Suchergebnisse

Der Autor erörtert in seinem Vortrag auf dem Hintergrund seiner Erfahrungen in der Schweiz die Möglichkeiten der direkten Demokratie in Deutschland. Er betont, dass angesichts des modernen Entwicklungsstandes der Rechtsvergleichung und der vergleichenden Rechtspolitik nicht das jeweilige Land mit seinen Besonderheiten, sondern ihr verallgemeinerungsfähiges Gestaltungspotential im Mittelpunkt des Interesses stehen sollte. Im ersten Teil seiner Ausführungen zeigt er die Unterschiede zwischen direkter und repräsentativer Demokratie sowie die hauptsächlichen Rechtfertigungsgründe der direkten Demokratie auf, die in der Bekämpfung autokratischer Willkür, einer sachlich-gemeinwohlorientierten Beurteilung, der politischen Freiheit und der Relativität dieser Rechtfertigungen bestehen. Der zweite Teil hat die bisherigen Entwicklungen in Deutschland im Allgemeinen und den Gesetzesentwurf von SPD und Bündnis 90/Die Grünen im Besonderen zum Inhalt. Im dritten Teil diskutiert der Autor die Perspektiven der direkten Demokratie, die sich z.B. auf den Wandel zur Bildungs- und Informationsgesellschaft, die erzieherisch-integrierende Wirkung, die Qualität der Deliberationsprozesse und finanzwirtschaftliche Vorzüge beziehen.

Discusses forms of direct democracy envisaged by the Croatian Constitution of 1990, which defined Croatia as semipresidential republic, before constitutional amendment of 1997. The article describes normative regulation of referenda & speculates about reasons for their absence. One of the main reasons seems to be the specific institutional framework & political consensus existing among the Parliament, the Government, & the President of the Republic, which is of a dynamic nature. Referendum, having a gridlock-breaking capacity, offers a solution in the form of recourse to the people on initiative of the President of the Republic or of the Parliament in the absence of political consensus. However, due to the existence of such consensus, referenda never took place in Croatia. The author also discusses citizens' right to petition the government in light of an important decision of the Croatian Constitutional Court. Adapted from the source document.

Abstract
Instruments of direct democracy can be – and are – used to further and strengthen illiberal democracy by restricting minority rights (1). The legal design of these instruments can make this easier or less likely (2).

When during the debate on a motion of censure in October 1962 Paul Reynaud challenged the government from the rostrum of the National Assembly with a scornful: "Here and nowhere else is France!", the issue was well joined. To Reynaud, perennial deputy during three republican regimes, General de Gaulle's projected referendum appeared as a two-fold attack upon French republican traditions. If adopted, the proposal to elect the President of the Republic by popular suffrage would divest the Assembly of its role as the sole bearer of national sovereignty. Moreover, to seek approval for such a change of the constitution of 1958 without a prior vote of parliament deprived both houses of any participation in the amending process.In 1958, as President of the Consultative Constitutional Committee, Reynaud had insisted that the possibilities of any direct appeal to the electorate be carefully circumscribed and hedged by parliamentary controls. He had obtained official assurances that the referendum would never be used by the executive as a means of arousing popular opinion against the elected assemblies. The final text of the constitution had incorporated proposals by the Consultative Committee which strengthened the position of parliament whenever either a referendum or presidential emergency powers might create a plebiscitarian situation.

Adapted from the source document.