Suchergebnisse

This article provides a new perspective on sovereign finance and money in England from pre- modern to early modern times. Re-reading the literature on sovereign fiscality through the lens of sovereign jurisdictions and religious authority, it describes two distinct forms of sovereign finance: the rise and fall of sovereign credit from the seventh to eleventh century, followed by sovereign debt developing from the eleventh century into 'modern' sovereign debt from the seventeenth century onwards. In the early Anglo Saxon period, sovereign credit was given and received in non-monetised forms. It was when sovereign jurisdictions became too wide for labour and bulky produce to travel that tax was monetised. However, the monetisation of credit undermined the very sovereign-subject relation on which sovereign credit was based. After the introduction of short-term sovereign debt by the Normans, for the next five hundred years, the two distinct fiscal mechanisms of sovereign credit and sovereign debt ran in parallel, although the latter was restrained by the church's prohibition of usury. In the seventeenth century, sovereign credit and sovereign debt became conjoined elements within one fiscal system, rather than separate mechanisms.

This paper draws upon research in the UK debt advice sector to consider the role played by the credit referencing sector in shaping how UK society is 'governed by debt.' In response to existing literature within cultural economy on the 'governmentality of the credit file,' the paper draws upon two images of the 'debt trails' concept to foreground the hopeful futures, shaped by and mediated through relationships with intimate others, that are conjured and articulated by debtors. It describes in this respect two distinct 'imaginaries' that take hold in debtors' speculative practices; that of a stable household anchored in a strong or improved credit file, and that of a household that is able to manage the 'hard edges' of 'priority' debt enforcement. While the latter marks a distinct limit for the 'power' located in the credit referencing sector, the paper finishes by noting how changes in income and household budgets are re-shaping this speculative landscape.

During the past years, much of the European media has presented the Greek Crisis Case as a mix of economical news, political analyses and commentaries of various nuances and tones which oftenly combined in quite unexpected ways charges with pity, compassion with clemency, incomprehension with ignorance. The echo of the impressive media news and images succeded to nearly convey the feeling that, actually, a single request has been heard by the Greeks: money. And none of the answers seemed to have been loud enough and credible enough to this terrible request. Many European news programs and newspapers mirrored a nation in distress, people experiencing a living nightmare, overwhelmed institutions and political turmoil.
Beyond any other, one question is still open: how could all this happen to an EU member country in the 21st century? – The invariable answer concerns the 2008 economical and financial crisis. However, is this the only true answer?
In one of the most thorough books of this year, "Stateness and Sovereign Debt: Greece in the European Conundrum", Kostas Lavdas together with Spyridon Litsas and Dimitrios Skiadas, have succeeded to draw the picture of the unbelievable Greece Case.

La profunda crisis que atraviesa Grecia concentra desequilibrios tan variados como explosivos. Desde el comienzo fue rechazada la aplicación de una quita de la deuda o la realización de un canje de títulos. Finalmente se aprobó un tercer memorándum más duro que todos los precedentes. En este proceso han salido a flote las divergencias de estrategia que oponen a Estados Unidos con Alemania. También se verifica la inconsecuencia del gobierno que debía enfrentarlo y la necesidad de programas alternativos. Persiste, además, una llamativa gama de similitudes y diferencias con el default argentino del 2001. ; The deep crisis in Greece focuses imbalances as varied as explosives. From the beginning it was rejected the application of a debt relief or performing an exchange of securities. Finally harder than all the preceding third memorandum was approved. In this process they have surfaced divergent strategy that oppose the US with Germany. The inconsistency of the government that should face and the need for alternative programs are also checked. Persists also a striking range of similarities and differences with the Argentine default of 2001. ; Fil: Katz, Claudio Isaac. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentina. Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales; Argentina

Prime Minister Modi injected a new dynamism in conducting India's external relations assuming an influential role in regional and international issues. Since he was elected, he has traveled to almost all continents but only visiting Latin America twice under multilateral meetings. Latin America offers diverse opportunities to India regarding food and energy security, investments, and South-South cooperation. However, India shows benign negligence towards the region. In this article, Modi's foreign policy is analyzed with a particular interest in Latin America to identify opportunities and obstacles in the bilateral relation

AbstractThis paper analyzes strategies and policy conditionality of the troika – European Commission, European Central Bank, and IMF – in resolving the euro area crisis from Asia's perspective with the 1997 IMF Asian crisis management as a possible counterfactual and a yard stick for their effectiveness. The IMF entered into collaboration with the EU mainly to provide the technical expertise in and share with its European partners the lessons it learned from managing past crises. But many of these lessons have been unheeded – in particular limitations of the export‐led recovery through internal devaluation and the need to move forward with financial reform at an early stage of the crisis and calibrate supply side reform with the implementation capacity of the crisis countries.