Suchergebnisse

Introduction The relation between the bailiff and the debtor is conflictive due to the conflict of interest of both actors. The main interest for the debtors is focused on his or her daily life, while the bailiffs' interests lie within the judicial system. Also the current laws and disciplinary regulations are not always a guarantee for lawful and proper behavior of the bailiff during the face-to-face interactions with debtors. This could generate conflicts, like vigilantism. Moreover, several current societal developments lead to an increase of the friction between bailiffs and debtors, in particular: the intensification of the debt problems and new and profound powers of creditors, the increased individualization of citizens and their more outspoken behavior, and the dominance of the free market process for bailiffs. This thesis focuses on the conflictual interactions between bailiffs and debtors. The main research questions are: "What is the reason escalating conflicts occur between bailiffs and debtors and why does the incidence increase?" Methods A practical empirical approach is used. A total of 43 cases of face-to-face interactions between bailiffs and debtors are described. The backgrounds of the conflictive interactions are analyzed using qualitative and quantitative research methods. These methods include a participant observation study of bailiffs and debtors, interviewing bailiffs and debtors, and conducting surveys among bailiffs. The main point of view is bottom-up, in which a special focus is addressed to the perceptions and behaviors of the bailiff and debtor. Finally, the perspective of third parties is described, such as debt counselors. Results There are four distinct types of face-to-face interactions between the bailiff and debtor observed: 1) volatile interactions, 2) confronting interactions, 3) strategic interactions, and 4) strong/firm interactions. Each of the four interaction types has its own conflictive character and describes the behavior at the door. The two actors act and react ...

In Europe and especially in the euro existed between mid 2007 to late 2009 preserve vote on how the institutions of a sometimes fragile EU and the single currency managed to the global financial crisis defy. The crisis hit over from the United States, where the dangers of applied liberal and deregulated model of financial markets and inadequate governance were insufficiently recognized. European banks, but a few, behaved more than their American peers. Also banking supervision was generally effective, especially in countries like Italy, Spain and the small Cyprus. Through an innovative and fast answer to the European Central Bank had a leading role in tackling the crisis: the European legal framework for emergency loans was modified and cross-border coordination was performed. Crucial factor was that, in countries such as Belgium, Greece and Italy after, most EU and eurozone countries thanks to the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the Treaty of Maastricht had their debt under control. The result was that most European countries have not been hit as hard by the recession and the United States. The Anglo-American capitalism performed moderately, while the European system had shown its resilience (for the first time). Adapted from the source document.

Ten years ago, now, the Eurozone began to shake on its foundations. This article traces the genesis of the crisis and the present state of affairs. As to the causes of the global financial crisis in 2008, I argue that contrary to common understanding, the financial crisis had its deeper causes in a decades old tendency towards crisis in the real economy, produced by the continuous overaccumulation of capital which can only return profits by undertaking speculative short-term investments (a phenomenon known as 'financialisation'). I then trace how the global financial crisis morphed into a crisis of public deficits and debt in 2010-2011, particularly in the Eurozone. Three factors are shown to be responsible: financialization, design faults in the European monetary union, and the neo-mercantilist strategy of especially Germany and the Netherlands. The paper next looks at the five main traits of the policy responses in the Eurozone: bailing out governments and banks through creating emergency funds; imposition of austerity and budget discipline for member state governments; attempting to create and complete a Eurozone banking union; subsequently the European Central Bank engaged on an unprecedented scale in 'quantitative easing'; and finally, institutional reform in an attempt to repair the most pressing design faults of the EMU. The paper concludes that the underlying structural factors leading up to the crisis have only been addressed incompletely: the overaccumulation of capital continues, the completion of the banking union is in an impasse, quantitative easing has mostly just intensified financialization by pushing up asset prizes, and institutional reform has taken the form of a fundamentally undemocratic attempt at monetary and political union by stealth. The broader legitimacy of the European project has been substantially undermined, and Europe is not in a better position than eight years ago in case of a new global crisis.