Suchergebnisse

This paper is devoted to the analysis of selected aspects how Ukrainian schools present the historical narrative that covers the post-World War II history of this country – particularly the period of late socialism. My goal was to establish how post-Maidan textbooks presented the times when Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union in its superpower phase. I was especially interested in the current assessment of such phenomena as: post-Stalinist modernization, the movements opposing communist ideology, and the late socialist concept of the Soviet people. The source material was five new textbooks for historical education at high-school level approved for use by the Ukrainian authorities in 2019. The basic research method was discourse analysis: the content of the textbooks were critically evaluated in light of the ongoing political and social situation. Among the theoretical assumptions that were applied in the paper was that the historical narrative has a key importance as a function of the nation-state and as such serves its interests. To conclude the analysis below, it should be emphasized that historical narrative of Ukrainian Schools presents the past of the country in the second half of the 20th century as a general process of gaining independence from the Soviet centre. In the context of Russia's aggression against Ukraine, it should be assumed that the emancipatory nature of the interpretation of Ukraine's national history is now irreversible.

For about two years, the language of the new authorities has been constituting in Poland, made up by the comments of Jarosław Kaczyński, Chairman of the Law and Justice (PiS) party, and enunciations of the most important state officials and experts loyal to the ruling party, members of parliament, senators, Catholic church authorities and journalists who support the idea of the so-called "Good Change." Many important, sometimes controversial words spoken by the representatives of the ruling camp appeal or directly concern democracy, its principles of operation or legitimacy. Due to the specificity, repetitive nature and regularity of these statements, one may speak of the formation of a "PiS-style democracy" discourse. The main rules of its formation are imposed by the chairman and ideologist of the ruling party and its programming documents. The presented article is therefore based primarily on statements made by the Chairman of Law and Justice and on the party's official programme. The starting point is the hypothesis that the PiS-style democracy discourse and discourse formations in the Fourth Republic of Poland analysed in the article do not only recall or paraphrase slogans dating back to the Polish People's Republic, but they also use cognitive categories, thought patterns and reasoning in line with the discourses imposed on Poles by the Soviets in the PPR era. The analysis shows that the discourses of the new authorities, in particular the PiS-style democracy discourse, emerge according to the rules of the discourses of Soviet dictatorship of the proletariat, as well as the democratic dictatorship of the PPR, imposed on Poles by the Soviet Union after World War II. Similarly, statements made by the representatives of the ruling camp concerning the development patterns of the economy and political practices, emerged under the influence of the rules of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and the discourses of democracy in the Polish People's Republic. The PiS-style democracy discourse evokes their key ideologemes ...

For about two years, the language of the new authorities has been constituting in Poland, made up by the comments of Jarosław Kaczyński, Chairman of the Law and Justice (PiS) party, and enunciations of the most important state officials and experts loyal to the ruling party, members of parliament, senators, Catholic church authorities and journalists who support the idea of the so-called "Good Change." Many important, sometimes controversial words spoken by the representatives of the ruling camp appeal or directly concern democracy, its principles of operation or legitimacy. Due to the specificity, repetitive nature and regularity of these statements, one may speak of the formation of a "PiS-style democracy" discourse. The main rules of its formation are imposed by the chairman and ideologist of the ruling party and its programming documents. The presented article is therefore based primarily on statements made by the Chairman of Law and Justice and on the party's official programme. The starting point is the hypothesis that the PiS-style democracy discourse and discourse formations in the Fourth Republic of Poland analysed in the article do not only recall or paraphrase slogans dating back to the Polish People's Republic, but they also use cognitive categories, thought patterns and reasoning in line with the discourses imposed on Poles by the Soviets in the PPR era. The analysis shows that the discourses of the new authorities, in particular the PiS-style democracy discourse, emerge according to the rules of the discourses of Soviet dictatorship of the proletariat, as well as the democratic dictatorship of the PPR, imposed on Poles by the Soviet Union after World War II. Similarly, statements made by the representatives of the ruling camp concerning the development patterns of the economy and political practices, emerged under the influence of the rules of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and the discourses of democracy in the Polish People's Republic. The PiS-style democracy discourse evokes their key ideologemes ...

The paper discusses the origins and course of the current crisis in Mali. The author outlines the reasons for the structural weakness of Mali, resulting from the shape of the borderline drawn at the time of decolonization, the confrontation between the Tuareg and the central government, the impact of the collapse of Gaddafi's dictatorship in Libya at the onset of a new stage in the confrontation, the role of Islamist groups in northern Mali, and the course of French intervention there. The case of Mali as an almost classic 'fallen state' is treated separately. ; W artykule omówiono genezę i przebieg bieżącego kryzysu politycznego w Mali. Autor nakreślił przyczyny strukturalnej słabości Mali wynikające z dokonanego w czasie dekolonizacji wytyczenia granic, przebieg konfrontacji między Tuaregami a rządem centralnym, wpływ upadku dyktatury Kadafiego w Libii na otwarcie nowej fazy konfrontacji, rolę ugrupowań islamistycznych na północy Mali oraz przebieg francuskiej interwencji w tym państwie. W sposób odrębny potraktowany został przypadek Mali jako klasycznego niemal "państwa upadłego".

The terminology developed to serve the needs of stableWestern democracies fails with respect to the republics that emerged following the collapse of the USSR. This may be confirmed by the notion of the 'grey zone', assisted democracy, managed democracy or electoral democracy. The Belorussian transition process seems to be work in progress. Its closure would demand that the current state be acknowledged as being stable rather than transitional. Aunanimous assessment is not assisted by the terminological divergence that is indispensably accompanying transformation, transition or the period of transition, as termed in the Russian language, which seems to be the best description of the process. The analysis does not apply the dichotomist approach to democracy, either, where democracy is considered to be either present or absent, since it is impossible to identify the nondemocratic elements of the system unanimously. T. Carothers, who was critical of Huntington's Third Wave, claims that when the key elements of a political system are appropriately manipulated for the benefit of a heuristic analysis it results in a political system of managed democracy to be a priori acknowledged to be a democratic one. The tools of analysis developed for the needs of stableWestern democracies fail when faced with a new type of personal, party or military dictatorship, or with neoauthoritarianism, understood as authoritarianism altered by the irreversible globalization processes. ; The terminology developed to serve the needs of stableWestern democracies fails with respect to the republics that emerged following the collapse of the USSR. This may be confirmed by the notion of the 'grey zone', assisted democracy, managed democracy or electoral democracy. The Belorussian transition process seems to be work in progress. Its closure would demand that the current state be acknowledged as being stable rather than transitional. Aunanimous assessment is not assisted by the terminological divergence that is indispensably accompanying transformation, transition or the period of transition, as termed in the Russian language, which seems to be the best description of the process. The analysis does not apply the dichotomist approach to democracy, either, where democracy is considered to be either present or absent, since it is impossible to identify the nondemocratic elements of the system unanimously. T. Carothers, who was critical of Huntington's Third Wave, claims that when the key elements of a political system are appropriately manipulated for the benefit of a heuristic analysis it results in a political system of managed democracy to be a priori acknowledged to be a democratic one. The tools of analysis developed for the needs of stableWestern democracies fail when faced with a new type of personal, party or military dictatorship, or with neoauthoritarianism, understood as authoritarianism altered by the irreversible globalization processes.

The term 'Common European Home'was coined in 1987 by Mikhail Gorbachev to describe the future policy of the Soviet Union towards Eastern Europe. At present this notion has lost its disquieting tone, which was related to the statement made by the Soviet Political Bureau: 'a stifling embrace, a suffocating hug'. Nowadays, this idea covers various models of European integration, and is expressed in both the hopes and concerns of the states that participate in this process. The economic and political integration of European states has been a continuous and dynamic process. The question of its further direction has become particularly important after the French said 'non' to the European Constitution. This has refueled disputes over existing integration models, which are focused around the opposing concepts of a Federal Europe and a Europe of Homelands as a confederation. It is of significant importance since the process of Europeization has been parallel to the process of regionalization inside the national European states. Regionalization mainly followed from the demands of autonomists, but sometimes was initiated by central governments as part of the process of decentralization. At present, European regions have increased their economic significance and have won more rights and authority inside their states. Consequently, they have aspired to become independent forces for globalization and Europeization. This process can be exemplified by Spain. After forty years of Franco's dictatorship, where any form of regional autonomy whatsoever was rejected, in 1975 a slow democratization process began. ; The term 'Common European Home'was coined in 1987 by Mikhail Gorbachev to describe the future policy of the Soviet Union towards Eastern Europe. At present this notion has lost its disquieting tone, which was related to the statement made by the Soviet Political Bureau: 'a stifling embrace, a suffocating hug'. Nowadays, this idea covers various models of European integration, and is expressed in both the hopes and concerns of the states that participate in this process. The economic and political integration of European states has been a continuous and dynamic process. The question of its further direction has become particularly important after the French said 'non' to the European Constitution. This has refueled disputes over existing integration models, which are focused around the opposing concepts of a Federal Europe and a Europe of Homelands as a confederation. It is of significant importance since the process of Europeization has been parallel to the process of regionalization inside the national European states. Regionalization mainly followed from the demands of autonomists, but sometimes was initiated by central governments as part of the process of decentralization. At present, European regions have increased their economic significance and have won more rights and authority inside their states. Consequently, they have aspired to become independent forces for globalization and Europeization. This process can be exemplified by Spain. After forty years of Franco's dictatorship, where any form of regional autonomy whatsoever was rejected, in 1975 a slow democratization process began.

The term 'Common European Home' was coined in 1987 by Mikhail Gorbachev to describe the future policy of the Soviet Union towards Eastern Europe. At present this notion has lost its disquieting tone, which was related to the statement made by the So- viet Political Bureau: 'a stifling embrace, a suffocating hug'. Nowadays, this idea cov- ers various models of European integration, and is expressed in both the hopes and concerns of the states that participate in this process. The economic and political inte- gration of European states has been a continuous and dynamic process. The question of its further direction has become particularly important after the French said ' non' to the European Constitution. This has refueled disputes over existing integration models, which are focused around the opposing concepts of a Federal Europe and a Europe of Homelands as a confederation. It is of significant importance since the process of Europeization has been parallel to the process of regionalization inside the national European states. Regionalization mainly followed from the demands of autonomists, but sometimes was initiated by central governments as part of the process of decentralization. At present, European regions have increased their economic significance and have won more rights and authority inside their states. Consequently, they have aspired to become independent forces for globalization and Europeization. This process can be exemplified by Spain. After forty years of Franco's dictatorship, where any form of regional autonomy whatsoever was rejected, in 1975 a slow democratization process began.

Evolution of European political sytems in Zygmunt Cybichowski's works (1879-1946)The article presents briefly constitutional reflection of Zygmunt Cybichowski (1879-1946), a world-famous expert in law who became a radical Polish nationalist in 1930s and unsuccessfully tried to collaborate with the Third Reich during WW II. His thought concentrated particularly on two types of democratic system: liberał democracy and so-called 'nationalist democracy'.As a scholar, Cybichowski was following the 'national method' in law studies. According to his method, every legał system, including constitution, rose from a specific, particular culture of its own nation. The same rule or institution could have different meaning in various cultures of law - there were no two similar constitutions among the nations of the world. Understanding legał and political system of any country depended entirely on profound knowledge of local history and traditions.Cybichowski was considered that during interwar period political systems of all European countries underwenta process of totalizing - a rapid expansion of government power and functions. This phenomenon was the most advanced in 'nation­al democracies': fascist Italy and the Third Reich. Cybichowski maintained thatthese two states were truły democratic (but not liberał) because, in his opinion, democra­cy existed in every political system in which authorities were accepted by their peo- ple and followed the people's will. For Cybichowski democracy and dictatorship were not contradictory to each other - a dictatorial government could have democratic base. According to him, pre-war Poland had an intermediate regime which contained elements of the both types of democracy. This regime formally retained liberał institutions, but in political practice it started to create institutions typical for 'nationalist democracy' such as 'national political organization' and a 'national chieftain'.

Evolution of European political sytems in Zygmunt Cybichowski's works (1879-1946)The article presents briefly constitutional reflection of Zygmunt Cybichowski (1879-1946), a world-famous expert in law who became a radical Polish nationalist in 1930s and unsuccessfully tried to collaborate with the Third Reich during WW II. His thought concentrated particularly on two types of democratic system: liberał democracy and so-called 'nationalist democracy'.As a scholar, Cybichowski was following the 'national method' in law studies. According to his method, every legał system, including constitution, rose from a specific, particular culture of its own nation. The same rule or institution could have different meaning in various cultures of law - there were no two similar constitutions among the nations of the world. Understanding legał and political system of any country depended entirely on profound knowledge of local history and traditions.Cybichowski was considered that during interwar period political systems of all European countries underwenta process of totalizing - a rapid expansion of government power and functions. This phenomenon was the most advanced in 'nation­al democracies': fascist Italy and the Third Reich. Cybichowski maintained thatthese two states were truły democratic (but not liberał) because, in his opinion, democra­cy existed in every political system in which authorities were accepted by their peo- ple and followed the people's will. For Cybichowski democracy and dictatorship were not contradictory to each other - a dictatorial government could have democratic base. According to him, pre-war Poland had an intermediate regime which contained elements of the both types of democracy. This regime formally retained liberał institutions, but in political practice it started to create institutions typical for 'nationalist democracy' such as 'national political organization' and a 'national chieftain'.

The article presents the most recent Polish analyses concerning the thought of Niccolò Machiavelli on the background of trends in the contemporary international literature on this thinker, focusing on Romuald Piekarski's book Koncepcja cnót politycznych Machiavellego na tle elementów klasycznej etyki cnót (Machiavelli's Concept of Political Virtues against the Background of the Classical Virtue Ethics, Gdańsk 2007). The author points out that Piekarski's work uses the methodology appropriate to the philosophy of politics, while the important monograph by Igor Kąkolewski, based on modern methodology of the study of political discourse, seeks to reconstruct an image of tyranny in the political culture of the Renaissance, and the book by Piotr Kimla devoted to political realism utilizes fairly typical methodological assumptions for the studies of political and legal thought. While in Piotr Kimla's opinion Machiavelli is a "philosopher of security" seeking to stabilize the state with a strong power, Piekarski regards Machiavelli as a philosopher whose postulates assume the superiority of foreign policy over domestic one, and thus lead the unsettling of the political institutions. In turn, Kąkolewski argues that Machiavelli's works are the key to understanding the sixteenth-century discourse on tyranny, which began the process – culminating in the nineteenth century – of axiological neutralization of such terms as "dictatorship" or "despotism". Romuald Piekarski's analyses, though carried out from a completely different point of view, correspond with those theses. According to Piekarski (who refers to famous Leo Strauss' thoughts), Machiavelli was a thinker who broke with the classical, i.e. antique and Christian, concept of virtue in politics, and the contemporary research on politics which assumes refraining from value judgment and axiological pluralism is a specific legacy of Machiavelli's approach. Following the considerations of Piekarski and Kąkolewski, the author of the article states that distant heritage of that approach is a kind of inability of contemporary reflection on the politics to explicitly, i.e., in an unambiguous manner, asses such political phenomena as tyranny.

The article presents the most recent Polish analyses concerning the thought of Niccolò Machiavelli on the background of trends in the contemporary international literature on this thinker, focusing on Romuald Piekarski's book Koncepcja cnót politycznych Machiavellego na tle elementów klasycznej etyki cnót (Machiavelli's Concept of Political Virtues against the Background of the Classical Virtue Ethics, Gdańsk 2007). The author points out that Piekarski's work uses the methodology appropriate to the philosophy of politics, while the important monograph by Igor Kąkolewski, based on modern methodology of the study of political discourse, seeks to reconstruct an image of tyranny in the political culture of the Renaissance, and the book by Piotr Kimla devoted to political realism utilizes fairly typical methodological assumptions for the studies of political and legal thought. While in Piotr Kimla's opinion Machiavelli is a "philosopher of security" seeking to stabilize the state with a strong power, Piekarski regards Machiavelli as a philosopher whose postulates assume the superiority of foreign policy over domestic one, and thus lead the unsettling of the political institutions. In turn, Kąkolewski argues that Machiavelli's works are the key to understanding the sixteenth-century discourse on tyranny, which began the process – culminating in the nineteenth century – of axiological neutralization of such terms as "dictatorship" or "despotism". Romuald Piekarski's analyses, though carried out from a completely different point of view, correspond with those theses. According to Piekarski (who refers to famous Leo Strauss' thoughts), Machiavelli was a thinker who broke with the classical, i.e. antique and Christian, concept of virtue in politics, and the contemporary research on politics which assumes refraining from value judgment and axiological pluralism is a specific legacy of Machiavelli's approach. Following the considerations of Piekarski and Kąkolewski, the author of the article states that distant heritage of that approach is a kind of inability of contemporary reflection on the politics to explicitly, i.e., in an unambiguous manner, asses such political phenomena as tyranny.

Party Rivalry in the Kingdom of SHS during the Period from 1918 to 1929(Summary)This article has addressed issues shaping party rivalry in the Kingdom of SHS between 1918–1929, i.e. from the creation of the first Yugoslav state, being a result of the unification of the Kingdom of Serbia with the SHS state, to the introduction therein a dictatorship by King Alexander I, where a rapidly growing party rivalry was replaced by complete dependency on the wish of the royal court puppet party system. The decision of the King outlawed all political parties from the period of 1918–1929, between which were outlined a complicated system of political horse-trading. Special position in the parliament was assumed by the Nikola Pašić People's Radical that supported the centralist model of political system of the Kingdom of SHS, and thus made it the favoured party of the royal court and despite of a lot of arousing controversy over the election law ensured its participation in most governments of the first Yugoslav state. As a counter to this group, a strong opposition was formed among which the leading role was played by Stjepan Radic's People's Peasant Party, which were a group demanding the federalist model of state system, and thus the independence of the Croatian territory of the Kingdom of SHS. The function of the critical players of the Yugoslav party system in the period 1918–1929 was played by the Democratic Party as well as the Independent Democratic Party, which was the result of a rift in the camp of the Democrats. The strength of both groups often determined the potential of the ruling government or coalition. Furthermore, a large number of parties sprang up in the parliament, which in a kind of ideological collage fought for religious issues, agricultural, cultural, regional and political.

Party Rivalry in the Kingdom of SHS during the Period from 1918 to 1929(Summary)This article has addressed issues shaping party rivalry in the Kingdom of SHS between 1918–1929, i.e. from the creation of the first Yugoslav state, being a result of the unification of the Kingdom of Serbia with the SHS state, to the introduction therein a dictatorship by King Alexander I, where a rapidly growing party rivalry was replaced by complete dependency on the wish of the royal court puppet party system. The decision of the King outlawed all political parties from the period of 1918–1929, between which were outlined a complicated system of political horse-trading. Special position in the parliament was assumed by the Nikola Pašić People's Radical that supported the centralist model of political system of the Kingdom of SHS, and thus made it the favoured party of the royal court and despite of a lot of arousing controversy over the election law ensured its participation in most governments of the first Yugoslav state. As a counter to this group, a strong opposition was formed among which the leading role was played by Stjepan Radic's People's Peasant Party, which were a group demanding the federalist model of state system, and thus the independence of the Croatian territory of the Kingdom of SHS. The function of the critical players of the Yugoslav party system in the period 1918–1929 was played by the Democratic Party as well as the Independent Democratic Party, which was the result of a rift in the camp of the Democrats. The strength of both groups often determined the potential of the ruling government or coalition. Furthermore, a large number of parties sprang up in the parliament, which in a kind of ideological collage fought for religious issues, agricultural, cultural, regional and political.

By referring to the emblematic figure of Kurt Gödel, who saw contradictions in both mathematics and constitutionalism, in this paper I present and comment on a wide panorama of views on the current crisis and deconsolidation of liberal democracy, mainly expressed in four noteworthy books published in 2018. I criticize the ideas and views of Fareed Zakaria expressed in the book The Future of Freedom in which he postulates the need for restricting the democratic component of liberal democracy toward the notion of liberal constitutionalism. I argue that this idea actually displays a very limited understanding of both components of liberal democracy and may lead to support for dictatorship. Zakaria makes a case for using accurate terminology and draws attention to the democratic as well as the liberal component of liberal democracy, this alone is a valuable contribution. However, as it appears from the following three works, it could be said that a transmutation occurred within the concept of liberal democracy, resulting in merging of both components into a clear concept that can be equated to democracy in the contemporary sense of the word. Next, I discuss How Democracy Dies by Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt. Both scholars document in detail how democracy's assassins insidiously use institutions of democracy to kill it. Particularly of value are two threads in this work. The first one is the remarkable similarities of strategies used throughout the world by elected autocrats to subvert democratic institutions. Revealing these patterns makes it easier to combat them. The second one is the set of four key indicators of authoritarian behavior compiled by the authors. Similar issues are presented by Yasha Mounk in his brilliant book The People vs. Democracy in which he analyzes insightfully the roots of disenchantment with liberal democracy. I emphasize that Mounk incisively discloses the founding myth of modern liberal democracy, i.e. the improbable fiction that representative government would facilitate the rule of the people. A very wide array of positions of American scholars is offered in a volume edited by Cass R. Sunstein under the title Can It Happen Here? Authoritarianism in America. The essays collected in this book concern the likelihood of democracy's breakdown in the US. I selectively present the original theses of a score of authors, allowing for a deeper rethinking of the liberal democracy's crisis, these include issues like constitutional rot, big government role in helping to minimize the risk of a fascist takeover, deep state, the new breed of populist autocrats being lawyers by training, and the fact that many people do not wish to live by the rules of liberal democracy. In the context of these remarks, I stress the role of culture as a social binding mechanism and human's lack of evolutionary adjustment to social diversity. In the closing section, I stress the illusory nature of constitutional precautions against the democratic breakdown, especially the deceptive reliance on judges. I also draw attention to the double value of negation following from these considerations. First, I refer to the Kim Lane Scheppele's idea of aversive constitutionalism, to show the informative dimension of the negative side of comparative constitutional analysis. Second, I suggest that the crisis of democracy should encourage to acknowledge the limits of conventional wisdom on political systems that is based on dubious assumptions. Only in this way could attempts be made to counteract the global democratic disorder which, on the one hand, is not caused by some external natural factors, but on the other hand this disorder will likely be escalated by much more efficient and more charismatic autocrats, aided by modern technology. ; Odwołując się do symbolicznej postaci Kurta Gödla, dostrzegającego sprzeczności zarówno w matematyce, jak i w konstytucjonalizmie, przedstawiam i komentuję w niniejszym tekście szeroką panoramę poglądów dotyczących współczesnego kryzysu i dekonsolidacji demokracji liberalnej, głównie w oparciu o cztery ważne prace wydane w 2018 r. Krytycznie odnoszę się do poglądów Fareeda Zakarii wyrażonych w książce Przyszłość wolności…, postulującego ograniczenie demokratycznych elementów w ramach demokracji liberalnej na rzecz liberalnego konstytucjonalizmu. Koncepcja ta w istocie stanowi bardzo ograniczone rozumienie obu elementów składowych tego ostatniego pojęcia i prowadzić może do poparcia dla dyktatur. Cenna jest w pracy Zakarii dbałość terminologiczna i zwrócenie osobno uwagi na element demokratyczny i liberalny w ramach demokracji liberalnej. Jak jednak wynika z wykorzystywanych trzech kolejnych prac, można twierdzić, że w przypadku pojęcia demokracji liberalnej doszło do transmutacji zespalającej oba człony w czytelną koncepcję, która nie bez racji utożsamiana jest w skrócie z demokracją we współczesnym rozumieniu. Następnie omawiam pozycję Stevena Levitsky'ego i Daniela Ziblatta Jak umierają demokracje…, której autorzy szczegółowo dokumentują, jak skrytobójcy demokracji używają podstępnie instytucji demokratycznych do obalenia tej formy ustrojowej. Wartościowe w tej pracy są szczególnie dwa wątki. Pierwszy to uderzająco podobne strategie stosowane na świecie przez legitymowanych wyborczo autokratów. Ujawnienie takiego wzorca pozwala na łatwiejsze przeciwstawianie się mu. Drugim jest proponowany przez autorów zestaw czterech behawioralnych symptomów pozwalający na rozpoznanie polityków o skłonnościach autorytarnych. Podobną problematykę przedstawia Yascha Mounk w błyskotliwej książce Lud kontra demokracja…, analizujący głębiej źródła współczesnego rozczarowania demokracją liberalną. Akcentuję zwłaszcza, że Mounk przenikliwie odsłania mit założycielski współczesnej demokracji liberalnej w postaci fikcji, że rządy przedstawicielskie umożliwiają władzę ludu. Bardzo szeroką panoramę poglądów amerykańskich autorów na temat prawdopodobieństwa upadku demokracji w Stanach Zjednoczonych zawarto w obszernej pracy zbiorowej Czy to może się u nas zdarzyć? Autorytaryzm w Ameryce pod redakcją Cassa R. Sunsteina. Wybiórczo przedstawiam oryginalne tezy kilkunastu autorów pozwalające na pogłębione przemyślenie kryzysu demokracji liberalnej, m.in. konstytucyjne zepsucie, rozbudowany aparat władzy jako czynnik minimalizujący ryzyko faszyzmu, rolę tzw. ukrytego państwa, udział prawników w zawłaszczaniu władzy, permanentną niezgodę znacznej części społeczeństwa na życie według zasad demokracji liberalnej. W ramach tych uwag akcentuję m.in. rolę kultury jako spoiwa społecznego oraz ewolucyjne niedostosowanie człowieka do różnorodności społecznej. W uwagach końcowych podkreślam iluzoryczność konstytucyjnych gwarancji mających zapobiegać załamaniu demokratycznemu, zwłaszcza zwodnicze poleganie na sędziach. Zwracam również uwagę na podwójny walor negacji płynący z przedstawianych refleksji. Po pierwsze odwołuję się do koncepcji awersyjnego konstytucjonalizmu autorstwa Kim Lane Scheppele, aby wskazać na pouczający wymiar negatywnej strony komparatystyki ustrojowej. Po drugie sugeruję, że kryzys demokracji zachęcać winien do uświadomienia sobie ograniczeń ortodoksyjnej refleksji ustrojowej opartej na wątpliwych założeniach. Tylko w ten sposób można podejmować próby przeciwdziałania narastającemu globalnemu nieładowi demokratycznemu, który z jednej strony nie jest wywołany zewnętrznymi czynnikami naturalnymi, ale z drugiej strony rozwijany będzie zapewne przez znacznie sprawniejszych i bardziej charyzmatycznych autokratów, wspomaganych nowoczesnymi technologiami.