictions, allow urgent medical evacuations and the entry of humanitarian convoys, and ensure the protection of hospitals and medical facilities, especially in eastern Ghouta, Idlib and north of Hama. We wish to underscore once again the need for continued cooperation and coordination among the Syrian Government and the various humanitarian assistance agencies, so that the delivery of humanitarian assistance can be effective, especially in hard-to-reach areas, and to prevent administrative obstacles from derailing or negatively affecting the deployment of the required humanitarian assistance. We also stress the need to begin, as soon as possible, humanitarian mine-clearing in areas that require it, in particular in the city of Raqqa, to allow the return in dignified and safe conditions of people who were forced to flee their homes because of the conflict. As we have stated previously, we believe that if our aim is to alleviate the suffering of the Syrian people in the face of armed violence, the Security Council has the major challenge of maintaining its unity so as to ensure that this organ's decisions are implemented. We reiterate that the solution to this conflict can be found only through an inclusive political process based on dialogue and coordination, led by the Syrian people and for the Syrian people, that will make it possible to reach a peaceful solution among all parties involved. With this in mind, we wish to highlight the various forums for dialogue, specifically the Astana process, at which de-escalation zones were agreed on that must be respected by all parties. We will be closely following the next round of the process. We wish also to highlight the other opportunities for dialogue that could make it possible to reach further compromises to achieve a definitive end to hostilities, such as the Sochi national dialogue, which is aimed at strengthening the Geneva political process, with respect for the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria and its right to choose its own political, economic and social system without any external pressure or interference. Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue (Côte d'Ivoire) (spoke in French): Côte d'Ivoire thanks Mr. Jeffrey Feltman and Mr. Mark Lowcock for their respective briefings on recent developments in the situation in Syria following the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 2401 (2018), on the humanitarian situation in Syria. My delegation commends the Secretary-General for his unstinting efforts as part of the political dialogue among the Syrian parties with the aim of arriving at a lasting solution to the protracted crisis ravaging that country. In that regard, my country welcomes the holding of intra-Syrian peace talks on 25 and 26 January in Vienna in the framework of the Geneva process, followed by the talks held in Sochi on 29 and 30 January. My delegation cherishes the hope that the proposals stemming from the Sochi talks, including the establishment of a committee tasked with drawing up a new constitution, will receive consistent attention from the international community, as part of the concerted quest to find a lasting solution to the crisis in Syria. The situation on the ground is deeply alarming. Military operations that include the use of non-conventional weapons are leading to mass displacements of people, the loss of human lives, injuries and the destruction of public infrastructure, including hospitals and schools. The grave humanitarian crisis spawned by the fighting led to the adoption by the Security Council this past Saturday, 24 February, of resolution 2401 (2018), with a view to the cessation without delay of hostilities for a 30-day period to enable the delivery of humanitarian assistance to people in need as well as medical evacuations. My delegation notes with regret that the adoption of the resolution did not contribute to restoring calm on the ground. The ceasefire proposed was short-lived, despite the numerous appeals for a cessation of hostilities. Even the very minimum one called for by the Russian Federation, an ally of the Damascus Government, on Monday 26 February did not lead to a positive response. Air raids and rocket launches continue on the ground, thereby obstructing the work of humanitarian personnel. S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 14/22 18-05507 We deplore the ongoing loss of life among humanitarian workers — 22 United Nations personnel and 66 staff members or volunteers of the International Red Cross — and we deplore also the material damage that has been wrought, which includes the destruction of 25 vehicles and 44 facilities, according to the information we have received. Nonetheless, Côte d'Ivoire welcomes the fact that United Nations humanitarian agencies and their partners have managed to assist people in need by conducting 1,567 deliveries. My country reaffirms that a resolution of the crisis in Syria must be part of an inclusive dialogue and political process, as set out in the road map under resolution 2254 (2015). In that regard, my country calls for full compliance with the 30-day ceasefire, in accordance with resolution 2401 (2018), which will not only allow humanitarian actors to respond to critical emergencies but also create the conditions for a return to the negotiating table by all parties to the Syrian crisis. To that end, Côte d'Ivoire urges the members of the Security Council to unite and surmount their differences in order to send a message of hope and solidarity of the international community to the Syrian people. Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): As usual, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Mark Lowcock and Under- Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman just gave us detailed briefings on the humanitarian and political situation in Syria. Those were the first briefings to be delivered to the Security Council following the unanimous adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), on 24 February. I take this opportunity to thank both Under-Secretaries-General, as well as to acknowledge the willingness of the United Nations and its partners to send convoys of trucks with the necessary humanitarian aid and begin medical evacuations as soon as conditions on the ground allow. As Secretary-General António Guterres said two days ago in his statement before the Human Rights Council, "Security Council resolutions are only meaningful if they are effectively implemented". The Republic of Equatorial Guinea hopes resolution 2401 (2018) is meaningful in that way in order to relieve the affected population of the suffering it has endured, especially in eastern Ghouta, that is, we hope for it to be immediately implemented. We want to reiterate that the Syrian conflict has no military solution. The opponents therefore must take a seat at the negotiating table to engage in direct and frank dialogue, without exclusions, however complicated it may be to do so. It must be the Syrians who determine the future they want for their country. The international community must redouble its efforts in making sure the opponents engage in negotiations, and the countries that have influence need to wield it to establish trust, with the ultimate goal of achieving lasting and just peace in Syria. We commend the intention expressed by the largest opposition groups — Jaysh Al-Islam, Faylaq Al-Rahman and Ahrar Al-Sham — to respect the ceasefire, and we invite all the other parties involved to take the same decision. The Republic of Equatorial Guinea believes that the only reason that the humanitarian situation remains of concern is because the opponents do not agree on negotiating to reach a peace agreement, which consequently causes more civilian victims, leads to the destruction of hospital facilities and hampers humanitarian aid operations. The conflict has recently intensified around the town of eastern Ghouta and some other parts of Syria, which has resulted in civilian casualties, the destruction of a considerable number of medical and relief facilities and the obstruction of humanitarian relief operations led by the United Nations. Equatorial Guinea is very touched and horrified by the critical situation the Syrian people are experiencing, and we must not show indifference to so much pain and suffering. It is therefore imperative that the parties to the conflict implement and uphold the relevant Security Council resolutions, especially the most recent, resolution 2401 (2018), including allowing access to humanitarian aid, halting hostilities and ultimately, cooperating with the United Nations in its efforts to assuage the conflict and make humanitarian operations effective by ensuring aid deliveries reach the affected populations and evacuating the sick and seriously injured so that they can receive the necessary medical care. The international community, while striving to help Syria, must not forget the neighbouring countries that have welcomed refugees and shown a spirit of solidarity worthy of praise. I would like to conclude my statement by expressing well-deserved tribute to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and all those who work with it on the ground for their bravery and determination in fulfilling their humanitarian mission to deliver aid to 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 15/22 those in need. We encourage them to persist in their noble efforts. Mr. Tumysh (Kazakhstan): I join others in thanking Under-Secretary-General Lowcock and Under- Secretary-General Feltman for their comprehensive and sobering briefings. Kazakhstan welcomed the unanimous adoption of resolution 2401 (2018). That document should be urgently implemented to ensure a comprehensive ceasefire in Syria. The ceasefire regime should be implemented fully, especially in the areas of eastern Ghouta, southern Idlib and northern Hama, to resolve their long-accumulated acute humanitarian problems, deliver aid to the most difficult regions and evacuate the wounded and sick. Turning to the situation on the ground in the country, according to our humanitarian colleagues, over the past 78 hours and to our deep regret, military operations continued to be reported in besieged eastern Ghouta, resulting in deaths, including women and children. Attacks on Damascus from eastern Ghouta are also continuing. To our great disappointment, a Syrian Arab Red Crescent warehouse in a Damascus suburb was reportedly struck by shelling. During the same period, attacks on the city of Damascus and the governorate resulted in 14 deaths and 214 injured. We are glad to know that the United Nations has mobilized and is ready to immediately support life-saving aid convoys in several areas in eastern Ghouta. We therefore call on the Council members and the wider United Nations membership to assist the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in operationalizing the delivery of humanitarian assistance in eastern Ghouta, as well as in carrying out hundreds of medical evacuations. We echo the United Nations calls on all parties to facilitate unconditional, unimpeded and sustained access to all people in need throughout the country and take all measures to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure, including schools and medical facilities, as required by international law. It is equally important to ensure, in close coordination with OCHA, the protection of medical and humanitarian workers. We must also insist that parties support United Nation agencies in the fulfilment of their mandates. In that context, Kazakhstan proposes that all-round assistance be provided to the inter-Syrian negotiations through the Astana process and that positive developments be taken advantage of to improve the humanitarian situation. My country stands for a solution in Syria based on resolution 2254 (2015), the Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex) and agreements on the de-escalation zones reached through the Astana process. We regret the lack of full agreement and close coordination among the key stakeholders in managing the Syrian crisis. We also attach great importance to strengthening the inter-Syrian political dialogue with greater support from the world community. Lastly, Kazakhstan notes the need to establish closer interaction among the leading stakeholders in Syria, in particular between the Russian Federation and the United States, to improve the political process and ensure positive changes on the humanitarian track. Mr. Wu Haitao (China) (spoke in Chinese): I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General Lowcock and Under-Secretary-General Feltman for their briefings. China commends the United Nations aid agencies for their humanitarian relief efforts in Syria. The security situation in various parts of Syria, including Damascus and eastern Ghouta, has escalated recently, causing significant civilian casualties. We sympathize profoundly with the suffering of the Syrian people and condemn all acts of violence against innocent civilians. The parties concerned should take immediate measures to de-escalate the tensions in line with the relevant Security Council resolutions. The Council's unanimous adoption of resolution 2401 (2018) demonstrates the consensus and unity of its members on the humanitarian issue in Syria. We appreciate the positive efforts of the parties concerned. China welcomed Russia's announcement by Russia that it will implement the ceasefire measures and assist with the evacuation of people from conflict areas. We call on the parties in Syria to put an immediate end to hostilities in accordance with the resolution, actively coordinate with United Nations relief efforts and ensure safe humanitarian corridors in the relevant areas. A political settlement is the only viable solution to the Syrian issue. The Syrian National Dialogue Congress was recently held successfully in Sochi and has had positive results. Special Envoy de Mistura is making ongoing efforts to advance the Syrian political process. The international community should support the Syrian parties in resuming dialogue and negotiations under the auspices of United Nations mediation as soon S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 16/22 18-05507 as possible and in seeking a solution that is acceptable to all parties through a Syrian-owned and -led political process. That is the only way to fundamentally ease the humanitarian situation in Syria and end the suffering of the Syrian people without delay. Terrorist organizations are still launching attacks in Syria, causing significant civilian casualties and impeding United Nations humanitarian relief efforts. The international community should strengthen its cooperation on counter-terrorism, adopt unified standards and resolutely combat all terrorist organizations that are designated as such by the Security Council. Ms. Guadey (Ethiopia): We thank Under-Secretary- General Mark Lowcock and Under-Secretary-General Jeffrey Feltman for their comprehensive briefings. We would like to express our gratitude to the United Nations and its humanitarian partners for their continuing efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to millions of Syrians. As Mr. Lowcock said, the humanitarian crisis in Syria continues to be a devastating one. Military activities in various parts of the country, including eastern Ghouta, have affected the ability of the United Nations to deliver lifesaving assistance to all in need. As the report of the Secretary- General (S/2018/138) says, the conflict and other obstacles have had a disastrous effect on the level of humanitarian access. In order to address those challenges and to alleviate the Syrians' suffering, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2401 (2018), demanding the institution without delay of a cessation of hostilities for at least 30 consecutive days throughout Syria so as to ensure the safe, unimpeded and sustained delivery of humanitarian aid and services and medical evacuations. As we all emphasized on Saturday after welcoming the resolution's adoption (see S/PV.8186), what is now required is its full and comprehensive implementation with the immediate engagement of all parties and those with influence on them. Of course, we understand and appreciate the fact that the United Nations is ready to provide immediate humanitarian aid across the country. However, as Mr. Lowcock just highlighted, there are still military activities in various areas. In that regard, we call on all the parties to fully implement resolution 2401 (2018) for the sake of the Syrian people, who have continued to bear the brunt of the conflict for almost eight years. We appreciate any measure taken by Member States to facilitate the implementation of the ceasefire, including the humanitarian pause and humanitarian corridor announced by the Russian Federation. At the same time, it is obvious that more needs to be done to fully implement the resolution. It is therefore imperative to take urgent and coordinated action to bring about an immediate ceasefire, thereby ensuring that the United Nations and its humanitarian partners have safe, sustained and needs-based access in order to deliver humanitarian aid to all Syrians in need of assistance. In conclusion, it is ultimately a comprehensive, Syrian-led political solution, facilitated by the United Nations on the basis of resolution 2254 (2015), that can sustainably end the humanitarian tragedy in Syria. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Under-Secretary-General Lowcock and Under-Secretary-General Feltman for their briefings. By the way, at the outset I would like to take advantage of this opportunity to ask Mr. Lowcock where the United Nations is getting its evidence and data on deaths in Damascus, for instance. According to the Syrian authorities' information, for example, just since 22 January, 12 people have died in Damascus, while the United Nations figure is 11 for the whole month. Where is he getting his information from? The White Helmets, maybe? Today, as has been usual recently, the United States delegation devoted its statement to Russia. It told us that it knew what we were going to say today, which it does not. And I am pleased about that, because it means that it did not see our statement before the meeting began. On 24 January, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2401 (2018), in an important decision aimed at improving the humanitarian situation in Syria, especially in areas where the danger of military clashes remains or there are obstacles of one kind or another to the civilian population's access to essential assistance. Today many questions have been asked — emphatic questions, rhetorical questions, questions aimed directly at us. We answered the questions asked of us during our discussion at the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018). There are a lot of people here who like to pick citations from the resolution that they like and forget the ones that do not suit them. If I may, I will quote two extracts from it, from paragraph 1 and paragraph 10. 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 17/22 (spoke in English) "Demands that all parties cease hostilities without delay, and engage immediately to ensure full and comprehensive implementation of this demand by all parties, for a durable humanitarian pause for at least 30 consecutive days throughout Syria, to enable the safe, unimpeded and sustained delivery of humanitarian aid and … medical evacuations". "[U]nderscores the need for the parties to agree on humanitarian pauses, days of tranquillity, localized ceasefires and truces to allow humanitarian agencies safe and unhindered access to all affected areas in Syria". (spoke in Russian) Has everyone read the resolution? We have said, and we will say it again, that any sustained pause must be preceded by an agreement between the parties on de-escalation. The demands that military activity end overnight are either the result of a misunderstanding of the realities or a deliberate exploitation of this human tragedy. The statement by the United States delegation simply rewrote resolution 2401 (2018). What sort of joint effort, such as the Permanent Representative of France called for today, can we talk about in these circumstances after what we heard today in the United States delegation's statement? Russia has announced the establishment in eastern Ghouta of daily five-hour humanitarian pauses. Everything possible is being done to ensure that they function successfully. Specifically, medical and temporary accommodation posts have been equipped, ambulance teams organized, motor transport provided. We call on the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and other recognized humanitarian organizations to join these efforts. However, on the very first day, the militias took advantage of the announcement of the pause to go on the offensive. The same thing happened on the second day. The mortar shelling continued, including in the humanitarian operations corridors. Not a single person was able to leave the danger area. We took note of the relevant letters submitted on behalf of the illegal armed groups. We were told previously that the most convenient way of informing Council members about them was being sought. It has been found and it is indeed highly original — directly through the work e-mail addresses of all the political coordinators, meaning that someone deliberately sent the relevant contact information to dubious individuals from the ranks of the radical Syrian opposition. It is very similar to the situation that occurred when information about the closed negotiations on humanitarian resolutions became available to Western media agencies. However, we hope that the opposition leaders are serious and that their deeds will match their words. We are expecting clear guarantees in that regard from the militias' foreign sponsors, many of whom are seated around this table. The first thing that is needed is a definitive repudiation of the terrorist organizations. It has to be understood that terrorists continue to be a legitimate target of military operations, and we will not stand on ceremony with them. Overall, we have to decide on the most effective way to neutralize Jabhat Al-Nusra in eastern Ghouta. Why can't some members show a willingness to cooperate on that issue? Or do they not want to? The information background to this issue is overheated to the point of no return. If we had not adopted resolution 2401 (2018), it is difficult even to imagine what the Western media outlets would have made of it or how they would have portrayed Russia. But even now, when the resolution has been adopted, our Western partners act as if everything in it pertains solely to Damascus and Russia, and that its successful implementation depends almost entirely on the will of our two countries, while they, the self-styled champions of humanity, somehow imagine that they have an exclusive right to lecture us on the subject. In various media outlets, especially American ones, there have been false allegations that we mock the tragedy of this war and the situation in eastern Ghouta, and that we say that the campaign is exaggerated and fake. I will ask these humanistic gentlemen once again: Where were they when American aircraft blew Raqqa off the face of the Earth? Where were the cries and the hand-wringing? Months have passed since the terrorists were banished from that city and yet it is still uninhabitable. On top of that, there are new reports of 24 civilian casualties from Coalition air strikes in Deir ez-Zor province. Who are they — second-class citizens? Or when innocent people die from democratic bombs, is that somehow immaterial — perhaps even honourable? We urge the United Nations — in fact, we insist — to send an assessment mission to Raqqa as soon as possible, and that the Coalition, which is in de facto control of the area, give it all necessary support. We also expect that instead of establishing quasi- S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 18/22 18-05507 administrations in areas liberated from the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, the Coalition leadership will come up with a plan to turn them over to the central authorities, in consideration of the Security Council's repeated affirmations of Syria's sovereignty and territorial integrity. That would be a great deal more constructive than the relentless quest to find what is a non-existent basis in international law for maintaining its presence on Syrian territory. If Council members have interesting ideas on how to raise the profile of local Government and find effective ways to rebuild the ethnic and religious balance that existed before the war, they should present them to the Syrians in the negotiations in Geneva and let them decide the issues for themselves through the mediation of the United Nations. We also demand that the Coalition open humanitarian access to the territory it is occupying around the Al-Tanf military base in order to bring aid to the residents of the Rukban camp as soon as possible. By the way, that is also a provision of resolution 2401 (2018). It is not for nothing that we keep saying that what is going on is painfully reminiscent of the situation in eastern Aleppo when the West unleashed a wave of monstrous anti-Russian hysteria. We are the only country being asked to implement resolution 2401 (2018). We are being criticized for instituting humanitarian pauses. Some claim that there are not enough of them. Demands, demands, demands. For some reason, someone is always bossily demanding something of Russia. Britain's Foreign Secretary has altogether decided that he is the prosecutor who is threatening to punish our country. Apparently, he called for today's meeting to be convened. He said so himself. The Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic is making daily and hourly efforts to achieve a cessation of hostilities, establish humanitarian pauses and ease the suffering of civilians. May I ask what other members have done to implement resolution 2401 (2018)? Has even one of their countries lifted a finger? Have they brought their influence to bear on those whom they consider the moderate opposition? Have they persuaded them to lay down their weapons and stop taking hostages? The hugely complex issue that the Syrian conflict represents is being used for unscrupulous purposes. The rivers of tears roll down only when the next stronghold where militias and terrorists mingle is threatened, at which point an unheard-of level of action kicks in. The real aim is the regime, as some members like to refer to the lawful Syrian authorities. Any hint of its success in fighting terrorism on its own territory is a thorn in their side. They are ready to use any means to stop it. This is a warning. We know about the chemical evidence being fabricated in order to blame Damascus. We know about the meetings on the subject, where they are being held and who is taking part in them. Today we once again heard unsubstantiated allegations about the Syrian Government's use of chemical weapons. I am tired of asking if members understand the futility of Damascus using chemical weapons from both a military and a political point of view, and the completely believable probability of militias using chemical provocations. I think they do understand it perfectly, but they persist in seeking an excuse for military intervention. United States officials, and the head of the Foreign Office and others, have already talked about military strikes against Syria, and it is obvious where that intellectual activity is heading. We urge everyone to stop the dirty tricks and join the concerted efforts to alleviate the humanitarian situation in Syria by implementing the resolution we have just adopted. We hope that the United Nations generally and Mr. Lowcock personally, as Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, will rise to the occasion. We have circulated a draft presidential statement on the resolution's implementation. We have placed it under the silence procedure until 1 p.m., and we call on the Council to adopt it. We hope that there will be no objections before one o'clock. I will take the liberty of reading it out. (spoke in English) The Security Council, with reference to its resolution 2401 (2018), urges all parties to implement it and, to this end, further urges all armed groups and all Member States with influence on them to ensure the safety of the announced humanitarian corridors for evacuation from eastern Ghouta. The Security Council calls for the establishment of similar humanitarian corridors in Al-Tanf and Rukban. The Security Council requests the Secretary-General to expeditiously send a mission to Raqqa to assess humanitarian needs there. 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 19/22 (spoke in Russian) And by the way, we, like the other members of the Security Council, believe that there can only be a political solution to the Syrian conflict. We are doing everything we can to achieve that, and certainly somewhat more than those who have been spreading fire and fury today. We propose, as we have always proposed, that they join in these efforts, rather than throw up road blocks in an attempt to serve their own geopolitical agendas. The President (spoke in Arabic): I shall now make a statement in my national capacity. First of all, the delegation of Kuwait aligns itself to the statement made by the representative of Sweden on behalf of our two countries as co-penholders on the issue of Syria. We thank Mr. Mark Lowcock, Under- Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, and Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, for their briefings. Four days after the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), which demands that all parties cease hostilities throughout Syrian territory for 30 days, I would like to make the following points. We have said from the outset that resolution 2401 (2018) is only the first step towards improving the humanitarian situation in Syria. However, to date we have not seen the implementation of the provisions of the resolution — not even a partial implementation — as we heard from Mr. Lowcock this morning, in particular in eastern Ghouta. The Council demonstrated unity in adopting the resolution and it is up to us now to ensure that all its provisions are implemented in full and immediately in order to alleviate the suffering of our brethren in Syria and to protect civilians. The resolution is binding on all, in accordance with Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations. Secondly, we welcome the fact that the United Nations is ready to come to eastern Ghouta and other besieged areas so as to deliver all kinds of aid and assistance to those that need them. We call on all the parties to the conflict in Syria to uphold international humanitarian law and abide by the provisions of the resolution, which cover all the various aspects that are causing the daily suffering of the Syrian people. Thirdly, we underscore the importance of members of the Council making their contribution by spurring all the parties to the conflict in Syria to immediately implement the provisions of resolution 2401 (2018), keeping in mind that, as co-penholders, we are committed to closely follow its implementation, including ensuring a briefing by the Secretariat 15 days after the adoption of the resolution. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. In accordance with to rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in this meeting. I now give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic. Mr. Ja'afari (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): The Syrian Government has examined the forty-eighth monthly report of the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, and, yesterday morning, as usual, we sent a formal letter to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council setting forth the position of the Syrian Government on the report. We are realistic. We know well that the United Nations is not a charitable organization. That is clear given that it has been unable to implement the principles of the Charter and international law since its inception — and the Palestinian question is a case in point. There have been other failures by the United Nations: in Iraq, Libya, the former Yugoslavia, Grenada — for those who have forgotten Grenada — Nicaragua, and the list goes on. However, I hope we can preserve the United Nations as an organization even as it continues to lack charitability. I would now like to make the following points. First, the Syrian Government is fully committed to the principles of international law and international humanitarian law, as well as Syrian law and the Syrian Constitution, all of which stipulate that the Syrian Government has the responsibility to ensure the safety and security of Syrian citizens and protect them from terrorist groups. Secondly, the current report, just like previous reports, has a great flaw, namely, that the authors of the report continue to rely on politicized sources, open sources and unreliable figures. At the same time, the report continues to ignore credible Government sources and even the reports issued by the representatives of the United Nations in Syria. Those representatives, along with the reports they have submitted to the United Nations in New York, acknowledge the efforts S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 20/22 18-05507 of the Syrian Government and its cooperation on the humanitarian issue. However, none of this information that reaches New York appears to be mentioned in the report, as if by miracle. Thirdly, the Syrian Government condemns the authors of the report — the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs — especially after the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), for their failure to mention the Turkish aggression against the Syrian city of Afrin. That aggression has claimed the lives of many people, including women and children, destroyed public and private facilities and has led to the displacement of the city's inhabitants and a severe shortage of humanitarian goods. However, Afrin is not eastern Ghouta, eastern Aleppo, Fo'ah or Kefreya. Fourthly, the Syrian Government fully rejects the failure of the authors of the report to mention the catastrophic impact of the so-called International Coalition and its members. The Coalition, which has claimed the lives of hundreds of civilians and members of the Syrian forces who are fighting Da'esh, committed two new massacres yesterday that claimed the lives of 29 civilians and injured dozens, most of them women and children, in the villages of Sha'fa and Thahret Allouni in eastern Deir ez-Zor. It appears that the International Coalition is focused on this part of eastern Deir ez-Zor because it is home to civilians who do not host Da'esh or Al-Nusra Front terrorists. The Coalition has also destroyed the city of Raqqa, as my colleague the representative of the Russian Federation just noted. My Government calls once again for dismantling this illegitimate aggressive Coalition and for an immediately stop to its crimes against the Syrian people. The Russian military issued a communiqué today saying that the areas under the control of the allies and agents of the United States in Syria are witnessing the worst humanitarian crisis currently in the country. Those areas have become black holes, just like the black holes in outer space. With regard to the situation in eastern Ghouta, the Syrian Government believes that the current deterioration in the situation is due to the fact that terrorist groups there have launched attacks against residential zones and military targets. Up until yesterday, they had launched more than 2,180 missiles and mortars against the city of Damascus. Those attacks claimed the lives of 66 civilians and injured 474 others. Government forces have been forced to respond to those attacks and to carry out their constitutional responsibility in guaranteeing security and safety for the citizens. My Government condemns the use, by the authors of the report, of the term "besieged areas" when considering the situation in eastern Ghouta, in rural Damascus. Under pressure from influential countries in and outside of the Council, they continue to deliberately ignore the fact that people in eastern Ghouta are besieged from within by the various armed terrorist organizations operating there. Those terrorist organizations are exploiting civilians and using them as human shields. They are seizing and monopolizing humanitarian assistance, distributing the aid to their supporters or selling it at exorbitant prices, as was the case in eastern Aleppo. Syria regrets the failure of the authors of the report to refer to the suffering of thousands of kidnapped people who are in eastern Ghouta prisons and other places where the terrorist groups are spread. The kidnapped people include women, children and elderly. These people were kidnapped from their homes and places of work and have been subjected to the worst forms of torture. There are civilians, including from city of Adra and from Latakia, who were kidnapped from their homes five years ago. The Syrian Government also condemns the statements by the Secretariat and reports of the Secretary-General, which continue up till now to disregard the suffering of 8 million civilians in the capital Damascus as a result of hundreds of missiles and mortars launched daily from terrorist groups within eastern Ghouta. The accusations by the authors of the report, like those of the Western countries that have influence on them, that the Syrian Government is allegedly besieging Ghouta have been consistently refuted. They have proven to be unfounded, as we have seen in recent reports noting that the Saudi regime provided "aid" to eastern Ghouta in February. That proves, first, that eastern Ghouta is not besieged and, secondly, that it is possible to access it. In particular, the terrorist groups in Ghouta continue to receive arms and munitions from Governments that support terrorism, including Saudi Arabia's so-called humanitarian assistance. The Syrian Government is more committed than anyone to protecting its citizens across Syria. In that 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 21/22 regard, it has taken all necessary measures to protect its citizens and to respond to the attacks of terrorist groups in eastern Ghouta. We have sought to protect these civilians from the terrorists by establishing a humanitarian corridor to ensure their exit from eastern Ghouta. We announced the humanitarian corridor only hours after the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018) in order to ensure the safety of civilians — in cooperation with our Russian friends and allies. We have provided them with shelter, food, medicine and medical care at the expense of the Syrian Government, not the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The Syrian Government has also called on members of the armed groups to lay down their weapons, cease their terrorist activities inside residential areas and engage in national reconciliation efforts. However, those terrorist groups, including the Al-Nusra Front, Jaysh al-Islam and Faylak ar-Rahman, have forcibly prevented civilians from reaching the corridor, as some members of the Council may know. They also sought to target the humanitarian corridor after it was announced, through the use of mortars. As for the letter sent by the terrorist Mohamed Alloush, it is a clear indication that he rejects the exit of civilians from Ghouta. It is clear that he wants to use them as human shields. There seems to be a new trend in the United Nations to circulate a letter from a terrorist group as an official document. That is an innovation at the United Nations. There is no respect for the Member States concerned. We have followed closely the way resolution 2401 (2018) was adopted and today's statements and briefings. We can clearly say that the main goal behind the adoption of the resolution is neither to reach a clear truce or ceasefire, as some may claim, nor to protect civilians and meet their needs. The main goal was to use the Security Council once again as a means to prevent any progress by the Syrian army and its allies in the fight against the terrorist groups that are targeting the city of Damascus. I say that for the thousandth time. How else to explain the fact that the resolution fails to refer to any Council resolution on counter-terrorism? Who can explain to us the strong resistance of some States during the negotiations on the draft resolution to any text that excludes Da'esh, the Al-Nusra Front and the terrorist groups affiliated with them from the supposed ceasefire? For three days, the Council has continued to negotiate the issue of whether to include or exclude them. The false humanitarian propaganda on the situation in eastern Ghouta coincided with another campaign under the supervision of the United States, claiming the use of chemical weapons again in Syria, in areas under the exclusive control of terrorists or, I should say, the White Helmets. Today, The New York Times published a Tin-Tin style, childish report claiming that there is cooperation on the chemical issue between my country and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The article is a full-page report on the front page of The New York Times. It seeks to tarnish the image of the Syrian Government and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It ends by saying that this information is not substantiated. "Though experts who viewed the report said the evidence it cited did not prove definitively that there was current, continuing collaboration between North Korea and Syria on chemical weapons." That is a word-for-word quote from The New York Times. It seems that The New York Times is not up to date on what is going on in the world. It seems that the New York Times does not know that the American vessel, the MV Cape Ray, destroyed the chemical arsenal voluntarily submitted by the Syrian Government after joining the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), as a full member. That is old information, déjà vu, as is said in French. However, it seems that The New York Times has decided to address this issue today. I will read a communiqué that we received just now of information that I think should be taken into consideration when addressing the issue of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. And I can tell the Council that terrorists will use chemical weapons in Syria. On the morning of 20 February, four days ago, three Turkish trucks carrying chlorine entered Idlib governorate through the Bab Al-Hawa crossing. I think that The New York Times should verify that information. Two trucks stopped in the village of Qalb Loze in Idlib, and the third continued its way to Al-Habit village in northern Idlib. Information available to the Syrian Government points to the fact that terrorists are currently preparing for a chemical weapon using the substance of chlorine on a large scale and to then accuse the Syrian Arab Army of using such weapons. Those terrorists have clear instructions from Western and Turkish intelligence to fabricate a chemical attack before 13 March, because S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 22/22 18-05507 it is on that date that the eighty-seventh session of the Executive Council of the OPCW will be held. According to the information I received just now, the two trucks are currently in the school of Qalb Loze village. Other cars and terrorists are also currently in the school, which they have turned into a warehouse for chemical weapons. As for the third truck, it is currently in a centre belonging to the Hay'at Tahrir Al-Sham, which is a Turkish agent, in the north-eastern part of Al-Habit village. A vast number of terrorists are currently unloading the truck there. In providing the Security Council with this information, we affirm that these terrorists, at the instructions of their operators, will use these chemical weapons before 13 March. The main responsibility for ending hostilities lies with those countries that have real influence with terrorist groups in Ghouta and other parts of Syria. They should compel these terrorist groups to stop their terrorist activities and allow civilians to leave those areas, which are used by these groups as a base to launch their terrorist attacks. There is in this Organization a group of five countries that are shedding tears over the humanitarian situation in Syria. Unfortunately, some of them are members of the Council. They have invited Member States to watch a movie about the White Helmets, two days from now in the Economic and Social Council Chamber here at the United Nations. Some members of the Council are advocating for a group that has been designated as a terrorist group by the Council. I hope that the Council will address the information I have provided seriously and appropriately. The President (spoke in Arabic): As this is the last scheduled meeting of the Council for the month of February, I would like to express the sincere appreciation of the delegation of Kuwait to the members of the Security Council, especially my colleagues the Permanent Representatives, their respective staff and to the secretariat of the Council for all the support they have given to us. Indeed, February has been a busy month, and one in which we rallied to consensus on several important issues within our purview. We could not have done it alone or without the hard work, support and positive contributions of all the delegations and the representatives of the Secretariat, as well as all the relevant conference service officers, interpreters, translators and security staff. As we end our presidency, I know I speak on behalf of the Council in wishing the delegation of the Netherlands good luck in the month of March. I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject. The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.
"Liberal states are different. They are indeed peaceful". (1)Michael Doyle. IntroducciónComo es materia sabida, la disciplina de las Relaciones Internacionales se ha desarrollado a lo largo del siglo XX a través de una serie de grandes escuelas de pensamiento. Realismo, Liberalismo, Marxismo y más recientemente Constructivismo, entraron en competencia para explicar la complejidad de la política mundial, en un proceso por el cual han puesto a prueba sus fortalezas y debilidades y apuntalado su respectivo refinamiento (Walt, 1998). La influencia de buena parte de estas concepciones intelectuales, asimismo, ha ido mucho más allá del mero ámbito de las aulas universitarias para impregnar también la cosmovisión y el proceso decisorio de los responsables políticos de los principales Estados en el sistema internacional (Snyder, 2005).Un caso muy particular donde se advierte un importante debate por parte de la academia, así como una materialización marcada en el discurso y enfoque de ciertos gobiernos, es el de la Paz Democrática. Considerada como "lo más cercano a una ley empírica en las Relaciones Internacionales", la Paz Democrática resulta aún en el nuevo siglo materia controvertida y de amplio interés precisamente por esta doble dimensión científico-política. En este sentido, el presente trabajo aborda el tópico con el objetivo de repasar y reflexionar sobre su sentido y su contenido, sobre la evolución de su estudio y sobre su manifestación concreta en la política exterior de Estados Unidos y los dilemas que esto entraña.La Paz DemocráticaEn su noción más general la idea de la Paz Democrática es bien simple y consiste en la sencilla afirmación de que "las democracias no hacen la guerra entre sí". Esta presunción se complementa a su vez con otros dos postulados: el primero que las democracias liberales no son más propensas a la guerra que los Estados no democráticos, pero tampoco lo son menos y, el segundo, que aunque las democracias liberales no se hacen la guerra entre ellas, sí han tenido conflictos armados con los Estados no liberales (Peñas, 1997: 120). Puesta de otra forma, la Paz Democrática implica una variable independiente, el carácter democrático de un régimen estatal, y una variable dependiente, la ausencia de guerras entre las democracias (Ibíd.: 126). En las formulaciones más contemporáneas, pueden identificarse dos grandes variantes fundamentales de la Paz Democrática. Como señala Mónica Salomón (2001), se encuentran: la "tesis monádica", que sostiene que siempre las democracias son más pacíficas en sus relaciones con los demás Estados que los Estados no democráticos, yla "tesis diádica", menos ambiciosa en términos predictivos, que entiende expresamente que las democracias nunca (o rara vez) hacen la guerra a otra democracia.Aceptando esta postulación de que el tipo de régimen democrático determina la no propensión a la guerra contra otras democracias, la explicación de sus causas ha discurrido también en dos direcciones: por un lado, la dimensión institucional y por el otro, la dimensión normativa. En la primera se entiende que son los controles democráticos que penden sobre los gobernantes, como la opinión pública o las contiendas electorales, los que determinan este pacifismo. Precisamente, su punto débil es su incapacidad para explicar la frecuencia observada de las guerras entre democracias y países no democráticos. En la segunda, se sostiene en cambio que la política exterior de una democracia está regida por los mismos principios de conciliación y moderación que rigen la política interna, o bien, en la versión constructivista, que son las percepciones de los estadistas y decisores de política exterior (amistosas hacia otras democracias) lo que determina el comportamiento internacional singular de las democracias (Risse-Kappen, 1995; Peceny, 1997).En general se ha reconocido como el origen de la tesis de la Paz Democrática a las obras de Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Thomas Paine y especialmente la de Immanuel Kant (Schwartz y Skinner, 2002: 159). Fue el filósofo prusiano quien escribió en 1795 el clásico La Paz Perpetua, en tiempos en que la Revolución Francesa se debatía entre jacobinos y girondinos, y sólo Francia, Suiza y Estados Unidos podían ser considerados como democracias. Su punto de partida es la convicción en que el hombre es irrevocablemente empujado hacia la paz a causa de la razón práctico-moral. La paz mundial requiere de un Estado mundial y cosmopolita regido por un derecho mundial, desarrollo que Kant percibe sin embargo como irrealizable. Ello no lo desanima de todas formas para sugerir el camino hacia la paz consistente en un proyecto (cuya estructura es la de un tratado de paz) que contiene seis condiciones preliminares y tres definitivas para alcanzar (o tender a alcanzar) la paz perpetua (Salomón, 2001: 257), a saber:Bases previas:No debe considerarse válido un tratado de paz al que se haya arribado con reservas mentales sobre algunos objetivos capaces de causar una guerra en el futuro.Ningún Estado independiente, sea cual fuere su tamaño, puede pasar a formar parte de otro Estado por medio de trueque, compra, donación o herencia. (El Edo. es una sociedad de hombres que dispone sobre sí misma.)Los ejércitos permanentes deben desaparecer permanentemente.El Estado no debe contraer deudas que tiendan a mantener su política exterior.Ningún Estado debe inmiscuirse por la fuerza en la constitución y el gobierno de otro Estado.Un Estado que esté en guerra con otro no debe admitir el uso de hostilidades que impidan la confianza mutua en una futura paz. (Proscripción de la guerra de exterminio.)Bases definitivas:En todo Estado, la constitución política debe ser republicana (entendida como separación de poderes y en oposición al gobierno despótico).Principio de la libertad de los componentes de una sociedad, como hombres.Principio de la dependencia de todos, de una legislación común, como súbditos.Principio de la igualdad de todos, como ciudadanos.El derecho de gentes se debe basar en una Federación de Estados Independientes. (Referencia a una Sociedad de Naciones o Federación de Paz.)El derecho de la ciudadanía mundial debe limitarse a las condiciones de una hospitalidad universal.De esta forma, republicanismo (entiéndase aquí democracia), federación internacional (foedus pacificum) y derecho de gentes universal se articulan en La Paz Perpetua con el respeto por la soberanía ajena, la proscripción de ejércitos permanentes y la guerra limitada. Ciertamente Kant cifra sus esperanzas en una nación que sea puntal de estos valores y que a través de la irradiación de su ejemplo, no así de la promoción violenta de los mismos, vaya generando una creciente zona de paz mundial. Debe señalarse al respecto que, como afirma Peñas (1997: 121), "la herencia de Kant, de su concepción del individuo, de la historia y del tipo de régimen que permita al individuo llevar una vida racional y moral impregna" la tesis de la Paz Democrática.En gran parte, este vínculo se debe al rescate de su obra por Michael Doyle en 1983, a partir de cuándo se volvió moda referenciar a la Paz Perpetua como el basamento de partida para el análisis de la Paz Democrática. Asimismo, ha sido este trasfondo kantiano lo que ha facilitado la conexión estrecha entre la discusión filosófico-normativa y la teoría.El debate académicoPlanteada su esencia y sus orígenes, repasemos ahora el discurrir contemporáneo de esta tesis por el ámbito académico occidental. El primer estudio directo sobre la correlación positiva entre regímenes políticos democráticos y ausencia de conflictos armados interestatales es el de Dean Babst, publicado en 1964, que utilizaba la base de datos sobre guerras modernas elaborada en 1942 por Quincy Wright. Esta primera aproximación fue retomada luego por Melvin Small y David Singer (1976) quienes sometieron a verificación sus postulados y hallaron que, por un lado, si las democracias casi no habían combatido entre sí en el período 1816-1965 ello se debía a la distancia física entre ellas —y a las escasas fronteras compartidas—, y por el otro, que las guerras en que habían participado las democracias tenían en promedio la misma duración y causaban el mismo número de víctimas que las guerras internacionales en general. De esta forma, fueron los primeros en presentar argumentos causales distintos al tipo de régimen y en llamar la atención, en el marco del posterior debate,a la belicosidad normal de las democracias.El trabajo de Small y Singer le sirvió de insumo a Michael Doyle para su artículo Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs (1983), el cual dio el puntapié definitivo al debate más reciente sobre la Paz Democrática. Allí, este autor pretendía demostrar que las instituciones y los principios liberales llevan a los Estados liberales a tener políticas exteriores bien distintas a las observadas en Estados no liberales. Estos Estados liberales se definían a partir de cuatro condiciones: i) Economías de mercado, ii) autonomía en política exterior, iii) derechos jurídicos para los ciudadanos y iv) gobierno representativo y separación de poderes. Para Doyle, el liberalismo alcanzó "un éxito extraordinario" en las relaciones entre Estados liberales en la medida en que éstos nunca entraron en guerra entre sí, pero condujo simultáneamente a "una confusión excepcional" en las relaciones entre Estados liberales y no liberales. Lo interesante de su aporte fue, como ya se anticipó, la (re)introducción de los postulados de Kant sobre la Paz Perpetua, al considerar que las relaciones internacionales liberales conformaban una "unión pacífica" semejante a la "federación de paz" de Kant. Ese mismo año, Rudolph Rummel publicó también su investigación en la que defendía la tesis monádica de la Paz Democrática. En este contexto, otros investigadores (Chan, 1984; Weede, 1984; Maoz y Abdoladi, 1989; Bremer, 1992) se lanzaron a comprobar estadísticamente los postulados y se llegó a la conclusión general a favor de que las democracias no tienden a combatir entre sí. Fue entonces que Jack Levy (1988) afirmó: "la ausencia de guerra entre democracias es lo más cercano que tenemos a una ley empírica en Relaciones Internacionales".Ahora bien, la formulación teóricamente más refinada de la Paz Democrática vino unos años después con Bruce Russett y su libro Grasping the Democratic Peace (1993). Allí sostenía que:1. Los sistemas políticos organizados democráticamente actúan, en general, bajo restricciones que los hacen más pacíficos en sus relaciones con otras democracias. Sin embargo, las democracias no son necesariamente pacíficas en sus relaciones con otras democracias.2. En el sistema internacional moderno, las democracias tenderán menos a usar violencia letal contra otras democracias que hacia Estados gobernados autocráticamente o que los Estados gobernados autocráticamente entre sí. Además, no hay casos claros de guerras entre democracias soberanas estatales en el moderno sistema internacional.3. La paz relativa entre democracias es, fundamentalmente, consecuencia de determinados rasgos de la democracia, y no se debe exclusivamente a las características económicas o geopolíticas correlacionadas con la democracia (Peñas, 1997: 128; Salomón, 2001: 243).La formulación de Russett coincide con el "optimismo liberal" despertado por el colapso soviético y el fin de la guerra fría. Fue entonces que la tesis de la paz democrática suscitó gran entusiasmo, sobre todo entre aquellos estudiosos de las Relaciones Internacionales que ansiaban acabar con la hegemonía teórica del realismo-neorrealismo en la disciplina (Salomón, 2001: 242).La importancia de la obra de este autor yace en que la corroboración afirmativa de la tesis entraña la responsabilidad política de adoptar las medidas oportunas para conseguir el fortalecimiento tanto de las condiciones que hacen posible la democracia en otros estados, como promover su expansión —preferentemente desde una óptica multilateral y pacífica. Asimismo, se deben fortalecer las normas que hacen posible una comunidad de paz, haciendo frente a amenazas como el nacionalismo o el fundamentalismo. Como se puede ver, es una idea que en principio aparece como pacífica, inocente e incluso en ciertos aspectos algo cándida. Sin embargo, a la luz de las críticas realizadas por autores como Waltz, puede convertirse en el instrumento de una política mesiánica e incluso de una cruzada para expandir la democracia (Tovar Ruíz, 2009: 13). Tal evolución se distancia abiertamente de la formulación kantiana original que es más bien pro-soberanía,como se ha mencionado.Ya en el nuevo siglo, la Paz Democrática ha recibido el aporte de los nuevos desarrollos teóricos en la disciplina de las Relaciones Internacionales, en particular del Constructivismo. En un número de International Politics dedicado exclusivamente al tópico, Ewan Harrison (2004) por ejemplo explora el vínculo entre la paz democrática, las estructuras domésticas de política exterior y los procesos de socialización de los Estados en la política internacional desde lentes constructivistas, mientras que Matthew Rendall (2004) testea la tesis en un caso concreto: la crisis franco-británica de 1840 sobre Siria, en la que demuestra la importancia de las percepciones en las relaciones internacionales, antes que la fuerza causal de la Paz Democrática.Pero esto representa sólo una de las líneas evolutivas del debate académico. En todo caso, lo que parece imperar en la actualidad es el reconocimiento de que no existe una única versión, científicamente autenticada, de la Paz Democrática, sino varias lecturas de la relación entre liberalismo-democracia y paz-guerra (MacMillan, 2004), entre las cuales la versión más difundida es aquella articulada por Doyle y Russett, perteneciente al ala más conservadora del Liberalismo, avocada a las cruzadas.•* Candidato doctoral, Universidad Nacional de General San Martín (UNSAM, Argentina). Investigador del Centro de Estudios Interdisciplinarios en Problemáticas Internacionales y Locales (CEIPIL-UNCPBA).(1) "Liberalism and World Politics", The American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4., Dec. 1986.Referencias BibliográficasBabst, Dean: "Elective Governments - A Force for Peace", The Wisconsin Sociologist, No. 3 (1964), pp. 9-14.Barceló Sasía, Alejandra: Anti-americanismo: ¿Problema de percepción o de formulación de política exterior? (Puebla: Universidad de las Américas Puebla, 2006). Bremer, Stuart A.: "Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965", Journal of Conflict Resolution, No. 36 (1992), pp. 309-341.Chan, Steve: "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall. Are the Freer Countries More Pacific?" Journal of Conjlict Resolution,No. 28 (1984), pp. 617-648. Cohen, Raymond: "Pacific unions: a reappraisal of the theory that 'democracies do not go to war with each other'", Review of International Studies, No. 20 (1994), pp. 202-232.Deutsch, Karl: Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).Doyle, Michael: "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs, Part I & Part II", Philosophy & Public Affairs, No.12 (1983), pp. 205-235 y 323-353.Doyle, Michael: "Liberalism and World Politics", The American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (Dec. 1986).Elman, Miriam Fendius (ed.): Paths to Peace. Is Democracy the Answer? (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997).Farber, Henry & Joan Gowa: "Polities and Peace", International Security, No. 20 (1995), pp. 123-146.Harrison, Ewan: "State Socialization, International Norm Dynamics and the Liberal Peace",International Politics, No. 41 (2004), pp. 521-542.Hewitt, J. Joseph, Jonathan Wilkenfeld & Ted Robert Gurr: Peace and Conflict 2008. 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Author's introductionThis review of recent feminist analyses and theorizing of labor markets uses a global lens to reveal the forces shaping gender inequality. The first section introduces the key words of globalization, gender and work organization. Next, I examine gender as embodied labor activity in globalized worksites, and the effects of globalization on gendered patterns of work and life. Putting gender at the center of globalization discourses highlights the historical and cultural variability of gender relations intersecting with class, race and nationality, and highlights the impact of restructuring on workers, organizations and institutions at the local, national and regional as well as transnational levels. Then I turn to look at labor market restructuring through commodification of care, outsourcing of household tasks and informalization of employment to show how these processes shape the complexity of relationships between and the interconnectedness of social inequalities transnationally and in global cities. Place matters when analyzing how service employment alters divisions of labor and how these labor market changes are gendered. Global restructuring not only poses new challenges but also creates new opportunities for mobilization around a more robust notion of equality. The final section explores the development of spaces for collective action and the rise of new women's and feminist movements (e.g., transnational networks, non‐governmental agencies). The study of globalization, gender and employment has broad importance for understanding not only the social causes but also the social consequences of the shift to a post‐industrial society.Author recommendsAcker, Joan 2004. 'Gender, Capitalism and Globalization.'Critical Sociology 30, 1: 17–41.Feminist scholarship both critiques gender‐blind globalization discourses and an older generation of women and development theories. By tracing the lineage of current feminist literature on globalization to women and development research, Joan Acker shows both the continuities and distance traveled from the previous terrain of debate. New feminist scholarship on globalization owes a debt to these important, albeit limited, studies of women at work in Latin America, Africa and Asia, but acknowledges the need to go beyond the category of women to analyze specific forms and cultural expressions of gendered power in relationship to class and other hierarchies. One of the major advances in feminist theory comes under the microscope of Acker's keen analysis when she excavates how gender is both embodied and embedded in the logic and structuring of globalizing capitalism. This extends the case she made in her earlier pioneering research on gender relations being embedded in the organization of major institutions. For the study of globalization, Acker posits that the gendered construction (and cultural coding) of capitalist production separated from human reproduction has resulted in subordination of women in both domains. Acker uncovers the historical legacy of a masculine‐form of dominance associated with production in the money economy that was exported to and embedded in colonialist installation of large‐scale institutions. By the late 20th Century large‐scale institutions promoted images and emotions that expressed economic and political power in terms of new articulations of hegemonic masculinity. As an article outlining debates on the nature of globalization and of gender, it serves as a good introduction to the topic.Chow, Esther Ngan‐Ling 2003. 'Gender Matters: Studying Globalization and Social Change in the 21st Century.'International Sociology 18, 3: 443–460.Chow's introduction to the special issue on 'Gender, Globalization and Social Change in the 21st Century' in International Sociology (2003) reviews the literature on gender and globalization and provides an excellent overview of 'gender matters.' Her definition of globalization captures salient features of the current era. This definition encompasses the economic, political cultural and social dimensions of globalization. Further, she offers a framework for studying the 'dialectics of globalization', as 'results of conflicting interaction between the global and local political economies and socio‐cultural conditions…' A dialectics of globalization is a fruitful approach for studying transformative possibilities. This article could serve as background reading or as part of an introductory section.Arlie Russell Hochschild, Arlie Russell. 2003. 'Love and Gold.' Pp. 15–30 in Global Women: Nannies, Maids and Sex Workers in the New Economy, edited by Barbara Ehrenreich and Arlie Russell Hochschild. Metropolitan Books.Hochschild's chapter in Global Women examines the transfer of traditional women's work to migrant women. Women in rich countries are turning over care work (nannies, maids, elder care) to female migrant workers who can be paid lower wages with few or no benefits and minimal legal protections. This global transfer of services associated with a wife's traditional role extracts a different kind of labor than in prior migrations based on agricultural and industrial production. Emotional, sexual as well as physical labor is extracted in this current phase of globalization; in particular, emotional labor and 'love is the new gold'. Women migrate not only to escape poverty, but also to escape patriarchy in their home countries by earning an independent income and by physical autonomy from patriarchal obligations and expectations. Many female migrants who leave poor countries can earn more money as nannies and maids in the First World than in occupations (nurses, teachers, clerical workers) if they remained in their own country. Thus, migration can be seen as having contradictory effects on women's well‐being and autonomy. This chapter can be used in a section dealing with the specific topic of globalization and care work or in a section introducing the topic of gendered labor activities.McDowell, Linda, Diane Perrons, Colette Fagan, Kath Ray and Kevin Ward. 2005. 'The Contradictions and Intersections of Class and Gender in a Global City: Placing Working Women's Lives on the Research Agenda.'Environment and Planning A 37, 441–461.This group of prominent social geographers from the UK collaborates to great effect in a welcome addition to the literature theorizing the complex articulations of gender and class in global cities. Their detailed research comparing three localities in Greater London is a corrective to the oft‐cited multi‐site study of global cities by Saskia Sassen. They find that Sassen underestimates gains and losses for both men and women in the 'new' economy. Place makes a difference when assessing the impact of women's increased rates of labor market participation on income inequality and patterns of childcare. The article outlines a new research agenda by 'placing' working women's lives at the center of analysis.Parrenas, Rhacel Salazar 2008. The Force of Domesticity: Filipina Migrants and Globalization. New York: New York University Press.Rhacel Salazar Parrenas brings together her influential research on Filipina migrants and extends her path‐breaking ethnographic analysis to include Filipina domestic workers in Rome and Los Angeles and entertainers in Tokyo. David Eng incisively captures the importance of Parrenas's analysis when he states, 'Extracted from home and homeland only to be reinserted into the domestic spaces of the global north, these servants of globalization exemplify an ever‐increasing international gendered division of labor, one compelling us to reexamine the neo‐liberal coupling of freedom and opportunity with mobility and migration'. The book is well suited to illuminate discussions of domesticity and migration, transnational migrant families, the impact of migration laws in 'home' and 'host' countries, and transnational movements among migrant women.Walby, Sylvia. 2009. Globalization and Inequalities: Complexity and Contested Modernities. London: Sage.This book introduces new theoretical concepts and tests alternative hypotheses to explain variation in trajectories of gender relations cross‐nationally. It synthesizes and reviews a vast literature, ranging from the social sciences to the natural sciences to construct a new approach to theorizing the development of gender regimes in comparative perspective. Sylvia Walby seeks to explain the different patterns of inequalities across a large number of countries. The analysis differentiates between neo‐liberal and social democratic varieties of political economy, and makes explicit the gender component of institutions and their consequences. The project builds on Walby's pioneering work on comparative gender regimes, and extends the research by operationalizing empirical indicators for a range of key concepts, and by analyzing links between a wide set of institutions (including economy, polity, education and violence) and how these are gendered in specific ways. As in the past, Walby is not afraid to tackle big questions and to offer new answers. Throughout the book, like in her previous body of research, Walby takes on the question of social inclusion/exclusion and critically interrogates concepts of democracy, political participation, equality and rights. Walby uses a comparative lens to examine the democratic 'deficit' in liberal and social democratic countries, and how migration restructures patterns of inequality and the consequent reconstitution of national and ethnic relations within countries. There is more to the book than abstract theoretical debates. Walby poses and assesses alternative political projects for achieving equality. The book is an original contribution that will likely influence sociology in general and theories of social change in particular.Online resourcesStatus of women in the world: United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) http://www.unifem.orgUNIFEM was established at the United Nations in order to foster women's empowerment through innovative programs and strategies. Its mission statement summarizes UNIFEM's goals as follows: 'Placing the advancement of women's human rights at the center of all of its efforts, UNIFEM focuses on reducing feminized poverty, ending violence against women; reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS among women and girls; and achieving gender equality in democratic governance in times of peace as well as war'. The website includes information on global initiatives such as zero tolerance of violence against women, the impact of the economic crisis on women migrant workers, and strategizing for gender proportionate representation in Nigeria. Primary documents relevant to women's advancement appear on the website; these include the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. UNIFEM publishes monographs assessing the progress of women around the world. One notable example is the 2005 publication on Women, Work & Poverty by Martha Chen, Joann Vanek, Francie Lund, James Heintz with Renana Jhabvala and Christine Bonner. http://www.unifem.org/attachments/products/PoWW2005_eng.pdf Gender equity index http://www.socialwatch.org/en/avancesyRetrocesos/IEG_2008/tablas/valoresdelIEG2008.htm Social Watch produces an up‐to‐date gender equity index composed of three dimensions and indicators: empowerment (% of women in technical positions, % of women in management and government positions, % of women in parliaments, % of women in ministerial posts); economic activity (income gap, activity rate gap); and education (literacy rate gap, primary school enrollment rate gap, secondary school enrollment gap, and tertiary education enrollment gap). These separate indicators in addition to the gender equity index are arrayed by country. There are 157 countries, representing 94% of the world's population, in the sample. Mapping these indicators across countries presents a comparative picture of the absolute and relative standing of women and gender equity in the world.Focus QuestionsKey words: Globalization1. What is meant by globalization?
a. To what extent is globalization new? Or is globalization another phase of a long historical process? b. Can we differentiate inter‐national (connections between) from the global (inter‐penetrations)?
Feminism and globalization
How do feminist interventions challenge globalization theories (for example the presumed relationship between globalization and homogenization and individualization)? How do different feminisms frame and assess the conditions of globalization around the world?
Gender and globalization
What role do women, and different women, play in the global economy? Are patriarchal arrangements changing as a result of greater economic integration at the world level?
Migration and mobilities
What does Parrenas mean by partial citizenship?
How does it relate to the case of Philippine migrant workers? What is the relationship between 'home' and 'host' nations? How important is a vehicle like the Tinig Filipino in forging 'imagined communities' and new realities?
What is the mix of choice and compulsion in the different migrations mobilities of men and women?
Globalization and politics
Are women subject to the same kinds of legal protections (and regulations) that evolved in earlier periods? Do new flexible production processes and flexible work arrangements undercut such legal protections?
Globalization and collective mobilization
Does globalization open spaces for new women's movements, new solidarities, new subjectivities and new forms of organizing?
Sample syllabusCourse outline and reading assignments Conceptualizing the 'Global' and 'Globalization' Dicken, Peter, Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell. 1997. 'Unpacking the Global.' Pp. 158–166 in Geographies of Economies, edited by Roger Lee and Jane Willis. London: Arnold.Amin, Ash and Nigel Thrift. 1996. 'Holding Down the Global.' Pp. 257–260 in Globalization, Institutions, and Regional Development in Europe, edited by Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Acker, Joan. 2004. 'Feminism, Gender and Globalization.'Critical Sociology 30: 17–42.Background Reading:Gottfried, Heidi. 2006. 'Feminist Theories of Work.' Pp. 121–154 in Social Theory at Work, edited by Marek Korczynski, Randy Hodson, Paul Edwards. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Peterson, V. Spike. 2008. 'Intersectional Analytics in Global Political Economy.' in UberKeruszungen, edited Cornelia Klinger and Gudrun‐Axeli Knapp. Munster: Wesfalisches Dmpfboot.Chow, Esther Ngan‐Ling. 2003. 'Gender Matters: Studying Globalization and Social change in the 21st Century.'International Sociology 18 (3): 443–460.Walby, Sylvia. 2009. Globalization and Inequalities: Complexity and Contested Modemities. London: Sage. Gender and Globalization Gottfried, Heidi. Forthcoming. 'Gender and Employment: A Global Lens on Feminist Analyses and Theorizing of Labor Markets.'Sociology CompassFernandez‐Kelly, Patricia and Diane Wolf. 2001. 'Dialogue on Globalization.'Signs 26: 1243–1249.Bergeron, Suzanne. 2001. 'Political Economy Discourses of Globalization and Feminist Politics.'Signs 26: 983–1006.Freeman, Carla. 2001. 'Is Local: Global as Feminine: Masculine? Rethinking the Gender of Globalization.'Signs 26:1007–1037. Theorizing Politics and Globalization Sassen, Saskia. 1996. 'Toward a Feminist Analytics of the Global Economy.'Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 4: 7–41.Parrenas, Rhacel Salazer. 2001. 'Transgressing the Nation‐State: The Partial Citizenship and 'Imagined (Global) Community' of Migrant Filipina Domestic Workers.'Signs 26:1129–1154.Bosniak, Linda. 2009. 'Citizenship, Noncitizenship, and the Transnationalization of Domestic Work.' Pp. 127–156 in Migrations and Mobilities: Citizenship, Borders, and Gender, edited by Seyla Benhabib and Judith Resnik. New York: New York University Press.Background Reading:Benhabib, Seyla and Judith Resnik. 2009. 'Introduction: Citizenship and Migration Theory Engendered.' Pp. 1–46 in Migrations and Mobilities: Citizenship, Borders, and Gender, edited by Seyla Benhabib and Judith Resnik. New York: New York University Press. Migrations, Mobilities and Care Hochschild, Arlie Russell. 2003. 'Love and Gold.' Pp. 15–30 in Global Women: Nannies, Maids and Sex Workers in the New Economy, edited by Barbara Ehrenreich and Arlie Russell Hochschild. Metropolitan Books.Hondagneu‐Sotelo, Pierrette. 2001. Domestica: Immigrant Workers Cleaning and Caring the Shadows of Affluence. Berkeley: University of California Press.Parrenas, Richard Salazar. 2008. The Force of Domesticity: Filipina Migrants and Globalization. New York: New York University Press.Pyle, Jean 2006. 'Globalizations, Transnational Migration, and Gendered Care Work.'Globalizations 3(3): 283–295.Qayum, Seemin and Raka Ray. 2003. 'Grappling with Modernity: India's Respectable Classes and the Culture of Domestic Servitude.'Ethnography 4: 520–555. Restructuring and Gender Inequality in Global Cities McDowell, Linda, Diane Perrons, Colette Fagan, Kath Ray and Kevin Ward. 2005. 'The Contradictions and Intersections of Class and Gender in a Global City: Placing Working Women's Lives on the Research Agenda.'Environment and Planning A 37: 441–461.McDowell, Linda. 1997. 'A Tale of Two Cities? Embedded Organizations and Embodied Workers in the City of London.' Pp. 118–129 in Geographies of Economies, edited by Roger Lee and Jane Willis. London: Arnold.Bruegel, Irene. 1999. 'Globalization, Feminization and Pay Inequalities in London and the UK.' Pp. 73–93 in Women, Work and Inequality, edited by Jeanne Gregory, Rosemary Sales and Ariane Hegewisch. New York: St. Martin's Press. Embodiment and Restructuring Halford, Susan and Mike Savage. 1997. 'Rethinking Restructuring: Embodiment, Agency and Identity in Organizational Change.' Pp. 108–117 in Geographies of Economies, edited by Roger Lee and Jane Willis. London: Arnold.Gottfried, Heidi. 2003 'Temp(t)ing Bodies: Shaping Bodies at Work in Japan.'Sociology 37: 257–276. Gender in the Global Economy: Post‐Socialist and Emerging Economies Salzinger, Leslie. 2004. 'Trope Chasing: Engendering Global Labor Markets.'Critical Sociology 30: 43–62.Kathryn Ward, Fahmida Rahman, AKM Saiful Islam, Rifat Akhter and Nashid Kama. 2004. 'The Nari Jibon Project: Effects on Global Structuring on University Women's Work and Empowerment In Bangladesh.'Critical Sociology 30: 63–102Otis, Eileen. 2007. 'Virtual Personalism in Beijing: Learning Deference and Femininity at a Global Luxury Hotel. Pp. 101–123 in Working in China: Ethnographies of Labor and Workplace Transformation, edited by Ching Kwan Lee. Routledge.Background Reading:Ferguson and Monique Mironesco (eds.). 2008. Gender and Globalization in Asia and the Pactific: Method, Practice, Theory. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Globalization and Policy Developments Lenz, Ilse. 2004. 'Globalization, Gender and Work: Perspectives on Global Regulation.' Pp. 29–52 in Equity in the Workplace: Gendering Workplace Policy Analysis, edited by Heidi Gottfried and Laura Reese. Lexington Press.Woodward, Alison. 2004. 'European Gender Mainstreaming: Promises and Pitfalls of Transformative Policy.' Pp. 77–100 in Equity in the Workplace: Gendering Workplace Policy Analysis, edited by Heidi Gottfried and Laura Reese, Lexington Press.Fraser, Nancy. 2007. 'Reframing Justice in a Globalizing World.' in Global Inequality, edited by David Held and Ayse Kaya. Polity. Gender and the New Economy Walby, Sylvia, Heidi Gottfried, Karin Gottschall and Mari Osawa. 2006. Gendering and the Knowledge Economy: Comparative Perspectives, Palgrave, See chapters by Sylvia Walby, Mari Osawa, and Diane Perrons.Ng, Cecelia. 2004. 'Globalization and Regulation: The New Economy, Gender and Labor Regimes.'Critical Sociology 30: 103–108. Globalization and Transnational Organizing Ferree, Myra Marx. 2006. 'Globalization and Feminism: Opportunities and Obstacles for Activism in the Global Area.' Pp. 3–23 in Global Feminism: Transnational Women's Activism, Organizing, and Human Rights, edited by Myra Marx Ferree and Aili Mari Tripp. New York: New York University Press.Yuval‐Davis, Nira. 2006. 'Human/Women's Rights and Feminist Transversal Politics.' Pp. 275–295 in Global Feminism: Transnational Women's Activism, Organizing, and Human Rights, Myra Marx Ferree and Aili Mari Tripp. New York: New York University Press.Mohanty, Chandra Talpade. 2006. "Under Western Eyes" Revisited: Feminist Solidarity Through Anti‐Capitalist Struggles.' Pp. 17–42 in Feminism without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity, edited by Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.