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Discusses forms of direct democracy envisaged by the Croatian Constitution of 1990, which defined Croatia as semipresidential republic, before constitutional amendment of 1997. The article describes normative regulation of referenda & speculates about reasons for their absence. One of the main reasons seems to be the specific institutional framework & political consensus existing among the Parliament, the Government, & the President of the Republic, which is of a dynamic nature. Referendum, having a gridlock-breaking capacity, offers a solution in the form of recourse to the people on initiative of the President of the Republic or of the Parliament in the absence of political consensus. However, due to the existence of such consensus, referenda never took place in Croatia. The author also discusses citizens' right to petition the government in light of an important decision of the Croatian Constitutional Court. Adapted from the source document.

Public choice theory provides arguments to explain why protectionism is prevalent all over the world. In this paper it is argued that even when citizens have the possibility to decide on trade barriers in direct democracy, tariffs are maintained or even increased. This result is traced to the process of drafting the proposal, the individual decision to participate in the vote and the efforts to become informed properly about the alternatives put to the vote. As first an empirical investigation is made to test the theoretical hypotheses about protectionism in direct democracy by using data for referendums in Switzerland. ; Die ökonomische Theorie der Politik ermöglicht zu erklären, wie sich protektionistische Interessen im politischen Entscheidungsprozess einer reprasentativen Demokratie durchsetzen. Auch in einem System der direkten Demokratie, in dem die Bürger im Rahmen von Volksabstimmungen mitentscheiden können, kann die inländische Handelspolitik zugunsten von spezifischen Interessen beeinflusst werden. Möglichkeiten hierzu bestehen auf drei Ebenen des politischen Entscheidungsprozesses: im Vorbereitungsprozess der Gesetzes- bzw. Abstimmungsvorlage; bei der individuellen Entscheidung, sich an der Abstimmung zu beteiligen; und bei der Entscheidung der Abstimmenden, sich fur oder gegen die Vorlage auszusprechen. Die Bestimmungsgründe, die in der direkten Demokratie zu zunehmender Protektion und der Wahl spezifischer protektionistischer Instrumente fiihren, werden diskutiert und erstmals anhand von Referenden in der Schweiz empirisch überprüft.

Proponents of direct legislation maintain that the initiative and popular referendum empower ordinary citizens to set the agenda of politics. Some argue it shifts "ultimate authority from representatives in state legislatures, city councils, and even Congress to the people themselves" (Schmidt 1989, vii). Such elections, so the argument goes, produce greater voter interest in elections and higher voter turnout. Those in favor of the process also contend that it is an important check on special interests which exert too much control over elected politicians (Magleby 1984, chap. 2; Cronin 1989).Critics of direct democracy raise concerns about the quality of deliberation voters give to issues. Voters can be confused by ballot question wording or respond negatively to the length of the ballots. Moreover, because voters lack the simplifying devices of partisanship and candidate appeal, they may be more susceptible to the manipulations of campaign consultants.How well do these longstanding arguments for and against direct legislation reflect our actual experience with the process in the 1990s? Arguments for direct democracy depend largely on how the process is conducted. If the process can be manipulated by special interests or relies on questionable tactics, then many of the advantages claimed for the process disappear. In this article, we argue that political consultants play a significant role in the conduct of direct democracy. These consultants normally work directly for organized interests without the constraints imposed by candidates or parties.

Move to a new constitutional blend of parliamentary principles and national traditions. Electoral reforms recommended by the Tinkhundla Review Commission.

THE AUTHOR REPORTS ON THE POLITICAL CHANGES UNDERWAY IN SWAZILAND, WHICH IS MOVING TOWARD A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT BLENDING PARLIAMENTARY PRINCIPLES AND NATIONAL TRADITIONS, SUCH AS THE "TINKHUNDLA" (TRIBAL OR COMMUNITY COMMITTEES).