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It is becoming increasingly popular among Danes to use early voting. The article describes the changes that have been made in the electoral law to accommodate the use of early voting and describes the historical development in the use of early voting. In addition, we show that there is considerable variation in the use of early voting at the municipal level, and that it is especially the citizens of the island municipalities, rich municipalities and metropolitan municipalities that use early voting. In the third part of the analysis, we examine individual differences in the use of early voting with the help of a data set with over two million Danish voters in the municipal elections in 2013. We show that early voting is primarily used by the oldest citizens and citizens with a nontechnical education – two groups that traditionally have turned out at high rates. Finally, we analyze the characteristics that can help to predict which citizens use early voting. ; It is becoming increasingly popular among Danes to use early voting. The article describes the changes that have been made in the electoral law to accommodate the use of early voting and describes the historical development in the use of early voting. In addition, we show that there is considerable variation in the use of early voting at the municipal level, and that it is especially the citizens of the island municipalities, rich municipalities and metropolitan municipalities that use early voting. In the third part of the analysis, we examine individual differences in the use of early voting with the help of a data set with over two million Danish voters in the municipal elections in 2013. We show that early voting is primarily used by the oldest citizens and citizens with a non-technical education – two groups that traditionally have turned out at high rates. Finally, we analyze the characteristics that can help to predict which citizens use early voting.

"10 years after NATO Membership. An Anniversary in the Shadow of a Crisis", indeholder artikler fra politiske aktører, diplomater og forskere, der alle bidrog til til konferencen af samme navn, hvor den 10-året for baltisk medlemskab af NATO var omdrejningspunktet. Udover den danske forsvarsminister, er den estiske og litauiske forsvarsminister og NATO's vicegeneralsekretær blandt bidragyderne. Konferencens formål var at fejre, inddrage og diskutere 10 års forsvarspolitisk NATO-samarbejde i Østersøområdet. Den internationale udvikling i Europa betød at konferencens dagsorden i stedet for kom til at stå i skyggen af krisen i Ukraine, og det anspændte europæiske forhold til Rusland. Dette afspejledes ikke kun på selve konferencen, men har også sat et dybt fodaftryk på publikationen, der dels belyser det forsvarspolitiske samarbejde mellem Danmark og de baltiske stater, dels tegner et billede af hvordan den russiske aggression på Krimhalvøen blev italesat af de repræsenterede landes Forsvarsministre samt fra hovedkvarteret i NATO. Konferencen blev afholdt tidligere i år i København, og var et resultat af et tæt samarbejde mellem Forsvarsakademiet, Forsvarsministeriet og ambassadørerne for Estland, Letland og Litauen i Danmark. ; Since the recognition of their independence in 1921, the three Baltic States Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have enjoyed a special status in Danish foreign policy that has continued into present-day times. Being one of the few countries that never officially recognized the Soviet annexation in 1940, Denmark became an early advocate in relation to Baltic membership of NATO in the wake of the Cold War. Defence cooperation, such as the joint contribution to the missions in the Balkans in the early 1990s, as well as the present air policing mission, first initiated in 2004, has been an important part of the political relationship. A conference celebrating and evaluating the first ten years of NATO membership was quite naturally a high-level event to be placed in Copenhagen. As progress with planning the conference proceeded, the international security community suddenly faced a crisis in Crimea, when separatists, with Russian support, gradually took control of the Crimean Peninsula. In only 24 days, what had initially been demonstrations and protests evolved into a complete Russian annexation, through a very dubious local democratic election, where independence from Ukraine, as well as affi liation to Russia, was declared with 96% of voters in favor of joining Russia. These events naturally had a massive impact on this conference, which resulted in an anniversary in the shadow of a crisis. This turn of events forced a new discussion upon the member states of NATO: What is the main purpose of the Alliance? This question became a focal point for the conference, as well as the articles presented here.

I denne artikkelen deler Bjørn Tore Godal sine erfaringer fra da han, som handelsminister, undertegnet EØS-avtalen i Porto i Portugal den 2. mai 1992 på Norges vegne. Han viser hvordan EØS avtalen kan forstås som en forlengelse av en norsk utenrikspolitisk tradisjon der forholdet til Europa alltid har vært komplisert og sammensatt. Mens internasjonalt samarbeid har hatt stor støtte, har det også vært en dyp skepsis mot unioner og stormakter. Som AUF-leder tidlig på 1970-tallet kjempet han også mot norsk medlemskap i EF. Som handelsminister mente han lenger enn en del andre politiske aktører at EØS kunne være et varig alternativ til EU-medlemskap. I dette bidraget viser Godal hvordan EØS-avtalen har fungert, og særlig hvordan han har erfart avtalen i sine ulike roller.
Abstract in English:EEA – in RetrospectIn this article, Bjørn Tore Godal shares his experiences from when he, as Minister of Commerce, signed the EEA Agreement in Oporto, Portugal on May 2, 1992, on behalf of Norway. He shows how the EEA Agreement can be understood as a natural prolongation of Norwegian foreign policy tradition where relations with Europe always have been complex and complicated. While international cooperation has been highly supported, there has also been a deep skepticism of unions and great powers. As a leader of AUF (the social-democratic youth league) in the early 1970s, he also fought against Norwegian membership in the EC. As a Minister of Commerce, he believed that the EEA could be a lasting alternative to EU membership. In this contribution, Godal shows how the EEA Agreement has worked and how he has experienced the functioning of this agreement in his various roles.

Norges relasjon til Kina har siden anerkjennelsen av Folkerepublikken i januar 1950 blitt utøvd i et spenn mellom småstatsrealisme og småstatsidealisme. Norges handlingsrom og politikk overfor stormakten Kina utformes i et samspill mellom nasjonale og internasjonale faktorer, men i tråd med teoriretningen ny-klassisk realisme har strukturene i det internasjonale systemet størst forklaringskraft. Som en liten stat må Norge manøvrere i forhold til stormaktenes maktbalanse og rivalisering for å sikre sin egen velferd og sikkerhet. Norge valgte i 1949 å inngå i en allianse med USA gjennom NATO, og dette har siden vært bærebjelken i norsk sikkerhetspolitikk. Norges handlingsrom vis-a-vis Kina er dermed til enhver tid påvirket av USAs forhold til Kina. Denne artikkelen trekker de lange linjer i norsk Kina-politikk over syv tiår, fra 1950 til 2020. Med en ambisjon om global orden som et ekstra sikkerhetsnett var Norge tidlig ute med å anerkjenne Kina og støttet landets inntreden i FN-systemet, men den kalde krigen begrenset relasjonene. USAs engasjement av Kina på begynnelsen av 1970-tallet var et vendepunkt i norsk Kina-politikk. Den tiltakende rivaliseringen mellom USA og Kina de siste år gjør at norsk Kina-politikk nå igjen står overfor et vendepunkt, i retning av redusert handlingsrom og engasjement.
Abstract in English: Norway's relationship with China over the Past 70 Years: A Small State's Idealism and Realism with Respect to a Great PowerFrom recognizing the People's Republic of China in 1950 until today, both realism and idealism as well as domestic and international level factors have informed Norway's relationship with China. Nonetheless, this article finds that in accordance with neo-classical realism, international system variables have the strongest explanatory value on Norway's China policy. Since joining NATO in 1949, Norway's alliance with the United States has been the pillar in Norway's defence and security policy. Norway's room for maneuver crafting and implementing its China policy is consequently strongly affected by the ups and downs in Sino-U.S. relations. Unlike the United States, Norway recognized the PRC in 1950 and supported China's entry into the UN system, but the Cold War restricted Norway from further developing its relations with China. The Sino-U.S. rapprochement in the early 1970s enabled Norway to engage China, and the end of the Cold War in 1989 enabled Norway to widen its engagement to include issues such as environment and climate change, human rights and welfare policies. Nevertheless, after five decades of engagement, Norway's approach to China is currently once again changing as the result of an intensified Sino-U.S. rivalry and a changing threat perception of China across Europe.

The regional powerhouse, South Africa, has since the introduction of the nonracial democratic dispensation in 1994, played a central and important role in the formation of both the regional and continental security architecture. With the establishment of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992, one of the central areas of collaboration for the community was envisioned to be security, understood within a broadened human security framework. Security was therefore from the outset one of the cornerstones of integration in the SADC. It was believed that the formation of a security community would help dismantle the enmities that had plagued regional relations during the apartheid era. For some parties, institutionalisation of relations pointed to a means of stabilising and disseminating a particular order. Such institutions depict the power relations prevailing at the time of their establishment, which, however, can change over time (Cox 1981:136). The integration ambition surrounding security correlated with the ambitions of South Africa, the new democratic government in the regional powerhouse. South Africa and its overall foreign policy ambitions desired the pursuit of peace, democracy and stability for economic growth and development in the region and within South Africa itself. Since South Africa's acceptance into the SADC in 1994, the organisation has attempted to set up the required institutional framework to enable co-operation on security, both in terms of narrow military co-operation and regarding designated 2 softer security issues, such as migration and cross-border crime. The military cooperation moved forward in the early years after 1994 with the 1996 decision of creating an Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC)1 and later the signing of the Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) in 2003, and eventually the creation of the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) in 2004, which operationalised the OPDSC (SADC 2004). However, the actual military cooperation, e.g. military exercises, came close to a standstill. Several developments obstructed military co-operation of which the evolving crisis in Zimbabwe and the subsequent withdrawal of donor support to, for instance, the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) in Harare are but two examples. The RPTC constituted the backbone of the co-operation, but political differences between member states illustrated during the Zimbabwean crisis and following the mandate of the interventions in especially the DR Congo and partly Lesotho in 1998 all contributed to regional tensions.2 Despite the crisis, SADC members, and in particular South Africa, declared that the organisation would be able to form a regional stand-by brigade for the use of the African Union (AU) as part of its wider security architecture. On 17 August 2007, the SADC declared its stand-by-force operational at a large parade in Lusaka, Zambia and at the same occasion signed a memorandum of understanding on the SADCBRIG (SADC 2007). According to the timeline provided by the AU, the brigade should be fully operational by June 2010. Former South African deputy foreign minister Aziz Pahad stated after the launch that this was an important step, but that now there was much to be done securing joint levels and types of training, interoperability, etc. (Pahad 2007). The question that continues to linger is to what extent this brigade is operational and for what purpose. Is this new regional military formation in its present form just a paper tiger, or is it "real progress" and an example of "successful" regional cooperation and integration? This article scrutinises the security co-operation and integration in SADC and asks whether an apparent lack of common values between SADC member states are blocking the security integration process, the creation of a security community, and thereby the establishment of an effective stand-by brigade, the so-called SADCBRIG. The article furthermore attempts to scrutinise the role played by South Africa in establishing the SADCBRIG.