It is observed that the essential concerns in the econ's of outdoor recreation differ little from those of econ concerns generally. Econ'ts working in this area face the problem of the efficiency of allocation of resources between outdoor recreation facilities & programs on the one hand, & goods & services in general on the other. The pricing system fails to function as a resource-allocator in recreation services. However, the use of fees as a means of rationing scarce resources & as manag tools to redistribute the load among all facilities more appropriately is considered necessary. The question of 'distributive' justice is discussed, ie, the distribution of recreational opportunities among the various segments of the pop. It is in this area that the creative integration of the contributions of econ'ts, soc psychol'ts & sociol'ts is needed in order to introduce the concept of consumer preferences meaningfully into the planning of recreational facilities & programs. While the provision of recreational facilities may be viewed primarily as a local public responsibility, the serious question of local fiscal capability & of state & federal responsibility must be raised. A policy of incentives & restraints might be created which would present more efficient & equitable provisions for recreational services. There is great need for careful stock-taking. Modified HA.
Dinner is over. Mr. and Mrs. Jones and Mr. and Mrs. Smith are having coffee. The question arises: What shall we do this evening? Play bridge? Go to the movies? Listen to some chamber music from the local FM station? Sit and chat? Each, in due course, expresses a "preference" among these four alternatives but with this difference: Mr. and Mrs. Jones and Mrs. Smith, though each has a preference, "don't much care." Their preferences are "mild" or "marginal." Not so Mr. Smith. His preference is "strong." He is tired, couldn't possibly get his mind on bridge, or muster the energies for going out to a movie. He has listened to chamber music all afternoon while working on an architectural problem, and couldn't bear any more. If the group does anything other than sit and chat, he at least will do it grudgingly. He "cares enormously" which alternative is chosen.Now: which is the "correct" choice among the four alternatives? Which, "distributive justice" to one side, is the choice most likely to preserve good relations among the members of the group? Some theorists, it would seem, find these two questions easy to answer. Mr. Smith ought to have his way, and good relations are likely to be endangered if he does not; and these answers are equally valid whether the other three all prefer the same thing or prefer different things. Since, for the latter, the choice is a matter of indifference, it is both "more fair" and "more expedient" (less likely to lead to a quarrel) for the group to do what Mr. Smith prefers to do.
Originally published in 1967. In the past half-century, Utilitarianism has fallen out of favor among professional philosophers, except in such "amended" forms as "Ideal" and "Rule" Utilitarianism. Professor Narveson contends that amendments and qualifications are unnecessary and misguided, and that a careful interpretation and application of the original theory, as advocated by Bentham, the Mills, and Sidgwick, obviates any need for modification. Drawing on the analytical work of such influential recent thinkers as Stevenson, Toulmin, Hare, Nowell-Smith, and Baier, the author attempts to draw a more careful and detailed picture than has previously been offered of the logical status and workings of the Principle of Utility. He then turns to the traditional objections to the theory as developed by such respected thinkers as Ross, Frankena, Hart, and Rawls and attempts to show how Utilitarianism can account for our undoubted obligations in the areas of punishment, promising, distributive justice, and the other principal moral convictions of mankind. He contends that the Principle of Utility implies whatever is recognized to be clearly true in these convictions and that it leaves room to doubt whatever is doubtful in them. Narveson concludes with a rationally forceful proof of the Principle of Utility. In the course of this argument, which draws on the most widely accepted recent findings in analytical ethics, Narveson discovers an essential identity between the ethical outlooks of Kant and of Mill, which are traditionally held to be antithetical. Both thinkers, he shows, center on the principle that the interests of others are to be regarded as equal in value to one's own. A new view of Mill's celebrated "proof of utilitarianism" is developed in the course of the discussion.
A Review Symposium consisting of "A Discussion and Introduction" by Harley L. Browning (U of Texas, Austin) & Dudley L. Poston, Jr. (U of Texas, Austin) plus 4 contributions. The Introduction comments on THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON POPULATION GROWTH AND THE AMERICAN FUTURE (New York, NY: New American Library, 1972) which is being reviewed. It is stated that this commission did its work well, hearing more than 100 witnesses across the country. The Report deserves a wide readership. Then the symposium participants are introduced & their papers summarized. Joseph J. Spengler (Duke U, Durham, NC), "Numbers Versus Welfare," places the Commission Report in historical perspective within a discussion of traditional views on pop growth held by earlier Amer's. Details of the Report & the prospects it holds out are then discussed, eg, how to control pop size & adjust the economy & policy for the advent of a stationary pop. It is noted that one of the more serious problems will be rendering the economy flexible enough to adjust to the changes in the US pop's demographic state as a stationary pop is achieved. Arthur J. Dyck (Harvard U, Cambridge, Mass), "Ethical Assumptions and Implications of the Population Commission's Report," notes that while the Report is replete with moral admonitions, it does not analyze & present the various arguments for & against its moral admonitions. Focus is on freedom, distributive justice & soc welfare, & examined are not only the moral consequences which could follow from implementing the Commission's recommendations, but also the moral assumptions & alternatives behind some of the recommendations. It is felt that for the most part the Report does not give all the reasons & evidence necessary to decide whether or not the implementation of all the recommendations into soc policy would in fact be more beneficial than harmful to society. Ozzie L. Edwards (U of Michigan, Ann Arbor), "The Commission's Recommendations From the Standpoint of Minorities," feels that the recommendations on fertility control will not bear positive consequences for US soc minorities & do not represent a viable solution to their problems. The choice between fertility control & full participation in the good things of Amer life is not an acceptable one for US racial minorities. Susan O. Gustavus (U of Utah, Provo), "Commission Report: Implications for Women," focuses esp on contraception & role alternatives for women. It will be interesting to see which of the recommendations will be more favorably received: that on removal of illegitimate status or that on liberalizing abortion laws. Women's Liberation has stated many of the points in the Report in a less academic, but perhaps more provocative way. The Report may help these issues to get wider exposure, gain greater respectability & credibility, & stimulate more discussion. Modified HA.
Après la thèse de Raymond Poidevin, et avant d'autres publications du même type, voici l'un des importants travaux issus de ce courant de la recherche dont Pierre Renouvin est le grand initiateur : une histoire rénovée des relations internationales, une nouvelle « lecture » de celles-ci. Nouvelle non pas seulement par le recours aux archives des grandes firmes s'ajoutant aux sources plus traditionnelles ; mais nouvelle surtout par la problématique proposée, celle d'une conception plus large, plus dialectique, plus multi-disciplinaire, en quelque sorte, des relations entre « États ». Il est normal que les grandes thèses successives ne se répètent pas, et que leurs divergences apparaissent même de plus en plus nettement : on s'en apercevra encore mieux avec les prochaines publications. C'est pourquoi il est trop tôt pour tracer un bilan comparatif — et qui ne sera pas un exercice de justice distributive.
"Elite political culture" may be defined as the set of politically relevant beliefs, values, and habits of the most highly involved and influential participants in a political system. Studying elite political culture requires methodological innovation which will allow us to do justice to the subtleties of the belief systems of sophisticated political leaders without doing violence to our normal standards of reliability and verification. As one example of the study of elite political culture, this paper presents an empirically based analysis of "ideological politics" and "the end of ideology."After some clarification of the logical structure and empirical assumptions of existing descriptions of "ideological politics," these descriptions are examined in the light of data from a study of the basic beliefs and values of British and Italian politicians, based on intensive interviews with random samples of 93 British MPs and 83 Italiandeputati.The core of the notion of "ideological politics" is interpreted in terms of "political style," that is,howpoliticians talk and think about concrete policy problems such as poverty or urban transportation. Each respondent's discussion of two such issues was analyzed in terms of 12 "stylistic characteristics," such as "inductive-deductive thinking," "use of historical context," "moralization," and "reference to distributive group benefits." Ratings of these stylistic characteristics are found to cluster in intelligible ways, and on the basis of the dominant stylistic dimension, an Index of Ideological Style is constructed. Those politicians who rank high on this Index are also found to be more ideologically motivated, more abstract in their conceptions of politics, especially party politics, and more idealistic than their less "ideological" colleagues. They are also more alienated from existing socio-political institutions and are concentrated at the extremes of the political spectrum. Further investigation shows, however, that contrary to the assumptions of the existing literature, these "ideologues" arenotmore dogmatic,notless open to compromise,notmore antagonistic to the norms of pluralist politics,notmore hostile to political opponents. Partisan hostility and ideological style are found to be two distinct syndromes.The "end of ideology" thesis is examined by comparing the attitudes and style of respondents from different political generations. In both countries younger politicians are markedly less dogmatic and hostile, but in neither country are they any less "ideological" in their approach to political phenomena and problems of public policy.In the light of these data the "end of ideology" debate is reformulated. The probable causes and consequences of both the decline of partisan hostility and the persistence of ideology are discussed. Finally, some conclusions are drawn concerning the role of ideology in politics and concerning the theoretical promise and methodological problems of studying elite political culture.
