Suchergebnisse

Artykuł jest próbą krytycznego socjologicznego spojrzenia na reformę samorządową przeprowadzoną w Polsce w 1990 r. oraz na jej kolejne korekty w 1999 i 2002 r. Krytyka ta odwołuje się do dwóch podstawowych koncepcji samorządu. Po pierwsze, do demokratycznych, obywatelskich, decentralizacyjnych idei Jerzego Regulskiego, głównego autora tej reformy. Po drugie, do rozwijanej w brytyjskim Institute of Local Government Studies koncepcji Michaela Clarka i Johna Stewarta dwóch typów relacji między władzą lokalną a mieszkańcami i co zatem idzie ‒ do dwóch typów zarządzania gminą: zarządzania zorientowanego na mieszkańca-klienta i zarządzania zorientowanego na mieszkańca-obywatela. Opierając się na krytyce tej reformy dokonanej przez samego Regulskiego piętnaście lat po jej wprowadzeniu oraz aktualnych danych zastanych i badaniach własnych, autor próbuje pokazać, że po kolejnych dziesięciu latach krytyka tej reformy jako niedostatecznie upodmiotowiającej mieszkańców jest co najmniej tak samo aktualna. Kanały demokratycznej artykulacji interesów różnych grup mieszkańców gmin są mało funkcjonalne, zwłaszcza w dużych miastach. ; In this paper the self-government reform of 1990 and its subsequent corrections of 1999 and 2002 are analysed from a sociological perspective. The critical analysis focuses on two basic concepts of self-governance: (i) the concept based on decentralisation, democratisation and citizenfocused government as represented by the main author of the reform Jerzy Regulski, and (ii) the concept currently being developed at the British Institute of Local Government Studies authored by Michael Clark and John Stewart, proposing two types of relations between a local authority and local residents, and consequently two types of commune and municipality (gmina) management: one oriented on the inhabitant-client and one oriented on the citizen-client relationship. Based on the criticism of the reform articulated by Regulski fifteen years after its implementation, as well as on the current data and his own analysis, the author proposes that today, after another ten years, the same criticism pointing to the still insufficient treatment of local residents as the main focus, or object of self-government concern, has lost none of its topicality. The channels of the democratic articulation of the interests of different groups of commune and municipality (gmina) inhabitants do not function properly, which is particularly evident in big cities.

The aim of this article is to analyse the fulfilment of the Stability and Growth Pact rules by the EU 15 member states in the period 1999–2015. The article also presents the evolution of the EU fiscal rules since their formulation, including, in particular, the influence of the crisis on both meeting the rules by the member states and their substance. The conclusion of the article is that the construction of the rules is the main cause of the ineffectiveness of the pact in eliminating the deficit bias in the EU. In the analysed period, there were years when the member states did not follow the limits defined by the rules (the whole period, but in particular the years before the crisis), years without anticyclical influence of the rules (in fact, the whole period 1999–2015), and years when the rules turned out not to be elastic enough (the years after the crisis). It leads to the overall conclusion that the EU fiscal rules are not the best tool to counteract the deficit bias in the EU. ; Celem niniejszego artykułu jest przeanalizowanie stopnia przestrzegania przez 15 krajów UE reguł fiskalnych zawartych w pakcie stabilności i wzrostu w latach 1999–2015 i ewolucji tych reguł od początku ich sformułowania. Analiza stopnia wypełniania poszczególnych reguł prowadzi do wniosku, że na nieskuteczność reguł w eliminowaniu zjawiska deficit bias rzutują w dużej mierze ich błędy konstrukcyjne. W trakcie całego analizowanego okresu, a zwłaszcza okresu przedkryzysowego, można było stwierdzić, że limity określone przez reguły nie były przestrzegane, właściwie przez cały analizowany okres nie prowadziły do antycyklicznej polityki fiskalnej, a po kryzysie nie były wystarczająco elastyczne. Prowadzi to do konkluzji, że reguły fiskalne nie są najlepszym środkiem do walki ze zjawiskiem deficit bias w Unii Europejskiej.

The aim of this article is the presentation and the attempt to analyse such phenomena as: an excessive general government deficit and public debt in EU Member States over the past 3 years. For the European Union the years 2008-2010 were the time when public finances of most member countries worsened dramatically. The average budget deficit in the EU increased during that period to a value of almost 7% compared to gross domestic product and public debt reached almost 80% of GDP. Referring the numbers to the principles of the budgetary policy in the Treaty on the European Union (the deficit should not exceed 3% in relation to GDP and public debt – 60% of GDP), the observance of budgetary discipline has been significantly violated. In consequence, the excessive deficit procedure has been initiated. in relation to almost all the countries of the EU, Its purpose was to force the member countries to take concrete actions to stabilize public finances. The economic crisis that began in the second half of 2007 in the United States of America which resulted in a significant deterioration of the finances of all the EU member countries might be regarded as the major source of violation of their budgetary discipline. The reactions of most governments TO the harmful effects caused by the financial crisis were to stimulate national economies and stem the decline of domestic demand. The higher level of public expenditures was simultaneously the cause of increased budget deficits,. To develop and present the problem of an excessive budget deficit and public debt in the EU countries some statistical methods were used and the data source statistics were mainly carried out by the European Commission and the European Statistical Office. ; Celem niniejszego artykułu jest prezentacja i próba analizy zjawisk: nadmiernego deficytu budżetowego i długu publicznego w krajach członkowskich Unii Europejskiej na przestrzeni ostatnich 3 lat. Lata 2008-2010 były dla Unii Europejskiej czasem, w którym stan finansów publicznych większości krajów członkowskich pogorszył się w sposób drastyczny. Średnia deficytu budżetowego w UE wzrosła w tym okresie do wartości prawie 7% w stosunku do wielkości produktu krajowego brutto, a zadłużenie publiczne osiągnęło poziom niemalże 80% PKB. Odnosząc te wielkości do założeń polityki budżetowej zapisanych w Traktacie o Unii Europejskiej (wartość deficytu nie powinna przekraczać 3% w stosunku do PKB, a zadłużenia publicznego 60% PKB), poszanowanie dyscypliny budżetowej zostało w sposób znaczący złamane. W następstwie, w stosunku do prawie wszystkich państw należących do UE, została wszczęta na szczeblu UE procedura nadmiernego deficytu. Jej celem było wymuszenie na krajach członkowskich podjęcia konkretnych działań zmierzających do ustabilizowania stanu finansów publicznych. Kryzys gospodarczy, który narodził się w drugiej połowie 2007 roku w Stanach Zjednoczonych Ameryki i skutkował znaczącym pogorszeniem stanu finansów wszystkich krajów członkowskich Wspólnot Europejskich można uznać za główne źródło złamania przez nie dyscypliny budżetowej. Reakcje większości rządów na niekorzystne zjawiska finansowe wywołane kryzysem miały na celu próbę pobudzenia gospodarek narodowych oraz zahamowania spadku popytu krajowego. Zwiększony poziom wydatków publicznych przyczynił się jednak równocześnie do wzrostu poziomu deficytów budżetowych. W celu opracowania i zaprezentowania problemu nadmiernego poziomu deficytu budżetowego oraz długu publicznego w państwach UE zostały zastosowane wybrane metody statystyczne, a źródłem danych były przede wszystkim statystyki prowadzone przez Komisję Europejską oraz Europejski Urząd Statystyczny.

The aim of this article is the presentation and the attempt to analyse such phenomena as: an excessive general government deficit and public debt in EU Member States over the past 3 years. For the European Union the years 2008-2010 were the time when public finances of most member countries worsened dramatically. The average budget deficit in the EU increased during that period to a value of almost 7% compared to gross domestic product and public debt reached almost 80% of GDP. Referring the numbers to the principles of the budgetary policy in the Treaty on the European Union (the deficit should not exceed 3% in relation to GDP and public debt – 60% of GDP), the observance of budgetary discipline has been significantly violated. In consequence, the excessive deficit procedure has been initiated. in relation to almost all the countries of the EU, Its purpose was to force the member countries to take concrete actions to stabilize public finances. The economic crisis that began in the second half of 2007 in the United States of America which resulted in a significant deterioration of the finances of all the EU member countries might be regarded as the major source of violation of their budgetary discipline. The reactions of most governments TO the harmful effects caused by the financial crisis were to stimulate national economies and stem the decline of domestic demand. The higher level of public expenditures was simultaneously the cause of increased budget deficits,. To develop and present the problem of an excessive budget deficit and public debt in the EU countries some statistical methods were used and the data source statistics were mainly carried out by the European Commission and the European Statistical Office. ; Celem niniejszego artykułu jest prezentacja i próba analizy zjawisk: nadmiernego deficytu budżetowego i długu publicznego w krajach członkowskich Unii Europejskiej na przestrzeni ostatnich 3 lat. Lata 2008-2010 były dla Unii Europejskiej czasem, w którym stan finansów publicznych większości krajów członkowskich pogorszył się w sposób drastyczny. Średnia deficytu budżetowego w UE wzrosła w tym okresie do wartości prawie 7% w stosunku do wielkości produktu krajowego brutto, a zadłużenie publiczne osiągnęło poziom niemalże 80% PKB. Odnosząc te wielkości do założeń polityki budżetowej zapisanych w Traktacie o Unii Europejskiej (wartość deficytu nie powinna przekraczać 3% w stosunku do PKB, a zadłużenia publicznego 60% PKB), poszanowanie dyscypliny budżetowej zostało w sposób znaczący złamane. W następstwie, w stosunku do prawie wszystkich państw należących do UE, została wszczęta na szczeblu UE procedura nadmiernego deficytu. Jej celem było wymuszenie na krajach członkowskich podjęcia konkretnych działań zmierzających do ustabilizowania stanu finansów publicznych. Kryzys gospodarczy, który narodził się w drugiej połowie 2007 roku w Stanach Zjednoczonych Ameryki i skutkował znaczącym pogorszeniem stanu finansów wszystkich krajów członkowskich Wspólnot Europejskich można uznać za główne źródło złamania przez nie dyscypliny budżetowej. Reakcje większości rządów na niekorzystne zjawiska finansowe wywołane kryzysem miały na celu próbę pobudzenia gospodarek narodowych oraz zahamowania spadku popytu krajowego. Zwiększony poziom wydatków publicznych przyczynił się jednak równocześnie do wzrostu poziomu deficytów budżetowych. W celu opracowania i zaprezentowania problemu nadmiernego poziomu deficytu budżetowego oraz długu publicznego w państwach UE zostały zastosowane wybrane metody statystyczne, a źródłem danych były przede wszystkim statystyki prowadzone przez Komisję Europejską oraz Europejski Urząd Statystyczny.

The aim ot the article is to analyze the barriers that hinder the development of active civic attitudes in Poland. The author reflects on three areas, corresponding to her research hypotheses. The first area concerns trust, which has remained at similarly low levels in Poland for years. The author argues that behavior and attitudes implied by a higher level of trust can successfully regulate cooperation among people, which may replace legal provisions in many fields.The second barrier is an area of religiousness, specific to Poland, which catalyzes citizens' activity. The third area of analysis pertains to the quality of political discourse in Poland, which becomes more and more suffused with agression with the aim of attracting attention of potential constituents rather than substantive discussion.

The purpose of this article is to analyze the healthcare policy in the light of securing citizens' interests by bringing the perspective of patients' advocacy organizations. The paper tries to supplement the discussion on the role of this particular group of stakeholders in the decision-making process in the healthcare sector. Referring to empirical examples, the author assumes that the entire Polish healthcare system does not serve patients' interests well because of organizational, financial and personnel shortages, while the constitutional promise of equal access to healthcare services is paradoxically an effective barrier to any changes aimed at improving the way of functioning of the system. Despite the impression of a "patient-centered turn" in the healthcare policy in Poland, the organized interests of patients centered around advocacy organizations still have little impact on the process of formulating and implementing important changes in this sector policy.

The purpose of this article is to analyze the healthcare policy in the light of securing citizens' interests by bringing the perspective of patients' advocacy organizations. The paper tries to supplement the discussion on the role of this particular group of stakeholders in the decision-making process in the healthcare sector. Referring to empirical examples, the author assumes that the entire Polish healthcare system does not serve patients' interests well because of organizational, financial and personnel shortages, while the constitutional promise of equal access to healthcare services is paradoxically an effective barrier to any changes aimed at improving the way of functioning of the system. Despite the impression of a "patient-centered turn" in the healthcare policy in Poland, the organized interests of patients centered around advocacy organizations still have little impact on the process of formulating and implementing important changes in this sector policy. ; Celem niniejszego artykułu jest analiza sektorowej polityki ochrony zdrowia w świetle zabezpieczenia interesu obywateli poprzez przybliżenie perspektywy zorganizowanych interesów organizacji pacjentów. Tekst jest próbą uzupełnienia dyskusji nt. roli tej szczególnej grupy interesariuszy w procesie podejmowania decyzji w sektorze ochrony zdrowia. Odwołując się do przykładów empirycznych, założono, że cały polski system ochrony zdrowia nie służy dobrze interesom pacjentów z powodu niedoborów organizacyjnych, finansowych i personalnych, a konstytucyjna obietnica równego dostępu do świadczeń ochrony zdrowia jest paradoksalnie skuteczną barierą dla wszelkich zmian zmierzających do poprawy sposobu funkcjonowania tego systemu. Pomimo wrażenia "zwrotu pacjento-centrycznego" w ochronie zdrowia w Polsce zorganizowane interesy pacjentów skupione wokół rzeczniczych organizacji pacjentów wciąż mają niewielki udział w procesie formułowania i wdrażania ważnych zmian w tej polityce sektorowej.

One of the instruments introduced into EU law on the basis of the Treaty of Lisbon for the first time, aimed at strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the functioning of the EU, is the European citizens' initiative (ECI). The regulation on the ECI was adopted and entered into force in 2011 and started to apply from 1 April 2012. It seems, that almost six years of the functioning of the ECI is a sufficient period of time to try to assess its meaning to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the functioning of the EU. The main aim of the study is to answer the question: whether, taking into account the experiences of the ECI, the European citizens' initiative contributed to reducing the democratic deficit in the EU and thus to strengthening the legitimization of the European Union institutions and the EU as a whole. The article indicates the objectives of the ECI, which would allow to reduce the democratic deficit in the EU and strengthen the legitimacy of this organization. The most important data illustrating the functioning of the EIO were also presented. The next part of the article is the analysis and assessment of the importance of the ECI in reducing the democracy deficit and strengthening the legitimacy of the EU. The conclusions are included in the summary.

This year ten years have passed since Poland became a member of the European Union. The full liberalization of capital flows between Poland and the EU, the OECD, and the EEA was one of the key changes resulting from this membership. The purpose of this article is to analyse selected indicators that define the external stability in the light of the growing involvement of foreign capital in the Polish economy, which is a consequence of that opening. The indicators examined in the article do not give a clear reason for concern; however, there is no doubt that Poland exceeds the thresholds defined by the EU to the current account balance and net IIP referred to the GDP. This means that there is a need to monitor the consequences of rising presence of foreign capital in the Polish economy from the point of view of the conditions of its external stability in the coming years.

The main threat to the economic development of Poland is the danger of overlapping of two processes – the decline in the growth of the working age population and the outflow of young, talented and educated people to richer countries. Therefore, the most important goal of the economic policy should be rapid making up the gap to the average EU level. This can be impeded by the current state of public finances, due to high level of debt. Moreo-ver, there are also other factors, which under certain conditions, may lead to a cumulative negative effect, which in turn would threaten the financial stability of the budget. At the same time, the bases of competitiveness of the economy gradually expire, which requires transition to the competition of a qualitative nature. According to the Author, an oppor-tunity to avoid the threat is to use the global market more extensively. He suggests public innovation in a form of the so-called smart company incubators. ; Głównym zagrożeniem dla rozwoju gospodarczego Polski jest niebezpieczeństwo nałożenia się dwóch procesów – spadku przyrostu ludności w wieku produkcyjnym oraz odpływu młodych, zdolnych i wykształconych osób do krajów bogatszych. Dlatego też, najważniejszym celem polityki gospodarczej powinno być szybkie odrobienie dystansu do średniego poziomu UE. Utrudnić to może obecny stan finansów państwa, z powodu wysokiego poziomu zadłużenia. Ponadto, pojawiają się też inne czynniki, które w określonych warunkach mogą doprowadzić do skumulowanego, negatywnego efektu, który z kolei zagrozi stabilności finansowej budżetu. Jednocześnie stopniowo wygasają dotychczasowe podstawy kon kurencyjności gospodarki, co wymaga przejścia do konkurencji o charakterze jakościowym. Zdaniem autora, szansą dla uniknięcia zagrożenia jest dużo szersze wykorzystanie rynku globalnego. Proponuje innowację publiczną w postaci tzw. inkubatorów inteligentnych firm.

The problem of democratic deficit in European institutions did not draw the particular attention of either EU officials or the national leaders of member states over the long period of the European Community's' existence. The political discussion over the issue of EU democratization was revived by a speech delivered by German minister of foreign affairs, Joschka Fisher, at the Humboldt University on May 12, 2000. Presenting his vision of the future of European integration this German politician emphasized that it was necessary to solve the 'problem of democracy' among others. Shortly before this, democratic deficit had become the subject of a comprehensive scientific analysis. The literature of the subject examined sources, formulated the definitions of democratic deficit, and searched for the answers to the question ofwhat the European Union is, what democracy is and whether it is appropriate to talk about a democratic non-state. ; The problem of democratic deficit in European institutions did not draw the particular attention of either EU officials or the national leaders of member states over the long period of the European Community's' existence. The political discussion over the issue of EU democratization was revived by a speech delivered by German minister of foreign affairs, Joschka Fisher, at the Humboldt University on May 12, 2000. Presenting his vision of the future of European integration this German politician emphasized that it was necessary to solve the 'problem of democracy' among others. Shortly before this, democratic deficit had become the subject of a comprehensive scientific analysis. The literature of the subject examined sources, formulated the definitions of democratic deficit, and searched for the answers to the question ofwhat the European Union is, what democracy is and whether it is appropriate to talk about a democratic non-state.

An issue raised more and more frequently in political, as well as scientific discourse in the context of the European Union, is "democratic deficit". At the time, EU is perceived as an institution guaranteeing the preservation of democratic values in Europe and promoting them both on the continent and beyond. This article discusses both points of view, with emphasis placed on the democratic deficit aspect, measures undertaken to eliminate the negative consequences of the process, as well as the history of the concept: starting from the single European Act, through general elections to the European Parliament, and formal solutions leading to the gradual increase of EU powers. It is assumed in the article that the problem of democratic deficit has persisted in the European Union, especially since several changes were introduced to the political system of EU after The Treaty of Lisbon. As result, the key question that must be answered is whether under the provisions of the Treaty the EU will strengthen its democratic legitimacy. This article attempts to provide an answer, analyzing the role of national parliaments in the new institutional and normative reality and in the context of the democratic legitimacy deficit.

The problem of the so - called democracy deficit in the European Union (EU) is one of the most interesting and complex problems as well as one of the most important challenges the EU faces at the beginning of the 21st Century. In the two previous articles on this subject ("Studia Europejskie", No.1/2007 and 2/2007) the Author addressed the question of certain theoretical aspects of democracy deficit in the EU and the EU's institutional system operation in which democracy deficit reveals.The article deals with the question of the public opinion in the EU member states about democracy deficit. The Author presents (on the basis of the Eurobarometer's data) and analyses research findings about such questions as general opinion on the membership in the EU in a given country or views on the problem of costs and benefits deriving from membership in the EU. In the second part the Author presents results of research on such questions as a degree to which people in member states trust the EU institutions and - for the sake of comparison - their domestic ones or whether people think that the EU imposes its views upon their country, whether they understand how the EU operates or how transparent it is.

The aim of the research is to explore various forms of participation of the EU Member States Parliaments in the political processes of the European Union. The assessment of the intensity of the analyzed participation will be made by applying the concept of classification of the distinguished participation, which includes passive and active participation. This study has a significant impact in the context of participation of citizens, whose direct representatives are elected members of the national Parliaments (NP). The article verifies the hypothesis that the variety of forms of participation of NP in the political processes in the EU strengthens the democratic legitimacy by increasing transparency and accountability of the EU institutions and by improving cross-level communication lines between the EU institutions and national authorities. Active forms of participation increase influence of NP on the EU political processes. However, a wide range of informal participation increases the effectiveness of supranational decision-making processes, in particular, reducing the technocratic nature of the decisions.