Suchergebnisse

ABSTRACTWhat is the impact of direct democracy, e.g. referendums, on public policymaking? The study will present data for Switzerland, the United States, Australia and Germany leading to the conclusion that direct democracy is an effective, but flexible veto player against expansive spending and taxation. The level of public expenditure and taxation is significantly lower in countries that have elements of direct democracy compared to pure representative democracies. Several theoretical arguments support this finding. For example, the social discount rate of voters is lower than that of politicians. Also direct democracy is related to the benefit principle in public finance. Taxpayers want their payments to be related to public services they receive. They are therefore inclined to veto projects not reflecting their preferences. Moreover, referenda have an implicit restraining effect on governments and the mere threat can reduce their capacity to act.

Direct democracy, an addition to representative democracy allowing citizens to directly vote on substantive issues parliaments usually vote on, has an intuitive appeal in appearing to be the most obvious institutionalization of democracy itself. Increased institutionalization and usage of direct democracy has heightened interest in the topic in political science. In the three papers which make up this dissertation I explore different aspects of the political effects of direct democracy with an aim to provide insights how it affects citizens' representation as well as their behavior and attitudes. In a first paper I test the claim that referendums are unrepresentative because turnout in referendums is usually lower than in parliamentary elections and tends to be skewed towards citizens of high socio-economic status. The analysis is made possible by a unique feature of Swiss post-referendum surveys which also asked non-voters about their opinion on the referendum's subject. Comparing opinion majorities in the surveys against actual referendum outcomes we show that representativeness increases slightly in turnout as well as over time. On balance we find more representative than unrepresentative outcomes implying that direct democracy, at least in Switzerland, seems to improve representation. In a second paper I focus on citizens' attitudes towards and actual participation in referendums. Using data from the European Social Survey I find that voting, other forms of political activity and political interest are positively associated with support for direct democracy. Analyzing post-referendum surveys I find the same pattern to hold for actual participation in referendums. Hence, direct democracy, despite its widespread popularity, appears insuff� cient to bring the politically disengaged back into democratic politics. In a third and final paper, I investigate whether direct democracy increases citizens' satisfaction with democracy. After all, they give citizens participatory opportunities and promise to offer them more control over policy. Combining aggregate data on satisfaction with democracy from semi-annual Eurobarometer surveys from 1973 to 2013 with data on all national referendums in the same period, I find no evidence for an (average) effect of referendums on democratic satisfaction. While an analysis of individual time-series suggests that referendums may have an effect under certain circumstances, significant positive estimates obtain for two countries, my empirical investigation of possible mechanisms remains inconclusive.

Since Slovakia's transition from authoritarian rule to democracy and the rule of law in 1992, the Slovak people are empowered to participate in the decision-making of the state by means of the popular initiative and the referendum. Although seven referendums have been held in the Slovak Republic so far, only one was considered valid. This paper aims to illustrate the reasons for this scarce success of popular votes and gives a brief insight into the significance of direct democracy in the Slovak Republic. To this purpose, it will set out the instruments of direct democracy provided in Slovakia and the experiences made therewith.

Uchwalenie Konstytucji Federalnej w 1848 roku było istotne dla kształtowania systemu politycznego Szwajcarii. Aktualna Konstytucja Federalna Konfederacji Szwajcarskiej została uchwalona w 1999 roku. Obecnie system tego kraju można określić mianem parlamentarno-komitetowego (system konwentu). Ze względu jednak na jego specyfikę, objawiającą się w głównie w dużej roli kantonów, określany jest także jako parlamentarno-kantonalny. Istotnym elementem systemu jest duża niezależność i samodzielność kantonów, a także gmin. Elementem determinującym kształt partii politycznych i podział socjopolityczny Szwajcarii jest przede wszystkim jej wielokulturowość. Zasadniczymi instrumentami demokratycznymi w tym państwie są: referendum, inicjatywa ludowa, zgromadzenie ludowe. Dysfunkcjonalne elementy szwajcarskiej demokracji bezpośredniej blokują efektywność procesu decyzyjnego w tym systemie politycznym. ; An important element shaping the political system of Switzerland was adopting the Federal Constitution in 1848. The current Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation was adopted in 1999. The current political system of this country can be referred to as directorial; however, because this specific system manifests itself mainly through the significant role of the cantons, it is also referred to as a 'parliamentary-cantonal' system. An important element of the system is the large degree of independence and self-reliance of the cantons and the communes. What determines the shape of the political parties and the socio-political division of Switzerland is the multiculturalism of the country. The fundamental democratic instruments in the country comprise: referenda; popular initiatives and popular assemblies. Dysfunctional qualities hinder the system, and even constitute a barrier for the effectiveness of the process of decision-making.

A variety of direct democratic instruments allow "policy-making at the ballot box" (Gerber, 1999, p. 3), with the citizens having the last word on policy adoption and change. Criteria for the classification of direct democracy devices include who initiates a popular vote, who has control over the content of the proposal, whether it addresses statutory or constitutional law, or whether the result is binding or not. Interest groups use two main direct democracy instruments to influence policy-making: the initiative to put a new policy issue on the political agenda and the referendum to veto a policy adopted by the legislature. This chapter scrutinizes the effects of these tools on the policy process, on policy outputs, and on interest group populations. It shows that citizen groups benefit more than business groups from the initiative and referendum.

In the public sector, employment may be inefficiently high because of patronage, and wages may be inefficiently high because of public employee interest groups. This paper explores whether the initiative process, a direct democracy institution of growing importance, ameliorates these political economy problems. In a sample of 650+ cities, I find that when public employees cannot bargain collectively and patronage could be a problem, initiatives appear to cut employment but not wages. When public employees bargain collectively, driving up wages, the initiative appears to cut wages but not employment. The employment-cutting result is robust; the wage-cutting result survives some but not all robustness tests. (JEL D72, J31, J45, J52)

Tobacco control advocates began to use ballot initiatives to enact tobacco control policies in the late 1970s. In response, the tobacco industry worked for over two decades to change laws governing initiative and referendum processes to prevent passage of tobacco control measures. In 1981, the tobacco industry's political lobbying arm, the Tobacco Institute, created a front group that presented itself as a neutral initiative research clearinghouse to affect changes in state initiative and referenda laws. In 1990, the Tobacco Institute began creating an in-house team, and worked with third party groups to try to change state initiative laws. While the industry ultimately abandoned both efforts when neither achieved immediate success, over time, the industry's goals have penetrated legitimate discourse on the I&R process in the United States and many specific ideas it advocated have garnered mainstream support. Direct democracy advocates, as well as public health advocates and policymakers, need to understand the tobacco industry's goals (which other industries adopted) of limiting the direct democracy process in order to ensure that any changes do not inadvertently increase the power of the special interests that direct democracy was developed to counterbalance.

Direct democracy typically is lauded for putting power in the hands of the people. But is it really as democratic as it seems? To what extent, and in what circumstances, is it less about citizen power and more about external influences seeking to manipulate outcomes? Addressing these issues, Shauna Reilly draws on and compares case studies of referendums, recall elections, and initiatives around the world to investigate the complex realities of direct democracy in action

"Direct Democracy and Political Decision Making" published on by Oxford University Press.