Suchergebnisse

So lange die Deutsche Demokratische Republik existierte, befand sie sich in einer ständigen Systemkonkurrenz mit der Bundesrepublik, weshalb der sogenannten Auslandsinformation oder Auslandspropaganda eine wichtige Rolle zukam. Auch nach der diplomatischen Anerkennung 1972 blieb Schweden ein Schwerpunktland für die Außenpolitik der DDR. Der Grund hierfür lag hauptsächlich in der wirtschaftlichen Stärke des Landes, aber auch in Schwedens internationaler Stellung, besonders wegen seiner Haltung in Friedens- und Abrüstungsfragen. Die Propagierung des Friedens sowie der Erfolge des Sozialismus waren in der DDR-Auslandsinformation zentrale Ziele. Für Letzteres spielten die einzigartigen Erfolge der DDR-SportlerInnen eine große Rolle. Der Bereich Sport schien eine ideale Arena, die Überlegenheit des Sozialismus aufzuzeigen. Auch in Schweden wurde über das Sportwunder DDR berichtet und diskutiert. Wie waren diese Erfolge zu erklären? Der Fokus des Artikels gilt den Konzeptualisierungen der DDR-Sporterfolge im öffentlichen Diskurs Schwedens. Mithilfe einer Analyse von Pressetexten sowie von Informations- und Reiseliteratur zur DDR in den 1970er und 80er Jahren wird der Frage nachgegangen, wie in Schweden über den DDR-Sport berichtet wurde und welches Image dadurch entstand. Der Beitrag orientiert sich theoretisch und methodisch an der linguistischen Kultur- und Diskursanalyse sowie der Diskurslinguistik und geht davon aus, dass eine Analyse des Sprachgebrauchs für die Untersuchung von politischen, historischen und sozio-kulturellen Phänomenen fruchtbar ist. Die Analyse zeigt, dass die hervorragenden Leistungen der DDR-SportlerInnen in erster Linie durch strukturelle und ideologische Konzepte erklärt werden. Dabei übernimmt die DDR nicht selten eine Vorbildfunktion für Schweden, wobei die Instrumentalisierung des Sports für politische Zwecke durchaus auch problematisiert wird. Vor dem Hintergrund der Dopingrealität in der DDR ist es interessant zu konstatieren, dass explizite Dopingvorwürfe im Material nicht vorkommen; Dopinggerüchte hingegen werden mehrmals vehement zurückgewiesen.

While disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) have become integral statebuilding tools in post-conflict states, the existing empirical literature examining their relationship has focused on supply-side considerations related to the programming of both processes. In practice, though, DDR and SSR are implemented in the wider context of war-to-peace transitions where the state is attempting to establish a monopoly over the use of force and legitimize itself in the eyes of domestic and international communities. This paper therefore assumes that to identify opportunities and constraints for establishing closer practical linkages between DDR and SSR it is important to take the local politics into consideration. It examines two past externally driven peacebuilding interventions in West Africa, namely Liberia and Sierra Leone, featuring cases in which the central state had essentially fragmented or collapsed. Through this comparative analysis, the paper aims to provide a stepping-stone for future studies examining demand-side considerations of DDR and SSR in post-conflict contexts.

- ; Selective literature review and preliminary agenda for research: Recent insights on war economies have important implications for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR). This paper identifies an underlying dilemma of DDR: on the one hand, in order to convince warring factions to commit to peace, DDR strategies will have to offer significant incentives that in turn may entrench the factions' economic and political standing. On the other hand, offering the armed factions important peacetime roles may jeopardise post-war economic reconstruction, perpetuate cycles of underdevelopment and risk entrenching instability. It is argued in the paper that while more insights are needed on how DDR can be improved, it is equally important to go one step further and identify the positive as well as negative consequences for the economy, the market and the state when attempts at comprehensive disarmament and reintegration of combatants are undertaken. The paper discusses key findings from the literature on political economy of armed conflict and suggests possible directions for new research. ; Work undertaken for this paper was financed by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

This article analyses the nature of coordination between the various stakeholders during the design and implementation of a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process. It makes detailed reference to the contemporary DDR programme in South Sudan as this African country is a relevant example of significant international and local efforts to facilitate DDR coordination in a fragile and complex political and operational environment. The analyses showed that in South Sudan, coordination appeared to have been negatively affected by hierarchical, convoluted and inflexible organisational structures and arrangements. In addition, further contributing factors included: inadequate communication; uncertainty over roles and responsibilities; and unequal access to financial resources. Moreover it was apparent that these arrangements and dynamics fostered inter-organisational tensions and eroded trust between stakeholders. This ultimately resulted in fragmented and sub-standard DDR outcomes.

This paper argues that demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) trajectories of non-state armed groups are shaped by a group's internal organization. Extensive research by political scientists has demonstrated a correlation between internal features of armed groups and their behaviour (e.g. extent of violence used against local communities). I extend this analysis to DDR outcomes by illustrating how two features of an armed group's internal organization – command profile and financing architecture – influence post-conflict DDR trajectories. To substantiate the theory, four case studies from Colombia, Nepal and Libya are reviewed. The article concludes with the limitations and opportunities of this approach, including the potential of predicting DDR challenges.

Der vorliegende Artikel analysiert auf der Basis der 2011 an der Universität Stockholm veröffentlichten Dissertation Von Jungen Pionieren und Gangstern. Der Kinder- und Jugendkriminalroman in der DDR die Entwicklung des Genres Kinder- und Jugendkriminalliteratur in der DDR. Welche Erzählmuster, Figurenkonstellationen und literarische Verbrechensdarstellungen waren möglich in einem Land, in dem es offiziell keine Kriminalität mehr gab und wo das Leserinteresse nach spannender Unterhaltungsliteratur immer in Einklang gebracht werden musste mit dem an die Kinderliteratur gerichteten ideologischen Erziehungsanspruch? Anhand ausgewählter Textbeispiele wird im Folgenden die Umsetzung dieser Vorgaben veranschaulicht, die Verflechtung gesellschaftspolitischer Entwicklungen mit literarischen Darstellungen aufgezeigt und es werden wiederkehrende Beschreibungen von u.a. Tätern, Opfern und Detektiven diskutiert.

Within different political systems, youth cultures use similar symbols and styles which are charged with distinct and specific meaning. In the German Democratic Republic, the socialist part of Germany, youth cultures were identified as being a political threat. They created space for communication that was in sharp contrast to the propagandistic ideal of the so-called "socialist personality" and hardly to control by the state. Based on the example of the hippie phenomenon in the East, the essay explains the way global youth cultures had been differentiated culturally and loaded with political sense under the circumstances of socialism

International audience ; This paper addresses 'cooperation' between the former combatants of the Kosovo Liberation Army and international actors in Kosovo following the adoption in 1999 of the Undertaking of Demilitarisation and Transformation by the Kosovo Liberation Army. Though the UN Resolution 1244 called for the dismantling of Albanian armed groups, the Undertaking actually created a new organisation, the Kosovo Protection Corps, which can be seen as a quasi-army and extension of the KLA. Far from being a typical achievement of the liberal peace, the KPC was the result of KLA resistance and a co-production of DDR policy in Kosovo. To understand some (generally underestimated) outcomes of the peacebuilding mission in Kosovo, one must turn to the 'political sociology of intervention', in particular by examining the interdependent 'strategic interactions' that took place between intermediary actors and international administrators. Former KLA combatants sought to promote their own agenda. Since peacebuilders required their cooperation to implement peace, they acceded to some KLA demands. As a result of this negotiation process, the KPC may be seen as a hybrid entity that permitted an alliance between, on the one hand, pragmatic combatants who had renounced armed struggle and transformed their organisation into political parties and, on the other, international administrators who favoured the stability of the peace mission. Consequently, international interventions produce substantial effects on the societies in which they take place, by reinforcing some groups and weakening other ones.

International audience ; This paper addresses 'cooperation' between the former combatants of the Kosovo Liberation Army and international actors in Kosovo following the adoption in 1999 of the Undertaking of Demilitarisation and Transformation by the Kosovo Liberation Army. Though the UN Resolution 1244 called for the dismantling of Albanian armed groups, the Undertaking actually created a new organisation, the Kosovo Protection Corps, which can be seen as a quasi-army and extension of the KLA. Far from being a typical achievement of the liberal peace, the KPC was the result of KLA resistance and a co-production of DDR policy in Kosovo. To understand some (generally underestimated) outcomes of the peacebuilding mission in Kosovo, one must turn to the 'political sociology of intervention', in particular by examining the interdependent 'strategic interactions' that took place between intermediary actors and international administrators. Former KLA combatants sought to promote their own agenda. Since peacebuilders required their cooperation to implement peace, they acceded to some KLA demands. As a result of this negotiation process, the KPC may be seen as a hybrid entity that permitted an alliance between, on the one hand, pragmatic combatants who had renounced armed struggle and transformed their organisation into political parties and, on the other, international administrators who favoured the stability of the peace mission. Consequently, international interventions produce substantial effects on the societies in which they take place, by reinforcing some groups and weakening other ones.

International audience ; This paper addresses 'cooperation' between the former combatants of the Kosovo Liberation Army and international actors in Kosovo following the adoption in 1999 of the Undertaking of Demilitarisation and Transformation by the Kosovo Liberation Army. Though the UN Resolution 1244 called for the dismantling of Albanian armed groups, the Undertaking actually created a new organisation, the Kosovo Protection Corps, which can be seen as a quasi-army and extension of the KLA. Far from being a typical achievement of the liberal peace, the KPC was the result of KLA resistance and a co-production of DDR policy in Kosovo. To understand some (generally underestimated) outcomes of the peacebuilding mission in Kosovo, one must turn to the 'political sociology of intervention', in particular by examining the interdependent 'strategic interactions' that took place between intermediary actors and international administrators. Former KLA combatants sought to promote their own agenda. Since peacebuilders required their cooperation to implement peace, they acceded to some KLA demands. As a result of this negotiation process, the KPC may be seen as a hybrid entity that permitted an alliance between, on the one hand, pragmatic combatants who had renounced armed struggle and transformed their organisation into political parties and, on the other, international administrators who favoured the stability of the peace mission. Consequently, international interventions produce substantial effects on the societies in which they take place, by reinforcing some groups and weakening other ones.

International audience ; This paper addresses 'cooperation' between the former combatants of the Kosovo Liberation Army and international actors in Kosovo following the adoption in 1999 of the Undertaking of Demilitarisation and Transformation by the Kosovo Liberation Army. Though the UN Resolution 1244 called for the dismantling of Albanian armed groups, the Undertaking actually created a new organisation, the Kosovo Protection Corps, which can be seen as a quasi-army and extension of the KLA. Far from being a typical achievement of the liberal peace, the KPC was the result of KLA resistance and a co-production of DDR policy in Kosovo. To understand some (generally underestimated) outcomes of the peacebuilding mission in Kosovo, one must turn to the 'political sociology of intervention', in particular by examining the interdependent 'strategic interactions' that took place between intermediary actors and international administrators. Former KLA combatants sought to promote their own agenda. Since peacebuilders required their cooperation to implement peace, they acceded to some KLA demands. As a result of this negotiation process, the KPC may be seen as a hybrid entity that permitted an alliance between, on the one hand, pragmatic combatants who had renounced armed struggle and transformed their organisation into political parties and, on the other, international administrators who favoured the stability of the peace mission. Consequently, international interventions produce substantial effects on the societies in which they take place, by reinforcing some groups and weakening other ones.

In the 1950s, the epidemic occurrence of infantile paralysis (poliomyelitis) posed major challenges to health systems worldwide. Since there was no causal therapy for the viral disease, exposure prophylaxis was of particular importance. Ultimately, it was only through the development of vaccines that infantile paralysis could be permanently reduced. In 1960, the Sabin–Tschumakow oral vaccine was administered in the former German Democratic Republic GDR for the first time in Germany. Within one year, this vaccine succeeded in almost completely eradicating polio in the GDR. The article uses unpublished archival material to trace the systematic vaccination campaign using the example of the then district capital Halle (Saale). There alone, 63,328 children and adolescents were immunized within three days in May 1960. With 78,085 vaccinees recorded in advance, this corresponded to a rate within the polio-vulnerable population group of around 81%. The sources show that the GDR's government healthcare system and the principle of outreach vaccination contributed to the success of the vaccination campaign.

Not only West Germany saw the social rehabilitation of former National Socialists after 1945, former NSDAP members were also integrated into the GDR society and into the echelons of its functional elites. The share of former National Socialists among the elites varies between societal sectors. However, some of them even entered the ranks of the power elite. Due to the omnipresent myth of anti-fascism, disclosed brown shadows of the past could put careers at risk, but submissive loyalty to the young socialist state and its leadership could balance the scales. Keeping silent turned out a successful strategy in many cases: the general exculpation of the populace and the antifascist propaganda made serious checks rather inopportune for the Communist regime. For a differentiated evaluation of the ambivalent process of socialist denazification, it is vital to discuss its impact on social structure and to analyze the strategy of the Communist Party.

yes ; The success of programmes that relate to disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants into civilian life is dependent on four crucial aspects. First, it is essential that there is insightful and comprehensive planning that is based on sound research and analysis in order for a realistic strategy to be developed. Second, it is critical that the requisite political will exist at all levels to implement this strategy efficiently and effectively. Third, these programmes are typically expensive and time-consuming processes, and hence the necessary resources, namely financial and material support, and technical expertise, need to be secured. Fourth, it is vital that effective monitoring and evaluation systems are included in DDR processes, and that these systems are an integral part of the implementation strategy. The purpose of this paper is to examine critically current DDR developments, as well as explore the possible next steps for DDR. This will include the consideration of the current state of DDR and the extent to which initiatives such as the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), the United Nations Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) and the Stockholm Initiative on DDR (SIDDR), as well as other contemporary policy instruments and programmes encompass a human security perspective and reflects the interests of the poor. The key question that this paper will explore is: to what extent does current or "third generation" DDR programming differ from those DDR initiatives of the 1980s and 1990s (or "second generation")1; and to what extent do they contribute to the sustainable alleviation of poverty?

This paper examines the Rwandan experience of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) from 1997 to 2008, with a view to x-raying the nature, pattern, principles, and legacies of DDR in that context, in addition to setting agenda for the practice of DDR elsewhere in Africa. By way of a desk exegesis, the paper posits that DDR was significantly successful given the fact that it led to successful demobilisation and reintegration of a large number of ex-combatants who participated in the Rwanda crisis. The paper notes, however that the Rwanda DDR failed to a large extent in disarming and demobilizing many of the ex-armed groups operating in the country and its proximate region. In the light of the limited success of the Rwandan DDR efforts, it is therefore recommended that future DDR programmes in Africa should be holistic and pragmatic enough to address the concerns of DDR within the formal military sector as well as frontiers of militia formations. This entails considering DDR not merely as a Security Sector Reform (SSR), but essentially, an effort at state building in conflict and post-conflict situations.