The crisis in relations between Russia and Ukraine, and the related increase in tensions between the Russian Federation and the European Union countries, reverberated in the Balkan Peninsula. Individual countries in the region have reacted in various ways to the new situation and changes in the international balance of power. This paper analyzes the manner in which the Ukrainian crisis has affected the international situation of the Republic of Serbia.Serbia found itself within the circle of political influence between the European Union and the Russian Federation. Serbian authorities refused to join the EU sanctions imposed on Russia; at the same time, they received President Vladimir Putin and politicians subjected to international sanctions, such as the President of the State Duma Sergey Naryshkin, in Belgrade. This has been reflected in the reports of the European Commission on Serbia's progress towards the integration with the EU. Despite the apparent exacerbation of polarization in the European political arena, Serbia is striving to find the balance between the EU and the Russian Federation. Serbian representatives even made proposals suggesting that Serbia could bring about the 'reconciliation' between Russia and the EU, acting as a mediator.To some extent, Serbian authorities continue the political tradition of the time of Yugoslavia, governed by Josip Broz Tito, when Belgrade also tried to find the balance between East and West, the communist and the capitalistic blocs. Currently, Serbia is making attempts to take advantage of the new situation in the system of international relations in Europe in order to pursue its own political goals. ; The crisis in relations between Russia and Ukraine, and the related increase in tensions between the Russian Federation and the European Union countries, reverberated in the Balkan Peninsula. Individual countries in the region have reacted in various ways to the new situation and changes in the international balance of power. This paper analyzes the manner in which the Ukrainian crisis has affected the international situation of the Republic of Serbia.Serbia found itself within the circle of political influence between the European Union and the Russian Federation. Serbian authorities refused to join the EU sanctions imposed on Russia; at the same time, they received President Vladimir Putin and politicians subjected to international sanctions, such as the President of the State Duma Sergey Naryshkin, in Belgrade. This has been reflected in the reports of the European Commission on Serbia's progress towards the integration with the EU. Despite the apparent exacerbation of polarization in the European political arena, Serbia is striving to find the balance between the EU and the Russian Federation. Serbian representatives even made proposals suggesting that Serbia could bring about the 'reconciliation' between Russia and the EU, acting as a mediator.To some extent, Serbian authorities continue the political tradition of the time of Yugoslavia, governed by Josip Broz Tito, when Belgrade also tried to find the balance between East and West, the communist and the capitalistic blocs. Currently, Serbia is making attempts to take advantage of the new situation in the system of international relations in Europe in order to pursue its own political goals.
Publikacja recenzowana / Peer-reviewed publication ; Poland has repeatedly acted as a reliable ally in promoting Ukraine's activity on the international stage and during internal political turmoil. Polish leadership played the exceptional role during the Revolution of dignity. Having regard to the aggravation of confrontation, especially Poland's activity enabled to approve a common position of the EU concerning the events on the Maidan and force Yanukovych to sign the Agreement on settlement of political crisis in Ukraine. From the beginning of Russian aggression on the territory of Ukraine, Poland stressed the inviolability of Ukrainian borders and encourage to the implementation of sanctions against Russia at the various international forums. Since a Poland's representative has not been involved at the negotiating group on normalization of the situation in Ukraine, intensity of Ukrainian-Polish dialogue on the highest level slightly reduced during 2014–2015. Direct contacts of Ukraine's leadership with the leaders of Germany and France, which having signifi cant impact on making decisions within the EU and being eligible as partners in the negotiations for Russia, have positive effects. However, they have not allowed to fully using great potential of Ukrainian-Polish strategic partnership.
European Union is principal example of the so-called fourth current of institutionalization of international relations. What makes it special in the context of other state-like communities is the level of integration and what follows the level of institutionalization of intra-communal relations. There are two levels of institutionalization of intentional relations in integration organizations. On the first level international relations are institutionalized within the community of states. The second level concentrates on institutionalization of relations between the community and other subjects of international relations. The European Union is an example of organization that is advanced on both levels of institutionalization. This paper analyzes institutionalization of international relations between EU and developed states (Australia and New Zealand) and Mercosur – another integrational organization. Recommencement of negotiation between EU and Mercosur on a treaty of association, as well as commencement of negotiations between EU and Australia on the conditions of a Framework Agreement, have taken place at the moment when it was certain that world economy has to cope with the effects of a serious recession. Those actions, although they may seem irrational, are thoroughly rational as they increase the chances of reaching a compromise. Crisis helps to concentrate on the core problems and states (or organizations of states) are more willing in that distinctions to reach an agreement, provided that the balance tilts in their favor (even if the results of negotiations are very diff erent from what was assumed at the beginning).
The purpose of this paper is to provide a political and legal analysis of the choice options, decisionmaking processes and negotiation strategies of political actors in dispute over the date of the presidential elections in Poland the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Possible decisions are outlined in the form of a modified decision tree known from the decision theory, taking into account not only the options falling within the scope of individual actors' performance, but also scenarios triggered by specific choices and interdependent on the behavior of other actors (their cooperation or lack of cooperation). The descriptive-explanatory and predictive analysis is based on the assumptions of the public choice theory. The article also explains the legal determinants and boundaries of actions available to political actors ; Teisės fakultetas ; Vytauto Didžiojo universitetas
Energy market in EU is changing, for examle: economic crisis, energy consumption is still growing, CO2 emissions problems, costs of clean energy. That's why UE needs good cooperations between all the actors. The EU needs a stable long term strategy to promote the development of the energy sector in 2050. The Polish Presidency will suport this way and suport aspirations of European conutries. Poland started the Presidency in July 2011 (the first country of the Trio, which also includes the Kingdom of Denmark and the Republic of Cyprus). During the 6-month presidency took place a lot of meeting and events. The Polish Presidency for example finalise the negotiations on the Regulation on the Integrity and Transparency of the Energy Market (REMIT), The Presidency adopt also the TTE Council conclusion in november 2011. Polnad also make progress on the Infrastructure Package and Energy Efficiency Acts.
On balance the performance of the first Polish EU Council Presidency in the matter of the enlargement process of the European Union seems to be positive. The Polish Presidency effectively implemented the five main functions of a Presidency: the agenda-setting, brokerage, management, coordination and internal representation in the contacts with the governments of member states and the institutions of the European Union. The most important aspect was that it managed to implement almost all the operational objectives typically required for the enlargement process. Despite the objections and doubts expressed by the governments of many member states, conditioned mainly by the debt crisis of the Eurozone and the need for internal and external consolidation of the European Union, the Polish Presidency managed to maintain the concept of enlargement as an important element on the EU's agenda. On 5 December 2011, on the initiative of the Polish Presidency, the General Affairs Council agreed a new approach to the accession negotiations involving the earliest possible opening of the most contentious negotiation chapters, including fundamental rights and policies pertaining to the area of freedom, security and justice. Employing the agenda-setting function, the Polish Presidency was the co-author of the Group Presidency programme and the author of the country's Presidency programme and both documents provided the foundation for Poland's activity in the process of enlargement of the European Union. The most important achievements of the Polish Presidency resulting from the implementation of the brokerage, coordination and management functions concerned Croatia, Iceland, Serbia and Montenegro. The Polish government finalised the work on the text of the accession treaty with Croatia and brought about the signing of the treaty on 9 December 2011. It also accepted the agreements referring to the status of Croatia in the transition period; that is, until the treaty becomes fully effective. The Polish Presidency also gave a significant impetus to the accession negotiations with Iceland, by opening seven negotiation chapters and concluding six. The achievement of the Polish Presidency towards the endeavours of the countries of the Western Balkans to gain accession to the European Union was the opening of procedures leading to Serbia being granted candidate country status, although the formal decision was taken on 28 February 2012 by the General Affairs Council under the chairmanship of the Danish Presidency. In addition, the politically crucial enlargement conclusions of the General Affairs Council for Montenegro, on the basis of which the European Council announced that a decision would be taken on the commencement of accession negotiations in June 2012, were achieved during the Polish Presidency. Taking into account that some member states were critical of the steps taken to normalise relationships between Serbia and Kosovo, the balanced conclusions of the Council, in the part referring to Serbia, should also be taken as a success for the Polish Presidency. Although the Polish Presidency suffered a few failures it is worth emphasising that they resulted mainly from the attitude of other member states such as Greece or the negligence of the third party countries in the enlargement process – in the cases of Turkey, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. The Polish government, like the others since 2009, failed to overcome the opposition of Greece to the commencement of accession negotiations with Macedonia, although other member states fully supported the concept. The Polish Presidency, like the Belgian and Hungarian Presidencies, was unable to open any new chapter in the accession negotiations with Turkey. However, the reasons were the lack of progress in the implementation of the process of reforms by the Turkish government, the still unsolved controversial issues with Cyprus, the growing assertiveness of Turkey in the foreign policy arena and the unfavourable attitude towards the accession of Turkey to the Union by some member states. Nonetheless, the Polish Presidency achieved an agreement with other member states for a positive agenda in the relations between the Union and Turkey, which led to a relatively balanced text relating to Turkey in the conclusions of the General Affairs Council on 5 December 2011. The reason for the lack of achievement in the enlargement process with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo was the limited progress in fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria made by these countries. Therefore, these countries still remain only as states which aspire to be members of the European Union. Balancing all the stated successes and failures it should be emphasised that the Polish Presidency gave new impetus to the enlargement process of the European Union. This was visible in the proposal by the Polish government and its acceptance by the General Affairs Council of a new methodology for conducting future accession negotiations, the significant advancement of the accession negotiations with Iceland, the opening of the procedure for granting candidate country status to Serbia and establishing the political requirements for the commencement of accession negotiations with Montenegro. In addition, the Polish government signed the accession treaty with Croatia and accepted the agreements regarding the country's status in its relationships with the European Union in the transition period until the accession treaty is fully implemented.
The CSCE Final Act, signed in Helsinki in 1975, opened a new chapter in the search for the optimal security system in the Euro-Atlantic area, stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok. It established a cooperative security system introducing a supra-bloc negotiation mechanism of political and economic cooperation, as well cooperation in such humanitarian fields as culture, education, exchange of information and interpersonal contacts. After the Cold War, CSCE organs were created and equipped with new competences in the field of preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution, but the evolution of the international order in Europe meant that, contrary to the original intention of the CSCE (renamed at the beginning of 1995 as the OSCE), it has not become the central institution of European security. As a result of the Eastern enlargement of NATO and the European Union, the principle of equal security for all participating states was abandoned. The OSCE remained a secondary institution specialising in what is called the soft aspects of security. The Ukrainian crisis, which broke out in the autumn of 2013, accompanied by other challenges and threats to security originating in other regions showed the need to revitalise the OSCE and create a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community. ; The CSCE Final Act, signed in Helsinki in 1975, opened a new chapter in the search for the optimal security system in the Euro-Atlantic area, stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok. It established a cooperative security system introducing a supra-bloc negotiation mechanism of political and economic cooperation, as well cooperation in such humanitarian fields as culture, education, exchange of information and interpersonal contacts. After the Cold War, CSCE organs were created and equipped with new competences in the field of preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution, but the evolution of the international order in Europe meant that, contrary to the original intention of the CSCE (renamed at the beginning of 1995 as the OSCE), it has not become the central institution of European security. As a result of the Eastern enlargement of NATO and the European Union, the principle of equal security for all participating states was abandoned. The OSCE remained a secondary institution specialising in what is called the soft aspects of security. The Ukrainian crisis, which broke out in the autumn of 2013, accompanied by other challenges and threats to security originating in other regions showed the need to revitalise the OSCE and create a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community.
The CSCE Final Act, signed in Helsinki in 1975, opened a new chapter in the search for the optimal security system in the Euro-Atlantic area, stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok. It established a cooperative security system introducing a supra-bloc negotiation mechanism of political and economic cooperation, as well cooperation in such humanitarian fields as culture, education, exchange of information and interpersonal contacts. After the Cold War, CSCE organs were created and equipped with new competences in the field of preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution, but the evolution of the international order in Europe meant that, contrary to the original intention of the CSCE (renamed at the beginning of 1995 as the OSCE), it has not become the central institution of European security. As a result of the Eastern enlargement of NATO and the European Union, the principle of equal security for all participating states was abandoned. The OSCE remained a secondary institution specialising in what is called the soft aspects of security. The Ukrainian crisis, which broke out in the autumn of 2013, accompanied by other challenges and threats to security originating in other regions showed the need to revitalise the OSCE and create a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community.
The text is an attempt to analyze the international political situation in the security sector in the context of the crisis which has arisen as a result of the aggressive actions of the Russian Federation in relation to Ukraine: in particular the forcible annexation of the sovereign territory of Ukraine in violation of all the principles and norms of international law and the inspiration of the armed conflict in the eastern regions of Ukraine. For the first time after the end of the World War II aggression has become a fact of reality in European politics. Pan-European and transatlantic security institution – the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe – was not sufficiently effective mechanism for crisis management. In two years, the conflict in eastern Ukraine killed about 10 thousand men. The conflict in Eastern Ukraine has radically changed the perception of security in Europe. The problem is that Ukraine, like most of the "new democracies" of Eastern Europe as a result of the transformation processes of the early 90th appeared in a "gray zone" of security. Most of the Eastern European countries overcame the security gap by joining NATO/EU. At the same time, Ukraine remained in the buffer zone and became an object of intense economic, political, informational and military pressure from the Russian Federation. As a result, Ukraine is forced to rely primarily on their own capabilities and the military-industrial potential (not being part of the European collective defense/security), on the other – the international political, economic, informational support from the international community plays a key role in the possibility of Ukraine resist aggression. However, the crisis has led to a certain re-evaluation of existing regional security system: 1) The failure of attempts to build a pan-European security system became obvious; 2) The OSCE in Ukrainian crisis has created a platform for the negotiations and the peace process, but did not provide, at least until now, the mechanism of a real resolution to the crisis; 3) The question of inefficiency, lack of prospects and obsolescence of NATO as a collective security organization may be withdrawn from the agenda; 4) There is an activization of existing and search for new formats of cooperation between European countries in the development and improvement of the international security system in Europe. ; W artykule podjęto próbę analizy bezpieczeństwa w wymiarze polityczno-międzynarodowym w kontekście kryzysu wywołanego agresywnymi działaniami Federacji Rosyjskiej wobec Ukrainy – w szczególności aneksji części terytorium Ukrainy przy użyciu siły z pogwałceniem wszelkich norm prawa międzynarodowego oraz "instalacji" konfliktu zbrojnego we wschodnich obwodach państwa ukraińskiego. Po raz pierwszy od zakończenia II wojny światowej agresja stała się rzeczywistością polityki europejskiej. Ponadto ogólnoeuropejskie i transatlantyckie struktury bezpieczeństwa – Organizacja Bezpieczeństwa i Współpracy w Europie – nie jest zbyt efektywnym mechanizmem zarządzania kryzysowego. W ciągu dwóch lat konfliktu zginęło ok. 10 tys. osób. Konflikt na wschodzie Ukrainy radykalnie zmienił postrzeganie bezpieczeństwa na kontynencie europejskim. Problemem jest to, że Ukraina jak większość "nowych demokracji" Europy Wschodniej w wyniku procesów transformacyjnych znalazła się w szarej strefie bezpieczeństwa. Większość wschodnioeuropejskich państw rozwiązało problem security gap, wstępując do NATO i UE, podczas gdy Ukraina pozostała w szarej strefie, stając się celem ekonomicznych, politycznych, informacyjnych i wojskowych nacisków ze strony Federacji Rosyjskiej. Po pierwsze, w wyniku rozwoju kryzysu Ukraina jest zmuszona w pierwszej kolejności liczyć na własne możliwości i potencjał wojskowo-przemysłowy (nie będąc częścią europejskiego systemu bezpieczeństwa kolektywnego/obronnego). Po drugie, wsparcie polityczne, ekonomiczne i informacyjne ze strony społeczności międzynarodowej odgrywa kluczowe znaczenie w kontekście przeciwstawienia się Ukrainy rosyjskiej agresji. Razem z tym kryzys doprowadził do przewartościowań w zakresie istniejących w regionie systemów bezpieczeństwa: 1) możemy konstatować nieudane próby wybudowania ogólnoeuropejskich mechanizmów zagwarantowania bezpieczeństwa; 2) OBWE stworzyło platformę rozmów w ramach pokojowego rozwiązania konfliktu, ale nie wybudowała do tej pory realnego mechanizmu rozwiązania konfliktu; 3) NATO jako system bezpieczeństwa kolektywnego nie powinno być traktowane w kategoriach nieefektywności, archaiczności i braku perspektyw; 4) pojawiły się formy aktywizacji istniejących i poszukiwanie nowych form współpracy pomiędzy państwami europejskimi w celu rozwoju i doskonalenia systemów bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego w Europie. ; Текст является попыткой анализа международно-политической ситуации в секторе безопасности в контексте кризиса, возникшего в результате агрессивных действий Российской Федерации по отношению к Украине: в частности насильственная аннексия части суверенной территории Украины в нарушение всех принципов и норм международного права и инспирирования вооруженного конфликта в восточных областях украинского государства. Впервые после завершения Второй мировой войны агрессия стала фактом действительности европейской политики. При этом общеевропейская и трансатлантическая структура безопасности – Организация по безопасности и сотрудничеству в Европе – оказалась не достаточно эффективным механизмом кризисного урегулирования. За два года конфликта погибло около 10 тыс. человек. Конфликт на востоке Украины радикально изменил восприятие безопасности на европейском континенте. Проблемой стало то, что Украина, как и большинство «новых демократий» Восточной Европы в результате трансформационных процессов начала 90-х гг. оказались в «серой зоне» безопасности». Большинство восточно-европейских государств решило проблему security gap путем присоединения к НАТО/ЕС. В то же время Украина остались в этой «зоне» и стала объектом интенсивного экономического, политического, информационного и военного давления со стороны Российской Федерации. В результате развития кризиса с одной стороны Украина вынуждена полагаться в первую очередь на свои собственные возможности и военно-промышленный потенциал (не будучи частью европейской системы коллективной обороны/безопасности), с другой – международно-политическая, экономическая, информационная поддержка со стороны международного сообщества играет ключевую роль в возможности Украины противостоять агрессии. Вместе с тем, кризис привел к определенной переоценке существующих в регионе систем безопасности: 1) Можно засвидетельствовать провал попыток выстроить общеевропейские механиз- мы обеспечения безопасности; 2) ОБСЕ создала платформу для переговоров и мирного процесса, но не обеспечила, по крайней мере, до сих пор, механизма реального урегулирования кризиса; 3) Вопрос о неэффективности, бесперспективности и устарелости НАТО как организации коллективной безопасности может быть снят с повестки дня; 4) Происходить активизация существующих и поиск новых форматов сотрудничества между европейскими государствами в целях развития и усовершенствования системы международной безопасности в Европе.
Podpisany w Helsinkach w 1975 roku Akt Końcowy KBWE otworzył nowy rozdział w poszukiwaniu optymalnego systemu bezpieczeństwa w strefie euroatlantyckiej, obejmującej obszar od Vancouver do Władywostoku. Ustanowił kooperatywny system bezpieczeństwa wprowadzający ponad blokowy mechanizm uzgadniania współpracy politycznej, gospodarczej i w dziedzinach humanitarnych, takich jak kultura, oświata, wymiana informacji i kontakty międzyludzkie. Po zimnej wojnie stworzono organy KBWE, wyposażono ją w nowe kompetencje w zakresie dyplomacji prewencyjnej i rozwiązywania konfliktów, ale ewolucja ładu międzynarodowego w Europie sprawiła, że wbrew początkowym zamierzeniem KBWE, przemianowana z początkiem 1995 roku na OBWE, nie stała się centralną instytucją bezpieczeństwa europejskiego. W wyniku rozszerzenia NATO i Unii Europejskiej na Wschód dokonało się odejście od zasady równego bezpieczeństwa dla wszystkich państw uczestniczących. OBWE pozostała drugorzędną instytucją wyspecjalizowaną w tzw. miękkich aspektach bezpieczeństwa. Kryzys ukraiński, wybuchły jesienią 2013 r., jak inne wyzwania i zagrożenia dla bezpieczeństwa pochodzące z innych regionów ukazały potrzebę rewitalizacji OBWE i stworzenia euroatlantyckiej i euroazjatyckiej wspólnoty bezpieczeństwa. ; The CSCE Final Act, signed in Helsinki in 1975, opened a new chapter in the search for the optimal security system in the Euro-Atlantic area, stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok. It established a cooperative security system introducing a supra-bloc negotiation mechanism of political and economic cooperation, as well cooperation in such humanitarian fields as culture, education, exchange of information and interpersonal contacts. After the Cold War, CSCE organs were created and equipped with new competences in the field of preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution, but the evolution of the international order in Europe meant that, contrary to the original intention of the CSCE (renamed at the beginning of 1995 as the OSCE), it has not become the central institution of European security. As a result of the Eastern enlargement of NATO and the European Union, the principle of equal security for all participating states was abandoned. The OSCE remained a secondary institution specialising in what is called the soft aspects of security. The Ukrainian crisis, which broke out in the autumn of 2013, accompanied by other challenges and threats to security originating in other regions showed the need to revitalise the OSCE and create a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community.
The purpose of this paper is to examine human rights issues through the prism of the Polish Presidency in the EU Council. The Polish Presidency of the EU Council started with high expectations on the part of other Member States and EU officials. Poland took over the EU Council Presidency on 1 July 2011. Assuming the EU Presidency for the first time since its accession in 2004, Poland was well prepared for this challenge. At the same time, all actions of the Polish Presidency were very closely watched in other EU capitals as it was the first Presidency held by Warsaw. Even more so, as the previous Presidencies held by Member States that had joined the EU after 2004, had not been considered as terribly successful. Both the Czech Republic, because of the collapse of the government, and Hungary, because of the adoption of the controversial act on the media, were remembered as weak presidencies whose achievements had been overshadowed by negative internal developments. The Poles were aware of the fact that the standards were set high and of the challenges they would have to face. They also knew that even well prepared Presidencies were often hampered by unexpected turns of events. In a very difficult atmosphere marked by discussions on the need to deal more decisively with the economic crisis and the expectations of strong action on behalf of Europe's leaders, the Polish Presidency pushed the European Agenda forward and achieved some significant results. The main task of the Presidency was to lead the EU on a path to faster economic growth and an enhanced political community. In order to follow these targets, this article has been concentrated on some aspects of the three basic presidency's priorities: "European integration as the source of growth", a "Secure Europe" and a "Europe benefiting from openness". Special emphasis has been put on the development of expanding the area of European values and regulations, including further EU enlargement and the development of cooperation with neighboring countries. The initial objective of the Presidency, adopted by the Council of Ministers in May 2011, was to implement effectively the Stockholm programme. Thus, activities were engaged to protect EU citizens and facilitate their access to justice. Poland fully implemented the priority of the Presidency concerning the strengthening of collaboration in combating drug-related crime. The European Pact against synthetic drugs was adopted, along with the conclusions of the Council concerning the cooperation between the EU and Eastern Europe concerning drugs and conclusions concerning combating of new psychoactive substances. Taking into consideration the EU human rights policy, this paper aims at providing a general, and at the same time, comprehensive picture of the Polish Presidency activities in the field of the EU support for the protection of fundamental rights, as well as enhancing mechanisms for the prevention against any kind of discrimination. One of the key elements, in that respect, has been the EU accession to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. As a part of its Presidency, Poland took a major step forward in the process of the negotiations for the accession.
Immediately after the dicision of the Ambasador's Council of July 28, 1920,concerning the division of the Cieszyn Silesia, it became clear thet the said delimitation did not win the acceptance of any serious political forces in Poland. The Polish state's difficult international situation, however, made the Polish authorities abandon the idea of resolving the Zaolzie question by force. Fruitless negotiations were, at the same time, conducted to obtain the cossion of at least a part of the disputed territory in Poland's favour and various diplomatic interventions were undertaken to improve the situation of the Polish population inhabiting the Zaolzie Silesia. In spite of the low efficiency of such initiatives, in 1925 the political relation between Poland and Czechoslovakia were normalised and a liquidation agreement was signed, which led to a normalisation of mutual relations in the divided area. The actions of the Polish Republic in relation to the Zaolzie were influenced by various factors that were difficult to harmonise. One of them was the necessity to subjugate the Zaolzie question to the atate's general interests, which included an acceptance of the Versailles status quo, and attempts to find a platform of co-operation with Czechoslovakia in view of the growing German threat. Another factor was the desire to maintain the Polish national character of the Zaolzie motivated by the reluctance to give up that territory in an unequivocal way. The expectation of a cooperation with Czechoslovakia in the international context led to the policy of letting bygones be bygones. The democratic nature of the Chechoslovak state afforded a possibility of making the defence of the Polish national rights the responsibility of the Polish deputies in the parliament in Prague. The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs tried then to persuade the leaders of the Polish community in the Zaolzie to assume a more activistic attitude. At the same time, the Polish Consul in Moravska Ostrava supported financially the institutions of the Polish national life nad tried to resist the assimilating policy of the Czech authorities. This tactics brought, up to a point, some results, but it did not prevent all attempts at an assimilation on the part of influential Czech organisations and bussiness circles, neither did it safeguard the conditions of the national life in the Zaolzie so as to obviate the need for the steady flow of the Polish financial aid without which the Polish educational and cultural institutions would not survive. In the late 1920s and early 1930s a rapprochement between Warsaw and Prague seemed to substantiate the hopes for a betterment of the situation of the Poles in the Zaolzie. In the wake of such hopes there appeared Polish-Czechoslovak societies and Czechoslovak-Polish clubs. These clubs reised high expectations in the consular centre in Moravska Ostrava, which hoped that they would help to break down the barriers between the Polish and Czech population and to obtain the support of influential Czech circles for the postulates of the Polish minority. The most committed members of the clubs (just like all, with no exceptions, Polish cosuits in Moravska Ostrava) were treated, however, with great suspicion and aversion by the Czech nationalist circles, as well as by the personalities representing the views of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The most far-reaching initiative, that is the idea of calling a reconciliation conference concerning the matters of the Cieszyn Silesia in 1932, ended in a fiasco. Such factors as the way the 1930 sensus was carried out, the obvious deterioration of the living standards at the time of the Great Depression, and the attitude of the persons responsible for the Czech foreign policy who insisted on all Polish citizens leaving Czechoslovakia before "equitable" negotiations with Poland could begin, signalled the end of the period in which a positive and active conduct of the Polish population could seem an efficient antidote to the growing pressure for assimilation. The political events of 1933 changed the perception of the chances for a cooperation between Poland and Czechoslovakia, both of them being situated between Germany and the Soviet Union, which, in early 1934, made the representatives of the Polish Republic change their policy in the Zaolzie. From then, on the support of the Polish authorities and society for the Polish minority was emphasised, also a pressure was being exerted on the Czechoslovak government by means of an organised press campaign in Poland. The Czechoslovak government, however, did not yield under pressure, and assumed an intransigent attitude, taking this opportunity to get rid of a certain number of the Poles in the Zaolzie. The assimilation of the local Poles both of a natural kind and enforced by political and economic pressure seemed to the Czech authorities to be the best way to pacify this important borderline region. The tactics to which the Polish side resorted did not then lead to an improvement of the situation of the ethnic Poles in Czechoslovakia, it had, however, a different result, namely it aroused the national feelings and kindled the hopes for the Polish state's stronger support for the minority aspirations. In Poland, on the other hand, the internal situation in Poland's southern neighbour state, beginning with the elections of 1935, started to be looked at from the perspective of the apparently imminent crisis. In view of this, while the idea of an intensive propaganda camping was abandoned, the Czech policy in relation to the ethnic minorities was carefully watched, and the internal integration of the Polish community in the Zaolzie was strongly supported.
Poland towards Russia between 1992 and 2015 and outline their specifics. The author attempted at a synthesis of major manifestations of Polish-Russian cooperation and most sticking points in the intergovernmental (international) relations during that period. An important objective was to show the sources and examples of a divergence of interests, and point to the goals, which were based on these premises, established by the foreign policy-makers in Poland and Russia and pursued in mutual relations and international affairs. Between 1992 and 2015, in Poland's foreign policy towards the East and national security policy, the relations with Russia and the Ukraine were of utmost importance. On the economic level, considering the volume of mutual trade turnover, Poland's main partner in the East was the Russian Federation, whereas on the political level, the Ukraine was seen as a strategic partner. Along with the Ukraine, Russia played a key role in Poland's security policy in the discussed period. It should be emphasized that Polish-Russian and Polish-Ukrainian relations were very closely linked, and so was Poland's policy towards Russia and the Ukraine. In Poland's foreign policy towards Russia, or in broader terms, in Polish-Russian relations between 1992 and 2015, seven stages can be distinguished; each having their own characteristic. Despite some new specifics in each particular stage, they all shared an element of continuity. The constant theme was a great divergence of interests between Poland and Russia, particularly with regard to the European security system, and the role of NATO in shaping this security, as well as further stages of the alliance's enlargement, especially by countries of the post-Soviet area; energy security and Poland's strive for diversification of fuels supplies faced with Russia's actions aimed at the diversification of routes of sending its gas and crude oil to Western Europe bypassing the Ukraine and Poland; a historic dispute, in which a thorough, satisfying for the Poles, explanation of the Katyn Forest massacre was particularly high on the agenda among other issues; opposing visions of building an order in Eastern Europe, and first and foremost, in the Ukraine. With the passing of time, especially after Poland's NATO and the EU accession, the future of Eastern European countries, particularly the Ukraine and Belarus, has become a fundamental issue in Polish-Russian relations. Both Russia and Poland treated Eastern European countries as a sort of a safety buffer. However, the two countries had entirely different visions of how this buffer ought to be shaped. The political leadership in Poland saw the strenghtening of national security in the strenghtening of the Ukrainian buffer through the Ukraine's membership in NATO and the EU, whereas for the political leadership in Russia, the strenghtening of national security through Ukrainian buffer meant preserving its outside NATO status, or incorporating it in the the security system built under the aegis of Russia on the area of CIS. A characteristic of the Polish-Russian relations in that period was a great imbalance to Poland's disadvantage, resulting from the differences in broadly understood physical potential of the two countries and, consequently, their international roles (Poland being a medium-size country situated in Central Europe and Russia being a superpower in Central Eurasia). The capacities of Poland to shape the situation in Eastern Europe on its own were incomparably lower than Russia's. Therefore, Poland was trying to make use of European and Euro-Atlantic multirateral structures, mainly through the Eastern Dimension realized by the EU and NATO, to have as much influence as possible, on the desired developments in Eastern Europe. The eastern policy under successive RP governments was characterized by their overrating, frequently, of their own capacities, lack of objectivity in assessment of the situation across our eastern border, and application of double standards, particularly in the policy towards Russia. Polish-Russian political relations throughout the post-Cold War period were critical, and improvements were relatively short-lasting. Not only Russia, but also Poland is to blame for such a state of events. The Polish side, due to historical reasons and imbalance of potential, expected Russia to take more initiative in coming to an agreement with Poland. However, it has to be admitted that in many activities undertaken by Poland with regard to European security, in particular Eastern European subregion, the interests of Russia were completly disregarded, although they did not have to be accepted fully. An example of this was Polish diplomacy in the second half of 2013 intended not to allow Russia to be included in the negotiations on the EU association agreement with the Ukraine about issues that had economic implications for Russia's interests. In their policy towards Russia, foreign policy-makers in Poland, forgot, all too often, or, were unwilling to remember, about the principle that in order to meet the security needs of one's own country, one should also consider the security needs of other countries, the neighbouring ones in the first place. Analyzing the policies under succesive III RP governments on European security and relations with the post-Soviet countries, it is hard to share the view prevailing in our country that Poland did its best to develop partnership and good neighbourly relations with Russia. Among politicians, publicists and the Polish society, there was a large group of people who took a stance, though it was not always formally articulated, that Poland has a right, or even a duty to remain hostile towards Russia. On the other hand, Russia should not act unfavourably towards Poland, regardless of Poland's anti-Russian policy, although, obviously, it was declared otherwise. One of the few stages showing a distinct improvement in Poland's policy towards Russia and a mutual willingness to normalize our political relations, was the one between 2008 and 2010, when an unsuccesful attempt was made at pragmatizing foreign policy towards Russia. Since the end of 2007, this new foreign policy, gradually encompassing other areas, led to a greater or lesser modification of the policy to date towards Russia, the Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia by basing it on the so-called positive realism. These new trends increased cooperation between Poland and Russia and, eventually, a considerable progress was achieved in normalizing our relations. Between 2008 and 2010, Polish policy towards the East not only changed in practice, it was also a conceptual change. The crash of the presidential plane at Smoleńsk (April 10th, 2010), in which 96 peple were killed, including President of RP Lech Kaczyński and His Spouse, was a major, if not primary reason why the normalization process (2008–2010) was seriously hampered to the point of a standstill between 2011 and 2013. The Smoleńsk air disaster, and conflicting stands over its causes in particular, exacerbated divisions in the Polish society and strenghtened reluctance, if not hostility, towards Russia. A large part of the Polish political class and society did not accept a version of an inadvertent air disaster (plane crash), whose causes, like not following correct procedures, lay on both Poles and Russians. The surveys conducted during the years following the Smoleńsk air disaster showed that over 30% of the Polish society were convinced that it had been an attempt on the life of the Polish delegation en route to a commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the Katyn Forrest massacre, and that the Russian government and secret services had been involved. After the Smoleńsk air disaster, foreign policy towards Russia and Polish-Russian relations became a ground for political struggle in our country. For many politicians and conservatist right-wing journalists, a demonstrated degree of anti-Russian sentiment became the main criterion of patriotism. In a large part of the Polish society, a belief was strenghtened that actions should be taken to weaken and isolate Russia, and to minimize, rather than increase cooperation between the two countries. This meant that internal conditions within our country, which could possibly motivate the foreign policy-makers to stop viewing Russia as the main threat and encourage a breakthrough in thinking about that issue, deteriorated markedly. Consequently, Polish-Russian relations between 2011 and 2013 remained in a state of deadlock. In the foreign policy of Poland between 1992 and 2015, Russia played the leading role. This, however, stemmed from Russia being perceived by the policy-makers as the main threat to our national security, not a recognized partner in pursuing this security. Throughout that period, in all successive stages of Polish security policy, Russia was regarded as the main threat. Each political leadership in Poland, especially since the mid 1990s, treated Russia in this way, and these were not merely anti-Russian declarations, but a guiding principle of the foreign policy. Behind it, was a conviction that Russian imperialism was timeless and Russia would never accept the sovereignty of Poland. It was an obvious reference to the classical Polish geopolitical thought about Russia posing main threats to our national security. During the crisis and conflict in eastern Ukraine, between 2014 and 2015, the foreign policymakers in Poland revived the stance of a military threat on the part of Russia. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, such loud voices were heard about a possible military attack on Poland. Unlike the earlier periods, when there was an informal presumption that Russia was a threat to the security of Poland, in 2014, for the first time, in III RP's security policy, Russia was formally pointed to as a direct military threat. It was articulated in official state documents, including Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej from November, 2014, and in addresses delivered by the Polish government officials (for instance in exposé of Foreign Minister R. Sikorski and his follower G. Schetyna). The crisis and conflict in south-eastern Ukraine did not substantially change Poland's policy towards Russia. What did change between 2014 and 2015, however, was that much more emphasis than ever was placed on Russia being a threat to our national security, and there being a serious risk of a Russian direct invasion of Poland. During 2014 and 2015, the process of politicizing fear (policy of fear) of Russia was at its height. For Poland, a major outcome of the Ukrainian conflict and crisis was decreased national security and growing fears, among them the fear of Russian invasion, which does not mean that such a threat was real. During the years 2014 and 2015, Polish-Russian political relations at the highest level came almost to the point of being frozen. Important direct implications of the Ukrainian conflict for Poland's security were, apart from a growing fear of Russia, increased desires towards strenghtening its own defense capability, strenghtening NATO cohesion, increased involvement of NATO in our sub-region's security and closer bilateral Polish-American cooperation regarding military security. Resolving the conflict in eastern Ukraine as quickly as possible was in the interests of Poland. However, Polish diplomacy did not engage much in the conflict deescalation. They were very sceptical about the successive agreements aimed at ending the military operations negotiated within the frames of the so-called Normandy format (Mińsk I and Mińsk II). It seems that, considering the geopolitical situation in the Ukraine and divisions of the Ukrainian society, this country should remain a buffer state. Alternatively, coming out of this role should occur gradually, through a simultaneous Europeization of the Ukraine and Russia. Poland should not be interested in the "revolutionary" speeding up of the processes occuring in the Ukrainian society. Responsible politicians willing to serve the best interests of their nation should be aware of the limitations in pursuing even the most support worthy goals. The policy of every country, the foreign policy of Poland and the Ukraine included, should be founded on a realistic assessment of one's own capabilities so that aspirations would not outgrow the real possibilities of their attainment. Poland, aspiring to the role of the EU main expert in Russian and the post-Soviet area affairs, through insisting in the EU on the earliest possible Ukraine association with the EU, contributed in a way to the situation when the Ukraine had to choose between the EU and Russia. Polish politicians did not anticpate the negative outcomes of such acceleration for the Ukraine itself (including the loss of Crimea and strong separatist tendencies in the East of the Ukraine), as well as for Russian- Ukrainian relations and the security of Poland. Therefore, the firm support and involvement of the Polish political class in the so-called democratic revolution in the Ukraine during 2013 and 2014, can hardly be regarded as a succcess. Polish policy towards the East ended in yet another failure, which was shown as confirmation when Poland was not included in the talks aimed at resolving the Ukrainian crisis, which were held by officials from the Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France since the middle of 2014. The Ukrainian crisis and conflict was a turning point in Polish security policy and Polish-Russian relations. The Polish government officially began to treat Russia as the largest threat to the national and international security. A considerable part of the political elites in Poland did not see the threat in excessive dependence of Polish economy on Russian energy resources or other economic threats, but in a direct military attack. Generally speaking, it is unknown to what extent the Ukrainian crisis and conflict will, in the long run, have an impact on changes in Polish policy towards the East, particularly towards Russia and the Ukraine. It exposed the ineffectiveness of our foreign policy to date towards the East. In this context, a question arises: What will be mid- and long-term implications of the Ukrainian conflict for the modification or a radical alteration to Polish foreign policy towards the East? Another fundamental question pertains to Polish-Russian relations: What policy should Poland pursue towards Russia now and in the future? Will the foreign policy and security policy be directed, like in 2014 and 2015, at instransigence and confrontation, or will the normalization tendency prevail as regards Russia, and will the relations with the Ukraine be redefined? However, at the end of 2015, nothing implied that the foreign and security policy-makers intended to transform in any way the policy towards Russia and the Ukraine to date. It does not mean that changes will not be implemented in the years to come. It will be closely connected with the impact of the Ukrainian conflict on the modification of the policy of Germany and the entire European Union as well as the policy of the United States on the post-Soviet area. The crisis and conflict in eastern Ukraine strenghtened the legitimacy of argumentation that the main player in the post-Soviet area is Russia. None of the serious problems in this area can be resolved without the participation of Russia, and all the more, against Russia, which obviously, does not mean that the proponents of this stance overrate the capabilities of Russia in terms of shaping the closer and farther international environment. On this account, Polish policy will be hardly effective if at least some of Russia's interests in the post-Soviet area, especially in Eastern Europe, are taken into consideration, as was proven to date. Bearing in mind long-term consquences, the strategic conceptions of the Polish policy towards the East, should opt for the closest possible ties of Russia with political and economic structures of the EU and Euro-Atlantic structures (Europeization of Russia). This, in turn, should result in the evolution of the economic-political system of Russia into liberal democracy. The Ukrainian crisis and conflict classified the effectiveness of the Polish conception aimed at occidentalizing the Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova without simultaneously occidentalizing Russia. As was indicated by the proponents of this conception, its implementation assumed an inevitable cost such as a political conflict with Russia. The crisis and conflict in the Ukraine between 2014 and 2015 should be a good reason to change this stance. The biggest price for its implementation was paid by the Ukraininas themselves. Therefore, in the context of these experiences, Poland should suport not in opposition to Russia, but together with Russia, which does not imply that this process has to be fully synchronized. The direction of actions in this matter is of key importance. Despite the many contentious issues in Polish-Russian relations and different historical memory of Poles and Russians, in the long-term interests of Poland's security, lies implementing a cooperative and integrating, not a confrontational conception. For the normalization of Polish-Russian relations, it is essential that the successive governemnets of Poland and Russia should have a political will to a less confrontational approach towards disputable issues and resolve emerging problems in a compromising way, which is one of the "scarcest commodities" in the Polish-Russian relations. A compromise should not be treated as a failure, as is often believed, also by the Poles. It also requires changes in mutual perception. A true normalization of mutual relations between Poland and Russia will not be possible if the majority of political elites, media and society in both countries will see the other not even as a difficult partner of rival, but an enemy. The divergence of interests does not have to lead to hostility. The governing groups in Poland and Russia face a challenge in improving Polish-Russian relations. They can either attempt to broaden the area of common interests or to highlight the discrepancies and divergence of interests, and thus strenghten social attitudes prone to either cooperation or confrontation.
The European Union is a space o f continuous negotiations and an arena hosting the clashes of diverse integration options and concepts represented by EU member states and institutions. Furthermore, the disintegration of the EU (which dates back to the Maastricht Treaty) is becoming more and more visible. It is reflected directly by the presence in the European debate concerning multi-speed Europe and the current actions taken by the Eurozone states aimed at escalating the integration among selected states. Poland is also taking part in the debate concerning the future o f the European Union. The author of this paper attempted to examine Poland's place in the political and economic space o f the European Union by referring to the theory of integration. The research objective o f the paper is to analyse the Polish integration policy between late 1989 and 2012 within the context o f the international and European integration theory. The advanced research reflection in this scope in relation to Poland as the selected and important EU member state fits into the debate on the relevance of the European Union uniting concepts. The author posed the following research hypotheses in the dissertation: 1 .Considering the current stage o f development of the European Union, the Polish integration policy does not firmly support strictly one international or European integration concept. The Polish integration policy does not have a cohesive and stable integration policy concept and it is largely dependent on the policy and objectives of the current government (this is not only typical o f Poland) and the integration level. 2.Poland is strongly fixed in western structures, which makes the integration policy a vital component of development. What is more, the outlook on the European Union continues to evolve in the Polish political and social space. Poland sees the European Union as the main point o f reference in many political, economic, and social areas. 3.The organisation of the European Union does not only see Poland affect the form of the integration process, but also sees member states and EU organisations affect the functioning of Poland. The influence of a given state on the form o f the European Union mostly depends on the state's strength and significance in the EU community. This premise sees the place o f a given state in the system conditioned by the current factors, for example the European Union expansion process. Therefore, the interests o f Poland do not always correspond to the interests of the European Union, and the other way around. This deepens the EU's intergovernmental dimension. 4.Member states constitute the most important element o f the European Union. It is a union of states and nations supported by community institutions. This structure covers the convergence o f its methods, theories, and areas. This makes it impossible to profile the structure only from the perspective of the specified international integration theory. 5.The current stage o f the European Union's development, its challenges, and its problems show that the integration process continues to evolve and its result is impossible to foresee. 6.The current economic crisis influences the perception and management o f the European Union. The expectations include the intensification of intergovemmentalism and the establishment of multi-speed Union. If Poland remains outside of the Eurozone, it will find itself on the periphery o f the integration process, which is rather far from its very centre. Based on these research findings, Polish politics with regard to and, later, as part o f the EU can be divided into several principal periods. Period 1: (1989-1997) a time of consolidating Polish independence and security. This time was associated with the choice of a principal direction of the Polish foreign policy after 1989, i.e. Western Europe and declaration of Poland's will to take part in the process of its integration, without having any concrete vision for further course of those processes. This approach was often marked by a claiming attitude, both among political elites (marked by high instability) and the society (a simplified attitude, no social debate or knowledge about integration processes). During that period, Polish politics with regard to the EU cannot be ascribed to any specific model, since that policy was in statu nascendi at the time and was targeted at the EU membership, an objective in its own right. Period 2: (1998-2004) a time of negotiating Poland's accession to the EU, and the candidate's becoming accustomed to the rules o f EU's workings. There was still no vision o f integration processes from the Polish perspective and related opinions were expressed in a very cautious way. The primary aim was membership in the EU, such that was available at a given moment. At the same time, we should stress an important moment in the process of changes: the breakthrough o f the years 1999/2000. The interest in issues related to Poland's integration with the EU grew more intense then. The Polish government began to address this issue not only from the local perspective (a balance o f benefits and losses), but also expressed opinions on the reformation of the EU as a whole. Poland came as a difficult candidate for an EU member state (Polish support for US activities in Iraq and Afghanistan). This "difficulty" also emerged in the government's seeking to secure Poland's financial interests in connection with the accession. It was a period of preparations for membership, marked by a high level o f uncertainty (no clear vision, conflicting views: strong Union or preservation of independence, Common Foreign and Security Policy or working with the USA). Period 3: (2005-2007) a process aimed at building a vision of "Europe of Solidary Nations" in the EU by the government o f K. Marcinkiewicz and J. Kaczyński. Decisive, though not quite stable, support for international liberalism in the Polish integration policy. This manifested itself in reinforcing the Euro-realistic stance, both within Poland and abroad, by many considered, in fact, Eurosceptic. Period 4: (since 2008 to this day) a period of an integration vision being developed by D. Tusk's government, especially the Minister o f Foreign Affairs, R. Sikorski. It is a time of big changes and evolution in the Polish integration policy. An important issue at this time was a real sense of benefits coming from Poland's integration with the EU and the Polish government's pro-European attitude. The integration policy being developed shows a more flexible approach to the concept of independence (emergence o f collective independence) and thinking about the Polish foreign policy from the EU perspective. Additionally, we observed a return to constructing strategic partnership between Poland and Germany, rationalisation of partnership with the USA, Poland's active contribution to solving EU problems (e.g. the economic crisis), working towards a better "Eastern policy" as part of the EU. R. Sikorski was the first Polish Minister o f Foreign Affairs to have officially used the concept of federalism and vow his support for it in integration processes, mindful of Polish experiences and historical heritage in this respect. The Polish government expresses a firm objection to the idea of "multi-speed" Europe and builds an image o f Poland as an active member state (presidency at the EU Council), enjoying a good economic situation and having a society with an enthusiastic approach to the integration processes and strong Europe, and seeking to be as close to the "epicentre" o f countries behind this process.The analysis o f the integrative concepts presented in this paper shows that the different periods of the Polish integration policy (establishment and execution) saw and continue to see various levels in the majority of the international integration theory elements (of course, this is not just a Polish characteristic in the European Union, but rather a predominant trend in the Union's integration process). This has been and continues to be conditioned in large part by the foreign policy objectives of the given government, as well as by the current challenges and problems Poland is facing. In the case of the Polish integration policy, as in most other EU member states, we can observe an aggregation of interests, concepts and attitudes. This research project seeks to systematise them.
