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Intro -- FEDERAL DEBT, INTEREST COSTS AND THE DEBT LIMIT -- FEDERAL DEBT, INTEREST COSTS AND THE DEBT LIMIT -- Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- Chapter 1: FEDERAL DEBT AND INTEREST COSTS -- INTRODUCTION -- SUMMARY -- Debt Held by the Public -- Other Measures of Federal Debt -- Interest Payments and Receipts -- DEBT HELD BY THE PUBLIC -- Trends in Debt Held by the Public -- Types and Amounts of Treasury Debt Held by the Public -- Marketable Securities -- Auctions -- Borrowing Schedule -- Bills -- Notes -- Bonds -- Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities -- Maturity -- Seasonality -- Nonmarketable Securities -- Savings Bonds -- EE/E Bonds -- Other Types of Savings Bonds -- State and Local Government Series -- Thrift Savings Plan -- Zero-Coupon Bonds and Other Nonmarketable Securities -- Reasons for Borrowing Other than Budget Deficits -- Credit Programs -- Student Loans -- Purchases of Mortgage-Backed Securities -- Supplementary Financing Program -- Other Factors Affecting the Treasury's Borrowing -- Ownership of Federal Debt Held by the Public -- Domestic Ownership -- Foreign Ownership -- U.S. Debt Compared with that of Other Countries -- OTHER MEASURES OF FEDERAL DEBT -- Debt Held by the Public Net of Financial Assets -- Cash -- Credit Programs -- Gross Federal Debt -- Debt Subject to Limit -- What the Debt Limit Covers -- Options for the Treasury When Debt Approaches the Limit -- Suspending Sales of Nonmarketable Securities -- Trimming or Delaying Auctions of Marketable Securities -- Suspending Issuance of Maturing Cash Management Bills in the Supplementary Financing Program -- Suspending Flows and Redeeming Securities in Government Accounts -- Swapping Debt with the Federal Financing Bank -- Consequences of Having a Limit on Debt -- INTEREST PAYMENTS AND RECEIPTS

Debt Restructuring provides a legal analysis of international corporate, banking and sovereign debt restructuring from both the creditors' and debtors' perspective. It provides a practical guide for creditors holding distressed debt, debtor options in a distressed scenario and the necessary steps for the parties to achieve their goals.Written by an expert author team of leading practitioners and academics, the legal analysis is supported by case studies and draft clauses. This topical work is divided into three parts: corporate debt restructuring; bank resolution; and sovereign debt restructur

Since the 1950s, the need to raise the debt ceiling, the statutory limit to the borrowing authority of the federal government, has created highly contentious votes in Congress. In some cases, full blown debt ceiling crisis has resulted, in which default appeared a distinct possibility. This paper attempts to explain why periodic debt ceiling crises take place. It concludes that debt ceiling crises are the product of increased national debt and more frequent instances of divided government, coupled with heightened levels of partisanship and party polarization in the post-1950 period. These conclusions are supplemented by case studies of three debt ceiling crises: 1985, 1995-1996, and the summer of 2011.

What is called 'capitalism' is best understood as a series of stages. Industrial capitalism has given way to finance capitalism, which has passed through pension fund capitalism since the 1950s and a US-centered monetary imperialism since 1971, when the fiat dollar (created mainly to finance US global military spending) became the world's monetary base. Fiat dollar credit made possible the bubble economy after 1980, and its substage of casino capitalism. These economically radioactive decay stages resolved into debt deflation after 2008, and are now settling into a leaden debt peonage and the austerity of neo-serfdom. The end product of today's Western capitalism is a neo-rentier economy - precisely what industrial capitalism and classical economists set out to replace during the Progressive Era from the late 19th to early 20th century. A financial class has usurped the role that landlords used to play - a class living off special privilege. Most economic rent is now paid out as interest. This rake-off interrupts the circular flow between production and consumption, causing economic shrinkage - a dynamic that is the opposite of industrial capitalism's original impulse. The 'miracle of compound interest', reinforced now by fiat credit creation, is cannibalizing industrial capital as well as the returns to labor. The political thrust of industrial capitalism was toward democratic parliamentary reform to break the stranglehold of landlords on national tax systems. But today's finance capital is inherently oligarchic. It seeks to capture the government - first and foremost the treasury, central bank, and courts - to enrich (indeed, to bail out) and untax the banking and financial sector and its major clients: real estate and monopolies. This is why financial 'technocrats' (proxies and factotums for high finance) were imposed in Greece, and why Germany opposed a public referendum on the European Central Bank's austerity program.

Public debts capitalize into property prices. Therefore, property owners tend to favor tax over debt financing for government spending. In contrast, tenants do not suffer from debt capitalization. Thus, they tend to favor debt over tax financing. Our model of the resulting democratic fight between property owners and tenants over public debts and taxes predicts that the property ownership rate in a jurisdiction negatively effects the debt level. We provide empirical support for this hypothesis by analyzing a cross-section of the 171 communities in the Swiss Canton of Zurich in the year 2000.

Public debts capitalize into property prices. This so far neglected fact has important consequences for the tax vs. debt choice. Property owners suffer more from the debt burden and, thus, have a stronger preference for tax financing of government spending than tenants. As a consequence of the resulting democratic struggle between property owners and tenants, the property ownership rate in a jurisdiction negatively affects public debts. We provide empirical support for this hypothesis by analyzing a cross-section of the 171 communities in the Swiss Canton of Zurich in the year 2000.