Suchergebnisse

A government‐interest group model is presented. Voters are neither always rationally ignorant nor always fully informed. Voters' information is variable. Unlike other models that assume a vote production function, this model considers the voter's utility and shows how rational voters with limited information can sometimes vote for inefficient policies.If voters can be informed inexpensively, then democracies are efficient. If the cost of informing voters is prohibitive, then pressure groups efficiently extract rent. If the cost of informing voters is low for efficient direct handouts, but high for inefficient policies, then inefficient redistributions will occur.

THE AUTHOR PRESENTS A GOVERNMENT-INTEREST GROUP MODEL. UNLIKE OTHER MODELS THAT ASSUME A VOTE PRODUCTION FUNCTION, THIS MODEL CONSIDERS THE VOTER'S UTILITY AND SHOWS HOW RATIONAL VOTERS WITH LIMITED INFORMATION CAN SOMETIMES VOTE FOR INEFFICIENT POLICIES. IF VOTERS CAN BE INFORMED INEXPENSIVELY, THEN DEMOCRACIES ARE EFFICIENT. HOWEVER, IF THE COST OF INFORMING VOTERS IS PROHIBITIVE, THEN PRESSURE GROUPS EFFICIENTLY EXTRACT RENT. IF THE COST OF INFORMING VOTERS IS LOW FOR EFFICIENT DIRECT HANDOUTS, BUT HIGH FOR INEFFICIENT POLICIES, THEN INEFFICIENT REDISTRIBUTIONS WILL OCCUR.

AbstractThis paper analyzes how ethnic diversity affects the provision of public goods in democratic and non‐democratic societies when political parties compete for voter support by offering a mix of private and public goods. Our model implies that increasing diversity that leads to more heterogeneous preferences for public goods decreases the provision of public goods in democracies, where political power is distributed equally among citizens, while there is a weaker or no effect in non‐democracies, where political power is distributed unequally among citizens. When measuring diversity by ethnic fractionalization and public good provision by either levels of government expenses, expenditures on health, or life expectancy, we indeed observe a negative association between diversity and the provision of public goods in democracies but no or only a weak association in non‐democracies.