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In this article I make a critical analysis of educational policy in Poland during the 25 years of the political transformation. I try to refer to the Polish thoughts and practices of teaching experience in the period of 1918--1948. What is more, I present experiences of anti-socialist opposition during the socialist period. They influenced on impression in the works and commitments of many scientists and a new generation of academics. Furthermore, I indicate how my generation after 1989 went into the road of scientific autonomy and/or independence in the field of government and private education. Benchmark for these analyzes build up the hopes which we tied up with the Polish revolution of non- violence. Moreover, there was a strong disappointment, which revealed over the years due to the departure of distinctive political formation of the Third Republic of the ideals and the phenomenon of Polish "Solidarity" movement, and civil society, which included the move away from the base of participatory democracy. Finally, I look at how education as a science and practice of education fit into democratization of the Polish state and society. The key meaning for me has the perception of education as a common good, as environments and entities, institutions or management practices which participate in the democratic society. To sum up, this society is constantly in the period of recovery from years of experience not only fascist, but Bolshevik totalitarianism, too.

This article analyses the Brexit debate within the UK. It examines the historical roots of the debate from 1973 when the UK joined the European Economic Community, but focuses primarily on the debates that occurred between 2013 when David Cameron pledged to hold a referendum up and the 2019 UK General Election. Section one briefly introduces the topic. Section two examines the rise of social hatred during the referendum campaign. It focuses on the history of British euro-scepticism, the immediate context of the Brexit campaign, concerns over UK sovereignty and immigration, and the increasing use of threats and political violence. Section three examines the decline of trust in politics due to the increasing failure to challenge lies in the Brexit debate. It explores the idea of "Project Fear", the anti-expert narrative, and the anti-elitism narrative. Section four asks what this period tells us about UK democracy. It focuses on weak and disorderly government, the democratic status of the referendum, the erosion of trust in parliamentary institutions and mechanisms, and some reasons for (limited) optimism. The article concludes by considering possible ways forward for the UK government and polity following the decisive Conservative victory in the 2019 UK General Election. ; This article analyses the Brexit debate within the UK. It examines the historical roots of the debate from 1973 when the UK joined the European Economic Community, but focuses primarily on the debates that occurred between 2013 when David Cameron pledged to hold a referendum up and the 2019 UK General Election. Section one briefly introduces the topic. Section two examines the rise of social hatred during the referendum campaign. It focuses on the history of British euro-scepticism, the immediate context of the Brexit campaign, concerns over UK sovereignty and immigration, and the increasing use of threats and political violence. Section three examines the decline of trust in politics due to the increasing failure to challenge lies in the Brexit debate. It explores the idea of "Project Fear", the anti-expert narrative, and the anti-elitism narrative. Section four asks what this period tells us about UK democracy. It focuses on weak and disorderly government, the democratic status of the referendum, the erosion of trust in parliamentary institutions and mechanisms, and some reasons for (limited) optimism. The article concludes by considering possible ways forward for the UK government and polity following the decisive Conservative victory in the 2019 UK General Election.

This article analyses the Brexit debate within the UK. It examines the historical roots of the debate from 1973 when the UK joined the European Economic Community, but focuses primarily on the debates that occurred between 2013 when David Cameron pledged to hold a referendum up and the 2019 UK General Election. Section one briefly introduces the topic. Section two examines the rise of social hatred during the referendum campaign. It focuses on the history of British euro-scepticism, the immediate context of the Brexit campaign, concerns over UK sovereignty and immigration, and the increasing use of threats and political violence. Section three examines the decline of trust in politics due to the increasing failure to challenge lies in the Brexit debate. It explores the idea of "Project Fear", the anti-expert narrative, and the anti-elitism narrative. Section four asks what this period tells us about UK democracy. It focuses on weak and disorderly government, the democratic status of the referendum, the erosion of trust in parliamentary institutions and mechanisms, and some reasons for (limited) optimism. The article concludes by considering possible ways forward for the UK government and polity following the decisive Conservative victory in the 2019 UK General Election. ; This article analyses the Brexit debate within the UK. It examines the historical roots of the debate from 1973 when the UK joined the European Economic Community, but focuses primarily on the debates that occurred between 2013 when David Cameron pledged to hold a referendum up and the 2019 UK General Election. Section one briefly introduces the topic. Section two examines the rise of social hatred during the referendum campaign. It focuses on the history of British euro-scepticism, the immediate context of the Brexit campaign, concerns over UK sovereignty and immigration, and the increasing use of threats and political violence. Section three examines the decline of trust in politics due to the increasing failure to challenge lies in the Brexit debate. It explores the idea of "Project Fear", the anti-expert narrative, and the anti-elitism narrative. Section four asks what this period tells us about UK democracy. It focuses on weak and disorderly government, the democratic status of the referendum, the erosion of trust in parliamentary institutions and mechanisms, and some reasons for (limited) optimism. The article concludes by considering possible ways forward for the UK government and polity following the decisive Conservative victory in the 2019 UK General Election.

Turkey has adopted the presidential system over parliamentarism in 2018 with the promise that the new system would bring more stability, democracy, and economic growth. As being the most recent country which changed its government system through a referendum to presidentialism, Turkey constitutes a very important example to be analyzed in order to see the effects of it after a long-adopted parliamentary period in the 21st century. This paper compares the basic features of democracy as well as the democratic presidential systems with the example of Turkey and aims at finding out if the presidentialism has performed well and if not, why, in the light of examples and chosen indicators. Findings of this study suggest that presidential system led to a "consolidation of power" which in its nature is anti-democratic. Analysis of certain indicators show that presidentialism did not perform well in Turkey on democratic, political as well as economic fronts.

In actual legal and political conditions in Poland it has been assumed that in decision-making processes in an enterprise in the first place participate, as representatives of the employees' interests: a self-government of a crew, a Party organization, a trade union. In economic praxis, it created complicated problems, since it is very difficult to draw distinct lines separating the areas of activity of those organizations. The research indicates that despite quite large competences of a self-government, its participation in management activities is not big (a very big influence on decision-making: a general assembly of a crew and the employees' council — 8.9% of answers). The most important decisive body is a chief executive director — 35.3°/o of answers. In effect, formal institutions which might have created conditions to develop industrial democracy do not function according to the expectations and consequently, an increase in the position and authority of an enterprise director has been noted in 1988 in comparison with previous years. As a result of those changes, cooperation between a director, a Party organization and a trade union does not develop adequately. The cooperation is the best between a director and a Party organization — 16.6% of positive indications. Among workers a view prevails that the organizations which are to be the workers' representations in decision-making processes do not meet such expectations. It was only o 9% of respondents who indicated that a party organization represents the workers' interests. 12.9% of respondents were of the same opinion with respect to a self-government of a crew and the employees' council. At the same time workers declare little interest in taking posts in self-government organs; in effect, not always the best people are candidates for seats in the employees' council. The workers, however, want to have a much greater influence than they have now on decisions concerning their workplaces (26.9%) as well as on their participating in taking decisions concerning the collective work (30.6%). It seems apparent that the increase in employees' democracy depends on organizational and legal conditions and, in the first place, requires the change of attitudes among workers and the managing staff. It is also necessary to increase the self-dependence of enterprises in financial matters and to reduce the degree of their subordination to the economic center. Moreover, there arises the need to establish self-government structures on a supra-enterprise level, eg. the Self-Government Chamber in the Sejm (Parliament). ; Digitalizacja i deponowanie archiwalnych zeszytów RPEiS sfinansowane przez MNiSW w ramach realizacji umowy nr 541/P-DUN/2016

In the last part of the Empire trilogy, Commonwealth, Negri and Hardt ask about the possibility of the self-governance of the multitude. When answering, they argue that absolute democracy, understood as the political articulation of the multitude that does not entail its unification (construction of the people) is possible. As Negri states, this way of thinking about political articulation is rooted in the tradition of democratic materialism and constitutes the alternative to the dominant current of modern political philosophy that identifies political power with sovereignty. The multitude organizes itself politically by means of the constitutive power, identical with the ontological creativity or productivity of the multitude. To state the problem of political organization means to state the problem of class composition: political democracy is at the same time economic democracy. ; W ostatniej części trylogii Imperium, Rzeczy-pospolitej, Negri i Hardt pytają o sposób, w jaki wielość może rządzić sama sobą. W odpowiedzi stawiają tezę, że absolutna demokracja, pojmowana jako polityczna artykulacja wielości, niezakładająca jej redukcji do zunifikowanego podmiotu (ludu), jest możliwa. Jak stwierdza Negri, ten sposób myślenia o politycznej artykulacji jest zakorzeniony w tradycji demokratycznego materializmu, stanowiącej alternatywę dla dominującego w nowożytnej filozofii polityki nurtu utożsamiającego władzę polityczną z suwerennością. Wielość organizuje się politycznie dzięki władzy konstytuującej, tożsamej z ontologiczną kreatywnością/produktywnością wielości. Postawienie kwestii politycznej organizacji wymaga więc także postawienia kwestii składu klasowego wielości; demokracja polityczna jest zarazem demokracją ekonomiczną.

The author of the book examines the issues of constitutional stability and its role in ensuring sustainable democracy.

The opposition between the participationist approach, which favours wide participation of the people in democratic political process, and the deliberationist model, according to which political power should be exercised by people endowed with adequate cognitive competences, remains an important theme of the present debates in the theory of democracy. The author believes that those interpretations of the deliberationist model which perceive knowledge as a primary source of legitimation of participation in the political power, are guilty of a "cognitivist fallacy", and points out to dangers stemming from ascribing a prominent role to cognitive competences. In opposition to the "epistocratic" model, he stressed the importance of political skill in the governance of democratic systems. Taking as a starting point the belief that the normative ideal of democracy is based upon an egalitarian assumption of potentially universal ability to develop the political skill, he claims that this potentiality can be actualized through the very participation in political activity. ; Opozycja między podejściem partycypacjonistycznym, zakładającym szerokie uczestnictwo obywateli w demokratycznym procesie politycznym, a modelem deliberacjonistycznym, według którego władzę polityczną winny sprawować osoby obdarzone odpowiednimi kompetencjami poznawczymi, pozostaje ważkim tematem współczesnych debat w teorii demokracji. Autor twierdzi, że interpretacje modelu deliberacjonistycznego, uznające wiedzę za wiodące źródło prawomocnego uczestnictwa w sprawowaniu władzy politycznej, są obciążone "błędem kognitywistycznym" oraz wskazuje na niebezpieczeństwa wynikające z przypisania istotnej roli politycznej kompetencjom poznawczym.W opozycji do modelu "epistokratycznego" kładzie nacisk na wagę umiejętności politycznej w zarządzaniu systemami demokratycznymi. Biorąc za punkt wyjścia normatywny ideał demokracji, oparty na egalitarnym założeniu o potencjalnie powszechnej zdolności do kształtowania umiejętności politycznej, twierdzi, że ta potencjalność może się aktualizować przez samym udział w aktywności politycznej.

Since the end of the last century Mexico has experienced a profound proces of political and electoral change which was reflected in its transition from a dominant party authoritarian regime to a competitive multiparty system. This paper has two parts and a concluding section. The first part focuses on major changes in a number of relevant dimensions of the Mexican party system, including electoral competitiveness, party fractionalisation, electoral volatility, nationalisation, and the aggregate distribution of partisan loyalties among the electorate (macropartisanship) over the last three decades. The analysis is based on aggregate electoral data at the national and the district level, as well as on data from surveys of public opinion. The paper shows important changes in the structure and behaviour of the Mexican electorate, such as increasing partisan de-alignment as well as growing competitiveness, fractionalisation, and nationalisation of the party system. The second part is a brief review of the factors driving the process of political and electoral change in Mexico.

Since the end of the last century Mexico has experienced a profound proces of political and electoral change which was reflected in its transition from a dominant party authoritarian regime to a competitive multiparty system. This paper has two parts and a concluding section. The first part focuses on major changes in a number of relevant dimensions of the Mexican party system, including electoral competitiveness, party fractionalisation, electoral volatility, nationalisation, and the aggregate distribution of partisan loyalties among the electorate (macropartisanship) over the last three decades. The analysis is based on aggregate electoral data at the national and the district level, as well as on data from surveys of public opinion. The paper shows important changes in the structure and behaviour of the Mexican electorate, such as increasing partisan de-alignment as well as growing competitiveness, fractionalisation, and nationalisation of the party system. The second part is a brief review of the factors driving the process of political and electoral change in Mexico.

The aim of the paper is to analyze how Europeanization is used as an instrument of the European Union's foreign policy in the field of promoting democracy in the world. This fi rst requires an indication that all EU activities, including its relations with the international environment, are based on specific normative foundations. They include the so-called European values regarding, generally speaking, the promotion of democracy and broadly
understood human rights, as well as strengthening peace in international relations. "European values" are not only political and ideological guidelines, but also legal norms enshrined in EU treaties, so the promotion of democracy is one of the basic goals of the EU's foreign policy. Analysis of the EU's promotion of democracy requires the presentation of the main categories used to study this issue, i.e. showing what is understood by Europeanization, as well as by the associated concepts of democratization and socialization. Then mechanisms of europeanization are examined, as well as its results and evaluation of its effectiveness is provided. In this respect the case study is very helpful, in that it examines the results of
Europeanization in relation to the EU partner countries covered by the Eastern Partnership. The paper ends with fi nal remarks constituting a summary of the studied issues.

RESEARCH OBJECTIVE: The purpose of this article is to analyse the relationship between ideas of philosophical anthropology and the problem of intellectual legitimacy of democracy. THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND METHODS: In the article I am trying to answer the question, what is the relationship between views on human nature and attitude to democracy. I analyse this problem by interpreting classic works of political thought. THE PROCESS OF ARGUMENTATION: The starting point is the statement: aversion to democracy arose largely from misanthropy. Democracy was not considered as intellectually legitimate regime, because it was not believed in the rationality of an ordinary person and his ability to participate responsibly in public life. This situation changes during the Enlightenment, when anthropological pessimism was undermined, and the theories underlying the idea of the intellectual legitimacy of democracy were formulated. The later course of events largely questioned these theories, but nevertheless democracy in the West is considered as the only legitimate form of government. RESEARCH RESULTS: This leads me to a view on the paradoxical nature of modern democracy. On the one hand, there is a consensus regarding the intellectual legitimacy of democracy. On the other hand, in theory and practice, the ability of ordinary people to participate reasonably in public life is commonly questioned. CONCLUSIONS, INNOVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: The results of the analysis should prompt the political scientist to change the way of understanding the nature of modern democracy. This system is called democracy, but it seems to have less and less to do with the hopes of those authors who formulated its intellectual assumptions. ; CEL NAUKOWY: Celem tego artykułu jest analiza związku między wy‑ obrażeniami z zakresu antropologii filozoficznej a problemem intelektualnej prawomocności demokracji. PROBLEM I METODY BADAWCZE: W artykule próbuję odpowiedzieć na pytanie, jaki jest związek między poglądami na temat natury ludzkiej a sto‑ sunkiem do demokracji. Analizuję ten problem interpretując klasyczne dzieła z zakresu myśli politycznej. PROCES WYWODU: Punktem wyjścia jest konstatacja: niechęć wobec demo‑ kracji wyrastała w dużej mierze z mizantropii. Demokracja nie była uznawana za ustrój godny poparcia, ponieważ nie wierzono w racjonalność zwykłego czło‑ wieka i jego zdolność do odpowiedzialnego uczestnictwa w życiu publicznym. Ta sytuacja zmienia się w epoce Oświecenia, kiedy to podważono pesymizm antropologiczny i sformułowane zostały teorie stanowiące podstawę dla idei intelektualnej prawomocności demokracji. Późniejszy bieg wypadków w du‑ żym stopniu te teorie zakwestionował, ale mimo to demokracja na Zachodzie uznawana jest za jedyną prawomocną formę rządu. WYNIKI ANALIZY NAUKOWEJ: Analiza prowadzi do sformułowania poglądu o paradoksalnym charakterze współczesnej demokracji. Z jednej stro‑ ny, istnieje konsensus co do intelektualnej prawomocności demokracji, z dru‑ giej – w teorii i praktyce powszechnie kwestionowana jest zdolność zwykłego człowieka do rozumnego uczestnictwa w życiu publicznym. WNIOSKI, INNOWACJE, REKOMENDACJE: Wyniki analizy powinny skłonić politologa do zmiany sposobu rozumienia charakteru współczesnej demo‑ kracji. Ustrój ten nosi nazwę demokracja, ale wydaje się mieć coraz mniej wspól‑ nego z nadziejami tych autorów, którzy sformułowali jej intelektualne założenia.

W 2010 r. na Węgrzech przejęła władzę partia V. Orbana – FIDESZ. Dzięki wysokiej wygranej w wyborach parlamentarnych (niemal 53% głosów, co przełożyło się na 263 mandaty, czyli o 5 więcej niż wynosi konstytucyjna większość) możliwe stało się wprowadzenie głębokich zmian (w tym uchwalenie nowej konstytucji). W opinii wielu organizacji stojących na straży demokracji, a także Unii Europejskiej, zagrażają one fundamentom systemu demokratycznego w tym kraju. Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie rozwoju demokracji na Węgrzech po 1989 r., a przede wszystkim ocena zmian zachodzących w tym kraju po 2010 r. W oparciu o dostępne wskaźniki jakości demokracji (Freedom House oraz The Economist Intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy), podjęta zostanie także próba zweryfikowania tezy Janosa Kornaia, iż "Od lat 1989–1990 do wiosny 2010 r. na Węgrzech była demokracja. Już jej nie ma – formą rządów stała się autokracja" (Kornai, 2011). W artykule skonfrontowano również zarzuty stawiane węgierskim reformom przez społeczność międzynarodową z tym, co na ich temat mają do powiedzenia twórcy tychże reform. ; In 2010 the Fidesz party of V. Orban took power. Owing to the considerable majority they won in the parliamentary elections (nearly 53% of the votes, which translated into 263 mandates, five more than required for a constitutional majority) it was possible to implement profound changes (including a new constitution). In the opinion of numerous organizations guarding democracy and of the European Union, these changes pose a threat to the foundations of democracy in Hungary. The objective of this paper is to present the development of democracy in Hungary after 1989, and first and foremost to assess the changes that have taken place there after 2010. On the basis of accessible indices of the quality of democracy (Freedom House and The Economist Intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy), the paper also attempts to verify the statement by Janos Kornai who said that "from 1989–1990 to the spring of 2010 Hungary was democratic. Now democracy is gone – autocracy has become the form of governance" (Kornai, 2011). The paper also counterpoints the accusations of Hungarian reforms, voiced by international community, with the opinions of the authors of these reforms.