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After a return from Europe a decade ago, Professor Paul Tillich wrote about the great change in theological climate in that country which occurred a generation ago. "All groups," he said, "whether Lutheran, Reformed or Barthian, consider the last 200 years of Protestant theology essentially erroneous." A little later he wrote about Harnack and Troeltsch, two of the liberal giants, and said, "They died (in 1923 and 1926) in an atmosphere strange to that in which they had lived for the most part of their lives. And it seems that in Europe neo-Protestantism died with them." The past era to which Professor Tillich refers is, of course, that long reign of rationalistic thought which played such an important role in Protestant theology from the end of the 17th century to this century. A book which traces the beginning of that movement in England bears the significant title, From Puritanism to the Age of Reason. It is a study of changes in religious thought within the Church of England from 1660 to 1700. It tells of the eclipse of Calvinism, and of the influence of the Cambridge Platonists and the Latitudinarians; of the impact of the new science and the religious significance of John Locke. Then it traces the rise of Deism and ends with the triumph of the rationalist school of thought. Other works tell us the same story of this important period in history, which carried popular thought "from Puritanism to the age of reason." The revolution in thinking that took place then, "though silent and unnoticed, was the greatest revolution in human history, far outweighing in importance any of the political revolution whose thunder has reverberated through the world."

This book is an important contribution to the current lively debate about the relationship between law and society in the Roman world. This debate, which was initiated by the work of John Crook in the 1960?s, has had a profound impact upon the study of law and history and has created sharply divided opinions on the extent to which law may be said to be a product of the society that created it. This work is a modest attempt to provide a balanced assessment of the various points of view. The chapters within this book have been specifically arranged to represent the debate. It contains an introdu

In this work we show the challenge that legal dogmatics could represent to our legal institutions. Legal dogmatic often claims that plays a necessary role in order to identify legal rules and to solve their indeterminacies. Thus, legal dogmatics would be an indispensable complement of legislation. Like legislation, dogmatics attempts to provide judges with clear guidelines to help them determine the right decisions and, consequently, arbitrary ones. Only under this assumption does dogmatics help to make more predictable decisions. However, the search for precision could limit the arbitrariness of judges, while precision itself gives rise to arbitrary distinctions. In some cases the arbitrariness results from the indeterminacy generated by vague rules but in other cases the application of precise rules leads to arbitrariness because officials depart from the reasons that ground them. The challenge of dogmatics is to show that its contribution to rationality can improve upon the legislator?s contribution. That is, dogmatics must show why its rules can succeed where legislation inevitably fails for conceptual reasons. We claim that although the addition of dogmatic rules has the same conceptual difficulties as legislating has, its solutions contend with other formal justifications, i.e., reasons that ground legislated rules. ; El trabajo pretende mostrar que la expansión de la dogmática, sobre todo en el discurso penal, representa un desafío al legislador y cuál es el precio que debemos pagar por ello. La dogmática, al igual que la legislación, necesita ofrecer al juez pautas precisas que sirvan para delimitar las decisiones correctas y, en ese mismo sentido, identificar a las que se consideran arbitrarias. Sólo bajo este supuesto la dogmática contribuye a lograr decisiones más previsibles. La dificultad radica en que la búsqueda de precisión puede limitar la arbitrariedad de los órganos de aplicación, pero, a la vez, la precisión introduce distinciones arbitrarias. En ciertos casos la arbitrariedad se produce por la indeterminación que generan las normas imprecisas y en otros casos, la arbitrariedad consiste en que al aplicar normas precisas, los funcionarios se apartan de las razones que justifican a esas normas. El desafío para la dogmática es mostrar que su contribución a la racionalidad puede superar a las que elabora el legislador. Es decir, debe mostrar por qué sus normas pueden tener éxito donde el legislador, por cuestiones conceptuales, inevitablemente fracasa. Los autores de este trabajo sostienen que la incorporación de normas dogmáticas en el horizonte de justificación de las decisiones no solo posee las mismas dificultades conceptuales que las del legislador sino que sus soluciones compiten con otras justificaciones formales, e.g. normas legisladas y, con frecuencia, suponen una tensión entre las palabras de la ley y lo que los dogmáticos dicen que dice el legislador. ; Fil: Manrique, Maria Laura. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba; Argentina ; Fil: Navarro, Pablo Eugenio. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Centro de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Centro de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales; Argentina ; Fil: Peralta, José Milton. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Centro de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Centro de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales; Argentina