Suchergebnisse

Abstract
Instruments of direct democracy can be – and are – used to further and strengthen illiberal democracy by restricting minority rights (1). The legal design of these instruments can make this easier or less likely (2).

When during the debate on a motion of censure in October 1962 Paul Reynaud challenged the government from the rostrum of the National Assembly with a scornful: "Here and nowhere else is France!", the issue was well joined. To Reynaud, perennial deputy during three republican regimes, General de Gaulle's projected referendum appeared as a two-fold attack upon French republican traditions. If adopted, the proposal to elect the President of the Republic by popular suffrage would divest the Assembly of its role as the sole bearer of national sovereignty. Moreover, to seek approval for such a change of the constitution of 1958 without a prior vote of parliament deprived both houses of any participation in the amending process.In 1958, as President of the Consultative Constitutional Committee, Reynaud had insisted that the possibilities of any direct appeal to the electorate be carefully circumscribed and hedged by parliamentary controls. He had obtained official assurances that the referendum would never be used by the executive as a means of arousing popular opinion against the elected assemblies. The final text of the constitution had incorporated proposals by the Consultative Committee which strengthened the position of parliament whenever either a referendum or presidential emergency powers might create a plebiscitarian situation.

Direct democracy in Switzerland provides a particularly valuable site for the study of the direct policy consequences of low turnout. The analysis of the outcomes of 144 popular votes between 1981 and 1999 shows that the level of information held by voters matters slightly more for the outcome of a popular vote than does the level of turnout, controlling for the levels of information. About 35 percent of votes would have had a different approval rate if all citizens had voted, but even more results would have changed had voters had been much better informed. Counter to the conventional wisdom, in those cases where turnout and information did matter higher levels of turnout tended to work in favour of right-wing parties, whereas higher levels of information tended to work to favour outcomes supported by left-wing parties. Further, the findings suggest that the outcomes of popular votes are most likely to be biased when voters think an issue is unimportant and both levels of turnout and information are low. [Copyright 2006 Elsevier Ltd.]

Proponents of direct legislation maintain that the initiative and popular referendum empower ordinary citizens to set the agenda of politics. Some argue it shifts "ultimate authority from representatives in state legislatures, city councils, and even Congress to the people themselves" (Schmidt 1989, vii). Such elections, so the argument goes, produce greater voter interest in elections and higher voter turnout. Those in favor of the process also contend that it is an important check on special interests which exert too much control over elected politicians (Magleby 1984, chap. 2; Cronin 1989).Critics of direct democracy raise concerns about the quality of deliberation voters give to issues. Voters can be confused by ballot question wording or respond negatively to the length of the ballots. Moreover, because voters lack the simplifying devices of partisanship and candidate appeal, they may be more susceptible to the manipulations of campaign consultants.How well do these longstanding arguments for and against direct legislation reflect our actual experience with the process in the 1990s? Arguments for direct democracy depend largely on how the process is conducted. If the process can be manipulated by special interests or relies on questionable tactics, then many of the advantages claimed for the process disappear. In this article, we argue that political consultants play a significant role in the conduct of direct democracy. These consultants normally work directly for organized interests without the constraints imposed by candidates or parties.

The expanding use of direct democracy in many established democracies reflects a desire to provide citizens with more opportunities to be involved in the political process. These changes are assumed to be embraced by those who demand greater citizen involvement, though the underlining motivation remains unclear. One theory assumes that support is likely to come from citizens who have a deep interest in politics and are politically active. Another theory offers a contrasting view, claiming that those who find themselves on the periphery of politics, and are largely disenchanted, find such proposals attractive. We examine these theories drawing on public opinion surveys from six established democracies. We find that younger citizens and those who are more interested in the political process are more supportive of direct democracy, while political disaffection has a less consistent impact.

Common to many social movement studies is the argument that ideological heterogeneity causes organizational dilemmas. Yet, few scholars consider, let alone test, the impact of ideological heterogeneity on direct democracy campaigns (DDCs). Drawing from the extant social movements literature, I argue that DDCs function like short-term social movements. Based on in-depth interviews of initiative activists, and in some cases participant-observation opportunities, I conclude that ideological heterogeneity is also a contributing cause of DDC failure. Ideological heterogeneity within DDCs either results in factionalism that wastes time and resources, or the development of homogeneous groups that pursue policies unacceptable to the median voter. I also conclude that ideological heterogeneity is more destructive to DDCs than social movements. Whereas social movements can adapt over time, DDCs must achieve a singular electoral victory, within a specific electoral cycle, in order to succeed. Therefore, time constraints make factionalism more problematic for DDCs.