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[EN] The possibility to fulfill the increasing market demand and producers' needs in processing crude oil, a cheap and universally available feedstock, to produce petrochemicals appears to be a very attractive strategy. Indeed, many petrochemicals are produced as side streams during crude oil refining, which primary goal remains transportation fuel production. Availability of some critical feedstocks may then depend on local refining policy. In order to improve flexibility, it has been proposed to directly crack crude oil to produce petrochemicals, in particular light olefins (ethylene, propylene, butenes), using technologies derived from fluid catalytic cracking. This paper attempts to review the main research works done on the topic in the literature in the last five decades, focussing on process as well as catalyst technology, with a special interest for fluid catalytic cracking (FCC) based technology that can be used towards maximizing chemicals from crude oil. Factors investigated include use of severe cracking conditions, on-purpose additives (from ZSM5 to more exotic, metal doped additives), recycle streams and multiple riser systems. ; The authors thank Saudi Aramco for material and financial support. Financial support by the Spanish Government-MINECO through program "Severo Ochoa" (SEV 2012-0267), Consolider Ingenio (2010-Multicat, CSD-2009-0050), MAT2012-31657, CTQ2015-70126-R (MINECO/FEDER), by the European Union through ERC-AdG-2014-671093-SynCatMatch and by the Generalitat Valenciana through the Prometeo program (PROMETEOII/2013/011) is also acknowledged. ; Corma Canós, A.; Corresa Mateu, E.; Mathieu ., Y.; Sauvanaud ., LL.; Al-Bogami, S.; Al-Ghrami, M.; Bourane, A. (2017). Crude oil to chemicals: light olefins from crude oil. Catalysis Science & Technology. 7(1):12-46. https://doi.org/10.1039/c6cy01886f ; S ; 12 ; 46 ; 7 ; 1

The possibility to fulfill the increasing market demand and producers' needs in processing crude oil, a cheap and universally available feedstock, to produce petrochemicals appears to be a very attractive strategy. Indeed, many petrochemicals are produced as side streams during crude oil refining, which primary goal remains transportation fuel production. Availability of some critical feedstocks may then depend on local refining policy. In order to improve flexibility, it has been proposed to directly crack crude oil to produce petrochemicals, in particular light olefins (ethylene, propylene, butenes), using technologies derived from fluid catalytic cracking. This paper attempts to review the main research works done on the topic in the literature in the last five decades, focussing on process as well as catalyst technology, with a special interest for fluid catalytic cracking (FCC) based technology that can be used towards maximizing chemicals from crude oil. Factors investigated include use of severe cracking conditions, on-purpose additives (from ZSM5 to more exotic, metal doped additives), recycle streams and multiple riser systems. ; The authors thank Saudi Aramco for material and financial support. Financial support by the Spanish Government MINECO through program "Severo Ochoa" (SEV 2012-0267), Consolider Ingenio (2010-Multicat, CSD-2009-0050), MAT2012-31657, CTQ2015-70126-R (MINECO/FEDER), by the European Union through ERC-AdG-2014-671093–SynCatMatch and by the Generalitat Valenciana through the Prometeo program (PROMETEOII/2013/011) is also acknowledged. ; Peer Reviewed

Following record low interest rates and fast depreciating U.S. dollar, crude oil prices became under rising pressure and seemed boundless. Oil price process parameters changed drastically in 2003M5-2007M10 toward consistently rising prices. Short-term forecasting would imply persistence of observed trends, as market fundamentals and underlying monetary policies were supportive of these trends. Market expectations derived from option prices anticipated further surge in oil prices and allowed significant probability for right tail events. Given explosive trends in other commodities prices, depre

Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Notes on Language and Usage -- English-Language Quotations and Spelling -- Arabic Words and Names -- Cast of Characters -- The Saudis -- The Greeks -- The Americans -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Chapter 1: The Reign of Big Oil -- The Original Aramco Concession -- The Truman "Denial Plan" -- The Neutral Zone and J. Paul Getty -- A Giant Tax Break -- Chapter 2: Signs of Trouble -- A Legendary Arab Dies -- Nasser, the New Voice of the Arabs -- Aramco's Workers Strike -- Inside the Elite -- "Minister of Everything" -- Big Deals, Unhappy Outcomes -- Chapter 3: Intrigue on the Riviera -- A Nautical Fraternity -- The Greek Network -- FBI Scrutiny -- Old Money, Saudi Style -- The Deal Is Done -- Chapter 4: Onassis in the Dock -- Facing the Music -- The First Court Appearance -- Duplicity and Disappearing Ink -- Chapter 5: The Shot Heard 'Round the World of Oil -- When Is a Bribe Not a Bribe? -- Welcome to Jeddah, Mr. Ambassador -- What Was in It for Saudi Arabia? -- Seeking Support in Washington -- Alarm at the Pentagon -- Chapter 6: Oil and the Cold War -- An Official "Statement of Policy" -- The "Eisenhower Doctrine" -- America's Great Red Scare -- The Arabs as Targets -- Chapter 7: The CIA Is on the Case -- The New Spy Agency -- "Project Twixt" -- Maheu's Other Client -- Chapter 8: A Two-Tier Strategy -- More Money for Alireza -- The King Wants a Yacht -- The Amended Article IV -- Chapter 9: The World vs. Onassis -- Opposition from London -- Good Guys or Bad Guys? -- Rebuffing the French -- Other Countries Weigh In -- Splitting Hairs -- Chapter 10: Too Many Moving Parts -- Going Public -- Alireza Wants More -- A Film Mogul Enters the Picture -- The Teams Take the Field -- The FBI Sounds an Alarm -- Chapter 11: Onassis "in the Doghouse" -- Mood Swings, Real or Fake -- The Lawyers Weigh In.

The first report of the Borden Commission appeared in October, 1958. It dealt with the transmission, export and regulation of natural gas, and with the financing of Trans-Canada Pipe Lines Limited. Very little was said about the transportation and export of crude oil. This second report is designed to fill the gap. It deals with "the policies which the Commission believes will best serve the national interest in relation to the export of crude oil and the marketing of crude oil within Canada itself."On the model of their first report, the Commissioners start out by comparing reserves and potential output with future Canadian needs. But while they could regard natural gas as a limited stock of energy avidly desired by the United States market, they soon found that Canadian crude, like Canadian coal, had become excessively abundant. The United States and the rest of the world were so far from scheming to get hold of Canadian crude oil that they might even have been relieved if Canada had never found it. Even while the Commission sat, the situation deteriorated further. Those who sought approval of Canada's recently gained export markets along the Transprovincial pipeline in the American middle west, and in the Puget Sound area on the west coast, were replaced by those pleading for new Canadian markets to replace a falling export demand.

Climate change represents an existential, global threat to humanity, yet its delocalized nature complicates climate action. Here, the authors propose retrofitting air conditioning units as integrated, scalable, and renewable-powered devices capable of decentralized CO(2) conversion and energy democratization.

"Vor dem Hintergrund eines anhaltend hohen Erdölpreises und Krisen in Förderregionen prognostizieren zahlreiche Stimmen in den letzten Monaten verschärfte, auch gewaltsame Konflikte um Öl. Haupthypothese ist, dass die endlichen Ölreserven und die anhaltende oder gestiegene Nachfrage von Ländern wie den USA bzw. China gewalttätige Konflikte zwischen Ölimporteuren und/ oder -exporteuren hervorrufen werden. Erdölkriege sind in der Zukunft in mindestens vier Szenarien denkbar: 1. Konflikte zwischen Exporteuren und Importeuren, 2. Konflikte zwischen Importeuren, 3. Konflikte zwischen Exporteuren und 4. Konflikte innerhalb von Exportländern. Die Wahrscheinlichkeit von Erdölkriegen hängt zunächst von der wachsenden Ölknappheit ab. Diesbezügliche Prognosen (z.B. 'Peak Oil') sind aber sehr unzuverlässig. Stand und Entwicklung von Produktion und Reserven, Nachfrage, technologischer Innovation und alternativen Energiequellen sowie politische Faktoren sind in ihrer Gesamtheit kaum vorherzusagen. In der Vergangenheit waren Erdölkriege zwischen Staaten eher selten und nur erhebliche Ölknappheit bei gleichzeitig abwesenden Alternativen und fehlendem internationalen Ressourcenmanagement macht eine diesbezügliche Änderung wahrscheinlich. Erdölkriege waren bislang vor allem ein innerstaatliches Phänomen, dessen Häufigkeit bisweilen übertreiben wird. Ihre Wahrscheinlichkeit steigt vor allem bei ungünstigen Kontextbedingungen wie großer Ölabhängigkeit und schlechter Regierungsführung. Alarmistische Prognosen müssen mit einem gerüttelt Maß an Skepsis betrachtet werden - zu viele unbekannte Größen sind im Spiel. Ölexporteure und -importeure tun dennoch gut daran, sich auf mögliche Herausforderungen vorzubereiten. Während Exporteure vor allem auf die Diversifizierung der Wirtschaft und politisch sensible Governance setzen sollten, sind für Importeure verringerte Abhängigkeit von einzelnen Herkunftsländern und Energiequellen sowie technologische Innovation zu empfehlen. Insbesondere sollten die politischen Beziehungen zwischen Importeuren und Exporteuren verstärkt verregelt werden." (Autorenreferat)

In 1991, the state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) commenced the first Chinese national oil company equity oil investment overseas when it invested in a UN-sponsored oil sands project in Canada. Since then, the CNPC and the other Chinese national oil companies (Sinopec and the CNOOC) have steadily increased their equity oil investments in developing nations, sometimes with the assistance of various Chinese party and government organs. Viewed in the context of China's burgeoning oil consumption and plateauing oil production, these investments have led to accusations by Western analysts and policy makers that China is engaging in "mercantilism" by "locking up" oil supplies from vulnerable developing nations to assuage their mounting energy-security woes. Through examining Chinese oil engagement in Kazakhstan, this paper will analyze whether accusations of "mercantilism" can adequately capture the complexities and dynamics that drive Chinese oil company investment in developing nations. This will be achieved by first surveying contemporary debates regarding Chinese oil engagement abroad and then linking these debates to historical and contemporary conceptualizations of mercantilism. This will allow for a new multi-faceted definition of "oil mercantilist" behaviour, which will shift the label from a statement of ethical value to a statement of empirical fact that can be tested. This definition will then be used to examine the institutional contexts in China that support and counter contemporary accusations of oil mercantilism, and then to explore Chinese oil engagement in Kazakhstan from 1996 to the present day. This paper will contribute to emerging literature that suggests Chinese oil investment and diplomacy cannot be simply understood through mercantilist perspectives. Analyses of Chinese oil engagement need to recognize the important influence that China's institutional reforms have had on Chinese national oil companies' increasingly commercial approach to foreign investment, in addition to the unique host-country contexts China encounters through its oil investments.