District magnitude and third party representation in local government
In: British elections & parties review, Band 11, Heft 1, S. 192-210
ISSN: 1368-9886
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In: British elections & parties review, Band 11, Heft 1, S. 192-210
ISSN: 1368-9886
In: European journal of political research: official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Band 39, Heft 2, S. 203-224
ISSN: 1475-6765
Abstract. Duverger's propositions concerning the psychological and mechanical consequences of electoral rules have previously been examined mainly through the lens of district magnitude, comparing the properties of single–member district plurality elections with those of multimember proportional representation elections. The empirical consequences of multimember plurality (MMP) rules, on the other hand, have received scant attention. Theory suggests that the effect of district magnitude on the number and concentration of parties will differ with regard to whether the allocation rules are plurality–based or proportional. I test this theory by drawing on a uniquely large–sample dataset where district magnitude and electoral formula vary but the basic universe of political parties is held constant, applying regression analysis to data from several thousand Hungarian local bodies elected in 1994 consisting of municipal councils, county councils, and mayors. The results indicate that omitting the variable of electoral formula has the potential to cause significant bias in estimates of Duvergerian consequences of district magnitude. In addition, the analysis of multi–member plurality elections from the local election dataset reveals counter–intuitively that candidate and party entry may increase with district magnitude under MMP, suggesting important directions for future investigation of MMP rules.
In: European journal of political research: official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Band 39, Heft 2, S. 203-224
ISSN: 0304-4130
Duverger's propositions concerning the psychological and mechanical consequences of electoral rules have previously been examined mainly through the lens of district magnitude, comparing the properties of single-member district plurality elections with those of multimember proportional representation elections. The empirical consequences of multimember plurality (MMP) rules, on the other hand, have received scant attention. Theory suggests that the effect of district magnitude on the number and concentration of parties will differ with regard to whether the allocation rules are plurality-based or proportional. I test this theory by drawing on a uniquely large-sample dataset where district magnitude and electoral formula vary but the basic universe of political parties is held constant, applying regression analysis to data from several thousand Hungarian local bodies elected in 1994 consisting of municipal councils, county councils, and mayors. The results indicate that omitting the variable of electoral formula has the potential to cause significant bias in estimates of Duvergerian consequences of district magnitude. In addition, the analysis of multimember plurality elections from the local election dataset reveals counter-intuitively that candidate and party entry may increase with district magnitude under MMP, suggesting important directions for future investigation of MMP rules. (European Journal of Political Research / FUB)
World Affairs Online
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 38, Heft 1, S. 100-123
ISSN: 0092-5853
In an exploration of the ways that electoral institutions influence party systems, & the extent to which electoral laws mediate the influence of ethnic heterogeneity, data from earlier studies by Douglas Rae (1967) & Arend Lijphart (1990) are reanalyzed to reconsider the role of one institutional parameter -- district magnitude. It is concluded that district magnitude is not merely an important determinant of the number of parties that compete in a political system, but can offset the tendency of parties to multiply in ethnically heterogeneous societies. 5 Tables, 25 References. Adapted from the source document.
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 38, Heft 1, S. 100-123
ISSN: 0092-5853
In: The Western political quarterly, Band 44, Heft 2, S. 457-466
ISSN: 1938-274X
In: American journal of political science, Band 38, Heft 1, S. 100
ISSN: 1540-5907
In: European journal of political research: official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Band 13, Heft 4, S. 353-364
ISSN: 1475-6765
ABSTRACTFollowing Duverger, low district magnitude (low number of seats per electoral district) produces a mechanical effect, the underrepresentation of small parties, and a psychological effect, discouraging voters from voting for small parties. The two effects usually occur together and cannot be tested separately. However, in Venezuela an experimental 'control' is provided by the requirement that voters simultaneously cast a vote for the same party in each of three legislative tiers (Senate, Chamber of Deputies, and State Assembly), each with a different district magnitude. Hence the psychological effect can exert itself on only one tier. In the other tiers exceptionally high or low deviations from proportional representation are observed. The separate effects of district magnitude are analysed by their consequences on the number of electoral parties and the deviation from proportional representation.
In: Electoral studies: an international journal, Band 6, S. 123-132
ISSN: 0261-3794
Based on conference paper. Whether the election of women to the Irish Dáil varies across the country's three, four, and five-seat constituencies; uses data from three elections held in 1981 and 1982.
In: Electoral studies: an international journal, Band 6, Heft 2, S. 123
ISSN: 0261-3794
In: Electoral Studies, Band 6, Heft 2, S. 123-132
In: European journal of political research: official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Band 13, Heft 4, S. 353
ISSN: 0304-4130
In: European journal of political research: official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Band 13
ISSN: 0304-4130
In: Canadian journal of political science: CJPS = Revue canadienne de science politique, Band 29, Heft 3, S. 497-520
ISSN: 1744-9324
AbstractPrevious literature has assumed that there is a trade-off between cabinet stability, by means of a majority manufactured by a single-seat plurality system, and the alleviation of regional conflict, by means of a more proportional electoral system. This study demonstrates that no such tradeoff exists. The objective of this study is to find an alternative electoral system which satisfies both the criteria of majority government and multiregional representation. In a quasi-experiment, an electoral system with a district magnitude of two (M2) satisfies both of the above criteria. The results of the study show that a district magnitude of two can provide a large diffuse party with a majority of seats for the same amount of voter support as the present plurality system. In addition, M2 rewards this large diffuse party with seats necessary to form a minority government at a much lower level of voter support than does the existing system. Thus, M2 solves the problem of underrepresentation of regions in the government party, and is at the same time even more advantageous to a large diffuse party than is the present electoral system. If the argument of this study is correct, beneficiaries of the existing system should not be averse to implementing it.
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Band 30, Heft 2, S. 156-185
ISSN: 1552-3829
This article makes a fresh start in the attempt to explain the number of parties in party systems. It develops a simultaneous equations model to differentiate between the psychological and mechanical effects of district magnitude on party-system fragmentation. Both effects are statistically significant and approximately equal. However, neither effect is very large in comparison to underlying patterns of politicization, which are argued to be reflections of the number of political cleavages in society. These cleavages predispose each party system to converge toward a country-specific effective number of parties within 5 elections, regardless of the initial level of fragmentation, barring outside disturbances. Major devaluations may act as such disturbances, but the evidence so far is inconclusive. The analysis is based on new data from 62 elections in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela, supplemented by 30+ additional elections in Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, and Uruguay for the exploration of economic impacts.