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Intro -- Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Introduction -- Section 1: The Age of Cyberwar -- 1.1 AI-Influenced Weapons Need Better Regulation -- 1.2 Are We Ready for the Future of Warfare? -- 1.3 Fully Autonomous Weapons Pose Unique Dangers to Humankind -- 1.4 Here's How to End the Fog of Cyber War -- 1.5 Here's What a Cyber Warfare Arsenal Might Look Like -- Section 2: Infrastructure Under Attack -- 2.1 Hacker Attack on Essential Pipeline Shows Infrastructure Weaknesses -- 2.2 How Hackers Tried to Add Dangerous Lye into a City's Water Supply -- 2.3 Is the Power Grid Getting More Vulnerable to Cyber Attacks? -- 2.4 The Most Vulnerable Ransomware Targets Are the Institutions We Rely On Most -- 2.5 U.S. Hospitals Not Immune to Crippling Cyber Attacks -- 2.6 Urban Bungle: Atlanta Cyber Attack Puts Other Cities on Notice -- 2.7 What Do Hurricanes and Cybersecurity Have in Common? -- Section 3: Big Data In the Wrong Hands -- 3.1 Blockchain Enhances Privacy, Security and Conveyance of Data -- 3.2 Data Thieves Find Easy Pickings in the Health Care System -- 3.3 Data Vu: Why Breaches Involve the Same Stories Again and Again -- 3.4 Giant U.S. Computer Security Breach Exploited Very Common Software -- 3.5 The Equifax Hack-Bad for Them, Worse for Us -- Section 4: Are Our Elections Vulnerable? -- 4.1 Are Blockchains the Answer for Secure Elections? Probably Not -- 4.2 How to Defraud Democracy -- 4.3 The Vulnerabilities of Our Voting Machines -- Section 5: White Hats vs. Black Hats -- 5.1 CSI: Cyber-Attack Scene Investigation: a Malware Whodunit -- 5.2 FBI Takes Down Hive Criminal Ransomware Group -- 5.3 Hacking the Ransomware Problem -- 5.4 The Imperfect Crime: How the WannaCry Hackers Could Get Nabbed -- 5.5 Women in Cybersecurity: Where We Are and Where We're Going -- Section 6: Protecting Your Privacy.

This paper appeared in the Proceedings of the 9th European Conference on Information Warfare and Security, July 2010, Thessaloniki, Greece. ; Warfare without damage has always been a dream of military planners. Traditional warfare usually leaves persistent side effects in the form of dead and injured people and damaged infrastructure. An appealing feature of cyberwarfare is that it could be more ethical than traditional warfare because its damage could be less and more easily repairable. Damage to data and programs (albeit not physical hardware) can be repaired by rewriting over damaged bits with correct data. However, there are practical difficulties in ensuring that cyberattacks minimize unreversible collateral damage while still being easily repairable by the attacker and not by the victim. We discuss four techniques by which cyberattacks can be potentially reversible. One technique is reversible cryptography, where the attacker encrypts data or programs to prevent their use, then decrypts them after hostilities have ceased. A second technique is to obfuscate the victim's computer systems in a reversible way. A third technique to withhold key data from the victim, while caching it to enable quick restoration on cessation of hostilities. A fourth technique is to deceive the victim so that think they mistakenly think they are being hurt, then reveal the deception at the conclusion of hostilities. We also discuss incentives to use reversible attacks such as legality, better proportionality, lower reparations, and easier ability to use third parties. As an example, we discuss aspects of the recent cyberattacks on Georgia. ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Deterrence is possible only when others have at least a good idea of possible U.S. military reprisals, but cyberattack capabilities resist such demonstration. This report explores ways they can be and under what circumstances, then goes on to examine the difficulties and the drawbacks. Such "brandishing" is no panacea and could even backfire if misinterpreted. Its success also relies on the strength of other elements of the deterrence posture

Contrary to popular view, cyberattacks alone are rarely exercises of constitutional war powers – and they might never be. They are often instead best understood as exercises of other powers pertaining to nonwar military, foreign affairs, intelligence, and foreign commerce, for example. Although this more fine-grained, fact-specific conception of cyberattacks leaves room for broad executive leeway in some contexts, it also contains a strong constitutional basis for legislative regulation of cyber operations.

Abstract
The purpose of this article is to present selected threats that may affect the security of IT systems caused by cyberattacks coming from cyberspace, as well as to prescribe the results that could be caused by the failure to implement security measures to protect information system (IS).