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According to many social scientists, democratic institutions are subject to much discontent and distrust today. Citizens sense the existence of a substantial disconnect between the rhetoric of representative democracy and its reality—what citizens believe their proper role to be and what the realities of our government and society allow them to be. More to the point, citizens of all stripes believe that those who "represent" them live lives quite different from their own, and that those representatives are not seriously interested in the perspectives, ideas, or well-being of most people. The nature and extent of this discontent raises serious questions about the future of representative democracy and the conditions necessary for it to flourish. What, then, are the conditions of democracy? Among other things, citizens must share some sense of solidarity and common purpose. There must be a quality educational system committed to providing everyone—regardless of race or economic status—with an appropriate foundation for citizenship and personal fulfillment. There must be equal employment opportunity. Citizens must be well educated, and they must have access to credible news sources. Public officials must not be seen to cater to the rich or famous or seek short-term partisan advantage at the expense of long-term systemic values and stability. If a democratic society does not strive to satisfy these conditions, among others, representative democracy will either be brought down or so hollowed out as to become unrecognizable. Rather than attempting the impossible feat of addressing all of the conditions necessary for the flourishing of a democratic society, this Essay first explores what we mean to say when we talk about the concept of representative or constitutional democracy and then considers three of the ways in which our current governmental and political system may frustrate the practice of constitutional democracy. First, many Americans hold an idealized view of our democracy that prevents us from comprehending the full significance of the anti-democratic features of our constitutional system and hampers efforts to preserve and strengthen it. Second, our idealized view of American democracy prevents us from acknowledging that one important aspect of our constitutional tradition has been a preference for defining our political community in terms that are exclusionary, rather than inclusive. That, in turn, blinds us to the strong influence that this exclusionary preference continues to exert on our political life. Third, constitutional democracy requires nothing so much as a fair electoral system, but the ordinary political process often cannot ensure such fairness because politicians control the process and have little incentive either to draw maps that are fair or to undertake other necessary reforms. In many states, the people lack the power to assign these decisions to more disinterested agents, and, in recent years, the courts have tended to hold that such matters are unsuitable for judicial resolution. This Essay argues that these three obstacles must be overcome if representative democracy is to flourish.

Democracy is not just about the choice of policy determined by the aggregation of ballots cast in elections. It is also about managing tensions which may arise between proclaimed virtues of democratic values and the vicissitudes of public opinion. Further, a conundrum arises because it is not for the electorate to spend time and energy acquiring specialist knowledge about the efficacy of action, but the voters expect to be consulted on policy. It is a lofty ideal of democracy that the electorate can hold government responsible for adverse outcomes not expected by the voters when casting their ballots on policy. Resort to referendums does not necessarily resolve these contradictory demands of democracy, but it can amplify them.

It is clearly undemocratic for wealth to be concentrated in the same few hands, year in and year out, as was traditional in the sorts of aristocracies which Tocqueville contrasted with early American democracy and as arguably remains standard in virtually all modern industrial societies. The crucial question is whether democrats ought to be content with wealth being concentrated in different hands from one year to the next, or whether democratic egalitarians ought to insist instead that wealth ought not to be concentrated in anyone's hands at all. Certainly we do see a fair bit of income volatility in advanced industrial economies. I shall offer evidence of that shortly. But I shall go on to argue -pace Tocqueville and his many followers3-that that is not enough. A more general model of 'democratic welfare' ought to take account of the circulation of public benefits, and of the need for them, alongside earnings flows. Evidence from across the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) suggests that altogether too many of those who fall into poverty would get stuck there, were it not for government benefits; and those public benefits are more democratic in their incidence and their impact in some places than in others. That is one respect in which income volatility alone is insufficient to underwrite the democratic character of the economic order.

It is clearly undemocratic for wealth to be concentrated in the same few hands, year in and year out, as was traditional in the sorts of aristocracies which Tocqueville contrasted with early American democracy and as arguably remains standard in virtually all modern industrial societies. The crucial question is whether democrats ought to be content with wealth being concentrated in different hands from one year to the next, or whether democratic egalitarians ought to insist instead that wealth ought not to be concentrated in anyone's hands at all. Certainly we do see a fair bit of income volatility in advanced industrial economies. I shall offer evidence of that shortly. But I shall go on to argue -pace Tocqueville and his many followers3-that that is not enough. A more general model of 'democratic welfare' ought to take account of the circulation of public benefits, and of the need for them, alongside earnings flows. Evidence from across the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) suggests that altogether too many of those who fall into poverty would get stuck there, were it not for government benefits; and those public benefits are more democratic in their incidence and their impact in some places than in others. That is one respect in which income volatility alone is insufficient to underwrite the democratic character of the economic order.

This essay, written for a volume surveying "contemporary legal thought", provides an overview of Democratic Experimentalism, a perspective that draws on both pragmatist social theory and recent practical innovations in private and public organization. Normatively, Democratic Experimentalism aligns with process theories that emphasize the role of courts in vindicating entitlements through inducing, collaborating with, and policing institutions, rather than vindicating them directly through interpretive or policy-engineering techniques. It departs from some such theories, however, in emphasizing that practice must often take the form of continuous investigation and revision, rather than the adoption of definitive solutions already known to at least some social actors. Descriptively, Democratic Experimentalism purports to give a better account than other perspectives of important recent developments in private, public, and international law that aspire to enhance decentralization and accountability simultaneously.

In the face of increasing political disenchantment, many Western governments have experimented, with innovations which aim to enhance the working and quality of democracy as well as increasing citizens' political awareness and understanding of political matters. This text is the most comprehensive account of these various democratic innovations. Written by an outstanding team of international experts it examines the theories behind these democratic innovations, how they have worked in practice and evaluates their success or failure. It explains experiments with new forms of democratic engagement.

If the passing of the European age is not to mean the passing of the democratic way of life, democrats must be better equipped than they now are to carry on the struggle for the minds and hearts of men who dwell beyond the confines of the Western, democratic world. Indeed, if democracy is to maintain itself against the forces which threaten it from within, democrats must reexamine the bases of their belief. The struggles to make the world safe for democracy and to make democracy safe in its traditional Western homelands are indeed so intertwined that the task is as urgent on the one front as it is on the other.

1. Implementing popular preferences : is direct democracy the answer? / Ian Budge -- 2. Direct democracy : the Swiss experience / Hanspeter Kriesi -- 3. Evaluating new vs old forms of citizen engagement and participation / David Beetham -- 4. Deliberative polling : reflections on an ideal made practical / James S. Fishkin -- 5. Deliberative democracy and mini-publics / Graham Smith -- 6. Deliberation as an ideal and practice in progressive social movements / Dieter Rucht -- 7. Making better citizens? / Ken Newton -- 8. Impacts of democratic innovations in Europe : findings and desiderata / Brigitte Geissel -- 9. When democratic innovations let the people decide : an evaluation of co-governance experiments / Julien Talpin.

Letter from Berni Toft (Constituency Secretary) to Eric Byrne informing him of his selection as a delegate representing Dublin South Central at the forthcoming Annual Delegate Conference, 10th - 11th May 1996. Royal Marine Hotel Dun Laoghaire. Plus conference details, deadlines for ammendments to motions etc.

"This book offers a systematic treatment of the requirements of democratic legitimacy. It argues that democratic procedures are essential for political legitimacy because of the need to respect value pluralism and because of the learning process that democratic decision-making enables. It proposes a framework for distinguishing among the different ways in which the requirements of democratic legitimacy have been interpreted. Peter then uses this framework to identify and defend what appears as the most plausible conception of democratic legitimacy. According to this conception, democratic legitimacy requires that the decision-making process satisfies certain conditions of political and epistemic fairness."--Jacket

Final list of candidates for NEC election and final list of candidates for incoming steering committee.

Democratic education inspires the learning process with democratic values of the society, like meaningful participation, personal initiative, and equality and justice for all. It sees young people as active recipients of knowledge and active co-creators of their own learning. They are not the products of an education system, but rather valued participants in a vibrant learning community. Democratic education begins with the premise that everyone is unique, so each of us learns in a different way. By supporting the individual development of each young person within a caring community, democratic education helps young people learn about themselves, engage with the world around them, and become positive and contributing members of society. Guided by this vision, democratic education can take various forms, each shaped by the by teachers, young people, school programs and communities. Schools implementing democratic education by involving practices like self-directed learning, shared decision-making, individualized project-based work, and student-chosen internships in the community. This includes schools that use the label "democratic schools"and others that practice these values and use other terms. Teachers creatively involve students working within the conventional structure of the school, but still need to provide students' opportunity to have a choice in their learning. These teachers go beyond conventional building program to build more relevant and engaging experience that is associated with the lives of young people. (Bennis)