Suchergebnisse

Goldmann, K. Détente and Crisis. Cooperation and Conflict, XVIII, 1983, 215-232. Can a relationship of détente survive a crisis? This question is addressed as a problem of foreign policy stability. A framework of analysis is offered focusing on a number of factors in domestic politics, belief systems and international relations which may function as stabilizers of foreign policy, including détente policy, in times of crisis. It is emphasized that the protection of détente can be rendered difficult by the mechanism of negative interconnections. The slow pace of détente stabilization is another difficulty. Moreover, the stabilization of détente itself may be self-defeating by undermining the credibility of deterrence. The empirical illustration of these mechanisms has to do with Soviet-German relations during the Polish crisis. It is clear that a measure of détente survived the crisis. Even though it is difficult to estimate the exact amount of stress the Polish crisis created, it remains possible that even relatively limited stabilization of détente may have significant effects.

Can a relationship of détente survive a crisis? This question is addressed as a problem of foreign policy stability. A framework of analysis is offered focusing on a number of factors in domestic politics, belief systems and international relations which may function as stabilizers of foreign policy, including détente policy, in times of crisis. It is emphasized that the protection of détente can be rendered difficult by the mechanism of negative interconnections. The slow pace of détente stabilization is another difficulty. Moreover, the stabilization of détente itself may be self-defeating by undermining the credibility of deterrence. The empirical illustration of these mechanisms has to do with Soviet–German relations during the Polish crisis. It is clear that a measure of détente survived the crisis. Even though it is difficult to estimate the exact amount of stress the Polish crisis created, it remains possible that even relatively limited stabilization of détente may have significant effects.

In a speech to the South African Senate on 23 October Prime Minister Vorster declared that the situation in Southern Africa had reached a point at which a choice had to be made between peaceful negotiation on the one hand, or escalating strife on the other. He offered Africa 'the way of peace'. Within three days President Kaunda responded favourably. In a graduation day speech at the University of Zambia, he described Vorster's overture as 'the voice of reason for which Africa and the world have been waiting for many years'. Without hesitation policy-makers and the press in South Africa fastened upon the term détente, hoisted it from another context, and applied it to describe both the atmosphere and substance of ensuing interstate relations in Southern Africa.

In practice, détente has been an active policy based on hard realities. Its goal is not a simple and temporary relaxation of international tension but the creation of mutual interest in the maintenance of peace.