Suchergebnisse

Delinquents are embedded in a network of relationships. Social ties among delinquents are modeled by means of a graph where delinquents compete for a booty and benefit from local interactions with their neighbors. Each delinquent decides in a non-cooperative way how much delinquency effort he will exert. Using the network model developed by Ballester et al. (2006), we characterize the Nash equilibrium and derive an optimal enforcement policy, called the key-player policy, which targets the delinquent who, once removed, leads to the highest aggregate delinquency reduction. We then extend our characterization of optimal single player network removal for delinquency reduction, the key player, to optimal group removal, the key group. We also characterize and derive a policy that targets links rather than players. Finally, we endogenize the network connecting delinquents by allowing players to join the labor market instead of committing delinquent offenses. The key-player policy turns out to be much more complex since it depends on wages and on the structure of the network.

Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contributing Authors -- Dedication -- Foreword -- Preface -- Biographies -- Contents -- Introduction to the Transaction Edition -- Chapter 1 Introduction -- Part I The Social Organization of Delinquency Control -- Chapter 2 The Police and the Delinquent in Two Cities -- Chapter 3 Agents of Delinquency Control: Stanton Wheeler, Edna Bonacich -- Chapter 4 Delinquency Prevention And Organizational Relations -- Part II Agencies and Their Clients -- Chapter 5 The Acceptance of Emotionally Disturbed Children by Psychiatric Agencies -- Chapter 6 Experiences of Unsuccessful Applicants to Child Psychiatric Agencies -- Chapter 7 Becoming an Inmate -- Chapter 8 The Delinquent's Perception of the Law and the Community -- Part III Community Prevention and Casework Programs -- Chapter 9 Legal Knowledge and Casework With Delinquent Adolescents and Their Families -- Chapter 10 Clinical and Actuarial Predictions of Juvenile Delinquency -- Chapter 11 Orientations of Street-Corner Workers and Their Effect on Gangs -- Chapter 12 The Analysis and Evaluation of Detached-Worker Programs -- Chapter 13 Conclusion -- Name Index -- Subject Index

This analysis examines the dynamic reciprocal relationship between delinquent peer associations and delinquent behavior. It tests the hypothesis, derived from learning and interactional theories, that delinquent peers and delinquent behavior are reciprocally related—delinquent peer associations foster future delinquency, and delinquency increases the likelihood of associating with delinquent peers. It also tests the competing hypothesis, derived from control theories, that delinquent peers do not cause delinquency, but instead, the relationship is (1) spurious due to individual criminal propensity, (2) a result of the effects of delinquent behavior on future associations with delinquent peers, or (3) an artifact of problems of measuring delinquent peers. To test these propositions, we use data from the National Youth Survey and estimate a cross‐lagged panel model that corrects for measurement error in indicators of delinquent peers and delinquent behavior. The model species a covariance structure model for ordinal measures. Parameters are estimated by (1) estimating a threshold model relating ordinal measures to continuous latent variables; (2) estimating a matrix of polychoric correlations relating observed variables, and (3) using an asymptotic distribution‐free estimator to estimate structural parameters. The results suggest that delinquent peer associations and delinquent behavior are reciprocally related, but the effect of delinquency on peer associations is larger than that of peer associations on delinquency.

Plus: RFK Jr.'s Super Bowl ad, New York's war on Airbnbs, Biden's TikToks, and more...