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This study is an integrative examination of three aspects of joint venture formation: complementarity of the partners, ownership/control and joint venture autonomy. Past research has examined each of these concepts individually without considering potential interactive effects. Moreover, most past studies have used global measurements ignoring critical dimensions within each concept. For example, most studies of ownership/control have examined the effects of dominant control by one partner versus shared influence. This approach overlooks the possibility that joint venture parents may exert varying degrees of control over decision making in the different functional areas. Personal interviews of 98 managers involved in oil and gas exploration and production joint ventures are used in an investigation of the three joint venture concepts. In this industry, complementarity had little if any effect on joint venture performance. In fact, complementarity actually appeared to have a negative impact on several dimensions of joint venture performance. Qualitative data suggest that joint venture partners with distinctive competencies in different functional areas may experience difficulties in implementing potential complementarities. Moreover, it may be important for all joint venture partners to perceive some influence over the strategic decisions of the joint venture, regardless of their actual influence over those decisions. Perhaps the most important implications of this study are for future joint venture research. First, a dimensionalized approach to the issues of implementation and performance is justified. Examining ownership/control over each functional area provided additional insights into issues of joint venture management and aided in explaining the results of tests using global measures. Second, analyses of joint venture autonomy and ownership/control produced different results based on the functional area under consideration. Thus, the use of global measures is likely to result in the loss of information. Third, joint venture performance is a multidimensional concept. The results of the analyses related to performance varied according to the dimension of performance under consideration. Some measures of performance were actually negatively related to others. It is believed that this outcome is appropriate. Performance is measured relative to the various goals established for a joint venture. Some goals may be in conflict with others or present managers with tradeoffs to consider. Research that fails to consider multiple dimensions of performance may lose some of the richness of the performance concept. Finally, joint ventures are particularly likely to be subject to goal conflicts since they are formed by two or more firms, each with its own set of goals. Ultimately, a joint venture is measured by the extent to which the venture meets the goals and expectations of the individual partners. As a result, it is necessary for joint venture research to examine performance related issues from the perspective of the individual partners.

The aim of this paper is to describe a relatively new legal form of the simple joint stock company introduced into Slovak company law in 2017 and evaluate whether it may indeed be a suitable corporate vehicle for new companies with highly innovative potential (startups), or alternatively assess whether the legal form is suitable for other legal and business use cases; and explore and identify potential issues.Moreover, this paper provides an overview and legal analysis of the legal regulation of the simple joint stock company form in comparison with other legal company forms. The attractiveness of some of the key elements of the simple joint stock company's regulation is verified by an empirical statistical method from public databases. Additionally, the article also provides an assessment as to what extent the identified objectives of the policy maker in relation to the introduction of the new legal form were achieved.

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "The Joint Strike Fighter Program (JSFP), the military's most expensive aircraft program, is intended to produce affordable, next-generation aircraft to replace aging aircraft in military inventories. Although JSFP has made good progress in some technology areas, the program may not meet its affordability objective because critical technologies are not projected to be matured to levels GAO believes would indicate a low risk program at the planned start of engineering and manufacturing development in October 2001."

"May 2006." ; Shipping list no.: 2007-0218-P. ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 117-132). ; Mode of access: Internet. ; 2

In 1975 the US-Saudi Arabian Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation was created through an agreement signed by Secretary of State Kissinger and Crown Prince Fahd. Under the agreement US government agencies were to provide technical assistance to their ministerial counterparts in Saudi Arabia in the fields of agriculture and water, labor and manpower, science and technology, and industrialization. More than 30 separate projects have been implemented since the inception of the commission, but their impact or relevance to Saudi needs is continually diminishing. This article examines what went wrong and suggests corrective measures for the two sides to consider when reviewing their commitment to the program. (DÜI-Hns)

Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is a cooperative program between the Department of Defense (DOD) and U.S. allies for developing and producing next generation fighter aircraft to replace aging inventories. As currently planned, the JSF program is DOD's most expensive aircraft program to date, costing an estimated $200 billion to procure about 2,600 aircraft and related support equipment. Many in DOD consider JSF to be a model for future cooperative programs. To determine the implications of the JSF international program structure, GAO identified JSF program relationships and expected benefits, and assessed how DOD is managing challenges associated with partner expectations, technology transfer, and recent technical concerns."

Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed Department of Defense (DOD) Joint Strike Fighter acquisition program, focusing on the: (1) best commercial practices for developing new products; (2) reasons why DOD does not follow these practices; and (3) opportunity that Joint Strike Fighter represents to strengthen--or weaken--the effect of best practices and acquisition reform on major weapons."