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The 2013 Defence White Paper includes security against major cyber attacks on Australia as an element of our �defence of Australia� national strategic interest. It devotes a separate section to cyber in its strategic outlook. While the White Paper makes heartening comment about the need to integrate cyber power into national strategy, it provides no insights into how this might be achieved, nor does it set any real strategic direction for an improved whole-of-nation effort. It does not attempt to identify any cyber objectives that should underpin Australia�s national security strategy. Australia needs to develop a current baseline cyber posture, derive a consolidated view of all requirements and gaps, and develop future remediation and implementation plans in an integrated fashion. Without this, cyber capability gaps across the Australian Government will continue to hinder the agencies� ability to plan for and conduct effective operations. Accordingly, this article calls for a comprehensive capabilities-based assessment, a national cyber capability plan, and an implementation plan (with specific actions and implementation responsibilities, timeframes, and performance measures) and a funding strategy for addressing any gaps resulting from the assessment. It also calls for a clearer articulation of operational planning considerations, including dealing with the conflation of electronic warfare and cyber warfare, and the use of uninhabited aerial vehicles for improved intelligence collection and network penetration.

The 2013 Defence White Paper includes security against major cyber attacks on Australia as an element of our �defence of Australia� national strategic interest. It devotes a separate section to cyber in its strategic outlook. While the White Paper makes heartening comment about the need to integrate cyber power into national strategy, it provides no insights into how this might be achieved, nor does it set any real strategic direction for an improved whole-of-nation effort. It does not attempt to identify any cyber objectives that should underpin Australia�s national security strategy. Australia needs to develop a current baseline cyber posture, derive a consolidated view of all requirements and gaps, and develop future remediation and implementation plans in an integrated fashion. Without this, cyber capability gaps across the Australian Government will continue to hinder the agencies� ability to plan for and conduct effective operations. Accordingly, this article calls for a comprehensive capabilities-based assessment, a national cyber capability plan, and an implementation plan (with specific actions and implementation responsibilities, timeframes, and performance measures) and a funding strategy for addressing any gaps resulting from the assessment. It also calls for a clearer articulation of operational planning considerations, including dealing with the conflation of electronic warfare and cyber warfare, and the use of uninhabited aerial vehicles for improved intelligence collection and network penetration.

Facing the increasing dependence on cyber infrastructures and vulnerability of the current information society through cyber attacks, this article defines various risks within cyberspace, potential scenarios and challenges of such an attack, as well as in the context of international law and international humanitarian law. The article focuses on questions of responsibility - getting more complex given the non-governmental aspects of cyberspace -, constant protection of critical infrastructure and Europeanization of those aspects which are as relevant as Austria's role, implementing the EU's policies. Finally, it discusses the tasks of the Austrian Armed Forces within cyberspace in the context of defending the sovereignty of Austria in case of an attack. (S+F/Pll)

Neutrality is a concept of international law, which the Swiss Confederation adopted in 1815. Its current idea goes beyond the legal requirements set by The Hague Convention of 1907. The convention comprises mainly of territorial definitions relevant for conventional warfare. Switzerland, on the other hand, defines the idea of neutrality more broadly. Considerations on its cyber neutrality policy could also be applied to other countries that claim to be neutral or impartial. We take Switzerland as an example for a case study, as it has the longest continuous tradition of neutrality. Due to the non-territorial character of cyber conflict, the conventional practices of Switzerland's neutrality and foreign policy are confronted with challenges: Major challenges are posed by the clash between national interest and the self-restrictions of neutrality policy. The national interest demands a strong cyber security capacity and an effective defence capability. However, this might only be achieved by means of international collaboration and knowledge exchange. This collides with the principle of impartiality and non-intervention in international conflict, a core-concept of neutrality. A new concept for neutrality in cyberspace has to be developed, which builds on the foundation of Switzerland's tradition as a neutral country in the international community. This paper outlines the inherent problem of neutrality and cyber defence. We describe Switzerland's neutral tradition, how it has developed since 1815 and its current characteristics, described as active neutrality policy. Furthermore, we illustrate Switzerland's involvement in cyber activities and outline where these involvements reach their limits. Finally, an outlook on future implementations of neutrality policy is made.

Die Gefährdung von Informationssystemen betrifft Unternehmen und Behörden gleichermaßen. Ebenso wie Firmen-und Behördennetzwerke sind auch die Netzwerke der Bundeswehr einer Vielzahl von Gefährdungen ausgesetzt. Neben Zugriffsversuchen von Außenstehenden stellen auch unachtsames Verhalten eigener Mitarbeiter und nie ganz auszuschließende illegale Handlungen sogenannter Innentäter eine Gefahr für das Netz der Bundeswehr dar. (Europäische Sicherheit & Technik / SWP)

The paper deals with cyber security, cyber defence and operations in cyber space. It follows earlier performed analysis of cyber defence tasks and proposes distribution of competencies among key players. The required capabilities are derived from tasks determined by legislation, NATO and EU commitments and earlier developed strategic and operational scenarios. Comparing required capabilities and an actual state, a solution harmonizing defence in cyber space with defence of the Czech Republic and ensuring the cyber space defence and integration cyber capabilities into common operations conducting is proposed.