Suchergebnisse

A current ambition in welfare states across Europe and in the US is for political decision-making to be based on rigorous research (Bason 2010; Cartwright et al 2009; Mulgan 2009; Nilsson et al. 2008). Promoted as 'evidence-based policy-making', 'good analysis, or 'better governance' (Nilsson et.al. 2008) the aspiration finds its roots in the governance paradigm generally referred to as 'new public management' (Hartley 2005) and the central concern for developing a cost-effective and agile public sector (Rod 2010). . Sound as this ambition may seem, it has nevertheless been problematized from within the civil services and from the research community (e.g. Boden & Epstein 2006; Cartwright et al. 2009; Elliott & Popay 2000; House of Commons 2006; Nilsson et al. 2008; Whitty 2006; Rod 2010, Vohnsen 2011). Some warn that the term 'evidence-based' is used too lightly, and often in cases where 'evidence' has not fed into the policy processes but rather has been invoked after the fact to support already agreed upon policy (House of Commons 2006; Nilsson et al. 2008); others warn that politics and science are – if not incompatible – then at odds with one another (e.g. Boden & Epstein 2006; Whitty 2006). The article pin-points the friction points between science and policy-making and discuss why it is that evidence rarely feeds into policy-making and how the evidence-based paradigm effectively challenges the traditional craftsmanship of the civil service.

Artiklen giver først en kort oversigt over covid-19-håndteringens forløb fra krisens udbrud i 2020 til 2022, hvor der er en forventning om covid-19's forvandling fra en alvorlig og svært kontrollabel sygdom til en endemisk viruslidelse. Næste afsnit gennemgår krisens politiske og administrative beslutningsprocesser, dels under selve krisen i strikt forstand, dels i den lange fase hvor det har handlet om administrativt og politisk at håndtere et samfundsproblem, som ikke ville gå væk. Det sidste afsnit tager krisehåndteringens ret alvorlige kvalitative aspekter op. Det drejer sig om de demokratiske problemer, som krisehåndteringen snarere end krisen aktualiserede, det faglige beslutningsgrundlag (sundhedsfagligt, juridisk, økonomisk og adfærdsvidenskabeligt) og endelig spørgsmålet om, hvordan man kvalitetssikrer krisehåndteringen. ; The paper presents an overview of Danish Covid-19-crisis management as it developed from its outbreak to its status as an endemic virus. This is followed by an analysis of political and administrative decision making during the crisis and during the protracted series of events where the handling of problems that would not go away attracted all political attention. Finally, the paper discusses the important qualitative issues that were raised both by the crisis and by its political handling. These issues were democratic, legal, and professional (health professional, economic, and behavioral).

Selv om Danmark efter sigende fik »verdens bedste miljølov« i 1973 præges miljøbeskyttelsesloven af iværksættelsesproblemer. Halvdelen af de særligt forurenende virksomheder modtager ikke et eneste tilsynsbesøg om året, og halvdelen af virksomhederne har stadig ikke en miljøgodkendelse. Da reguleringen er altovervejende baseret på ren administrativ styring med et imponerende ressourcekrav, må markarbejderne i miljøforvaltningerne udvikle særlig konsulentrolle som reaktion på et administrativt overload. Implementeringen af miljøbeskyttelsesloven må ses som en genuin politisk proces, snarere end en mekanisk af en vedtagen lov. Stærke interesser af økonomisk og bureaukratisk karakter fik under udformningen af lovgivningen indbygget en række indflydelsesmuligheder og vetopunkter med henblik på implementeringen, hvor aktørerne såvel legitimt som illegitimt fortsætte spillet fra beslutningsprocessen om reguleringen. ; The basic danish environmental law, passed in 1973, was structured with extention of the traditional patterns of participation, not only delegating local authorities a major responsibility, also allowing interest organizations of the regulated to play a major role during implementation. chosen regulation was solely administrative and during the decision-making process the different actors managed to complicate the law with further vetopoints as well as accesspoints influence. The implementation gap in Danish environmental regulation is to be explained the genuine political character of the implementation proces. The complicated procedures rules are defended by the strong interests, and the resulting administrative overload influences strategies of the street-level environmental bureaucracy. Often ignoring formal rules the local inspectors seek an advisor-role helping companies to comply, but leaving more than half of the especially polluting firms unattended, according to offical figures. The prevailing neo-corporative regulation seems unable to cope with the need for change arising from the ecological crisis.