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For generations, Europeans have become accustomed to rising prosperity, an increasingly supportive social safety net and the expectation that each generation will fare better than the last. Europe has built a social model that is second to none, and fashioned a continent of disparate nations into a community that shares common values with democratic institutions that are the envy of the world. Yet, Europe, as a common project is increasingly questioned by its citizens. The emphasis on solidarity, the driving force behind the social and economic integration, has given way to suspicion and nationalism. Openness and tolerance are strained by xenophobic, anti-immigrant sentiments, while populists and extremists set the agenda and dominate the policy debate. European countries have borne the brunt of the global economic forces that have strained its institutions and capacity to respond appropriately. Characterised by uncertainty and delay both in handling the Euro crisis, Greece's ongoing economic woes, Brexit and now a migrant crisis, Europe is at a crossroads in its development: a restructuring at the very least, if not a new settlement of power within the union, is on the cards. This book will attempt to understand what 'post-crisis Europe' will look like, and what the opportunities are to rethink its economic, social and institutional architecture as well as to address the nagging democratic deficit that undermines its legitimacy as a democratic entity.

A central question of political theory has long been how to reconcile the democratic ideal – where the people rule – with the reality of political power that is restrained and limited in various ways. This question has recently been raised in the debate on the European Union's "democratic deficit". A neo-Madisonian discourse has emerged that identifies in the EU's multi-level governance a contemporary version of Madison's separation of powers and checks and balances. This article develops a critique of this discourse by revisiting Madison's writings and highlighting his republican vision of democratic legitimacy whereby institutional limitations to power are legitimized through their relationship with the principle of popular sovereignty. ; Une question centrale pour la théorie politique est de savoir comment réconcilier l'idéal démocratique – selon lequel le pouvoir est détenu par le peuple – avec la réalité d'un pouvoir restreint et limité. Cette question est apparue dans le débat autour du « déficit démocratique » de l'Union européenne. Selon le discours néo-madisonien, où la « gouvernance multi-niveaux » de l'UE est présentée comme version moderne du système de séparation et diffusion de pouvoir élaboré par Madison dans le Fédéraliste, l'UE apparait comme une solution aux problèmes du majoritarisme à l'échelle nationale. Cet article développe une critique de ce discours en proposant une lecture « républicaine » du système politique madisonien qui souligne le lien entre institutions et normes et entre limitations juridiques et souveraineté populaire.

A central question of political theory has long been how to reconcile the democratic ideal – where the people rule – with the reality of political power that is restrained and limited in various ways. This question has recently been raised in the debate on the European Union's "democratic deficit". A neo-Madisonian discourse has emerged that identifies in the EU's multi-level governance a contemporary version of Madison's separation of powers and checks and balances. This article develops a critique of this discourse by revisiting Madison's writings and highlighting his republican vision of democratic legitimacy whereby institutional limitations to power are legitimized through their relationship with the principle of popular sovereignty. ; Une question centrale pour la théorie politique est de savoir comment réconcilier l'idéal démocratique – selon lequel le pouvoir est détenu par le peuple – avec la réalité d'un pouvoir restreint et limité. Cette question est apparue dans le débat autour du « déficit démocratique » de l'Union européenne. Selon le discours néo-madisonien, où la « gouvernance multi-niveaux » de l'UE est présentée comme version moderne du système de séparation et diffusion de pouvoir élaboré par Madison dans le Fédéraliste, l'UE apparait comme une solution aux problèmes du majoritarisme à l'échelle nationale. Cet article développe une critique de ce discours en proposant une lecture « républicaine » du système politique madisonien qui souligne le lien entre institutions et normes et entre limitations juridiques et souveraineté populaire.

IN ENGLISH: This article aims to detect the level of Croatian youth's social trust, as well as to identify the generators or determinants of this phenomenon. It argues that social trust is, following social capital theory and human development theory, determined by institutional and sociocultural contexts, respectively. It is especially important to identify the way it is formed, considering the democratic deficit and the process of retraditionalization that occurred in Croatian society. The results show that both institutional and cultural factors influence the level of social trust in the expected direction. The analysis uses data from a national survey conducted in 2010 (N=2, 000), which is a national representative sample of university students from all public universities in Croatia. --- IN CROATIAN: Cilj ovoga rada je otkriti razinu socijalnog povjerenja mladih u Hrvatskoj, kao i identificirati generatore ili odrednice ove pojave. U članku se tvrdi, polazeći od teorije socijalnog kapitala i teorije ljudskoga razvoja, da je socijalno povjerenje određeno institucionalnim i sociokulturnim kontekstom. Posebno je važno utvrditi način na koji se oblikuje, s obzirom na demokratski deficit i proces retradicionalizacije koji se dogodio u hrvatskom društvu. Rezultati pokazuju kako institucionalni i kulturni čimbenici utječu na razinu društvenog povjerenja u očekivanom smjeru. U analizi su korišteni podaci iz nacionalnog istraživanja provedenog 2010. godine na nacionalnom reprezentativnom uzorku sveučilišnih studenata svih javnih sveučilišta u Hrvatskoj (N = 2 000).

In November 2003, at the end of a ten-year process, the EU passed legislation (Regulation (EC) No 20044/2003) on the granting of public subsidies to European political parties, thus laying down the conditions governing both their funding & their implicit recognition. The article explores in detail this normative framework & the political implications of the European party finance law. It is argued that the case for granting political parties EU public subsidies has been based on the same arguments as national party-funding legislation & that the European legislation contains provisions that resemble those applicable within member states, despite the fact that political parties perform substantially different functions at European & national levels owing to the special features of the EU's institutional & political architecture. It is also argued that the granting of EU subsidies to political parties has very largely been cast within the debate on the "democratic deficit," but it is unlikely to contribute substantially to remedying that deficit & to fostering the development of a party system at the EU level that can help to kick-start momentum towards integration. The article analyzes the European party finance law by comparison with the national legislation of several member states, & presents a preliminary assessment of the impact of the new Regulation on the European political landscape during the first two years of application. References. Adapted from the source document.

Abstract
Constitutional courts are portrayed as counter-majoritarian institutions empowered to strike down ordinary legislation that is inconsistent with the constitution. This power is to be used sparingly, since it is seen as being in tension with basic democratic principles. Judicial review in these circumstances should be limited to minority rights protection and the enforcement of structural limitations that prevent majority rule excess. But this is only half the story. Depending on the democratic credentials of the particular constitution, courts that strike down legislation as inconsistent with the constitution can also be said to be engaging in majoritarian action. The characterization of constitutional courts as counter-majoritarian institutions is premised on: (1) the status of ordinary legislation as the quintessential majoritarian instrument, (2) the un-elected nature of judges, (3) a narrow understanding of the concept of the 'negative legislator', and (4) the democratic deficit that results when judges impose their views over those enacted by parliament. This Article challenges these assumptions. First, this Article demonstrates that ordinary statutes adopted by elected legislatures are not necessarily the superior articulation of popular will. On the contrary, the democratization of modern constitution-making allows the constitution to acquire ultimate majoritarian status. Because of popular skepticism about the ability of ordinary politics to adequately reflect society's views on important substantive policy matters, the People have repeatedly decided to bypass the legislative process and directly entrench these policy views in the constitutional text. As a result, it is the constitution that embodies popular will. Second, this Article dissects the so-called counter-majoritarian difficulty, in order to distinguish between illegitimate counter-majoritarian review and legitimate counter-majoritarian review. The former occurs when the constitutional court substitutes the legislature's policy views with its own, thus generating an impermissible democratic deficit. The latter occurs when the constitutional court invalidates ordinary legislation that violates minority rights or exceeds the structural limits imposed by the constitution. In both instances, counter-majoritarian intervention is warranted, precisely, to make sure that democratic self-government through ordinary politics can be adequately carried out. Third, this Article suggest the existence of a third class of judicial review: legitimate majoritarian review. This is when a constitutional court invalidates ordinary statutes because the legislature attempted to substitute the will of the constitutional drafters with their own. In other words, in instances when the legislative body carries out an anti-majoritarian act by ignoring the policy choices made by the People and entrenched in the constitutional text. When a court strikes down legislation of this sort, it is actually re-establishing majoritarian self-rule by making sure that the constitution's policy commands are respected. In that sense, the court is not exercising independent judgment. Instead, it becomes the enforcement instrument of the majoritarian constitution to avoid legislative usurpation. This makes the un-elected nature of courts an almost irrelevant factor. Finally, this Article explores how the majoritarian potential of judicial review on constitutional matters interacts with the 'negative legislator' role of constitutional courts. In particular, how the 'negative legislator' should not be characterized, necessarily, as a limited one.

Intro -- Preface -- Contents -- Chapter 1: The Significance of Metaphors in International Relations Theory -- Beginning Again with an Anecdote -- Foreign Policy by Metaphor: Barack Obama's "Red Line" -- Metaphors and Public Policy -- Why Metaphors Matter -- Conceptual Versus Linguistic Metaphors -- Governments and Metaphors -- The Nexus Between Policy Metaphors and Scholarship -- References -- Chapter 2: Metaphors of International Political Economy -- Metaphors in Economics1 -- Metaphors in the Study of Relations Among International Actors of Unequal Wealth -- Ordinal Worlds Metaphor -- Metaphors of "Development" -- The Metaphors of "Core," "Center," and "(Semi)Periphery" -- Metaphors of "North" and "South" -- Metaphor of "Dependency" -- "Global Inequality" -- Additional Thoughts About Relations Among International Actors of Unequal Wealth -- Foreign "Aid" -- "Globalization" in Metaphorical Perspective -- Some Metaphors of European Integration -- Functionalism, Neofunctionalism, and "Spillover" -- European Neighborhood Policy -- Reflections on the Subplot of IPE -- References -- Chapter 3: Metaphors of Democratization -- Metaphors in the Study of Democratization -- Democratic "Transition" and "Consolidation" -- Democratization Has a "Direction" -- "Waves" of Democratization -- Democratization and Swings of the "Pendulum" -- Directions of Democracy and "Modernization" -- "Advanced Democracies" -- Summary -- Reform/Democracy "From Above" Versus Reform/Democracy "From Below" -- Government Has "Density": "Thick" and "Thin" Political Authority -- Metaphor of the Democratic Deficit -- Narratives in the Metaphors of Democratization -- References -- Chapter 4: Theoretical Reflections -- Theoretical Aspects of Metaphors in Realism -- Metaphors and the Epistemology of Neorealism -- Metaphorical Aspects of Liberal Theory

It is often claimed that the participation of civil society organisations (CSOs) can mitigate the 'democratic deficit' of international organisations and the European Union. The underlying assumption is that transnational CSOs are, through their advocacy work, voicing citizens' interests, anxieties, hopes and ideals. In this paper we report the first results of an empirical research project in which we investigated if, and in what precise way, transnational CSOs are actually reaching out to citizens. In our interviews with officials from 60 transnational CSOs we found that, in most cases, communication between the CSO offices and members is dense when discussing strategic decisions. However, in tactical matters CSO officials seem to rely more on consultation with peers, and the international secretariats often act autonomously. We were also able to identify two prevailing models of consultation in transnational CSOs. First, there is a 'formal and federal model' of consultation that features representative bodies in which sub-units are represented. The second is an 'informal participatory model', which contains a great deal of ad hoc communication between the office and interested individuals. From the point of view of democratic theory, both models have specific advantages and, thus, it cannot be said that one is generally preferable. Within each category, however, there are CSOs that perform better than others.

Recently, a democratic deficit has called for new forms of e-participation to increase or deepen citizens' political participation. A new solution for rapid feedback, GiMening, is undergoing development and implementation in Norway. This article contributes to the understanding of the implementation of quick-response tools by suggesting which key points of awareness must be considered to enhance associated possibilities and avoid pitfalls. The research questions under examination are: How do municipal political leadership, school leadership and youth perceive the need for extended digital citizen participation? What are their thoughts on the possibilities and pitfalls that GiMening may trigger during its implementation and use in different contexts? Research on digital engagement and political participation among Scandinavian youth is used to theorise about the concept of democratic innovation. The data material consists of semi-structured interviews with actors from five Norwegian municipalities. The main findings of the analysis show that the use of GiMening could lower the threshold for participation, lead to better-informed decisions, increase citizens' level of trust and improve awareness of people's opinions; however, there are pitfalls related to the risk that GiMening might be used only as a one-way information sharing tool or that decision-makers will not apply input data.