Suchergebnisse

India is a country of billion plus population with mixture of varieties of ethnic, religious, caste and class people live harmoniously from century past and this assimilation and amalgamation nourished a distinct Indian civilization which is called "Unity in Diversity". Over the period it developed as a strong nation. Despite so much upheaval people bound together in a singular nationhood. Post Nehruvian era, the lack of political manoeuvring created huge socio-economic divide among citizen of this country. Though, it has initiated several policies & programmes to uplift vulnerable groups but somehow Muslim minority left marginalized because of political chauvinism and lack of will of the government. This paper tries to explore the causes & consequences of socio-economic conditions of Muslim minority in general. The Study is based on primary as well as secondary sources that has been analysed on the pretext of describing the problems facing the community in socio-economic front.

Conventionally considered a developmental trait that would tend to disappear with the increase of wealth and the stabilization of democracy, corruption is rampant not just among developing countries and recent democracies, but also in mature democracies and developed countries. This editorial introduces the thematic issue and considers what the contributions tell us about new approaches to corruption control in the developed world. It also outlines avenues for future research in the field of corruption control.

Seit dem britischen Referendum am 23. Juni 2016 plant Großbritannien den Austritt aus der Europäischen Union (EU). Unter Berufung auf Artikel 50 des Vertrags von Lissabon (im März 2017) wird Großbritannien den gemeinsamen Markt und die Zollunion im März 2019 verlassen. Die Verhandlungen über den "Brexit" erweisen sich aufgrund der gegenteiligen Positionen der beiden Vertragspartner als schwierig. Obwohl das Austrittsabkommen erfolgreich verhandelt wurde, besteht über den endgültigen "Deal" zwischen der EU und Großbritannien nach wie vor weitgehende Unklarheit. Unabhängig vom Ausgang der Gespräche wird der Brexit grundlegende Veränderungen der britischen Handelsregelungen mit Drittländern mit sich bringen. Den Anfang bildet eine Verhandlung der nationalen Bedingungen für die Mitgliedschaft in der Welthandelsorganisation (WTO) gefolgt von einer Neuverhandlung zahlreicher Freihandelsabkommen der EU. Darüber hinaus wird Großbritannien nicht länger dem Allgemeinen Präferenzsystem (GSP) oder der Initiative "Alles außer Waffen" (EBA) angehören, nach der die am wenigsten entwickelten Länder niedrige oder keine Abgaben auf ihre Exporte an die EU zahlen. Auch die Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommen (EPA) zwischen der EU und den AKP-Ländern (Afrika, Karibik und Pazifik) gelten für Großbritannien dann nicht mehr. Während negative Auswirkungen des Brexit für Großbritannien und die EU im Mittelpunkt stehen, werden die Konsequenzen für Drittstaaten weniger beachtet. In der vorliegenden Analyse präsentieren wir daher neue Erkenntnisse zu den Auswirkungen des Brexit auf die am wenigsten entwickelten Länder (LDCs) und diskutieren Empfehlungen für politische Maßnahmen. Die 49 ärmsten Länder der Welt profitieren derzeit von der Vorzugsbehandlung im Rahmen der EBA-Initiative, die für 99% aller Produkte gilt. Über 35% der Bekleidungs-, 21% der Textilien- und 9% der Zuckerexporte dieser Länder entfallen auf Großbritannien (basierend auf UN Comtrade, 2013-2015). Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass der Verlust dieser Vorzugsbehandlungen in Verbindung mit dem EU-Austritt Großbritanniens das Bruttoinlandsprodukt (BIP) der EBA-Länder um 0,01 bis 1,08% senken könnte. Dabei werden die Verluste in Kambodscha und Malawi aufgrund der starken Marktabhängigkeit am größten sein. Zudem könnte der Brexit einen Anstieg der Anzahl der Menschen, die in extremer Armut leben (KKP 1,90 US-Dollar pro Tag), um fast 1,7 Millionen in den EBA-Ländern bewirken, wobei es sich um konservative Schätzungen der negativen Folgen des Brexit handelt. Zusätzliche Effekte durch die Unsicherheit, die Abwertung des Pfund Sterling, rückläufige Entwicklungshilfe, Transfers und Investitionen wurden dabei noch nicht berücksichtigt. Großbritannien muss handeln, um die negativen Konsequenzen für wirtschaftlich schwache Länder abzumildern. Entsprechende Maßnahmen könnten eine Replizierung der Präferenzen in existierenden EU-Abkommen oder eine entwicklungsfreundliche Handelspolitik mit einem Präferenzzugang für Dienstleistungsimporte und kumulativen Ursprungsregeln sein. Auch die EU könnte die LDCs unterstützen, z.B. durch liberale kumulative Ursprungsregeln. Darüber hinaus sollten auch die Entwicklungsländer ihre Exportziele und -industrien stärker diversifizieren und eine wirtschaftliche Transformation anstoßen, die sie weniger abhängig vom Handel, von der Entwicklungshilfe und den ausländischen Direktinvestitionen Großbritanniens macht.

Seit dem britischen Referendum am 23. Juni 2016 plant Großbritannien den Austritt aus der Europäischen Union (EU). Unter Berufung auf Artikel 50 des Vertrags von Lissabon (im März 2017) wird Großbritannien den gemeinsamen Markt und die Zollunion im März 2019 verlassen. Die Verhandlungen über den "Brexit" erweisen sich aufgrund der gegenteiligen Positionen der beiden Vertragspartner als schwierig. Obwohl das Austrittsabkommen erfolgreich verhandelt wurde, besteht über den endgültigen "Deal" zwischen der EU und Großbritannien nach wie vor weitgehende Unklarheit.Unabhängig vom Ausgang der Gespräche wird der Brexit grundlegende Veränderungen der britischen Handelsregelungen mit Drittländern mit sich bringen. Den Anfang bildet eine Verhandlung der nationalen Bedingungen für die Mitgliedschaft in der Welthandelsorganisation (WTO) gefolgt von einer Neuverhandlung zahlreicher Freihandelsabkommen der EU. Darüber hinaus wird Großbritannien nicht länger dem Allgemeinen Präferenzsystem (GSP) oder der Initiative "Alles außer Waffen" (EBA) angehören, nach der die am wenigsten entwickelten Länder niedrige oder keine Abgaben auf ihre Exporte an die EU zahlen. Auch die Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommen (EPA) zwischen der EU und den AKP-Ländern (Afrika, Karibik und Pazifik) gelten für Großbritannien dann nicht mehr.Während negative Auswirkungen des Brexit für Großbritannien und die EU im Mittelpunkt stehen, werden die Konsequenzen für Drittstaaten weniger beachtet. In der vorliegenden Analyse präsentieren wir daher neue Erkenntnisse zu den Auswirkungen des Brexit auf die am wenigsten entwickelten Länder (LDCs) und diskutieren Empfehlungen für politische Maßnahmen.Die 49 ärmsten Länder der Welt profitieren derzeit von der Vorzugsbehandlung im Rahmen der EBA-Initiative, die für 99% aller Produkte gilt. Über 35% der Bekleidungs-, 21% der Textilien- und 9% der Zuckerexporte dieser Länder entfallen auf Großbritannien (basierend auf UN Comtrade, 2013-2015). Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass der Verlust dieser Vorzugsbehandlungen in Verbindung mit dem EU-Austritt Großbritanniens das Bruttoinlandsprodukt (BIP) der EBA-Länder um 0,01 bis 1,08% senken könnte. Dabei werden die Verluste in Kambodscha und Malawi aufgrund der starken Marktabhängigkeit am größten sein. Zudem könnte der Brexit einen Anstieg der Anzahl der Menschen, die in extremer Armut leben (KKP 1,90 US-Dollar pro Tag), um fast 1,7 Millionen in den EBA-Ländern bewirken, wobei es sich um konservative Schätzungen der negativen Folgen des Brexit handelt. Zusätzliche Effekte durch die Unsicherheit, die Abwertung des Pfund Sterling, rückläufige Entwicklungshilfe, Transfers und Investitionen wurden dabei noch nicht berücksichtigt. Großbritannien muss handeln, um die negativen Konsequenzen für wirtschaftlich schwache Länder abzumildern. Entsprechende Maßnahmen könnten eine Replizierung der Präferenzen in existierenden EU-Abkommen oder eine entwicklungsfreundliche Handelspolitik mit einem Präferenzzugang für Dienstleistungsimporte und kumulativen Ursprungsregeln sein. Auch die EU könnte die LDCs unterstützen, z.B. durch liberale kumulative Ursprungsregeln. Darüber hinaus sollten auch die Entwicklungsländer ihre Exportziele und -industrien stärker diversifizieren und eine wirtschaftliche Transformation anstoßen, die sie weniger abhängig vom Handel, von der Entwicklungshilfe und den ausländischen Direktinvestitionen Großbritanniens macht.

The Doha Ministerial Declaration emphasized that priority should be given to improving market access for products originating in the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). In this paper, we analyze the importance of this proposition with respect to market access in the Triad economies. We first present a brief history of non-reciprocal preferences granted by the Triad. This covers Generalized System of Preference (GSP) programmes in each, and further preferences granted to African, Caribbean and Pacific countries by the EU and preferences granted to Caribbean Basin, Andean, and African countries by the US. This history is followed by an assessment of trade generated by these preferences in the year 2000, and of the extent to which LDC exports might be expected to increase should the preferences be made comprehensive. Preferences in 2000 are shown to have led to an increase of US$3.5 billion in LDC exports, while a complete duty-free treatment could expand LDC exports by as much as US$7.6 billion, 90 per cent of which will be absorbed by the US. As this represents a doubling of LDC exports to these countries, we interpret these results as an endorsement of this priority in the Doha Round of negotiations.

possible ways of reducing the poverty levels in less developed countries. some of these reasons are mainly put into action by the government and by that, it means that poverty comes from the quality of governance in an economy from issues like policymaking and budgeting. once the issues I have mentioned in the article are tackled, poverty can be under control in most of the less developed countries which include most of the African countries.

Following the decision of the British referendum on 23 June 2016, the United Kingdom (UK) plans to exit the European Union (EU). Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty was invoked at the end of March 2017 and the UK will officially leave the single market and customs union in March 2019. Brexit negotiations have proven difficult due to diverging positions of the two partners on many issues, such as freedom of movement, financial contributions and the potential re-emergence of a tough border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. Despite the successfully negotiated Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration, there is still con¬siderable political uncertainty about the final EU-UK deal. Regardless of the final outcome of the negotiations, Brexit implies fundamental changes in the British trade regime concerning third countries. This starts with a negotiation of national terms of access for World Trade Organization (WTO) membership and extends to renegotiation of the numerous EU free trade agreements. Moreover, the UK will no longer be part of the European Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) or the Everything But Arms (EBA) treaty, which allow vulnerable developing countries to pay fewer or no duties on their exports to the EU. The Economic Partnership Agree-ments (EPAs) between the EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific countries will not apply to the UK either. While the negative effects of Brexit on the UK and EU are in the limelight, the implications for third countries receive less attention. This paper puts the spotlight on these often-overlooked issues by presenting new findings on Brexit implications for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and discussing policy recommendations. Developing countries with close ties to the UK will suffer from Brexit as import duties are once again imposed. In particular, 49 of the world's poorest countries presently benefit from preferential treatment that covers 99% of all products under the EBA agreement. Although these countries account for only 1.15% of the UK's imports, the share of their exports to the UK exceeds 35% in apparel, 21% in textiles and 9% in sugar (calculations based on the UN Comtrade data for 2013-2015). Our findings show that losing these preferences together with the UK's withdrawal from the EU may cause EBA countries' GDPs to fall by -0.01% to -1.08%. Our simulations also indicate that the highest losses will occur in Cambodia and Malawi, where dependence on the UK market is strong. Moreover, Brexit may cause the number of those living in extreme poverty (PPP $1.90 a day) to rise by nearly 1.7 million in all EBA countries. These are conservative estimates of Brexit's negative impacts; they do not take into account the addi¬tional implications of uncertainty, depreciation of the pound sterling, reduced aid spending, remittances and investments. The UK must act to mitigate the adverse effects on economically vulnerable countries. Such action may include replicating existing EU treaties that grant preferential access to goods from LDCs, creating a more development-friendly UK trade policy with preferential access to services imports and cumulative rules of origin, as well as offering better-targeted aid for trade initiatives. The EU could also support LDCs by implementing liberal cumulative rules of origin and applying its preferential treatment partly to goods with a low value-added content from considered countries. In addition, developing countries should diversify their export destinations and industries as well as engage in economic transformation that makes them less dependent on UK trade, aid and foreign direct investment (FDI).

Following the decision of the British referendum on 23 June 2016, the United Kingdom (UK) plans to exit the European Union (EU). Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty was invoked at the end of March 2017 and the UK will officially leave the single market and customs union in March 2019. Brexit negotiations have proven difficult due to diverging positions of the two partners on many issues, such as freedom of movement, financial contributions and the potential re-emergence of a tough border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. Despite the successfully negotiated Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration, there is still con¬siderable political uncertainty about the final EU-UK deal.Regardless of the final outcome of the negotiations, Brexit implies fundamental changes in the British trade regime concerning third countries. This starts with a negotiation of national terms of access for World Trade Organization (WTO) membership and extends to renegotiation of the numerous EU free trade agreements. Moreover, the UK will no longer be part of the European Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) or the Everything But Arms (EBA) treaty, which allow vulnerable developing countries to pay fewer or no duties on their exports to the EU. The Economic Partnership Agree-ments (EPAs) between the EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific countries will not apply to the UK either.While the negative effects of Brexit on the UK and EU are in the limelight, the implications for third countries receive less attention. This paper puts the spotlight on these often-overlooked issues by presenting new findings on Brexit implications for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and discussing policy recommendations.Developing countries with close ties to the UK will suffer from Brexit as import duties are once again imposed.In particular, 49 of the world's poorest countries presently benefit from preferential treatment that covers 99% of all products under the EBA agreement. Although these countries account for only 1.15% of the UK's imports, the share of their exports to the UK exceeds 35% in apparel, 21% in textiles and 9% in sugar (calculations based on the UN Comtrade data for 2013-2015). Our findings show that losing these preferences together with the UK's withdrawal from the EU may cause EBA countries' GDPs to fall by -0.01% to -1.08%. Our simulations also indicate that the highest losses will occur in Cambodia and Malawi, where dependence on the UK market is strong. Moreover, Brexit may cause the number of those living in extreme poverty (PPP $1.90 a day) to rise by nearly 1.7 million in all EBA countries. These are conservative estimates of Brexit's negative impacts; they do not take into account the addi¬tional implications of uncertainty, depreciation of the pound sterling, reduced aid spending, remittances and investments.The UK must act to mitigate the adverse effects on economically vulnerable countries. Such action may include replicating existing EU treaties that grant preferential access to goods from LDCs, creating a more development-friendly UK trade policy with preferential access to services imports and cumulative rules of origin, as well as offering better-targeted aid for trade initiatives. The EU could also support LDCs by implementing liberal cumulative rules of origin and applying its preferential treatment partly to goods with a low value-added content from considered countries.In addition, developing countries should diversify their export destinations and industries as well as engage in economic transformation that makes them less dependent on UK trade, aid and foreign direct investment (FDI).

Les politiques agricoles mises en œuvre dans les pays riches ont entrainé par le biais de l'intensification, des dommages a l'environnement. Toutefois les causes sont plus profondes car liées au développement économique. On ne peut donc attendre d'un simple changement de politique agricole un retournement de tendance. Dans ces conditions la protection de l'environnement lorsque les pratiques agricoles sont en causes relèvent de mesures spécifiques qui doivent être conçues dans une perspective d'optimum collectif. Pour les effets irréversibles, il convient de faire appel a la réglementation alors que dans les autres cas le principe pollueur-payeur peut être applique avec des modalités variables selon les productions. ; The agricultural policies of wealthy countries were set up in a period of scarcity, therefore they aimed at self sufficiency or an export expansion. The productivity increase necessary to reach these goals was achieved at different times by different countries. In addition, these policies allowed the incomes of those farmers remaining in business to increase at a time when economic growth needed a greater force.

This article describes the materials and training program that Extension created to assist current and potential Latino immigrant entrepreneurs in starting businesses in Arkansas. The content-based educational materials describe the process for starting a new business, government regulatory requirements, start-up costs and considerations, and how to organize important documents. All items were designed with the ultimate goal of providing business owners with worksheets and an organizational system that can be used to write a business plan.

This article describes the materials and training program that Extension created to assist current and potential Latino immigrant entrepreneurs in starting businesses in Arkansas. The content-based educational materials describe the process for starting a new business, government regulatory requirements, start-up costs and considerations, and how to organize important documents. All items were designed with the ultimate goal of providing business owners with worksheets and an organizational system that can be used to write a business plan.

This study uses the Luxembourg Income Study to examine the size of the middle class across several less developed American nations. One main finding is that in the mid 2000s the size of the middle class in Latin America does not seem to depend on demographic factors. A second finding is that, in contrast to most developed nations, government tax and spending policies do little to increase the size of the middle class in less developed America. Finally, as in the developed world, labor market factors do not have much impact the size of the middle class in Latin America. The main exceptions here seem to be Brazil and Mexico, where employment appears to increase the size of the middle class.

This article presents the indings of the study focused on operation of research core facilities in foreign countries. The main aim of the research is to identify the most promising methods of raising the eiciency of research infrastructure, based on the study focused on operation of university core facilities in developed countries. The core facilities of the leading universities of the U. S., Germany, United Kingdom and France were selected for the study. The research focused on the human resource management, sources of funding and management tools applied in research core facilities. The results showed that research core facilities in developed countries experience the problems typical for their Russian peers: decreasing inancial support from the government, lack of highly qualiied researchers and managers and low marketing activity. As the national governments in most developed countries are cutting support for science, the quantity and quality of services provided to external users is growing dramatically. The article addresses various methods of cost reduction at research core facilities that are free of negative impact on service quality. The conclusion is drawn that adaptation of foreign experience in the Russian research core facilities will need, irst and foremost, to cultivate the employees' entrepreneurship consciousness and ability.

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to analyse supply chain network management (SCNM) in the context of emergency preparedness management (EPM). The results of this study revealed that civil-military relations are essential for EPM to function as a coordinated approach to safety and security, and are necessary to respond effectively to complex emergencies and mitigating threats to developed countries. Civil-military relations are still a concern in the context of communication, the exercise of authority, and the coordination of emergency supplies (ES) to emergency operations. Design/methodology/approach: This qualitative study is based on field observations, with attention focused on the EPM of Sweden, Finland, and Poland. The analysis of a broader SCNM through EPM was supported by semi-structured interviews among civil-military actors in Sweden, information collected from informal conversations known as "hanging out", and secondary materials. Empirically, the analysis included a variety of civil-military relationships and identified implications for management, policy, and planning that are applicable to developed countries. Findings: The management of civil-military relations is a meaningful resource when used as an overall approach for safety and security. The integration of civil-military relations in EPM in the planning of ES is a long-standing and complex matter. The management of Swedish civil-military relations in EPM is recognising that implications for management are imbedded in continuous policy changes in, for example, the Swedish policy history. Civil-military relational complications that arise in the field of operations are impossible to anticipate during emergency planning, as those complications are grounded in policy changes. Originality/value: Escalating threats to developed countries are highlighted. The study underlines the primary measures used in studying military involvement in EPM. An understanding of SCNM as a choice for management can be obtained in future research that focuses on a broader role of the military in EPM. Sweden has emphasised a clearer role for the military by reactivating total defence planning and by evolving common practices and processes with civil actors in civil defence. Meanwhile, Poland and Finland are increasing their focus on supporting the management of civil-military policies on safety and security regarding communication, authority, and developing coordination. Consistent with findings from previous reports on SCNM, civil-military relations are essential for EPM. This study confirmed the importance of civil-military coordination, the management and practice of authority, and shared forms of communication.

Abstract In a great majority of countries throughout the world productive government services have declined as percentage of GDP since the 1970s. In the macroeconomic literature this is often associated with the general productivity growth decline, suggesting an important role for infrastructure investment in economic growth. However, this also raises the question as of why public capital spending declined in so many countries. Surprisingly, hardly any research on this exists. This paper is one of the first attempts to fill this gap by testing various hypotheses that may explain the development of government capital spending using panel data for 123 non-OECD countries for the period 1970{1998. Politico-institutional variables, like ideology, political cohesion, political stability and political business cycles do not seem to be important when explaining government capital formation in less-developed economies. On the other hand, variables like public decits, private investment and foreign aid are significantly related to public capital spending.