Suchergebnisse

The second and updated edition of this new study of the genesis of the Indonesian national state is based on the notion that the birth of that nation grew out of not only the liberation movement but also from the Dutch rule that the nationalists agitated against. The book places a clear emphasis on the ways in which Dutch rule was established in the Indonesian archipelago in the course of three centuries and examines the developments of Dutch colonial policies. This feeds into chapters that focus on the Indonesian nationalist movement and the Japanese occupation of the colony in 1942-1945. The occupation helped to enable the proclamation of Indonesian indepence and the creation of the Republic in August 1945. The conflict that erupted between the Repub-lic and the Netherlands was brought to an incomplete 'solution' in 1949, but the dis-pute about West-Irian led to a sequel that lasted for another thirteen years. More than half of this book is dedicated to the conflict and its aftermath. Much attention is paid to the sentiments and ideas that informed Dutch policy.

Various issues that have received scant attention in the historiography are now dis-cussed. The author based his study on Dutch and international literature, contemporary newspapers and policy documents, and his own memories. In the book's title, the stork represents the Dutch and the garuda functions as a symbol of Indonesia.

J. Herman Burgers (1926) worked at the Dutch Department of Foreign Affairs. He studied Law in Amsterdam and Political Science at Stanford University. He was deeply interested in the conflict between the Netherlands and the Republic of Indone-sia, as it broke out in 1945. This fascination has never left him, and he has continued to study the conflict and its aftermath, especially during the years 1948-1950 when he was in Indonesia for his Dutch military service.

For a long time, the war in Indonesia and the extreme violence used by the Dutch troops were not a subject that was much discussed or written about in the Netherlands. After the end of the war, the government made great efforts to avoid discussions about it or even to nip them in the bud. The revelations by East Indies veteran Joop Hueting in 1969 initially led to great commotion, resulting in the 'Excessennota' and the government position that the armed forces had behaved correctly, apart from a number of 'excesses'. That was it, until in recent decades more and more indications emerged that the armed forces had used extreme violence on a larger scale. Not only politicians but also journalists, historians and history teachers struggled with the violent decolonisation of Indonesia. The groups most affected, such as veterans, Moluccans and Indo-Europeans, were also reluctant for a long time to talk about their often bitter experiences in public. Finally, Indonesia also did not seem very interested in reviving this history of mutual violence. As a result, it was only very late, very cautiously and jerkily, that the war gained a place in the Dutch culture of remembrance.

Preliminary Material -- The verenigde oost-indische compagnie (voc), the dutch united east india company -- My Long_Standing Request for my Release -- Sing the Watch Song -- Fleas and Hottentots -- Your Very dear and Beloved Father -- What a Wonderful Country -- To Invest our Pennies Securely -- Tied with a Chinese Silken bow -- Raised in my small Country Garden -- Some Pins, Needles and thread -- Becoming Quite an Amsterdam -- Those Gentlemen! -- Not Without Ailments -- Dear and Beloved Grandpapa -- The van Outhoorn Family -- The Van Hoorn Family -- The Van Riebeeck Family -- Njeij Bantam and Thebitia -- Portraits -- Appendices -- Glossary -- Sources -- Index Persons.

Why did the Dutch hold on to Western New Guinea, one of the many territories that constituted the Dutch East Indies (modern-day Indonesia), when the colony became independent in 1949? This thesis argues against the traditional explanation that it was due to a singular Dutch 'decolonization trauma': an inability to let go of the glorious colonial past, combined with resentment against Indonesian nationalist leaders such as Sukarno. It shows that historians have overstated the importance of emotions in Dutch colonial policy-making and diplomacy after 1949, mainly because of their narrow scope of analysis, which has traditionally been restricted to trilateral relations between the Netherlands, independent Indonesia (which wanted to incorporate Western New Guinea, if need be with military means) and the allegedly 'anti-colonial' United States. This thesis situates Dutch decision-making in the Western New Guinea Crisis in a much wider network, incorporating the colonial policy, diplomacy and perception of other Western powers such as Britain, France, Australia, Belgium and Portugal between 1930 and 1962. It is argued that, when viewed within this network and its discourse, the Dutch decision to retain Western New Guinea is best explained with rational actor theory. The decision was inspired not so much by emotions as by cost-benefit analyses, which included the possibility of transferring the territory to a new Indonesian regime—which the Dutch expected to be more forthcoming to the interests of the Papuans, the native inhabitants of Western New Guinea, and the Dutch (economic) interests in Indonesia than the regime headed by Sukarno. Research into hitherto neglected French, Belgian, British and Dutch archives also shows that the Netherlands could count on much more support for its New Guinea policy from its Western allies—including the US—than traditional historiography suggests. It remains true that the United States forced the Netherlands to hand over Western New Guinea to Indonesia in 1962, but the Kennedy ...

Y. Kleistra, Hollen of stilstaan. Beleidsverandering bij het Nederlandse ministerie van buitenlandse zaken P.R. Baehr, M.C. Castermans-Holleman, F. Grünfeld, Human rights in the foreign policy of the Netherlands E.M. van den Berg, The influence of domestic NGOs on Dutch human rights policy. Case studies on South Africa, Namibia, Indonesia and East Timor. The role of human rights in post-1945 Dutch foreign policy: Politicological and historical literature, Maarten KuitenbrouwerThe second Dutch government under Prime Minister Kok fell in 2002 following the publication of a critical report by the Dutch Institute for Wartime Documentation (NIOD) on the Srebenica issue. This event forms the starting point for a review of the recent literature on the role of human rights in Dutch foreign policy during the last few decades in both political science and history. Both disciplines share the 'decisionmaking analysis' in international relations theory as a common background. In addition, political scientists and historians have often found themselves researching the same human rights issues that affect Dutch relations with a series of non-Western countries. An explanation of Dutch policy is usually sought based on a combination of internaland external factors. In general, comparative analyses and research into its effectiveness are still conspicuous by their absence. All in all, there are more similarities than differences between recent political and historical studies on the role of human rights in Dutch foreign policy.