Suchergebnisse

Abstract In the early years of the Community it was assumed that there was a widespread consensus about the future development of Europe, and that decisions by the Council of Ministers were broadly in line with public opinion. In recent years the growth in the powers and responsibilities of European institutions has been considerable, through the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty. The Community is now the world's largest trading group, and one of the three most important players on the world economic scene alongside the USA and Japan. The EU has grown from six to fifteen member states, and further waves of enlargement are on the horizon. Yet many fear that processes of representation and accountability have not kept pace with this expansion, producing a legitimacy crisis (Anderson & Eliassen 1996; Hayward 1995). The key issue addressed throughout this Special Issue is the classic one of political representation: how the preferences of European citizens can be linked to decision making within the European Union.

In the early years of the Community it was assumed that there was a widespread consensus about the future development of Europe, and that decisions by the Council of Ministers were broadly in line with public opinion. In recent years the growth in the powers and responsibilities of European institutions has been considerable, through the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty. The Community is now the world's largest trading group, and one of the three most important players on the world economic scene alongside the USA and Japan. The EU has grown from six to fifteen member states, and further waves of enlargement are on the horizon. Yet many fear that processes of representation and accountability have not kept pace with this expansion, producing a legitimacy crisis (Anderson & Eliassen 1996; Hayward 1995). The key issue (...) is the classic one of political representation: how the preferences of European citizens can be linked to decision making within the European Union. (European Journal of Political Research / FUB)

Examines whether economic and monetary union (EMU) and the European Central Bank (ECB) causes a democratic deficit problem; non-majoritarian forms of policymaking, democratic accountability, economic theories for institutional design, and why an economic government was absent from the EMU project. Some focus on lessons from Germany about the role of an independent central bank.

The introduction of the euro is accompanied by an independent European Central Bank (ECB) which is solely responsible for monetary policy in the euro zone. No European institution will be introduced to flank the ECB. This particular institutional design is problematic. This article argues that Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) suffers moderately from a democratic deficit. However, the case of Germany illustrates that it is not the independence of the ECB that should be cause for concern, but the absence of specific domestic features and a government. It is unclear which political authority will be held responsible if EMU leads to an uneven distribution of costs and benefits across the euro zone. Economic literature suggests that under EMU distortions could well occur and that a different design could deal better with these imperfections. The historical process leading to EMU explains the reasons for its particular design. Although imperfect, EMU is an improvement over the pre-EMU status quo in which Germany de facto dominated monetary policy. Nevertheless, the design of EMU remains suboptimal.

The effects of a free market system on European citizenship are investigated. Arguing that globalization has diminished nation-states' authority to control public policy agendas, individual governments have responded by establishing more flexible postwelfare state national economies; consequently, social rights are constrained while social exclusion advances. Three explanations for the reduction in citizens' social protection are presented: increased competition between European Union member states; notions of social rights; the absence of a European Union state with the authority to define social rights; & member states' superior power over supranational institutions, thus preventing the promotion of social rights. Consequently, supranational institutions must be granted increased authority to ensure the maintenance of fundamental social rights in the international free market. 11 References. Adapted from the source document.

THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES TWO DIFFERENT, YET INTERRELATED, PHENOMENA: PARLIAMENTARY DECLINE IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE "DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT" OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. IT ARGUES THAT THE LATTER HAS HELPED TO CONSOLIDATE THE FORMER. THIS IS ILLUSTRATED BY TWO SETS OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES. THE MAIN CONCLUSION TO BE DRAWN IS THAT A SIMPLE REORDERING OF SOME POLICIES WITHIN AND ACROSS DIFFERENT PILLARS WILL NOT REMEDY THE CURRENT DEMOCRATIC SHORTFALLS.