Suchergebnisse

In South America in the 1960s and 1970s the contradictions of economic, social and political structures were deepening. The excepcional states of the new militarism appeared on the continent. Formally these state systems were set up by the institutional takeover of the armed forces. The military governments strove for the total reorganization and modernization of the societies in their all ‒ economic, political and ideological ‒ territories.The break-down of the military dictatorships in South America, in the one of three semi-peripherical areas of the world, took place in the 1970s and 1980s and 1990s and it was followed by the restoration of the civil governing in the form of hybrid systems. All these processes constituted the parts of the democratization.However in those societies have been present the authoritarian enclaves and the so-called "powers that be" as well as the inherited non-elected system of institutions of the controlled democray endangering the democratic establishment.The study aims at analizing these processes, the governmental and the state structures and the Económic transformations on the ground of the Brazilian experiences.

The study examines the results of the 1922 general elections on the basis of new research into so-far unexplored sources. One novelty of the present paper is that it compares these results to the already existing research on the field, and debates the arguments of other scholars discussing the topic. The study proves that besides the 140–143 mandates of the United Party (Egységes Párt), the government was also supported by approximately 30 members of the parliament. This altogether meant 170–173 Christian-conservative MPs. It really stood for the "Two-Third" parliamentary support of Bethlen's government. However, the paper also calls attention to the fact that the elections yielded this result not only because of the open ballot system of the rural areas, but also due to corruption and breaching of law in the sphere of civil service. Consequently, whoever praises the system of consolidation by István Bethlen's government, should also keep in mind that it was not based on universal suffrage and secret ballot that were deemed necessary in a modern parliamentary democracy.

This article sets out a conceptual basis for measuring Vojvodina's regional autonomy in Serbia's European perspective. Serbia is a potential candidate country for EU accession, implementation of the European Partnership (2008) will be examined through the mechanisms established under the stabilization and association process. In 2009, the Serbian Parliament ratified the new autonomy statute for Vojvodina. While the national government could not entirely close its eyes to the EU regionalization requirements the provincial government had the opportunity to express its demands. The Statute of Vojvodina was to set out the key principles that should underlie effective regional democracy, covering areas such as financial autonomy and legislative powers. Parallel with regional autonomy one sees the challenges of personal autonomy and Hungarian National Council in the sphere of freedoms relating to language, education and cross-border cooperation. The article concludes by examining measures of Hungary's national policy towards capacities of AP Vojvodina, aiming at faster integration of Serbia, and Hungarian minority communities living in the border area.

The EU is bound to respect the national identities of Member States. States might, at occasions, define their national identities in ways that breach inclusive constitutional values (e.g. equality) protected under TEU Article 2. The assumption behind the recognition of diverse constitutional identities is the peaceful coexistence of both, which is challenged by illiberal national developments. Instead, we see a zero-sum game between the constitutional recognition of exclusive values (e.g. dominant ethnicity or religion) and inclusive constitutional values; every gain by the proponents of emergent authoritarianism translates to a loss on the side of constitutional democracy. While exclusive norms appear in virtually every constitutional system, a critical mass of exclusive values can lead to the hollowing out of a democratic order, both on the national and on the supranational level. To try to draw the line where this shift happens, we are relying on the limits of toleration, and recognition, of exclusive norms and identity elements of minority communities in liberal theories of multiculturalism (e.g. Raz, Taylor, Kymlicka). We think that the case of illiberal minorities raise structurally similar theoretical questions, insights, and experiences than the dilemma defined above, the challenge of illiberal Member States undermining EU fundamental values.

After the transformation to democracy and market economy the Visegrad Four (V4) countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia) have rejoined the group of donors providing international development assistance to poor emerging countries. The aim of the paper is to help to better understand the foreign aid policy and practice of the V4 countries and their contribution to the development of the poor emerging countries by providing foreign aid for them. The main research questions focus on the following issues: What is the history and the major motif of the V4 countries for providing foreign aid? Which are the most preferred beneficiary countries and why? How much foreign aid and in what area is provided? How does it relate to other international donors? What does it mean to the recipient countries? Are there similarities or differences between the V4 countries in this respect? What are the major features distinguishing V4 donors from others? What kind of challenges and opportunities can arise? The hypotheses of the research to be tested are as follows: 1. Providing foreign aid by the V4 countries has its roots in the past regime which still has an influence on the present practice. 2. The V4 countries represent a special model for development cooperation with the aid recipient countries. 3. The major motif of the V4 countries for providing foreign aid was to support the geopolitical interest of the ex "Soviet Block", while after the change of the regime the aspiration of the V4 countries shifted towards gaining economic benefits from the cooperation with the aid recipient countries. The method of the research is literature review related to development theory and foreign aid as well as statistical analysis based on data on Official Development Assistance (ODA). Results prove the hypotheses.

Mátyás Rákosi, first secretary of the Hungarian Workers' Party, was forced to resign by soviet Politburo member Anastas Mikoyan on 18th July, 1956. He was followed by Ernő Gerő, who was also a hated man, responsible for all economic decisions in earlier years and taking part in a leadership which had committed serious crimes. He remained in power for three months only, until the October 1956 Revolution. Although Gerő announced political reforms, historians regard it only as a tactical step. This study suggests that these reforms, named "clear sheet", or "tabula rasa" policy, were in fact serious steps toward a "socialist democracy". What is more, these steps were not only announced but many of them was also taken. However, three months were not enough for Gerő to introduce all changes, because he was also engaged in neutralizing the activity of the party opposition lead by Imre Nagy's group. The study analyzes these reforms (e.g. increasing the role of the National Assembly, restoring the "socialist legality", decentralization, improving the living standards of the society, broadening the freedom of speech, giving greater support to the intellectuals etc.). To sum up, it can be stated that these reforms have a lot in common with the reforms of Imre Nagy in 1953. Surprisingly, it seems that the so-called "soft dictatorship" would have started much earlier, already in 1956, instead of 1963. The later reforms of János Kádár, introduced gradually in the 1960s (and sometimes only in the 1980s) probably originated also from this period of time, the Summer of'56. This study has much more questions than answers, its aim is to generate a new debate on Gerő's first secretariat hoping that a better understanding of this period can be reached. The most important questions are the following: why did the Revolution exacdy break out; how would it be possible to avoid it and, most interestingly, what would have happened if the Revolution did not break out at all?