Privatizing Disability Insurance
In: ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 22-010
1507 results
Sort by:
In: ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 22-010
SSRN
SSRN
SSRN
In: American Political, Economic, and Security Issues
Intro -- SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE -- SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- Chapter 1 PRIMER ON DISABILITY BENEFITS: SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE (SSDI) AND SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME (SSI) -- SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE -- SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME -- TYPE OF BENEFITS AND AVERAGE BENEFIT LEVELS -- SSDI -- SSI -- ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS -- Definition of Disability -- SSDI -- SSI -- DISABILITY DETERMINATION PROCESS -- PROGRAM FINANCING INFORMATION -- SSDI -- End Notes -- Chapter 2 DISABILITY BENEFITS AVAILABLE UNDER THE SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE (SSDI) AND VETERANS DISABILITY COMPENSATION (VDC) PROGRAMS -- SUMMARY -- INTRODUCTION -- SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE -- Eligibility Requirements -- SSDI Benefits -- SSDI Determination Process -- SSDI Four-Step Appeals Process -- Step 1 in the SSDI Appeals Process (Reconsideration) -- Step 2 in the SSDI Appeals Process (Administrative Hearing) -- Step 3 in the SSDI Appeals Process (Social Security Appeals Council) -- Step 4 in the SSDI Appeals Process (U.S. District Court) -- VETERANS DISABILITY COMPENSATION -- Background in Brief -- VDC Eligibility Requirements -- VDC Determination Process -- 100%/Total Disability Ratings -- Presumptive Conditions -- VDC Benefits -- VDC Appeals Process -- DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN SSDI AND VDC PROGRAMS -- Comparison of Recipient Populations -- SSDI and VDC Program Administration -- Health Care Benefits for SSDI and VDC Recipients -- Thresholds for Substantial Gainful Activity under SSDI and Substantially Gainful Employment under VDC -- Differences in the Disability Evaluation Process -- Differences in the Treatment of Benefits -- CONTINUED DIVERGENCE BETWEEN SSA AND VA DISABILITY PROGRAMS -- Assessing VA Disability Compensation for Noneconomic Loss.
In: The S. S. Huebner Foundation for Insurance Education
In: Studies
This paper investigates the effects of stricter screening of disability insurance applications. A large-scale experiment was setup where in two of the 26 Dutch regions case workers of the disability insurance administration were instructed to screen applications more stringently. The empirical results show that stricter screening reduces long-term sickness absenteeism and disability insurance applications. We find evidence for direct effects of stricter screening on work resumption during the period of sickness absence and for self-screening by potential disability insurance applicants. Stricter screening seems to improve targeting efficiency, without inducing negative spillover effects to the inflow into unemployment insurance. The costs of stricter screening are only a small fraction of the monetary benefits.
BASE
This paper investigates the effects of intensified screening of disability insurance benefit applications. A large-scale experiment was setup where in 2 of the 26 Dutch regions case workers of the disability insurance administration were instructed to screen applications more intense. The empirical results show that intense screening reduces long-term sickness absenteeism and disability insurance applications. This provides evidence both for direct effects of the more intensive screening on work resumption during sickness absenteeism and for self-screening by potential disability insurance applicants. We do not find any spillover effects to the inflow into unemployment insurance. A cost-benefit analysis shows that the costs of the intensified screening are only a small fraction of its benefits.
BASE
Does participation in a social assistance program by parents have spillovers on their children's own participation, future labor market attachment, and human capital investments? While intergenerational concerns have figured prominently in policy debates for decades, causal evidence is scarce due to nonrandom participation and data limitations. In this paper we exploit a 1993 policy reform in the Netherlands which tightened disability insurance (DI) criteria for existing claimants, and use rich panel data to link parents to children's long-run outcomes. The key to our regression discontinuity design is that the reform applied to younger cohorts, while older cohorts were exempted from the new rules. We find that children of parents who were pushed out of DI or had their benefits reduced are 11% less likely to participate in DI themselves, do not alter their use of other government safety net programs, and earn 2% more in the labor market as adults. The combination of reduced government transfers and increased tax revenue results in a fiscal gain of 5,900 euros per treated parent due to child spillovers by 2014. Moreover, children of treated parents complete an extra 0.12 years of schooling on average, an investment consistent with an anticipated future with less reliance on DI. Our findings have important implications for the evaluation of this and other policy reforms: ignoring parent-to-child spillovers understates the long-run cost savings of the Dutch reform by between 21 and 40% in present discounted value terms.
BASE
This paper investigates the effects of intensified screening of disability insurance benefit applications. A large-scale experiment was setup where in 2 of the 26 Dutch regions case workers of the disability insurance administration were instructed to screen applications more intense. The empirical results show that intense screening reduces long-term sickness absenteeism and disability insurance applications. This provides evidence both for direct effects of the more intensive screening on work resumption during sickness absenteeism and for self-screening by potential disability insurance applicants. We do not find any spillover effects to the inflow into unemployment insurance. A cost-benefit analysis shows that the costs of the intensified screening are only a small fraction of its benefits.
BASE
Does participation in a social assistance program by parents have spillovers on their children's own participation, future labor market attachment, and human capital investments? While intergenerational concerns have figured prominently in policy debates for decades, causal evidence is scarce due to non-random participation and data limitations. In this paper we exploit a 1993 policy reform in the Netherlands which tightened disability insurance (DI) criteria for existing claimants, and use rich panel data to link parents to children's long-run outcomes. The key to our regression discontinuity design is that the reform applied to younger cohorts, while older cohorts were exempted from the new rules. We find that children of parents who were pushed out of DI or had their benefits reduced are 11% less likely to participate in DI themselves, do not alter their use of other government safety net programs, and earn 2% more in the labor market as adults. The combination of reduced government transfers and increased tax revenue results in a fiscal gain of 5,900 euros per treated parent due to child spillovers by 2014. Moreover, children of treated parents complete an extra 0.12 years of schooling on average, an investment consistent with an anticipated future with less reliance on DI. Our findings have important implications for the evaluation of this and other policy reforms: ignoring parent-to-child spillovers understates the long-run cost savings of the Dutch reform by between 21 and 40% in present discounted value terms.
BASE
Does participation in a social assistance program by parents have spillovers on their children's own participation, future labor market attachment, and human capital investments? While intergenerational concerns have figured prominently in policy debates for decades, causal evidence is scarce due to nonrandom participation and data limitations. In this paper we exploit a 1993 policy reform in the Netherlands which tightened disability insurance (DI) criteria for existing claimants, and use rich panel data to link parents to children's long-run outcomes. The key to our regression discontinuity design is that the reform applied to younger cohorts, while older cohorts were exempted from the new rules. We find that children of parents who were pushed out of DI or had their benefits reduced are 11% less likely to participate in DI themselves, do not alter their use of other government safety net programs, and earn 2% more in the labor market as adults. The combination of reduced government transfers and increased tax revenue results in a fiscal gain of 5,900 euros per treated parent due to child spillovers by 2014. Moreover, children of treated parents complete an extra 0.12 years of schooling on average, an investment consistent with an anticipated future with less reliance on DI. Our findings have important implications for the evaluation of this and other policy reforms: ignoring parent-to-child spillovers understates the long-run cost savings of the Dutch reform by between 21 and 40% in present discounted value terms.
BASE
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 11334
SSRN
Working paper
SSRN
In: State Government: journal of state affairs, Volume 21, p. 89-90
ISSN: 0039-0097
Using a 1993 Dutch policy reform and a regression discontinuity design, we find children of parents whose disability insurance (DI) eligibility was reduced are 11% less likely to participate in DI themselves, do not alter their use of other government programs, and earn 2% more as adults. The reduced transfers and increased taxes of children account for 40% of the fiscal savings relative to parents in present discounted value terms. Moreover, children of treated parents complete more schooling, have a lower probability of serious criminal arrests and incarceration, and take fewer mental health drugs as adults.
BASE