Suchergebnisse

The aim of this work is to shed light on the relations between the principles, those which present the basis of dominant theories of global justice, and states without a clear legitimity basis and in a process of democratization. A premise is that a global society does not have an absolute responsibility for the results achieved in overcoming internal injustices by the aforementioned states. Non-transparency of global conditions, necessary for the development of the mentioned processes, hinders the states in a process of development of long lasting stability basis. Therefore, those states are captured in a condition of permanent incompleteness. Moreover, here we highlight a position of an individual. The individual is defined as a potential subject of global processes, as well as a member of certain political communities. This definition includes their political capacity to achieve self-defined demand for justice. Considering Serbia's positioning within the frame of debates about global justice, 5th of October 2000 has been defined as a crucial moment. .

Electronic media in many countries have from their inception been linked and defined with commercial content. However, together with the development of the system of commercial radio, democratic countries very soon began to build and/or revamp the alternative systems of public and/or uncommercial radio. The 1994 Croatian Law on telecommunications again allowed private owner-ship of electronic media and consequently the number of radic-stations doubled. There are 114 of them today (excluding Croatian Radio stations). However, the expected democratization of the media resulted only in an increase of commercial and entertaining broadcasts. The true role of the radio as a public media whose purpose is public dissemination of information has been replaced by a new (and profitable) role of public entertainer. Should radio be left there? (SOI : PM: S. 244)

In Serbia, in the aftermath of 5 October 2000, the process of desecularization, including the revitalization of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC), overlapped with the democratization of its political institutions, as well as with the political and social pluralism. The desecularization of the Serbian society had already started in the socialist Yugoslavia, but the process itself intensified in the early period of political pluralism and establishment of the democratic political institutions. Is Orthodoxy compatible with democracy, viewed not only as the will of the majority or an election procedure, but also as a political culture of pluralism and rule of law? Is Orthodoxy possible as a "civic" church, in line with the European political tradition of democracy and pluralism? The author contends that the contemporary Orthodoxy, including the SOC, accepts globalization in its technical, technological and economic sense, with a parallel tendency towards cultural fragmentation. Thus one needs a consensus between the SOC, state and society in Serbia concerning the basic values, such as: democracy, civil society, pluralistic discourse, secular tolerance and individual human rights. ; In Serbia, in the aftermath of 5 October 2000, the process of desecularization, including the revitalization of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC), overlapped with the democratization of its political institutions, as well as with the political and social pluralism. The desecularization of the Serbian society had already started in the socialist Yugoslavia, but the process itself intensified in the early period of political pluralism and establishment of the democratic political institutions. Is Orthodoxy compatible with democracy, viewed not only as the will of the majority or an election procedure, but also as a political culture of pluralism and rule of law? Is Orthodoxy possible as a "civic" church, in line with the European political tradition of democracy and pluralism? The author contends that the contemporary Orthodoxy, including the SOC, accepts globalization in its technical, technological and economic sense, with a parallel tendency towards cultural fragmentation. Thus one needs a consensus between the SOC, state and society in Serbia concerning the basic values, such as: democracy, civil society, pluralistic discourse, secular tolerance and individual human rights.

The author argues that in the debates about "democratic transition" of post- socialist societies the importance of development of state of law for the formation of democracy has not been sufficiently accounted for. The absence of state of law results in the formation of authoritarian structures of politi power which in the long run obstruct the process of democratization. Those structures include the concentration of political power in the hands of charismatic leaders, the transformation of political into economic power, the formation of clientelist structures, the development of a system of privileges and corruption, and the break-down of the state monopoly of the means of violence, resulting in the "refeudalization" of political power. In conclusion the author describes two developmental options for the post-socialist societies: the formation of a "Latin American" type of authoritarian-populist regimes or the gradual transformation towards a Western type of state of law and liberal democracy, initiated by the pressures from the international environment and internal forces. (SOI : PM: S. 85)

The author's thesis stated in the title is based on the theoretical and practical experience of modern political regimes, particularly on the example of the Croatian postcommunist experience. The author shows how the belated political constitution of the nation has occurred at the expense of political emancipation, pluralization and democratization. Small nations, which did not take part in the creation of modern state and the establishment of the contemporary political and legal culture, suffer from a double setback: they did not have a state of their own and are regarded small, "unhistorical" peoples. The fascination and obsession with the state and the identification of the nation with the state is especially visible in those postcommunist societies that have not gone through the process of political emancipation, i.e. the emancipation of the state. The author points out that the fascination with the state has had serious consequences for the development of democracy since any oppositional opinion and activity or a criticism of the government is disqualified as an attack on the state. This fascination and the identification of the nation and the state is a barrier to state building since it stands in the way of its emancipation and integrational processes. (SOI : PM: S. 109)

The author examines attempts to reform the communist systems in Europe during the 1960s, especiallly as they relate to the process of election to organs of government in Croatia and Yugoslavia in 1967 and 1969. Issues surrounding the legitimacy of government, economic development, and internal political and national tensions provided the impetus for the growth of the reform movement. Economic reforms were geared towards recognition of market forces, while political reforms revolved around a general democratization of the system. The allowance for "slightly greater freedom" in politics meant minimum tolerance of diversity including national rights as well. The growing strength off the reform movement quickly revealed the threat reform posed to the fundamental social relations upon which the communist model of society was based. Reform especially threatened the dominant role played by the communist party. Conservative forces predominated in the ensuing political struggle, and the curtailment of reformist tendencies was also influenced by the involvement of the USSR. An example of the curtailment of reformist tendencies were the elections to the Croatian Sabor and the Federal Assembly of Yugoslavia. A relative liberalization of elective processes to the legislative branch took place when more than one candidate was allowed to run for a single mandate. In many instances during the 1967 elections, struggles between the candidate supported by the League of Socialists, the official candidate, and an independent, or "unofficial" candidate, were common. The loss of total control over the electoral process was viewed unfavourably by the ruling party and the former control over elections was quickly reestablished. (SOI : CSP: S. 346)

Based on the experience of former rightist and communist dictatorships in Europe regarding different forms of opposition - both open and hidden within these regimes' structures - the author analyzes the role of the opposition in the process of the sweeping democratic change that has taken place the "new democracies" of Central and Eastern Europe in the direction of the state of law and civil society. His conclusion is, that in today's Central European countries political multi-party pluralism which includes viable parliamentary opposition was given a smooth start and has since taken root. However in the countries with only superficial democracy and an obvious "democratic deficit" - for example Croatia (and Slovakia) - parliamentary opposition plays the second fiddle. The prime movers of the change - and of the democratization as well - are still the ruling parties (not unlike during the communist single-party regimes). Changes occur only when the ruling party or its major fraction opt for them considering them the lesser of two evils, either because they are no longer satisfied with the distribution of power and goods within the existing status quo or because they are aware that it cannot be maintained in its present form. This happened in the Soviet Union , first under Nikita Khruschev and then again under Mihail Gorbachev. Changes, however, when imposed from above get out of hand and backfire against those who have set them off (remember Gorbachev); what emerges is usually a compromise between tbe vestige of the old and the emerging regime. (SOI : PM: S. 92)

У раду се размaтра утицај политичких промена на културно-уметнички живот Пољске и Југославије средином прошлог века. Након периода социјалистичког реализма, у обе земље је отпочета тежња ка деетатизацији културе, што је у сфери организације музичког живота резултирало оснивањем интернационалних фестивала савремене музике – Варшавске јесени (1956) и Музичког бијенала Загреб (1961). Замишљени као места на којима би се сусрели композитори са обе стране Гвоздене завесе, организатори ових фестивала тежили су инкорпорирању домаћих композитора у актуелне западноевропске музичке токове, не би ли створили повољније услове за културну либерализацију Пољске и Југославије. Стога, иако перципирани као отклон од соцреализма, те као вид деполитизације музике, ови фестивали су, сасвим парадоксално, наставили да служе новопрокламованим политичким идејама, усмереним ка презентацији Пољске и Југославије као либерално-демократских средина. Будући да је Варшавска јесен утемељена пет година раније у односу на загребачки Бијенале, она је постала узор југословенском фестивалу, што имплицира потенцијалне аналогије између стратегија и циљева ових музичких манифестација. Компаративним сагледавањем ових музичких догађаја из првих година њиховог одржавања (1950-те и 1960-те године), установиће се где су места сусрета, а где разилажења у сфери пољске, односно југословенске фестивалске политике. ; This research examines the influence of political changes on the cultural life of Poland and Yugoslavia from the 1950s to the early 1960s. After the period of socialist realism, the tendency toward democratization and liberalization of culture started in both countries. In the sphere of organization of musical life, such tendencies reflected in establishing of international festival of contemporary music – The Warsaw Autumn (1956) and the Music Biennale Zagreb (1961) as places where composers from both side of Iron Curtain have presented their works. Hence, these festivals, although perceived as a departure from political ideologization of music, they continued to promote modified political aims, that referred to presentation of Poland and Yugoslavia as liberal countries. By comparing these musical events from the first years (1950 and 1960), this research will determine where are the similarities and where the differences in the sphere of Polish and Yugoslav festival policies.