Suchergebnisse

Cover -- Contents -- List of Tables, Figures and Exhibits -- Preface to the Third Edition -- List of Abbreviations -- Introduction -- Studying non-democratic regimes: why and how -- Modernizing non-democratic rule: the three phases -- Democratically disguised rule -- 1 Theoretical Approaches -- The totalitarian-authoritarian approach -- The 'military regime' and 'one-party state' approaches -- The personal-rule approach -- Approaching complexity: semis, hybrids and less-than-democratic rule -- The rationalization of politics -- 2 Monarchical and Personal Rule -- Ruling monarchies: past -- Ruling monarchies: present -- Presidential monarchy and personal dictatorship -- Establishing personal rule -- 3 Establishing Military Rule -- The forensic framework -- Motive -- Means -- Opportunity -- Indirect and military-supported regimes -- 4 Establishing One-Party Rule -- Motive -- Means -- Opportunity -- Theorizing the forensic calculus of usurpation -- 5 Consolidation, Legitimacy and Control -- Seeking legitimacy -- Electoral and ideological legitimation -- Strengthening control -- Military dictatorships' strengthening of control -- Party dictatorships' strengthening of control -- Personal dictatorships' strengthening of control -- 6 Non-Democratic Governance -- Policies -- Institutions -- Party policy-making institutions -- Military policy-making institutions -- Personalist policy-making -- Performance -- 7 Governance and State-Building -- Policy-implementing problems -- State-building successes -- State-building failings -- State failure and destroyed dictatorships -- State disintegration through democratization -- 8 Democratization and Rationalization -- The 'third wave' of democratization -- Transitions from dictatorship -- Reversals, hybrids and double movements -- Rationalization rather than democratization.

Contrary to a classic prediction of democratic theory, empirical studies do not find that democratic systems produce internal peace. This absence of relationship does not mean that democratic theory is entirely wrong. Indeed, democratic systems may have a negative effect on the support for revolution, as predicted by democratic theory, but a positive effect on opportunities for revolutions on the other part. Focusing on the support for revolution in 15 European democracies, this article re-examines the classic prediction that democratic systems reduce political grievances. This rests on three arguments: that (1) majority rule guarantees that the number of dissatisfied people is relatively low, (2) periodic elections allow dissatisfied people to hope for a change in the leadership within a reasonable period of time, and (3) power-sharing institutions diminish the negative impact of an unwanted government on people. We find empirical support for all arguments. In addition to shedding light on the reasons why democracy weakens revolutionary attitudes, our analysis provides some clues to understand the recent increase in the support for revolution in democratic countries.

"Today democracy is seen as the only legitimate form of government almost all over the world. That it can be institutionalized differently leads to the question which kind of democracy might be better or worse. This question can be answered normatively, but also an the basis of different performances that can be determined empirically. The latter requires an adequate theoretical conceptualization of types of democratic regimes and the operationalization of these types in the form of indices. This is the subject of the analysis. Types and indices of democratic regimes that figure in the current comparative and empirical research an democracy are compared against the background of a theoretical framework. They are categorized as presidentialism-parliamentarism-approaches or veto-player-approaches. Thereby, the analysis implies a comparison of these two basic approaches to the construction of types and indices of democratic regimes." (author's abstract)

Today democracy is seen as the only legitimate form of government almost all over the world. That it can be institutionalized differently leads to the question which kind of democracy might be better or worse. This question can be answered normatively, but also on the basis of different performances that can be determined empirically. The latter requires an adequate theoretical conceptualization of types of democratic regimes and the operationalization of these types in the form of indices. This is the subject of the analysis. Types and indices of democratic regimes that figure in the current comparative and empirical research on democracy are compared against the background of a theoretical framework. They are categorized as presidentialism-parliamentarism-approaches or veto-playerapproaches. Thereby, the analysis implies a comparison of these two basic approaches to the construction of types and indices of democratic regimes. ; Die Demokratie wird heute nahezu weltweit als die einzig legitime Herrschaftsordnung angesehen. Daß sie in unterschiedlicher Weise institutionalisiert werden kann, führt zu der Frage, welche Form der Demokratie besser oder schlechter ist. Diese Frage kann normativ beantwortet werden, aber auch auf der Grundlage von empirisch feststellbaren Performanzen. Letzteres setzt aber eine theoretische Konzeptualisierung unterschiedlicher Typen demokratischer Regime voraus und die Operationalisierung dieser Typen durch Indizes. Das ist das Thema der Analyse. Typen und Indizes demokratischer Regime werden vor dem Hintergrund eines theoretischen Rahmens miteinander verglichen. Sie werden zu zwei allgemeineren Ansätzen zusammengefasst: dem Präsidentialismus- Parlamentarismus- und dem Veto-Spieler-Ansatz. Das ermöglicht auch einen Vergleich dieser unterschiedlichen Vorgehensweisen bei der Konstruktion von Typen und Indizes demokratischer Regime.