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AbstractThis paper analyzes how ethnic diversity affects the provision of public goods in democratic and non‐democratic societies when political parties compete for voter support by offering a mix of private and public goods. Our model implies that increasing diversity that leads to more heterogeneous preferences for public goods decreases the provision of public goods in democracies, where political power is distributed equally among citizens, while there is a weaker or no effect in non‐democracies, where political power is distributed unequally among citizens. When measuring diversity by ethnic fractionalization and public good provision by either levels of government expenses, expenditures on health, or life expectancy, we indeed observe a negative association between diversity and the provision of public goods in democracies but no or only a weak association in non‐democracies.

Scholars argue that institutions in democracies constrain leaders and prevent international conflict. However, many democracies specify rules of governance in times of emergency that divert substantial power to the head of state. The manipulation of these "emergency powers" provides a rational motivation for conflict. Using a novel data set of emergency provisions within democracies, I test the relationship between emergency power strength and conflict propensity using several steps to achieve causal inference, including an instrumental variable analysis that exploits the specificity of the state's constitution as a plausibly exogenous determinant of emergency power strength. I find that emergency power strength is a strong predictor of conflict onset in democracies in each test and that states with strong emergency powers are substantially more likely to enact a state of emergency due to an international conflict. I conclude with a discussion of my findings and avenues of future research using these data.

Scholars argue that institutions in democracies constrain leaders and prevent international conflict. However, many democracies specify rules of governance in times of emergency that divert substantial power to the head of state. The manipulation of these "emergency powers" provides a rational motivation for conflict. Using a novel data set of emergency provisions within democracies, I test the relationship between emergency power strength and conflict propensity using several steps to achieve causal inference, including an instrumental variable analysis that exploits the specificity of the state's constitution as a plausibly exogenous determinant of emergency power strength. I find that emergency power strength is a strong predictor of conflict onset in democracies in each test and that states with strong emergency powers are substantially more likely to enact a state of emergency due to an international conflict. I conclude with a discussion of my findings and avenues of future research using these data.