Suchergebnisse

The record of the nuclear test-ban negotiations can well be read for its implications both for the procedure of negotiating and the substance of arms-control agreements. The history of the negotiations covers five years and includes an unpoliced moratorium on testing nuclear weapons which lasted nearly three years. Starting with the collapse of the Paris summit meeting in 1960, the negotiations took a radical turn for the worse, and, had it not been for the Cuban crisis and heightened Sino-Soviet tensions, they might well have been fruitless. The level of the United States technical prepara tion was not adequate to the task at hand, nor were crucial political decisions taken prior to 1961. The impunity with which the Soviet Union could abrogate the moratorium in 1961 demonstrates the danger of dropping one's guard. The experi ence of the negotiations suggests that areas where there is rela tive parity perhaps offer the most promise for arms-control agreements and that more progress might be made if greater emphasis were placed on national control or what has come to be called adversary or reciprocal inspection techniques.

I. The Nineteenth Party Congress and the Death of Stalin -- The Background to 1952 -- The Nineteenth Party Congress -- The Emerging Pattern -- The "Doctors' Plot" -- The Death of Stalin -- II. The Post-Stalin Interregnum -- The Initial Crisis and the Struggle for Power -- Policy Changes at Home and Abroad -- Beria's Bid for Power -- Beria's Arrest and Its Repercussions -- III. The New Foreign and Domestic Policies -- The End of the Interregnum -- The Malenkov-Khrushchev Economic Program -- The Literary Controversy -- The Anti-religious Propaganda Campaign -- Collective Leadership and the Struggle for Power -- The Virgin Lands Program -- The Consumers' Goods Program -- The New Diplomacy -- IV. Domestic Political and Economic Crises -- The Political Crisis -- The Continuing Economic Crisis -- V. Soviet Foreign Policy: 1955 -- The New Approach -- The Re-appraisal of Soviet Military Doctrine -- The Bandung Conference -- The Austrian State Treaty -- The Disarmament Negotiations -- The Rapprochement with Yugoslavia -- The Negotiation with Japan -- The Military and Foreign Policy -- The Pre-Geneva Maneuvering -- The Summit Conference -- The "Spirit of Geneva" -- The Middle East and Soviet Diplomacy -- The Stiffening Soviet Propaganda Line -- The Foreign Ministers' Conference -- The New Trend in Soviet Diplomacy -- VI. The Twentieth Party Congress -- The Announcement -- The Internal Struggle for Power -- The Stalin Image before the Congress -- The Increased Flexibility of Soviet Policy -- The Twentieth Party Congress -- Appendix I. The Secretariats of the Non-Russian Republic Communist Parties -- Appendix II. Changes in the Composition of the Cpsu and Non-Russian republic Central Committies as the Result of the 1956 Party Congresses -- Appendix III. Glossary of Communist Periodicals and Books -- Appendix IV. Typical Soviet Wages and Prices in Moscow and Nine Other Soviet Cities: September—October 1955 -- Biliography.

Both the Soviet Union and the Western powers have had to rethink their policies concerning Eastern Europe since the crisis of 1956. Both have to take full account of the cardinal importance of Germany. Many in the West now find hope in the possibilities of negotiation and "disengagement" to avert dangers of war and to promote freedom for Eastern Europe. For the West it promises to be a long, hard road before an acceptable solution of the German problem and that of Eastern Europe becomes possible. Its main task is to look to its own strength and unity.

On April 8, 1949, more than 500 delegates and assistants from thirty-four countries met in Annecy, France, for trade meetings convened to discuss tariff barriers and other problems of international trade. Twenty-three nations already adhered to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and eleven others wished to join it. The first of such meetings had been held in Geneva in 1947. The first meeting of the series held in Annecy concluded on April 22 after adopting a declaration defining the position of Palestine in relation to the agreement and adopting a decision to seek emergency measures to resolve the crisis of the Cuban textile industry. The meeting also studied charges of trade restrictions, plans for customs unions, problems of new tariff negotiations, African import restrictions that had introduced discriminations against imports from dollar and other hard currency areas, the dispute between India and Pakistan over rebate of the excise tax on exports to Pakistan from India, the South African–Southern Rhodesian customs union and modifications of various countries' tariff schedules introduced since 1947.

One of the att's affecting US foreign policy is empiricism, which leads to ad hoc solutions instead of the development of a long-range program. Pol'al problems are tackled by admin've means. This dooms America to a reactive policy that has to improvise counters to every Soviet move while the Russians' emphasis on theory gives them the certainty of action. Another problem of US foreign policy is their reluctance to think in terms of power, as internat relations cannot be conducted without awareness of power relationships. A major problem for America is the changed nature of negotiations in a revolutionary pol'al order. Diplomacy is no longer a legal process. Insufficient attention is being given to the symbolic aspect of foreign policy. As a result internat debate is being carried on in the categories & at the pace established by the Russians. US coalition policy also needs a new approach. But the adequcy of American att's for dealing with the crisis is mainly a problem of leadership. America faces the challenge of demonstrating that democracy is able to act with moral certainty & to run risks without a guarantee of success. IPSA.

Because of the nature of modern weapons, rela tions between the West and Russia will determine man's life in the future. All facets of Russian society are at the disposal of her diplomacy while US foreign policy is dependent on Con gress, the people, and group interests. Stalin held war inevi table ; his successors have adopted a policy of co-existence, however, the goal of both is world domination. Soviet diplo macy has sought to weaken the Western position; there have been several maneuvers, the latest being the German crisis. By focusing attention on Berlin, the Soviets have tried to di vert attention from German unification and European security. The US is ready to negotiate disarmament agreements, but traditional Russian mistrust of foreigners will not permit full inspection. The ultimate aim of Soviet economic aid to less- developed countries is penetration and subversion. The most important weapons of Soviet diplomacy are psychological war fare and propaganda. However, our information program, based as it is on truth, is an equally strong weapon. We should not be discouraged by Soviet rigidity and inflexibility in our search for negotiation since there have been some suc cesses, for example, agreement was reached on the Austrian State Treaty. If the West maintains itself strong militarily, adheres to the principles of the UN Charter, tries to prevent Communist subversion in less-developed lands, and actively demonstrates its values, the way of life of free people will endure.—Ed.

It is a rather puzzling historical coincidence that in many countries attention is being paid once more to inflationary tendencies at the very moment when the international situation suggests the possibility of relaxation of world political tension. If the East has, or ever does, come to the conclusion that the only way to keep the consequences of the Paris agreements under control is to act in time, the quickest form of diplomatic retreat reconcilable with exigencies of an inconspicuous negotiation-technique is the most probable. Correspondingly rapid demobilization in the West accompanied by inflexible pursuit of anti-inflation measures might produce a demobilization crisis that would fulfil Communist hopes for economic and social difficulties in the democratic world. Whether the immediate danger is inflation or deflation, an analysis of the recent history of savings, including periods of unemployment and overfull employment, should be enlightening.The development of national savings is recorded by Canadian statistics for the last three decades in a very informative way. They offer historical examples of all the typical combinations of factors that are important for a balanced economic development: what is commonly accepted as normal or full employment is followed by years of high unemployment and then comes a period of over-employment during the war years. An examination of the survey in Table II can tell more than lengthy theoretical disputations.Before discussing the details of the historical development in Canada, let us consider the essential components of the process in a simple arithmetical example.

'Fam policy' (FP) is consensus on a core of fam goals, towards the realization of which the nation deliberately shapes programs & policies. The US may now be in the first stages of development of a nat'l FP. 33 major traditions have operated to prevent a unitary FP: (1) Goals are individualistic re implicit US tradition. The fam is regarded by the individual, & by the country, as a private venture for the sake of personal satisfaction. (2) Goals are to be achieved through private enterprise, with minimum gov intervention. (3) The nature of the pol'al process is one of negotiation among diverse interests, tending to make it difficult to reach unitary goals to which the nation would consistently adhere. Under these influences, FP has taken a course following 3 principles: (A) the 'principle of coherence' - the outline of a FP will be most readily discernible where it is necessary to, or at least consistent with, the needs of individuals; (B) The 'pickaback principle' - change to achieve fam goals is most likely to occur when it is coincidental with other developments (ie, meeting an econ crisis); (C) The 'principle of direct response' - action taken explicitly re fam goals tends to occur on narrowly defined issues. The history of US housing policy & of the improvement in the standard of living turns out to be illustrative of these principles. The US tradition of minimal gov has been yielding to a sense of gov responsibility, & a growing sense that US wealth can meet almost any task may lead to the feeling that any econ costs of FP's can be borne. Both econ forces & gov activity tend to contribute to the development of small, mobile fam's which preserve close ties with other relatives. The motive for a nat'l FP lies in the central position that the US fam seems increasingly to hold for its members. 2 root functions of the fam, child rearing & meeting the personality needs of members, have become more signif. Individuals find themselves valued in their Pam's in a way that is becoming rarer in other instit's. As individual & fam goals become more fully consistent, increasing evidence of the importance of the fam in nat'l policy is anticipated. AA.

The third special session of the General Assembly, summoned by the Secretary-General to consider "the grave situation in Tunisia obtaining since 19 July 1961," was held from August 21 through 25, 1961. In his opening statement to the Assembly the Tunisian delegate, Mongi Slim, outlined events leading up to the crisis of July 19 when as a normal exercise of its sovereignty the Tunisian government decided to prohibit formally flights over its territory by any French aircraft and announced that aircraft which violated this prohibition would be shot down. Shortly after the notification of this prohibition, French aircraft began to fly over the Bizerta region, and, disregarding the warning shots directed against them, launched an assault, in which paratroopers and warships later joined. Furthermore, Tunisia had complied with the interim resolution adopted by the Security Council on July 22 calling for a cease-fire and a withdrawal of all armed forces to their original positions, whereas France, in open defiance of the Security Council and of the Tunisian government, had availed itself of the Tunisian compliance by extending its perimeter of occupation and by strengthening its military potential. Mr. Slim called preposterous the French argument that its actions were in self-defense, stating that the peaceful demonstrations of the Tunisian people on Tunisian territory could not possibly have prejudiced the political independence and territorial integrity of France. Thus, since all of Tunisia's attempts to enter into negotiations with a view to the peaceful settlement of the armed conflict and the evacuation of the French base at Bizerta had been in vain, Tunisia's only course of action, other than to submit to brutal force, was to appeal to the United Nations. In closing, Mr. Slim emphasized that the problem before the Assembly had a two-fold aspect: 1) the right of Tunisia to call for the swift withdrawal of all French troops from her soil, which touched upon the Organization's responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security; and 2) the refusal of France to comply with the interim resolution of the Security Council. Thus, the question before the Assembly involved not only a conflict between France and Tunisia, but one between France and the UN as well.