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For debtors everywhere who want to understand how the system really works, this handbook provides practical tools for fighting debt in its most exploitative forms. Over the last 30 years as wages have stagnated across the country, average household debt has more than doubled. Increasingly, people are forced to take on debt to meet their needs; from housing to education and medical care. The results-wrecked lives, devastated communities, and an increasing reliance on credit to maintain basic living standards-reveal an economic system that enriches the few at the expense of the many. Detailed st

The Great Recession has sent debt levels to a post-WWII high for several advanced economies, reviving the discussion of fiscal consolidation. This paper assesses the macroeconomic implications of tax-based versus spending-based consolidation within the framework of a New Keynesian model with long term government debt. Three results stand out: First, tax-based consolidations are inflationary whereas spending-based ones are deflationary. Second, the net benefits of inflation increase in the average maturity of outstanding debt: inflation revalues debt more efficiently, while distortions due to price dispersion remain unaffected - the maturity effect. Third, as a result, tax-based consolidations can become superior to spending cuts if the average maturity is high enough. Quantitatively, the threshold is two years for US data in 2013. The previous mechanism illustrates the importance of inflation in the consolidation process, even if raising its target rate is considered not to be an option.

We study debt mutualisation in the Euro area. Bearing in mind other existing proposals we provide an alternative Blue, Yellow and Red Bonds proposal: blue, would cover debt up to 60% of GDP, yellow would include debt from 60% up to 90% of GDP, and red would cover debt above 90% of GDP. Although not with joint liability, the rationale behind the Yellow Bonds with a joint issuance is the attraction of liquidity, which would be beneficial, especially for the countries with high yields. This could give more room to public authorities.

Intro -- FEDERAL DEBT, INTEREST COSTS AND THE DEBT LIMIT -- FEDERAL DEBT, INTEREST COSTS AND THE DEBT LIMIT -- Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- Chapter 1: FEDERAL DEBT AND INTEREST COSTS -- INTRODUCTION -- SUMMARY -- Debt Held by the Public -- Other Measures of Federal Debt -- Interest Payments and Receipts -- DEBT HELD BY THE PUBLIC -- Trends in Debt Held by the Public -- Types and Amounts of Treasury Debt Held by the Public -- Marketable Securities -- Auctions -- Borrowing Schedule -- Bills -- Notes -- Bonds -- Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities -- Maturity -- Seasonality -- Nonmarketable Securities -- Savings Bonds -- EE/E Bonds -- Other Types of Savings Bonds -- State and Local Government Series -- Thrift Savings Plan -- Zero-Coupon Bonds and Other Nonmarketable Securities -- Reasons for Borrowing Other than Budget Deficits -- Credit Programs -- Student Loans -- Purchases of Mortgage-Backed Securities -- Supplementary Financing Program -- Other Factors Affecting the Treasury's Borrowing -- Ownership of Federal Debt Held by the Public -- Domestic Ownership -- Foreign Ownership -- U.S. Debt Compared with that of Other Countries -- OTHER MEASURES OF FEDERAL DEBT -- Debt Held by the Public Net of Financial Assets -- Cash -- Credit Programs -- Gross Federal Debt -- Debt Subject to Limit -- What the Debt Limit Covers -- Options for the Treasury When Debt Approaches the Limit -- Suspending Sales of Nonmarketable Securities -- Trimming or Delaying Auctions of Marketable Securities -- Suspending Issuance of Maturing Cash Management Bills in the Supplementary Financing Program -- Suspending Flows and Redeeming Securities in Government Accounts -- Swapping Debt with the Federal Financing Bank -- Consequences of Having a Limit on Debt -- INTEREST PAYMENTS AND RECEIPTS

International audience ; The political and economic crisis in Europe is often viewed as an indirect consequence of the global financial and economic breakdowns caused by the US "subprime" crisis. European governments themselves tend to underestimate Europe's responsibility for the crisis and seem to prefer to manage the symptoms of the crisis rather than pursue a real recovery from it. This paper argues that the enforced policies are far from achieving an appropriate economic solution for the Eurozone. Moreover, it suggests that, although the European domestic debt situation is very close to the American one, their most recent evolutions and their main causes differ. If the growth of the American debt can partly be explained by macroeconomics imbalances, the causes of the growth of the European domestic debt must be found in a change in the behavior of the financial sector agents. The conclusion advocates for a more radical European policy to solve the debt bubble. ; La crise européenne est souvent perçue comme le produit indirect de la crise financière et de la récession mondiale causée par l'éclatement de la crise des "subprimes" américaine. Les gouvernements européens eux-mêmes tendent à sous-estimer les responsabilités des européens dans la crise et préfèrent en gérer les symptômes plutôt que de travailler à un redressement en profondeur. Dans cet article nous montrons que les politiques mises en œuvre ne peuvent être considérées comme des solutions appropriées à la situation économique. D'autre part, nous suggérons que bien que les niveaux des dettes domestiques européennes et américaines sont proches, leurs causes et leurs évolutions récentes sont différentes. Si l'accroissement de la dette américaine peut s'expliquer par des déséquilibres macroéconomiques, l'augmentation de la dette européenne ne peut s'expliquer que part des changements comportementaux des acteurs du secteur financier. En conclusion nous proposons de mettre en œuvre des solutions plus radicales pour mettre fin à la bulle du crédit.

International audience ; The political and economic crisis in Europe is often viewed as an indirect consequence of the global financial and economic breakdowns caused by the US "subprime" crisis. European governments themselves tend to underestimate Europe's responsibility for the crisis and seem to prefer to manage the symptoms of the crisis rather than pursue a real recovery from it. This paper argues that the enforced policies are far from achieving an appropriate economic solution for the Eurozone. Moreover, it suggests that, although the European domestic debt situation is very close to the American one, their most recent evolutions and their main causes differ. If the growth of the American debt can partly be explained by macroeconomics imbalances, the causes of the growth of the European domestic debt must be found in a change in the behavior of the financial sector agents. The conclusion advocates for a more radical European policy to solve the debt bubble. ; La crise européenne est souvent perçue comme le produit indirect de la crise financière et de la récession mondiale causée par l'éclatement de la crise des "subprimes" américaine. Les gouvernements européens eux-mêmes tendent à sous-estimer les responsabilités des européens dans la crise et préfèrent en gérer les symptômes plutôt que de travailler à un redressement en profondeur. Dans cet article nous montrons que les politiques mises en œuvre ne peuvent être considérées comme des solutions appropriées à la situation économique. D'autre part, nous suggérons que bien que les niveaux des dettes domestiques européennes et américaines sont proches, leurs causes et leurs évolutions récentes sont différentes. Si l'accroissement de la dette américaine peut s'expliquer par des déséquilibres macroéconomiques, l'augmentation de la dette européenne ne peut s'expliquer que part des changements comportementaux des acteurs du secteur financier. En conclusion nous proposons de mettre en œuvre des solutions plus radicales pour mettre fin à la bulle du crédit.

This dissertation explores the relationship between sovereign debt ownership, default probabilities, and debt returns, focusing on the increasing domestic debt ownership in devloped countries since the global financial crisis in 2007. It also explains, both theoretically and empircally, how changes in sovereign debt maturity structure would affect the real economy. This dissertation helps advance the study of the linkages between sovereign debt composition, asset prices and the real economy.In the first chapter, I study the relationship bewteen sovereign debt default and debt ownership structure. Major developed countries have experienced a significant run-up in public debt after the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008. However, the impact on sovereign debt ownership varies across countries. Specifically, the share of debt held by domestic banks has increased in GIIPS countries but declined in non-GIIPS countries. I explain the cross-country differences in debt ownership structure using a dynamic equilibrium model with strategic and non-discriminatory defaults, in which sovereign debt can serve as collateral for expanding private investments. The key insight is that the share of debt held domestically is positively correlated with the government's incentive to default. Consequently, the model predicts that the share of domestically-held debt is strictly increasing in total debt only in highly-indebted countries whose debt has low collateral value. My result is consistent with the notion that domestic debt is a committment device for debt repayment. The key policy implication is that changes in debt ownership are important indicators for the optimality of public debt level. Using data from a panel of 11 countries between 2007 and 2014, I find evidence consistent with these predictions.In the second chapter, I study the interaction between monetary and fiscal policies, and how changes in fiscal policies, such as the level of debt and debt maturity composition, would affect inflation, the real economy and asset prices. I developed a three-period equilibrium model, in which monetary policies are modelled as open market operations. In my model, inflation and the term structure of interest rates are jointly determined by monetary and fiscal policies, and therefore Sargent (1981)'s "game of chicken'' problem is avoided. I show from the model that fiscal instruments, such as the primary surplus, and the level and maturity structure of government debt, have important implications on inflations and the term structure of interest rates. I then provide robust empirical evidence on how changes in debt-maturity structure are associated with changes in future inflation using U.S. data. One percent increase in the fraction of short-term debt issued is associated with more than 0.2 percent increase in future inflation of different horizons. Empirical evidecne also shows that changes in the short-end of the maturity structure has the most explanatory power over short- and medium- horizons, whereas changes in the long-end of the maturity structure has the most explanatory power over long- horizons.

Debt Restructuring provides a legal analysis of international corporate, banking and sovereign debt restructuring from both the creditors' and debtors' perspective. It provides a practical guide for creditors holding distressed debt, debtor options in a distressed scenario and the necessary steps for the parties to achieve their goals.Written by an expert author team of leading practitioners and academics, the legal analysis is supported by case studies and draft clauses. This topical work is divided into three parts: corporate debt restructuring; bank resolution; and sovereign debt restructur

Achieving debt-free public higher education is an important goal for society as a whole and the left in particular. Education is a human right, and anyone who is willing and able should be able to attend an institution of higher education irrespective of their ability to pay for it. Public disinvestment in education needs to be challenged, because changing the very nature of higher education and exacerbating inequality even further is more than a budgetary matter.

International Debt Statistics (IDS) 2013 is a continuation of the World Bank's publications Global Development Finance, Volume II (1997 through 2009) and the earlier World Debt Tables (1973 through 1996). IDS 2013 provides statistical tables showing the external debt of 128 developing countries that report public and publicly guaranteed external debt to the World Bank's Debtor Reporting System (DRS). It also includes tables of key debt ratios for individual reporting countries and the composition of external debt stocks and flows for individual reporting countries and regional and income group

International Debt Statistics (IDS) 2015 is a continuation of the World Bank's Global Development Finance publication, Volume II (1997 through 2009) and the earlier World Debt Tables (1973 through 1996). IDS 2015 provides statistical tables showing the external debt of 128 developing countries that report public and publicly guaranteed external debt to the World Bank's Debtor Reporting System (DRS). It also includes tables of key debt ratios for individual reporting countries and the composition of external debt stocks and flows for individual reporting countries and regional and income groups

Since the 1950s, the need to raise the debt ceiling, the statutory limit to the borrowing authority of the federal government, has created highly contentious votes in Congress. In some cases, full blown debt ceiling crisis has resulted, in which default appeared a distinct possibility. This paper attempts to explain why periodic debt ceiling crises take place. It concludes that debt ceiling crises are the product of increased national debt and more frequent instances of divided government, coupled with heightened levels of partisanship and party polarization in the post-1950 period. These conclusions are supplemented by case studies of three debt ceiling crises: 1985, 1995-1996, and the summer of 2011.

At the height of the Washington feeding frenzy about the fiscal cliff, the debt ceiling, and sequestration, austerity hawks coined a new label to denigrate lawmakers who were opposed to cutbacks brought on by the cynical manipulation of national debt: "debt deniers." It was a savvy way of turning the tables on those who had gotten traction out of depicting the GOP as hopelessly afflicted by "climate denial." This past year finally saw the climate change threat acknowledged by the worlds leading international finance institutions. Both the IMF and the World Bank have acknowledged that the brunt of the impact will be borne by some of the poorest populations in the world, further jeopardizing their prospects for sustainable development. But neither institution has encouraged, let alone pressed, rich nations to pay climate debts to developing countries that have already felt the effects of climate change. Adapted from the source document.

Cover -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Executive Summary -- Ch 1. A Decade of Debt -- I. Introduction -- II. Surges in Public Debt -- III. The Financial Crash-Sovereign Debt Crisis Sequence -- IV. Debt and Growth -- V. The Aftermath of High Debt: The 1930s and World War II -- VI. Conclusion -- Ch 2. Chartbook of Country Histories of Debt, Default, and Financial Crises -- I. Preamble -- II. Key to Figures and Methodology Notes -- III. Debt and Crises: Main Themes -- References -- About the Authors -- Index.