Suchergebnisse

U prvoj polovini 19- stoljeća dolazi do povijesnih i političkih previranja u Europi: pojava panslavizma, revolucija 1948., koja je trebala rušenjem Austrougarske Monarhije uspostaviti temelje demokraciji (u kojoj se hrvatski ban Jelačić stavio na stranu Beča), te intenzivan interes kulturne Europe za zaostali srpski narod pod turskom vlašću. I pored kontroverzne uloge J. Kopitara i Vuka Karadžića, Hrvati prihvaćaju Književni dogovor 1850. g. sa Srbima, koji već u ono vrijeme, očevidno uz pomoć politike i lingvistike, osporavaju Hrvatima identitet. ; In the first half of the 19th century Europe saw some historical and political changes like Pan-Slavism and the Revolution of 1848, which was to build up democratic fundaments through the abolition of the Austro Hungarian Empire (with the Croartian Banus Jelačić on the Viennese side). Europe's cultural interest in Serbia increased. The Serbs were under Turkish dominance and thus restricted in their development. In 1850, despite controversial roles of J. Kopitar and Vuk Karadžić, the Croats agreed to a literary arrangement with the Serbs, who had already at that time obviously disputed the Croatian identity by means of politics and linguistics.

The existence of ethnic minorities gives headaches to most newly independent states, though they are much more homogeneous than their predecessors. Also, the fate of the minorities in the countries that have been trying to build themselves as nationally homogeneous is uncertain, although all the newly created states -- due to the triumph of the democratic models of government -- are forced to pledge allegiance to democracy. Due to the global dominance of democratic values, the authoritarian governments of the newly created states are forced to reach an accommodation with their minorities. The priority is to make the recognition of the minorities' rights one of the key measures of democracy. There are many ethnic conflicts in Europe but only those in the former Yugoslavia (including Kosovo) have spiraled into all-out war. Unlike the other incomplete democracies in postcommunist societies, the degrees of violence in the relationship majority-minority within nondemocratic states like Serbia (or SRY) or Tudman's Croatia, combined with the secessionist/separatist conflict, rapidly increases. In fact, the institutional protection of civil liberties & the respect for human rights are nonexistent; this prevents ethnic minorities from turning their demands into democratic electoral clout. Such governments are not able to govern democratically & to keep in check their ethnic opposition with democratic means. Also, a broad popular support for the peaceful resolution of conflicts via democratic institutions is lacking. 1 Appendix. Adapted from the source document.

The existence of ethnic minorities gives headaches to most newly independent states, though they are much more homogeneous than their predecessors. Also, the fate of the minorities in the countries that have been trying to build themselves as nationally homogeneous is uncertain, although all the newly created states -- due to the triumph of the democratic models of government -- are forced to pledge allegiance to democracy. Due to the global dominance of democratic values, the authoritarian governments of the newly created states are forced to reach an accommodation with their minorities. The priority is to make the recognition of the minorities' rights one of the key measures of democracy. There are many ethnic conflicts in Europe but only those in the former Yugoslavia (including Kosovo) have spiraled into all-out war. Unlike the other incomplete democracies in postcommunist societies, the degrees of violence in the relationship majority-minority within nondemocratic states like Serbia (or SRY) or Tudman's Croatia, combined with the secessionist/separatist conflict, rapidly increases. In fact, the institutional protection of civil liberties & the respect for human rights are nonexistent; this prevents ethnic minorities from turning their demands into democratic electoral clout. Such governments are not able to govern democratically & to keep in check their ethnic opposition with democratic means. Also, a broad popular support for the peaceful resolution of conflicts via democratic institutions is lacking. 1 Appendix. Adapted from the source document.

The article looks into the changes in the parties & the social structure of the first House of the Croatian parliament (the Sabor) in the transitional period. A total of 26 political parties have had seats in the parliament -- 16 of them securing their place through prior support of the electoral body, & 10 solely through individual lists. The author shows that this party fragmentation has occurred due to the process of parliamentary parties' factioning & the transfer of delegates from parliamentary to nonparliamentary parties. The degree of party fragmentation in the Sabor is considered moderate & not disruptive for the functioning of the parliament. This is due to the continued mandated dominance of the majority party & to the fact that the party fragmentation has primarily involved the opposition parties. An analysis of the social-demographic characteristics of the representatives shows that the Sabor is dominated by male, college-educated, 48-year-old Croats with a bit more than four years of parliamentary experience. The educational structure of the Sabor does not differ much from other European parliaments, but the number of senior representatives is somewhat higher than in other European countries, while the share of women is lamentable under all democratic standards. It has been suggested that the most effective strategy that the Croatian parliamentary political parties could employ regarding gender & age representation are internally determined quotas for women & young people on their candidates' lists for elections. This would indirectly influence the social structure & the level of democracy of the Croatian parliament. 7 Tables, 1 Appendix, 38 References. Adapted from the source document.