Suchergebnisse

 It's become common to speak of "red" and "blue" states, and to note that the "blue" (Democratic) states are richer than the "red" ones.  But the states are of widely different sizes, and some are very large, so they are probably not the best units to look at.  Representative Marcy Kaptur's office has produced a chart that shows median household income and party control by Congressional district.  There is a clear tendency for Democratic districts to have higher incomes--e. g., Ruy Teixeira says "The first page is heavily dominated by blue but the second, poorer page is a sea of red."  However, on looking at the chart, it seemed that it wasn't a simple matter of "the richer the district, the more likely to elect a Democrat."  Specifically, it seemed that the probability of electing a Democrat first declined and then increased as you went from low to high income.  But it's easy to imagine patterns when there's really nothing but random variation, so I looked more systematically.  After ranking the districts from low to high income, I computed a 50-seat moving average--seats 1-50, then seats 2-51, 3-52, ....392-441.*  The proportion of Democrats against the income of the middle district in the group:The pattern is even more complicated than I thought--the chance of electing a Democrat first falls, then rises, then remains steady once the median income reaches about $80,000 (about a quarter of districts are above that level).  There are hints that it increases again at the very top (9 of the 10 districts with the highest median income are represented by Democrats), but it's not possible to be sure.  The Democratic share is at a minimum when the median income is about $65,000.  I don't have any explanation--I'm just offering it as something to think about.  A few other observations:1.  The discussion of this chart has treated it as an example of the Democrats' problems with working-class voters, but the individual and district level relationships are different issues.   Congressional districts are large (about 800,000 people), so they all contain a range of classes.  Consequently, it would be possible for the Democrats to do better in richer districts and better among working-class voters--in fact, this is what a classical Marxist analysis would predict.  Of course, this is not the case in the United States today, but it means that the district-level relationship needs its own explanation.2.  Back in the 1950s, Seymour Martin Lipset observed that conservative parties sometimes did better in the poor regions of a nation (e. g., southern Italy).  His explanation was that those regions hadn't moved fully into a capitalist economy, so that their voters followed the lead of traditional elites, but this isn't applicable to the US today.  Curiously, the issue hasn't received much attention in subsequent research--I don't recall having seen anything, and my searches in Google Scholar drew a blank.  3.  A common method for detecting non-linearity is to include a squared term in addition to the original.  But when you do that with these data, the t-ratio for the squared term was less than one.  In fact, you had to go up to the fifth power before one was statistically significant, and people rarely go that high.  So in this case, if you used a polynomial regression, you'd probably miss the non-linearity.     *The chart includes non-voting delegates as well as representatives.  

The development of cultural districts has become a standard practice in policy-making worldwide at different scales – local, regional and national (Braun and Lavanga 2007). Government bodies have used cultural district policies to regenerate and rebrand urban areas, sometimes focusing on increasing cultural consumption, as in the case of museum districts, other times fostering innovation and entrepreneurship, as in the case of cultural production districts. This chapter first provides a definition of cultural districts and its roots in the Marshallian industrial district; secondly, it looks at the agglomeration economies that firms, organisations and individuals enjoy because they are not only co-located in the same area, but also highly interconnected among each other. The argument put forward in this chapter is the importance of intense face-to-face interaction and spatial proximity in the production, distribution and consumption of cultural goods and services.

The development of cultural districts has become a standard practice in policy-making worldwide at different scales – local, regional and national (Braun and Lavanga 2007). Government bodies have used cultural district policies to regenerate and rebrand urban areas, sometimes focusing on increasing cultural consumption, as in the case of museum districts, other times fostering innovation and entrepreneurship, as in the case of cultural production districts. This chapter first provides a definition of cultural districts and its roots in the Marshallian industrial district; secondly, it looks at the agglomeration economies that firms, organisations and individuals enjoy because they are not only co-located in the same area, but also highly interconnected among each other. The argument put forward in this chapter is the importance of intense face-to-face interaction and spatial proximity in the production, distribution and consumption of cultural goods and services.

In 1902 a new federal district court was established to serve a broad segment of the Texas Gulf Coast region, including Houston. In the use of its discretion to choose between "private" and "public" law, this court for many years served the interests of the region's economic and political elite and helped stabilize a fast-changing economy that was undergoing wild swings of boom and bust. After 1945, however, the court reluctantly began to address growing demands for

Chandrapur District (revised edition) Bombay: Directorate of Government Printing, Stationary and Publications, 1973

Minnesota was at the forefront of progressive civil rights in the 1960s through the middle 1980s, even more so than San Francisco. In 1971, Minnesota State Legislature passed a law requiring Minneapolis, St. Paul, and its suburbs to contribute just under half of the growth in their commercial tax revenues to a regional pool which would be distributed to tax-poor areas. This regulation was revolutionary; a plan like this has never been tried at the Met- ropolitan level (Minnesota, 2015). However, racial segregation in the Twin Cities is at an all-time high in the twenty first century. This racialized gap is due to many reasons: charter schools, open enrollment, loss of funding for inner city schools, and how the geography of residential segregation correlates to school segregation. But in 2009, the Institute on Race and Poverty at the University of Minnesota published a study on a possible solution. They drafted a hypothetical map with five school districts for the Twin Cities metropolitan area. These five districts are integrated and distribute the wealth and race evenly throughout the districts which will lead to all districts having appropriate funding, adequate educational programs, and the value of integration.

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed issues relating to the District of Columbia government's mismanagement of two building leases, focusing on: (1) whether the person or persons who approved the leases were authorized to do so; (2) the status of properties, leases, costs, and utilization; and (3) the steps the District has taken or is taking to ensure that leased properties, in general, are effectively managed and utilized."