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by Elizabeth Bodenman – Please note: within the context of this blog, the terms 'women' and 'girl' are inclusive to...
Der Beitrag The Dehumanization of Roma Mothers in Bulgarian Hospitals erschien zuerst auf Menschenrechte - der Blog..

Director of Zone of Interest Jonathan Glazer denounced the dehumanization of Palestinian victims in Gaza alongside those of the October 7 attacks.

"Women as Agents of Violence" published on by Oxford University Press.

This analysis explores how systemic dehumanization of Palestinian children by Israeli forces mirrors racial injustices against Black children in the US, highlighting the role of Western media biases in normalizing such injustices.

"Racial Prejudice, Racial Identity, and Attitudes in Political Decision Making" published on by Oxford University Press.

Current definitions of hate speech are inadequate as the basis for monitoring hate speech targeted at groups. First, they do not capture escalating group-targeted negative speech which can be a precursor to more extreme forms of hate speech such as dehumanization, demonization, and incitement to violence. While not hate speech, such negative speech is an early warning that could be helpful for a hate speech monitoring system to track, as responses and interventions, especially to the offline harms of hate speech, can take time to operationalize. Second, current definitions of hate speech do not capture hateful rhetoric aimed at groups not traditionally included in hate speech definitions (those without immutable qualities), such as groups targeted for hate based on profession-based identity like journalists. This chapter presents some suggestions for addressing these issues, including a hate speech intensity scale.

The American conception of normative self-justification is traced to the long period of colonial existence under British domination to argue that disentangling the dual American legacy that is blind to its own faults & acts so mercilessly is necessary to understanding state terrorism. The pathological dualism of America's global role is asserted to be weakening the emergent framework of global cooperative arrangements, & eroding the framework of international law. The pattern of subordinating moral & legal guidelines in pursuit of strategic goals is asserted to represent a fundamental breakdown of rule-governed relationships among states, & is related to cases of nonreciprocity of American conduct in the atomic attacks on Hiroshima & Nagasaki, the geopolitical frustrations of the Korean & Vietnamese War. The patterns of the self serving US & Japanese discourse are concluded require further study & challenge to the moralizing war myth that is coupled with dehumanization of the enemy. J. Harwell

Demonstrates how whites subscribe to & reproduce "white fright" -- the defensive perception that ethnic & racial minorities are growing exponentially while whites are decreasing -- via casual, private conversations or "racetalk," drawing on participant observation data (N = 282 incidents of white racetalk) gathered from 22 informants. Findings indicate that racetalk created an other against which whites could construct themselves as a unified, superior group. Whites accomplish this by employing the strategies of categorization & surveillance to elevate & protect white status. Categorization involves slurs & caricatures, dehumanization, & contamination, while surveillance centers on a critique & generalization of people of color for their public self-presentation & results in a sense of threat over white space & resources & resentment over apparent special treatment afforded groups other than whites. These strategies used in casual talk reveal the structure of racism & reproduce white supremacy by expressing the dominant racist ideology. 3 Tables. J. Zendejas

The way the escalation of violence in Israel, the Gaza Strip, and adjacent areas in the region is discussed in Germany is, in many respects, not surprising. It follows the structural dynamics of war discourses: the polarization into a friend–enemy schema; the negation of moral ambivalence; patterns of legitimation which suggest that the actions of one side are more than justified by the previous actions of the other side; the compulsion of the threat situation, discrediting reflection and distancing as inappropriate; the construction of unparalleled amorality; the circumvention of humane standards through dehumanization of the enemy; the simplification of an inherently complex situation.
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Hanna Pfeifer



Prof. Dr. Hanna Pfeifer ist Professorin für Politikwissenschaft mit dem Schwerpunkt Radikalisierungs- und Gewaltforschung in Kooperation mit der Goethe-Universität Frankfurt und Leiterin der Forschungsgruppe "Terrorismus" am PRIF. Sie forscht u.a. zu staatlichen und nicht-staatlichen Gewaltformen und –akteuren in der MENA-Region. // Prof. Dr Hanna Pfeifer is Professor of Political Science with a Focus on Radicalisation and Violence Research at PRIF and Goethe University Frankfurt, as well as head of PRIF's research group "Terrorism". Her research interests include, inter alia, state and non-state violence and actors in the MENA region. | Twitter: @hanna_pfeifer

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Der Beitrag Israel–Gaza: A German War Discourse erschien zuerst auf PRIF BLOG.

Before Marines deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan, they first went through a base in California called 29 Palms, where Iraqi refugees would roleplay as townsfolk in order to prepare the soldiers for what they would face abroad."The folks who were hired to play that, they all had terrible stories about [Iraqi President] Saddam Hussein, about family members being killed or going missing," remembered Capt. Tommy Furlong. "It pumped you up. It made you believe just that much more in the fight that you were going towards."That feeling of joy and confidence quickly unraveled when Furlong reached Afghanistan. "When you deploy, people aren't happy to see you," he said. "What you're trained to and what you're told is not what you're seeing on the ground." Thus begins "What I Want You To Know," a new documentary from director Catie Foertsch that gives an unflinching look at a pair of wars that many Americans might want to forget. The film focuses on the experiences of 13 Afghanistan and Iraq veterans, most of whom joined the military in order to fight back after the September 11, 2001, attacks and help build democracy in the war-torn countries.Foertsch explained in a Tuesday panel that she views the film as a "testimony project" — a deep dive into the views of the majority of veterans who believe neither war was worth fighting in the first place.The Quincy Institute, which publishes Responsible Statecraft, sponsored the discussion. Other panelists included Sgt. Travis Weiner and Furlong, both of whom are executive producers on the film, as well as Col. Gregory Daddis, a professor at San Diego State University and a Quincy Institute board member.Furlong told listeners that he felt no previous documentary about the wars had truly captured the "raw, on-the-ground perception" of the conflicts through the eyes of the soldiers that fought them. He praised interviewees for their candor. "The part that isn't talked about a lot is that war is very private," Furlong said. "It's difficult to talk about your experiences."While the stories are diverse, a few themes stand out. One is a shared feeling of betrayal — a sense that their political and military leaders had misled them with false promises of a noble war."Anyone who joins the Marine Corps or the military is demonstrating a willingness to sacrifice their life for their country," said Capt. Sarah Feinberg. "I think our politicians and our military leaders have a responsibility to at a minimum tell the truth on what we're doing."For Feinberg, this divide between hope and reality made it impossible for her to return to combat. "If I can't explain to someone why they're putting their life on the line, then I can't lead that mission," she said.Some put it in starker terms. "I was betrayed by my government, and I was lied to," said Spc. Garett Reppenhagen. "Here I am with blood on my hands, for what?"Another theme is dehumanization, both of the soldiers and the people of Afghanistan and Iraq. The veterans remember the difficulties of simply staying alive in a war zone and the incentive to view all locals as a threat. "There was very little respect for the Iraqi people throughout the units in the military that I served with," said Feinberg, who deployed to Iraq in 2009. A few of the veterans interviewed admit that they participated in the accidental killing of civilians, and many recount haunting images of dead children and friends. "It's not the firefights that really haunt me. It's what I've seen humans be able to do to other humans," said Sgt. Alan Pitts. "Those are the things that probably bothered me the most to this day — to see what humans are capable of and how horrible they can be when they're told that this other person is less than them."While the documentary never uses the word PTSD, a deep sense of trauma lurks behind every shot. Veterans relate the mental struggles of joining up to fight for a supposedly venerable cause that had little to do with their actual mission. Some found that this cognitive dissonance, combined with the hellish fighting that they participated in, was too much to bear. "Most of the suicides, at least of the combat veterans, are so intimately and inextricably linked to their experience in war that I use the term 'killed by combat,'" Maj. Danny Sjursen said.It's a harsh reminder of an often ignored fact about the War on Terror: While roughly 7,000 American soldiers died at war, an additional 30,000 took their own lives after returning home, according to the Costs of War Project at Brown University.Despite all the pain caused by these wars, the film shows that many veterans still care deeply about the military and its mission of defending America. They simply hope that policymakers will think more deeply about the suffering that results from our country's wars of choice. "We have to talk about the consequences or it will happen again," Foertsch said.

Hamas's surprise bloody attack on Israel on October 7, 50 years plus one day since the October 1973 war, and the massive Israeli military response in Gaza has dominated media coverage regionally and globally for the past two plus months.American mainstream media for the most part has avoided a serious discussion of the Hamas context, the "root causes" of the conflict, the long-term implications of Israel's indiscriminate bombing of Gaza, the morality, ethics, legality, and proportionality of the Israeli massive military operations in Gaza, and the diminishing stature and credibility of the United States among Arab and Muslim publics. The Hamas ContextHamas (Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya—Islamic Resistance Movement; the acronym means Zeal) emerged in 1987 in the West Bank and Gaza under the Israeli occupation after the first Palestinian Intifada as an alternative to the secular PLO. Israel, Jordan, and a few other Arab states were concerend about the growing strength of the PLO's secular nationalist ideology and thus initially supported Hamas's creation. Like other local Sunni Islamic political parties and movements — for example, PAS in Malaysia, Refah and AKP in Turkey, the Islamic Action Front in Jordan, and the Islamic Movement in Israel — Hamas was grounded in the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood.Hamas's political program and charter focused primarily on resisting the occupation and the state of Israel. Hamas never followed the Wahhabi Salafi radical Tawhidi doctrine of Islam emanating from Saudi Arabia. In most of its history, Hamas, unlike al-Qaida and ISIS, never subscribed to or practiced global jihad against the perceived enemies of Islam. Its operational context has always been Palestine and its leaders have always been Palestinians. Many of them spent years in Israeli jails where they learned Hebrew. Most of Hamas's political leaders are currently in exile in different Middle Eastern countries, especially in Qatar with whose leadership they maintained close relations.Hamas also comprises a political wing, which over the years participated in governing institutions in the West Bank and Gaza, and a military wing (Qassam Brigades) that has built a fighting force and planned and executed military operations against Israel. Hamas is not a monolithic group, which reflects the reality of Palestinian society in Gaza and the West Bank.Hamas's charter rejects the existence of the State of Israel in Palestine, but its political wing has engaged with Israel, especially since 2007, on pragmatic matters that affect the Palestinians' daily lives in Gaza and has shown a willingness to accept a two-state solution. Beginning in 2017, Hamas began to move slowly toward accepting a possible two-state solution to the conflict, implying recognition of Israel. Hamas leader Musa Abu Marzouk affirmed this position in a recent interview with the Washington based Al- Monitor but soon after tried to walk it back, claiming it was taken out of context.Israel, the U.S., and most other Western countries for years viewed Hamas as a local militant nationalist religious movement. And in order to further the cause of the two-state solution and undermine Israel's claim that there was no unified Palestinian interlocutor to negotiate with, some Palestinian leaders and Arab countries, particularly Qatar, suggested that the U.S. designate Hamas as a foreign terrorist organization, which it did in the late 1990s. After the Hamas election victory in Gaza in 2006, which incidentally was another intelligence failure, some important factions within Hamas sought a pragmatic engagement with Israel on such issues as labor, the power grid, water, fishing, and commerce. Some analysts within the U.S. government at the time judged that reaching out to the pro-engagement faction within Hamas would serve Israeli and U.S. national interests. Unfortunately, Israeli and U.S. policymakers rejected that judgement.Hamas's jihadism moves globalIsrael's goal of eliminating Hamas as a movement is unattainable. Liquidating the current military leaders of Hamas will bring a new cadre of leaders to the top. Hamas, like other resistance organizations, has developed leadership succession plans that go down to second, third, and fourth tiers. American and Israeli intelligence agencies for the most part have focused on the first tier with scant knowledge of the leadership tiers below that.Israeli and American policymakers have also yet to focus on the transformation of some of Hamas's military leaders shifting from a local, nationalist, religious ideology resisting the Israeli occupation and calling for a Palestinian state into a global jihadist ideology. If such a transformation takes root, Hamas would essentially move away from the Muslim Brotherhood ideology to a radical, Wahhabi Salafi jihadist paradigm. Extremists within the Wahhabi paradigm do not accept the existence of a Jewish state in Palestine.Much of the jihadist radicalization of many Hamas leaders, including Yahya Sinwar, occurred in Israeli jails. Although some were recruited by Israeli intelligence services, especially the Shin Beit, as assets and collaborators; others became more radicalized and secretive. Palestinian economic, social, and political dehumanization in Gaza and the West bank, together with Israeli hubris about its military power and presumed penetration of Palestinian society, have led many Palestinian activists, including within Hamas, to adopt a narrative of jihadism grounded in Wahhabism, al-Qaida, and ISIS. It's highly unlikely that Hamas's political leaders would be allowed to participate in any discussions about postwar Gaza unless the whole Hamas movement, including the military wing, jettisons the global anti-Jewish jihadist paradigm and returns to its local, anti-occupation resistance posture.The way forwardThe most recent public opinion poll in the West Bank and Gaza shows a significant rise in Hamas's popularity in both areas with nearly 90% calling on Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian Authority president in Ramallah, to resign. The poll, which was conducted between November 22 and December 2, finds that Palestinians view Hamas as the most legitimate group in the West Bank and Gaza.The path forward encompasses two crucial steps that are essential for a resolution of the conflict. First, the wider conflict must be viewed in the context of the political, security, economic, and human rights aspirations of both peoples between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea.Second, Washington must engage government and community representatives from Israel, the Palestinians, Arab states, the EU, and the U.N. in a serious, initially private, conversation about the long-term political status of Palestine that goes beyond Hamas and the current PA regime in Ramallah.This might sound like a pipedream, but we see the alternative in Gaza — and it is ugly.