Suchergebnisse

A managerial problem has existed in United States foreign affairs since the early postwar years because of lack of interest in the Department of State in supervising and co-ordinating the broad range of operational programs that had sprung up. Two elite groups within the State Department—the political appointees and the career diplomats— were united in the rationale that their role was in policy, not operations. The management problem became a crisis in 1961 when President Kennedy called for the State Department to take charge. But the Department was singularly unprepared, and a diverse and imaginative program of change, sponsored by the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, ultimately failed. The main reason was that management still remained an alien concept to the political leadership of the State Department and to the dominant conservative faction of the Foreign Service. But, subsequently, a remarkable ferment developed, resulting in a takeover of the American Foreign Service Association by a group of "Young Turks," running on a liberal reform program. This readiness of the Foreign Service for change offers some hope that the State Department will take charge in the 1970's if the political leadership to be appointed by the next administration understands the problem and executes a coherent managerial strategy.

A managerial problem has existed in US foreign affairs since the early postwar yrs because of lack of interest in the Dept of State in supervising & coordinating the broad range of operational programs that had sprung up. 2 elite groups within the State Dept-the pol'al appointees & the career diplomats-were united in the rationale that their role was in policy, not operations. The management problem became a crisis in 1961 when J. F. Kennedy called for the State Dept to take charge. But the Dept was singularly unprepared, & a diverse & imaginative program of change, sponsored by the Deputy Under Secretary for Admin, ultimately failed. The main reason was that management still remained an alien concept to the pol'al leadership of the State Dept & to the dominant conservative faction of the Foreign Service. But, subsequently, a remarkable ferment developed, resuiting in a takeover of the Amer Foreign Service Assoc by a group of 'Young Turks,' running on a liberal reform program. This readiness of the Foreign Service for change offers some hope that the State Dept will take charge in the 1970's if the pol'al leadership to be appointed by the next administration understands the problem & executes a coherent managerial strategy. HA.

Condensed from a chapter of his work entitled, "The management and resolution of conflict: a comparative analysis of competing strategies.".

Professor Herman Finer, author of fourteen books on world politics, and political institutions and philosophy, has now written a morality tale abounding with italics, capital letters, and searing words. The burden of his tale is this: In July 1956, John Foster Dulles thoughtlessly provoked a ruthless dictator into nationalizing the Universal Suez Canal Company which controls the lifeline of the West. Then Dulles compounded his sins. He failed to support our closest Western allies by holding the rest of the world at bay while our friends rightfully resorted to force against a Nasser who had rejected an international management board for the Canal.