IV. 1. Ian C. Glover (Institute of Archaeology, London) supplies a detailed, illustrated, report on the excavations which he undertook in 1969 and 1973 in a cave near to Maros (South Sulawesi), bringing to light a lithic tool complex, fragments of pottery and bones emanating roughtly from a period stretching from 8000 to 3000 B.C. It is a site important for the study of the prehistory of Sulawesi and, in a wider sense, for the prehistory of the whole of Eastern Indonesia.
2) Venerated as a pioneer of independence, education and national culture in Indonesia, Ki Hadjar Dewantara merits to be better known abroad. After having recalled the major moments in the life, action and thought of the father of the Taman Siswa. Bénédicte Milcent gives us a translation of four lesser-known texts. "The Partnership of East and West" must be situated in the colonial context of 1929 where Dutch served almost exclusively as the link for all contact with the outside world. In the following article "Cultural Relations between Indonesia and other Countries", concerning the same theme, the author declares his enthusiastic support for cultural exchanges, provided that they are founded on the principal of parity. After an interesting text on oriental music, the article ends with "Our Relations with Rabindranath Tagore", who had with Ki Hadjar Dewantara a warm relationship nourished by mutual admiration.
In 1975 the five countries of ASEAN proposed to the communist countries of Indochina to join in the creation of a " zone of peace, liberty and neutrality " in South-East Asia. They then refused to accept the Cambodian regime resulting from Vietnam's armed intervention in Cambodia in 1979. ASEAN members are now working to maintain a Khmer Rouge representation in the UN and to isolate Vietnam internationally, but they are much more divided on substance when it cornes to a dialogue with Vietnam : Thailand and Singapore support China's policy against Vietnam, the ally of the USSR, but Malaysia and Indonesia continue to see Peking as the "principal danger" and consider it possible to cooperate with Vietnam, which has shown ils ability to resist China, for the purpose of set limes up a new regional order. These differences do not, however, appear likely to lead to a break. The key to the problem will be the evolution of Bangkok's and Hanoi's positions.
The Reign of the Pacific, by René Vermont The shift of the world economic and technological center of gravity towards the Eastern Pacific is being more and more frequently noted. In addition to economists analysing the increasing interdependence of its bordering States (Japan, United States, Australia, Canada) the NICs (newly industrialized countries: South Korea, Taïwan, Hong-Kong, Singapore) and the developing countries (Indonesia, Malaysia), some pioneers have imagined flexible structures for organising this area. Since obviously the model of the European Economic Community will not be used, suggestions have been put forward which take account of the specific characteristics of this immense area where the heterogeneity of the cultures and the age differences of the economies constitute obstacles to the fullfilment of Theodore Roosevelt's prediction in 1901: "The next century will be the century of the Pacific". The potential and the dynamism of this area are analysed here and the Japanese, American and Australian organisational projects described. The presence of four world powers (United States, Japan, China, USSR) in the Pacific give every organisational attempt a geopolitical dimension.
L'analogie entre les Indes néerlandaises et l'empire russe — populations et cultures multiples sur un territoire gigantesque et disparate —, pourrait laisser penser que l'expérience soviétique d'Etat multinational aurait eu quelque influence en Indonésie. Mais les conditions de la lutte nationale aux Indes néerlandaises font naître un projet d"Etat-nation centralisé, marqué davantage des pratiques de la Révolution française que de celles de la Révolution russe. Quand elle s'inspire de la Russie, la politique indonésienne des années 1920 en tire surtout l'idée de rupture révolutionnaire par l'insurrection et de gouvernement par les soviets, ainsi que celle de parti avant-garde, pour guider le mouvement. L'échec de l'insurrection, et le fait mondial de la montée du fascisme orientent progressivement le mouvement vers la revendication plus classique d'un parlement représentatif comme instrument de gouvernement et, partant, de négociation avec la puissance coloniale, et l'inclusion des « minorités » (celles ainsi désignées par le colonisateur en tant que « non indigènes ») dans le mouvement même, synonyme de la nation, qui jusqu'alors les excluait. Mais ce rejet du racisme traduit ici une volonté d'extension et d'intégration croissante, qui refuse en même temps tout ce qui pourrait, par la reconnaissance d'un projet d'Etat fédéral ou plurinational, ouvrir la porte aux manœuvres extérieures d'éclatement. The analogy between the Dutch East Indies and the Russian Empire ― diverse populations and cultures spread over a vast and disparate area ― might suggest that Soviet experience as a multi-national State could have had some influence in Indonesia. However, the circumstances of the national struggle in the Dutch East Indies gave birth to plans for a centralized nation State, influenced by the practices of the French Revolution more than by those of the Russian Revolution. When drawing inspiration from Russia, Indonesian politics of the 1920s mainly derived the notions of achieving revolutionary break via insurrection and of government by soviets and also that of an vanguard party leading the movement. The failure of the insurrection and the worldwide rise of fascism gradually shifted the movement towards more conventional demands for a representative Parliament as an instrument of government and consequently, negotiations with the colonial power ― and the inclusion of "minorities" (those designated by the colonising power as "non-natives") in the movement itself ― synonymous with the nation ― which had hitherto excluded them. However, this rejection of racism was the reflection of a desire for extension and increasing integration, which at the same time refused anything that, through recognition of an intended federal or multi-national State, could open the door to outside attempts at division.
