Suchergebnisse

Il contributo, prendendo spunto dalla cittadinanza ateniese ai tempi di Pericle, esamina l'attuale ruolo discriminatorio di tale istituto nei confronti di esseri umani riconosciuti come non-cittadini e, pertanto, privati di tutti quei diritti che alla cittadinanza fanno capo. Nuovi bastardi, che si aggiungono ai cittadini oramai privi di ogni attributo sovrano ed in balia di potentati economico- burocratici privi di ogni rappresentanza politica, che dominano la vita sociale. ; Citizenship can discriminate against foreigners resident in a State depriving them of the rights enjoyed by citizens, as in Athens, during the age of Pericles. Even citizens are deprived of political rights if political and economic decisions are the prerogative of techno-bureaucracy. New nothoi and new idiotai.

Regional assemblies are among the losers of the European inte-gration process. Strengthening information rights and parliamentary scrutiny at both the national and the sub-national level is considered as the right way to address the European democratic deficit. The new toolbox provided by the Lisbon Treaty for a stronger commit-ment of regional assemblies within the EWS seems to be ineffective, even in genuine federal states, like Germany, Austria and Belgium. This paper examines the different domestic institutional frame-works emphasizing that, as the assemblies are getting more involved in EU proposals scrutiny, they rely always more on the technical ex-pertise of their government and on the support of parliamentary staff, which is far from an enhanced democratic control on EU matters.

To explain the institutional developments of the EC/EU, the traditional theories of European integration used to build their arguments around two opposite and well-known models of public authority, the International Organisation one vs. the State one: But both of these yardsticks have proven to be of limited heuristic power, faced with the peculiarity of the EC/EU institutional configuration. The deadlock that classic theories run into, then, was just bypassed by the following studies, that left behind the "ontological question" to focus on middle-range fields or specific dynamics, driven by the idea that the system had a unique nature, but the way it worked could be known and named. Thus, the post-ontological studies often referred to the European institutional level as a "governance system", to indicate that the EC/EU is able to allocate values by shaping trans-boundary policy processes, but through an institutional interplay hardly referable to some conventional political model. Thus, this paper aims (1) to analyse the different contents attached to the "governance" label in European studies since the fixing Hix made when talking of a "new governance agenda" in 1998, (2) to recast the ontological question in the light of the "new governance", a theoretical framework linking Rosenau's concept of self-sustaining trans-boundary "Spheres of Authority" to policy cycles now decoupled from the nation-state jurisdictions, and (3) to define and apply this framework to the institutional development of the EC/EU, to identify the reasons beneath the common project actual stalemate.

The concepts of democracy & the democratic deficit are often applied to the European Union uncritically. However, before discussions of democracy can be meaningful, we must decide if the EU is a political entity that warrants evaluation by democratic standards. This paper challenges the notion that a primordial demos must exist before a democracy can be viable. A primordial demos is not necessary as illustrated by many nation-states that are not based on a distinct ethnic identity. Europe already has an emergent civic demos on which it draws for support & legitimacy. Having established that a demos exists, the paper goes on to assess the performance of the EU in light of democratic standards. While important limitations exist, the EU's democratic capacity is growing in terms of accountability, openness, & perhaps representation. 42 References. Adapted from the source document.

Through a cross-disciplinary approach the authors provide an analysis of the large impact of the Early Warning Mechanism introduced in the Treaty of Lisbon with the goal of involving National Parliaments (NPs) in the European normative production and, consequently, contributing to a higher "democraticity" of EU decision-making process. The involvement of NPs should increase compliance with the principle of subsidiarity and overcome the traditional democratic deficit. The paper – through a critical perspective- concludes connecting the weakness of more democratising procedures with some crucial peculiarities of the prevailing EU integration paradigm. ; La presente ricerca si basa su un approccio interdisciplinare e mira ad analizzare e valutare l'impatto delle innovazioni procedurali introdotte dal Trattato di Lisbona relativamente al Meccanismo di Allerta Precoce (MAP), il cui scopo è di contribuire a una più elevata "democraticità" del processo decisionale europeo. Un sistematico coinvolgimento dei Parlamenti Nazionali secondo la procedura in questione favorirebbe una più diffusa armonia dell'azione di governo europea col principio di sussidiarietà, concorrendo, dunque, al superamento della tradizionale questione democratica. Il paper - attraverso un approccio critico - suggerisce, infine, di mettere in relazione la debolezza di procedure miranti a incrementare la democraticità del sistema decisionale con alcune cruciali peculiarità del modello d'integrazione alla base del progetto europeo. ; Peer reviewed

In November 2003, at the end of a ten-year process, the EU passed legislation (Regulation (EC) No 20044/2003) on the granting of public subsidies to European political parties, thus laying down the conditions governing both their funding & their implicit recognition. The article explores in detail this normative framework & the political implications of the European party finance law. It is argued that the case for granting political parties EU public subsidies has been based on the same arguments as national party-funding legislation & that the European legislation contains provisions that resemble those applicable within member states, despite the fact that political parties perform substantially different functions at European & national levels owing to the special features of the EU's institutional & political architecture. It is also argued that the granting of EU subsidies to political parties has very largely been cast within the debate on the "democratic deficit," but it is unlikely to contribute substantially to remedying that deficit & to fostering the development of a party system at the EU level that can help to kick-start momentum towards integration. The article analyzes the European party finance law by comparison with the national legislation of several member states, & presents a preliminary assessment of the impact of the new Regulation on the European political landscape during the first two years of application. References. Adapted from the source document.

Starting from the Covid-19 emergency and using a long-term analysis perspective, the article aims to demonstrate that, especially in Italy, a country characterized by a chronic mutual distrust between rulers and citizens: 1. The state of exception, institutionalized in a state of emergency, is not the turning point towards totalitarianism or a police state; rather, it is the condition of normality of democratic systems with personalistic guidance and with a deficit of institutional legitimacy. 2. The control society is not the primary objective of power but an obligatory collateral effect when the emergency becomes its main source of legitimacy. 3. The institutionalization of the emergency is not the tool for recovering a strong autonomy of politics; on the contrary, it accelerates the transfer of power from politicians to technicians and bureaucratsIn the final part of the article it is suggested that only through a radical transformation of educational systems and teaching practices, it will be possible to imagine new forms of citizenship capable of rebuilding trust between institutions and citizens; and new forms of political action that no longer need emergencies as the only source of legitimacy.

Starting from the Covid-19 emergency and using a long-term analysis perspective, the article aims to demonstrate that, especially in Italy, a country characterized by a chronic mutual distrust between rulers and citizens: 1. The state of exception, institutionalized in a state of emergency, is not the turning point towards totalitarianism or a police state; rather, it is the condition of normality of democratic systems with personalistic guidance and with a deficit of institutional legitimacy. 2. The control society is not the primary objective of power but an obligatory collateral effect when the emergency becomes its main source of legitimacy. 3. The institutionalization of the emergency is not the tool for recovering a strong autonomy of politics; on the contrary, it accelerates the transfer of power from politicians to technicians and bureaucratsIn the final part of the article it is suggested that only through a radical transformation of educational systems and teaching practices, it will be possible to imagine new forms of citizenship capable of rebuilding trust between institutions and citizens; and new forms of political action that no longer need emergencies as the only source of legitimacy.

La tesi di dottorato di Bruno Brancati concerne il ruolo delle corti nella crisi economica europea, con particolare attenzione alle decisioni relative ai diritti sociali. La tesi principale della ricerca è che, in questo particolare momento, il diritto pubblico europeo richiede un'espansione del ruolo delle corti. Infatti, l'autorità del diritto in Europa è in crisi, perché i confini tra i poteri nazionali e sovranazionali sono incerti. Questo contesto richiede un'espansione della "cultura della giustificazione". "Cultura dell'autorità" e "cultura della giustificazione" sono entrambe necessarie. La prima si concentra sull'autorizzazione ad agire dei vari attori. La seconda si concentra sulle ragioni sostanziali delle decisioni. Quando l' "autorità" è in crisi, l'espansione della "cultura della giustificazione" diventa molto importante, ed anche il ruolo delle corti. La "giurisdizionalizzazione" della crisi economica è un fatto, come dimostrano decisioni quali quella sull'ESM e il Fiscal Compact del Tribunale costituzionale tedesco (settembre 2012) o la decisione n. 187 del 2013 del Tribunale costituzionale portoghese, vertente su alcune misure di austerità. Il primo capitolo della ricerca spiega la tesi principale e la struttura del lavoro. Nel secondo capitolo è illustrata la prospettiva dei "conflitti d'autorità". Il costituzionalismo democratico nazionale e il diritto sovranazionale condividono un orizzonte ideale, ma nella storia della loro relazione è possibile distinguere due fasi: quella della "divergenza" e quella della "convergenza". Il diritto nazionale e quello sovranazionale si sovrappongono, e questa sovrapposizione innesca conflitti, perché essi sono diventati simili, ma non identici. Casi come Viking e Laval sono emblema di un importante conflitto tra queste due sfere. Nel terzo capitolo si può vedere che il livello nazionale e quello sovranazionale si intrecciano nella governance economica e finanziaria. Lo spazio per le valutazioni discrezionali in quest'area incrementa le incertezze dei confini tra i due livelli. Nel quarto capitolo, viene presentato il ruolo del rinvio pregiudiziale alla Corte di Giustizia dell'Unione europea nella prospettiva dei "conflitti d'autorità" e viene considerato il caso OMT. Poi, il capitolo si concentra sui rapporti tra diritto nazionale e diritto sovranazionale nelle "giurisprudenze costituzionali della crisi" portoghese e italiana. Nel quinto capitolo sono stati presentati alcuni argomenti classici, usati contro la giurisdizionalizzazione dei diritti sociali: legittimazione democratica, policentricità, expertise, flessibilità. Le relazioni tra il giudice ed il legislatore in quest'area sono spesso problematiche ed il controllo di proporzionalità può essere molto utile da questo punto di vista. Esso può rispettare la sfera legislativa, ma può anche essere molto pervasivo. Nel sesto capitolo, sono considerati alcuni modi di fare uso del controllo di proporzionalità nella giurisprudenza costituzionale della crisi italiana e portoghese. Le due Corti costituzionali si sono confrontate con la questione dell'equa distribuzione dei sacrifici, ma non sono state sempre persuasive. In altre decisioni, la mancata ricezione di adeguate giustificazioni del sacrificio di un diritto ha giocato un ruolo importante. Allocando l' "onere della giustificazione" sul legislatore, il giudice riconosce i suoi deficit, ma svolge anche un controllo molto efficace. Il settimo capitolo si concentra sulla limitazione degli effetti delle decisioni di incostituzionalità. Questa tecnica è molto utile, a causa della policentricità dei casi riguardanti l'allocazione delle risorse. Sia la Corte costituzionale italiana che il Tribunale costituzionale portoghese sono stati criticati per l'uso di questa tecnica. Inoltre, la giurisprudenza della crisi fornisce un'altra indicazione: il giudice può essere molto efficace se le sue decisioni sono pronunciate subito dopo l'adozione della misura. L'ottavo capitolo contiene le conclusioni del lavoro. La crisi mette alla prova le costituzioni, e le costituzioni appaiono "minimalizzate". Esse riescono a limitare la durezza della politica di austerità, ma non possono stravolgerla. Esse potrebbero perfino legittimarla, addomesticandola. Nella giurisprudenza della crisi, le corti corrono il rischio di perdere la propria legittimazione. La proporzionalità è una tecnica che può enfatizzare la discrezionalità del giudice. L'allocazione di un onere di giustificazione sul legislatore può limitarla, senza eliminarla. La limitazione degli effetti temporali della decisione comporta il rischio di politicizzazione del giudice, ma questa tecnica è molto utile in tempo di crisi, perché consente al giudice di adottare un' "etica della responsabilità". Tuttavia, l'adozione di una tale etica deve rispettare le regole che disciplinano il processo davanti alla corte costituzionale e deve essere controllata da un rigoroso ragionamento giuridico. Bruno Brancati's Phd thesis concerns the role of courts in the European economic crisis, with particular attention paid to decisions related to social rights. The main claim of the research is that, in this particular moment, European public law requires an expansion of the role of courts. In fact, the authority of law in Europe is in crisis, because the boundaries between national and supranational powers are uncertain. This context requires an expansion of the "culture of justification". "Culture of authority" and "culture of justification" are both necessary. The first one focuses on the authorization to act of the various actors. The second one focuses on the substantive reasons in support of the decisions to be taken. When the "authority" is in crisis, the expansion of the "culture of justification" becomes very important, and the role of the courts too. The "judicialization" of the economic crisis is a fact. Decisions such as the one about ESM and Fiscal Compact of the German Constitutional Court (September 2012) or decision n. 187/2013 of the Portuguese Constitutional Court, about austerity measures, demonstrate that. The first chapter of the research explains the main claim and the structure of the work. In the second chapter the perspective of the "conflicts of authority" is illustrated. National democratic constitutionalism and supranational law share an ideal horizon, but in the history of their relationship it is possible to distinguish two phases: a phase of "divergence" and a phase of "convergence". The national law and the supranational one overlap, and this overlapping triggers conflicts, because they have become similar, but not identical. Cases such as Viking and Laval are emblematic of an important conflict between these two spheres. In the third chapter one can see that the national level and the supranational one interweave in the economic and financial governance. The space for discretionary evaluations in this area increases the uncertainties of the boundaries between the two levels. In the fourth chapter, the role of the preliminary ruling question sent to CJEU is presented in the perspective of the "conflicts of authority" and the OMT case is considered. Then, this chapter focuses on the relationships between national law and supranational one in the Portuguese and Italian "crisis constitutional case law". In the fifth chapter, some classical arguments, used against the judicialization of social rights, are presented: democratic legitimacy, polycentricity, expertise, flexibility. The relationships between the judge and the legislature in this area are often problematic and proportionality review can be very useful in this respect. It can respect the legislative sphere, but can also be very pervasive. In the sixth chapter, some ways of making use of proportionality review in the Portuguese and Italian crisis constitutional case law are considered. The two Constitutional Courts have faced the issue of the fair distribution of sacrifices, but they have not always been persuasive. In other decisions the failure to receive adequate justification of a sacrifice of a right played an important role. By allocating the "burden of justification" to the legislature,, the judge recognizes its deficits, but also plays a very effective control. The seventh chapter focuses on the limitation of the effects of the decisions of unconstitutionality. This technique is very useful, because of the polycentricity of the cases regarding the allocation of resources. Both the Portuguese and the Italian Constitutional Courts have been criticized because of the use of this technique. Then, the crisis case law provides another insight: the judge can be very effective if its decisions are delivered soon after the adoption of the measure. The eighth chapter contains the conclusions of the work. The crisis represents a test for constitutions, and constitutions appear "minimized". They manage to limit the hardness of the austerity policy, but they cannot upset it. They could even legitimize it, by taming it. In the crisis case law, the courts run the risk of losing their legitimacy. Proportionality is a technique that can emphasize the discretion of the judge. The allocation of the burden of justification to the legislature can limit it, without eliminating it. The limitation of the temporal effects of the decision involves the risk of politicization of the judge, but this technique is very helpful in times of crisis, because it allows the judge to adopt an "ethics of responsibility". Yet, the adoption of such an ethics must respect the rules that regulate the trial before the constitutional court and must be controlled by a rigorous legal reasoning.