Formiranje vlade u razvijenim parlamentarnim demokracijama – SR Njemačka i Velika Britanija ; Government Formation in Developed Parliamentary Democracies – Germany and the United Kingdom
Pitanje kako formirati vladu ako izborni rezultat nije dovoljno jasan za određivanje kontura za njezino oblikovanje otvara se kada stranke nisu jasno obznanile svoje saveze prije izbora ili kada izborni rezultat nije izlučio apsolutnu većinu u korist jedne ili druge predizborno stvorene koalicije stranaka. Njemački odgovor daje prednost većinskom elementu nad ideološkim elementom. Umjesto stava da najbrojnija parlamentarna stranka nužno mora vladati ili da sukob dviju najvećih stranaka apsolutno isključuje njihov savez u postizbornom vladanju političke stranke smatraju da obvezatno moraju djelovati kako bi se institucionalno stvorila većina potrebna za vladanje. Njemačka doktrina iznosi da nužnost raspolaganja radno sposobnom vladom vrijedi više od stranačkih ideoloških razmatranja i prosudbi. U zbilji njemačkog parlamentarnog sustava predsjednik SR Njemačke predlaže za kancelara osobu koja na temelju objavljenog pismenog koalicijskog sporazuma zaključenog u prethodnom postupku formiranja vlade, prije započinjanja formalnog ustavom propisanog postupka, dokazuje da uživa apsolutnu većinu svih zastupnika u Bundestagu. U Velikoj Britaniji ustavna se zagonetka o formiranju vlade u slučaju da izbori ne rezultiraju apsolutnom većinom za pojedinu stranku u Donjem domu rješava ustavnom konvencijom. Od aktualne vlade očekuje se da podnese ostavku ako postane jasno da neće moći dobiti povjerenje Donjeg doma te ako postoji jasna alternativa. Ustav Republike Hrvatske (čl. 98.) određuje obvezatno obavljanje konzultacija, odnosno provedbu neformalnog prethodnog postupka za formiranje vlade. Takav postupak u praksi čine istražni koalicijski razgovori i završni dogovor vidljiv u koalicijskom sporazumu (SR Njemačka) ili na listi potpisa većine svih zastupnika (Hrvatska). ; The question of how to form the government if the election result is not sufficiently clear to determine the contours of its design presents itself when the parties have not made clear alliances before the elections, or if the election result did not produce an absolute majority in favour of either electoral alliance created before the elections. The German response to this problem favours the majority element over the ideological element. Instead of the view that the largest parliamentary party must necessarily rule, or that the conflict between the two largest parties absolutely excludes a post-electoral alliance, political parties consider it essential to try to institutionally create the majority required to govern. According to the German doctrine the necessity to have a working government at disposal is worth more than the party-oriented ideological considerations and positions. In the reality of the German parliamentary system, the German President proposes for a Chancellor a person who, based on a published written coalition agreement concluded in the previous procedure of forming the government, before the formal constitutionally prescribed due process, proves that he or she enjoys the confidence of an absolute majority of all the members of the Bundestag. In the UK, the constitutional puzzle of forming the government in the event that elections do not result in an absolute majority for a party in the House of Commons, is dealt with by a Constitutional convention. The current government is expected to resign if it becomes clear that it will not be able to secure the confidence of the House of Commons, and if there is a clear alternative. In Croatia, the President of the Republic gives the mandate to form the Government to the person who, upon the distribution of seats and consultations with parliamentary parties, enjoys the confidence of the majority of all the representatives. Giving the mandate to form the government without proof of consultations in previous proceedings (the list of signatures) provided to the head of a coalition that receives the most votes (a relative majority) would be unconstitutional.
