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We're taking the holiday off to be with our families, but that doesn't stop the economic news. And there is no story bigger than the collapse of the crypto exchange, FTX. One aspect that attracted our attention was Sam Bankman-Fried, the young CEO of FTX, officially bought into a philosophy called Effective Altruism, where you make the most money to give it to the poor. However, in a text exchange with a Vox reporter SBF said "this dumb game we woke westerns play where we say all the right things and so everybody likes us". It reminded us of what Vivek Ramaswamy said about woke capitalism on the show last year. We've decided to replay that show for you, and we'll be back in two weeks with a brand new episode of Capitalisn't.

Vivek Ramaswamy, a scientist, lawyer, and former venture capitalist and entrepreneur, has a new book out: "Woke, Inc.: Inside Corporate America's Social Justice Scam". In this book, he argues that "wokeism" has become a way for corporations to wrap themselves in a mantle, which then furthers the idea of crony capitalism and extends their power into spaces they were never meant to be in.

Luigi Zingales and Bethany McLean sit down with Ramaswamy to discuss his perspectives on the role of virtue, ethics, and politics in business and society.

Many people are familiar with Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations (WoN), But Smith's ethical thinking was just as important. In fact, it was The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS), published 27 years earlier, on 12 April 1759, that made him famous.Just The Wealth of Nations, this book marked a complete break from the thinking of the time. Ethics had until then been widely assumed to be based on God's will (or the clerics' interpretation of it); or something that could be deduced through abstract reason; or even something that could be felt through some 'moral sense' like touch or vision. Replacing this speculative thinking by scientific method, Smith argued instead that morality stemmed from our human nature as social beings, and our natural empathy for others. By observing ourselves and others, he said, we could discover the principles of ethical behaviour. Ethics was a matter of human psychology, stemming from how we form judgements about ourselves and others, and the influence of customs, norms and culture upon it.This scientific approach to ethics was a sensation. It was very much in line with the Scottish Enlightenment, which sought to apply observation and scientific method to the study of human affairs. Old hierarchies were breaking down; industrialisation was eclipsing Scotland's feudal past; radical thinkers like Francis Hutcheson and David Hume were pushing new boundaries, and religious pluralism was creating a more active debate on virtue and morality.Smith's book explained that morality is rooted deeply in human psychology, especially the empathy we have for our fellow humans. By our nature, we understand, and even share the feelings of others. Wanting others to like us, we strive to act such that they do. Even if there is no one else around to see how we behave, we are still impelled to act honestly, says Smith, as if an 'impartial spectator' is judging us all the time, setting the standard by which we rate ourselves and others. And under this imaginary eye, every choice we make helps us appreciate that standard more clearly and act more consistently in accordance with it. It is as if an invisible hand is drawing us to act in ways that promote social harmony.TMS is mainly a descriptive account of human moral action. It examines how people actually make moral choices, and the pressures on them to do so. It also provides a guide on how we can cultivate our morality, emphasising the importance of self-reflection and self-improvement. Smith's radical scientific approach in TMS and WoN provided a foundation for the subsequent development of psychology, sociology, and economics, establishing them as distinct subjects of academic enquiry. And its suggestion that self-interested actions—wanting to be liked by others, or exchanging things we value less for others' things we value more—could produce a cooperative social and economic order, continues to have a central place in liberal thinking.All this makes the themes in The Theory of Moral Sentiments just as relevant today as they were in 1759. Through self-reflection, we can make better moral choices. Through our empathy with others, we can foster understanding and create a more peaceful society. Through an appreciation of our shared feelings and interests, we can live and work and collaborate together for the mutual benefit of the whole of humanity.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky came to the United States last month bearing a powerful moral message: Ukraine's cause in fighting back against Russia is an unusually clear case of good versus evil.
Like Churchill rallying his people against Hitler's forces in World War II, he urged continued American resolve in ensuring that the war ends in Ukrainian victory, and he warned that any compromise with Moscow will only invite more aggression. America, he argued, faces a stark choice between right and wrong. If only things were that clear. In fact, the lengthening and increasingly bloody conflict in Ukraine is forcing the United States to grapple with a moral dilemma: a choice not between right and wrong, but between right and right. It is right to help Ukraine defend itself against Russia's invasion. After all, Ukraine did not attack Russia, and under the terms of the United Nations Charter, Russia had no legal basis for waging war on its neighbor absent authorization by the UN Security Council. And it is right to oppose Russia's brutal conduct in the war, which includes strikes on civilian facilities and numerous instances of rape, murder, and abuse of individual Ukrainians, all violations of international law. But these elements tell only part of the moral tale in Ukraine. German theorist Max Weber contrasted an "ethics of conviction" that battles against all injustice with an "ethics of responsibility" that calls for considering the potential results of such battles when weighing moral choices. An ethics of conviction argued that Western military intervention in Libya in 2011, intended to prevent mass atrocities by the barbarous Qadhafi regime, was the morally correct policy. An ethics of responsibility points out that America's good intentions resulted in disastrous instability that continues to radiate into Africa, the Middle East, and Europe to this day. These contrasting approaches complicate our calculations in Ukraine. Viewed through the lens of conviction, the correct response to Putin's invasion seems clear: one does not indulge evil; one fights and defeats it. Viewed through the lens of results, the case for such an uncompromising approach is far less certain. For now, the balance sheet in Ukraine features more assets than liabilities. Western aid has been instrumental in preventing Russian forces from capturing the vast bulk of Ukrainian territory and rendering Kyiv a Kremlin puppet, and the United States has so far managed to defend Ukraine while avoiding the escalatory dangers of a direct clash with the Russian military. But the conviction that any compromise with evil is wrong prompted Ukraine (with Western encouragement) to break off settlement talks that were progressing with Russia in April of last year, opting instead for a "counteroffensive" aimed at driving Russian forces off all Ukrainian territory, while so weakening Russia that it could never again contemplate such aggression. That counteroffensive has gone poorly. If Ukraine continues attacking into the teeth of formidable Russian defenses, it risks depleting its increasingly scarce supplies of men and munitions to such an extent that it could become vulnerable to new Russian advances. Should Russia threaten to overrun Ukrainian forces, could the Biden administration refrain from some form of direct involvement in the war, if that seemed to be the only way to prevent a Russian victory? Having ruled out compromise with Putin, Biden's political room for maneuver in such a scenario would be perilously narrow. Yet the consequences of a military clash between the world's preeminent nuclear powers could be horrific for everyone. Short of a Russian battlefield breakthrough, we must also consider the potential impact on Ukraine of a prolonged stalemate. Zelensky himself has also warned that a long war of attrition would mean "a fork in the road for Ukraine" and a "totally militarized economy." Having already lost millions fleeing to Europe and Russia, Ukraine would lose even more people, both on the front lines and to emigration. A demographic study published last year indicated that by 2040, Ukraine's working age population could fall by a third of its present size, with the number of children declining to half its pre-war level. A shrinking Ukraine would grow ever more dependent on the United States and Europe just to support its aging and war-crippled population's needs for social services. A prolonged war also threatens to reshape the world order in dangerous ways. The loss of cheap Russian energy supplies is damaging the German economy and fueling the rise of Germany's leading far right party, Alternative for Deutschland. Western economic sanctions are also driving increased Russian trade and military cooperation with China, Iran, and North Korea, compounding America's geostrategic challenges. Is helping Ukraine recover Crimea and Russian-controlled portions of the Donbass worth a radicalized Germany, a threatening entente between Russia and China, an accelerated North Korean ICBM program, and robust Russian-Iranian military cooperation? These are not questions that those favoring an ethics of conviction in Ukraine want to answer. But they are questions that our elected representatives, as agents entrusted with safeguarding the interests of the American people, are duty-bound to consider. It is right to help Ukraine defend itself against Russian aggression. And it is right to consider the potential fallout from the war on American and world security. Our challenge is to strike a pragmatic balance between these contending interests in justice and order. We will not achieve it through moral grandstanding, but through a judicious blending of military strength with diplomatic skill.

 Like so many I was saddened to learn of the death of Toni Negri. I never really knew him as a person, only very awkwardly meeting him once, but he was someone who fundamentally shaped and transformed philosophy for me. I wrote my first published paper on Negri, a paper that, as is the case with most seminar papers, was an attempt to make sense of the two books I had read, The Savage Anomaly and Marx Beyond Marx.  That it was published is not the important part, really a product of grad school hubris, the important part was that I am not sure if I would have stayed in grad school had I not written it, or found someone willing to read and discuss it with me, shoutout here to Bill Haver. Negri made it possible for me to conjoin doing philosophy and engaging the world politically, to see these as two sides of the same process, the same practice of philosophy. I should mention that this was before Empire, but just barely. I am not saying that to claim that I was into Negri before he was cool, but just that my first encounter with Negri was in some sense with an outsider. He was rarely talked about in classes, and his books were more associated with the para-academic presses of Autonomedia and Semiotexte than the presses that were translating and publishing the big names of theory, Derrida, Deleuze, Lacan, etc.With the news of his death I started to think about Negri again for the first time in awhile. I had not read anything by Negri in years (the little book on Spinoza was probably the last), nor really engaged with his writings in a long time. Philosophers still have their effects, still shape our thought long after we stop directly reading and writing about them. It just so happened the day that I learned of Negri's death was the day that we met for the Spinoza and Marx seminar. We spent part of the time talking about the importance of Negri's reading. He was not the first Marxist/Spinozist, but Marx-Spinozism would be fundamentally different without him. This is because Negri puts the intersection of metaphysics and politics, ontology and history at the center of his reading of Spinoza  It is well known that Spinoza interrupted his writing of the Ethics, a book he had worked on for years, to write and publish anonymously the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, as political intervention. For Negri this interruption is also a fundamental transformation: Spinoza's engagement with politics and history, with the historical force of the imagination, with the politics of affects, and the reality of power, transforms his understanding of imagination, affects, and power in the Ethics. As Negri writes in a passage that I have cited more than once, and returned to again and again. "After the development of such a radical pars destruens, after the identification of a solid point of support by which the metaphysical perspective re-opens, the elaboration of the pars construens requires a practical moment. The ethics could not be constituted in a project, in the metaphysics of the mode and of reality, if it were not inserted into history, into politics, into the phenomenology of a single and collective life: if it were not to derive new nourishment from that engagement."Negri effectively inverted our image of Spinoza, and with it our image of philosophy, it was no longer a matter of detaching oneself from history and politics in order to contemplate the world, of thinking sub specie aeternitas, but of plunging oneself into the historical moment in order to transform philosophy.In a piece I wrote on Negri that was recently republished in The Production of Subjectivity: Marx and Philosophy I described this transformation as follows:"While the Theologico-Political Treatise constitutes a fundamental displacement of the problems of the Ethics, from order as metaphysical problem to the historicity of the organization of human desires and beliefs, it does not complete this process. The Theologico-Political Treatise does not supplant the Ethics. Negri argues that the Treatise does not follow through on its most radical insights. It begins with the materiality of the imagination, with the power of constitutive praxis, but it ultimately crashes upon the universals of 'natural right' and the 'natural light of religion', universals which undermine the constitutive process. The contract subordinates the powers of society to a transcendent order and a pre-constituted end, thereby limiting the constitutive process. However, the results of the Treatise are fundamentally ambiguous: as much as the contract is introduced as an ordering structure of society, it is modified by the idea of power. As Spinoza writes, 'Nature's right is co-extensive with her power'. This redefinition of right as power fundamentally undermines two of the constitutive dimensions of natural right that philosophy exemplified by the contract, 'the absolute conception of the individual foundation and the absolute conception of the contractual passage'. In place of the absolutely individualistic foundation that paves the way for the absolute authority of the sovereign, Spinoza introduces a new theoretical object, the 'passions of the body social'. Right is coextensive with power: there is no natural state of power nor a final goal, only the historicity of its various organizations. There is thus no transfer of power, no actual passage from potentia to potestas, there is just the organization of potentia, of the striving (conatus), desire (cupiditas), and affects of the multitude. It is precisely this organization that is examined and developed in what Negri calls the 'second foundation' of the Ethics, Parts III and IV which develop the logic and sociability of the passions. This second foundation does not only develop the idea of conatus as the essence of each individual (EIIIP7), it also develops the logic of the affects as the determination of this desire. The affects begin with the most immediate, and simple, determinations – pain, pleasure, love and hate – and gradually unfold to encompass the constitutive conditions and constitutive power of subjectivity, which is not an autonomous starting point but is immersed in the power of affects. 'The nexus of composition, complexity, conflictiveness, and dynamism is a continual nexus of successive dislocations that are neither dialectical nor linear but, rather, discontinuous'. Thus, as much as the Theologico-Political Treatise disrupts the remnants of a metaphysical order, its provocation that the historicity of desire and affects are constitutive of the world, it demands a renewed ontological speculation. It is not the Theologico-Political Treatise or the Ethics that makes up the foundational book of constitutive power, but rather the movement, the displacement, from the one to the other. In Negri's book on Spinoza this movement continues to a reading of the Political Treatise, thus passing from metaphysics (the Ethics) to politics (the Theological Political Treatise) only to return to politics (Political Treatise) which in turn informs a new metaphysics (the 'multitude' as a concept produced in the interstices of the Ethics and the Political Treatise), while at the same time stating that 'Spinoza's true politics is his metaphysics'. This statement should be read not as a choice, placing Spinoza's metaphysical works over his political writings, but as a slogan of displacement. Constitutive power as praxis is developed through a practice of philosophy as a continual displacement that moves from metaphysics to politics and back, and this movement continues beyond a reading of Spinoza."One can find a similar trajectory of movement in Negri's thought in his reading of Marx in which it is the same concepts, most specifically "living labor" that traverse a line from economics, to ontology, and then to politics. Negri reading of Marx, especially in the book known in the US as Insurgencies, but in the rest of the world as Constituent Power, reads the early Marx's idea of democracy back into the latter Marx. Marx's politics is his metaphysics, is labor as the constitution of the world. As Negri writes, "As long as we follow the political Marx, political revolution and social emancipation are two historical matrices that intersect on the same terrain—the constitutional terrain—but still in an external manner, without a metaphysical logic of this intersection being given…This necessity resides at the core of Marx's theory of capital, where living labor appears as the foundation, and the motor of all production, development, and innovation. This essential source also animates the center of our investigation. Living labor against dead labor, constituent power against constituted power: this single polarity runs through the whole schema of Marxist analysis and resolves it in an entirely original theoretical practical totality."What I have tried to focus on here is what I have called, following Althusser and Balibar, is Negri's practice of philosophy, his way of doing philosophy (this was also the focus of the essay cited above). It is a trajectory which constantly moves from history and politics into ontology and from ontology into politics and history without ever, it seems to me, using a historical moment to criticize an ontology or developing an ontology that would ground a politics. It is a trajectory of displacement and transformation in which history, politics, and economics transform philosophical speculation, ontology and metaphysics, while at the same time philosophical speculation transform and reimagine the possibility of political practice. It would seem to me that this is the fundamental orientation that defines Negri's thought, and it is this orientation which is eternal, which continues to live, even after the concepts produced by that trajectory pass away, as they would have to being products of a given historical moment. (Here I have to recommend Roberto Nigro's little book Antonio Negri: Une Philosophie de la Subversion, which I read in the week since Negri's death. Nigro reminds us that the question of the historical relevance of particular concepts, was in some sense the central political and philosophical trajectory of not just Negri's thought but of what is called autonomist thought or post-autonomist thought. Concepts like the mass worker, the social worker, general intellect, and multitude are not just different theoretical positions, but also attempts to make sense of the shifting and changing nature of capitalism itself.) What Negri proposed for philosophy is not easy, and I would even argue that not even Negri always did it well. (In some sense this is a specific version of the general problem of doing philosophy after Marx). It is easy to err on both sides, to simply let a historical, economic, or political transformation stand in for a philosophical analysis, or, on the other side, to dissolve the specificity of a historical moment into a general ontological concept. However, as Spinoza wrote, "all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare." When it is done well such a method of displacement, of pars destruens/pars construens, promises a transformation of both philosophy and politics. (I would say that Negri's Savage Anomaly, Marx Beyond Marx, and the book on constituent power to name a few are nothing less than models of this method). What Negri proposed in his readings of Spinoza and Marx (among others) was nothing less than a transformation of philosophy, to borrow Althusser's formulation, a transformation that would make philosophy radical and materialist--a transformation that is still ongoing, still striving to produce its effects. It is that aspect of Negri's thought which transformed, and continues to transform my approach to philosophy. 

How it started/how it is goingLouis Althusser is most known for his argument regarding an epistemic break between the young and mature Marx. According to Althusser the works of the eighteen forties, most significantly The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, are burdened by a humanist and idealist conception of history that Marx inherited from Feuerbach and Hegel. In this conception capitalism alienates humanity from his or her productive essence. Marx breaks with this influence over the course of the eighteen fifties, eventually developing his own, anti-humanist and materialist philosophy in Capital. Marx broke with his focus on humanity and the human essence to focus on capitalism as a system of relations of exploitation. Althusser in part borrowed this notion of a break, a division between ideology and science, from Spinoza's understanding of the division between the first and second kind of knowledge in the Ethics. Althusser equated the first kind of knowledge with ideology, with the imagination, and the second (and third), with science. That Althusser relied on Spinoza's epistemology to drive a wedge between the young and the old Marx has, as its perhaps unstated corollary, that Spinoza is to be identified with the late Marx, with Capital.The connection is not just Spinoza in general, but the Ethics. It is from the Ethics that Althusser would draw most of his central arguments, not just the epistemic break, but also immanent causality and the theory of ideology. The Spinoza/Marx connection in Althusser is most of all a connection between the Ethics and Capital, those two completed works of maturity. Two recent works on Althusser and Spinoza have not so much questioned this connection, but complicated and expanded it. Juan Domingo Sánchez Estop's Althusser et Spinoza: Détours et Retours, cites an interview from 1966 in which Althusser states, "the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus is the Capital of Spinoza, because Spinoza is preoccupied above all with history and politics." This point is further developed in Jean Matthys' Althusser Lecture de Spinoza . Matthys shows that the connection between Spinoza, Marx, and Althusser is the problem of reading. Spinoza reads scripture in order to reveal the hidden text of obedience, its politics; Marx reads political economy in order to find the politics it necessarily cannot admit; and Althusser reads Marx to find the philosophy that he never developed. This is not to discount the emphasis of the Ethics on Althusser's thought, or to argue for some kind of break between the TTP and the Ethics, but to insist on not only different theoretical stakes and objects, such as the theory of reading, and as Matthys argues, a different idea of what it means to do theory, not a grandiose system but a specific intervention (I should add that this model of theory makes it easier to trace a direct connection to the conjunctural interventions of Balibar and Macherey). I make this connection only to make a different suggestion, a very un-Althusserian one, as I have mentioned, again and again on this blog, on social media, to random people on the street, I recently translated Franck Fischbach's La Production des hommes: Marx avec Spinoza, now out in English as Marx With Spinoza: Production, Alienation, History.  One of the many merits of this book is that it argues for a connection between Spinoza's Ethics and Marx's Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. In doing so it makes a case for a post or non-humanist reading of the 1844 Manuscripts. In doing so he joins Gerard Granel and, more obliquely, Deleuze and Guattari in arguing for a nonhumanist reading of that text. I will say, as something as an aside, that one of the strange things about the argument about the humanism of the young Marx is that it is rarely contested; it is more or less accepted as either a good thing, Marx is a humanist, Yay!, or a bad, thing, Marx is a humanist, Boo!. In philosophy, where everything is a Kampfplatz, and nothing is settled once and for, it seems odd that this point has remained mostly uncontested.Fischbach does not directly contest this claim about the young Marx, but transforms it through the engagement with Spinoza. Fischbach's own particular strategy of reading is to use Spinoza as an agent, a developer, to bring to light the philosophical dimension of Marx's thought. Following this we can say that if for Spinoza the formulation of humanism is to treat man as a "kingdom within a kingdom," as something that breaks rather than confirms nature's laws, then Marx's assertion in the 1844 Manuscripts that man is a part of nature is consistently Spinozist. To quote Marx,"Man lives on nature – means that nature is his body, with which he must remain in continuous interchange if he is not to die. That man's physical and spiritual life is linked to nature means simply that nature is linked to itself, for man is a part of nature."As Fischbach writes, summing up this connection."What exactly does this affirmation of man as a being of nature, as a part of nature, mean for Marx, because after all, he could or could not give these formulations a literal spinozist sense. It means first of all that man is "objective, natural, and sensuous" that is to say a finite mode amongst an infinity of other such modes. The determination of humanity as a objective being would be returned to by Marx again and again up to and including Capital, where he writes that, "the human being itself, considered as a pure existence of labor power, is a natural object, a thing, certainly living and conscious of itself, but a thing—and work properly speaking is a reification of this force." Adopting the point of view according to which the human being is first of all a being in nature, a thing in the world, is exactly to adopt the spinozist point of view according to which humans must first be grasped as a finite mode: to start, as does Spinoza, from the double fact, to know that on one hand that "man thinks" and, on the other, that "we feel that a certain body is affected in many ways," it being understood that these two traits are at the same level and of equal importance..."This is not to say that this is a simple identity, humanity is nature, Marx is Spinoza. All of these strategies of the "sive" from Spinoza's Deus sive Natura to "man is nature" are transformations as much as they are identifications. If humanity is part of nature, then that also means that nature and history are not opposed but part of the same process of transformation. As Fischbach writes, "What preserves Marx from a hypostasis of historicity is, as we have already seen, precisely his Spinozism. Because if there is a philosophy that does not know
the opposition between nature and history and which resists positing their separation, it is the philosophy of Spinoza. Not just because there is for Spinoza no real difference between nature and history, but also because with Spinoza it is difficult to even hope to understand history if one isolates it from the general order of nature. If the actors of history are certainly the peoples and states, the latter nonetheless are first and foremost made up of natural individuals, subject as such to natural necessity. If history is the history of states, and the history of a state is the history of its formation, its development, dissolution, and disappearance is made by internal dissensions and other seditions. In other words, there is for Spinoza in the Political Treatise a knowledge of nature that makes possible the understanding of history, a nature that makes history intelligible. History is made up of nothing other than the natural effort that human beings expend in order to create their collective power, to create the conditions that increase this power, and from the causes (equally natural) which contradict this effort and return human beings to their native impotence. We can therefore say, as Etienne Balibar argues, that with respect to Spinoza "nature…is nothing other than a new way of thinking about history, according to a method of rational exegesis that seeks to explain events by their causes." Historical knowledge cannot be of a different order than natural knowledge for the reason that actors of history are themselves nothing other than things in nature, parts of nature."Lastly, to add one more sive to the list, as the passage above indicates the relation of human beings to nature, of nature and history, is all because of another relation, equally important and equally overlooked, and that is humanity to society: humanity, that is society. We are nature and historical beings because we are social beings. Of course this sentence could be rewritten in multiple ways, we are social because we are natural (our needs met by society), or we historical because we are natural, and so on. Part of nature, part of history, part of society. This conception underlies one of Fischbach's most important theoretical interventions, a redefinition of alienation, not as the loss of the self, the subject in an object, but a reduction to subjectivity,"This is why we interpret Marx's concept of alienation not as a new version of a loss of the subject in the object, but as a radically new thought, of the loss of the essential and vital objects for an existence that is itself essentially objective and vital....Alienation is not therefore the loss of the subject in the object it is the loss of object for a being that is itself objective. But the loss of proper objects and the objectivity of its proper being is also the loss of all possible inscription of one's activity in objectivity, it is the loss of all possible mastery of objectivity, as well as other effects: in brief, the becoming subject is essentially a reduction to impotence. The becoming subject or the subjectivation of humanity is thus inseparable according to Marx from what is absolutely indispensable for capitalism, the existence of a mass of "naked workers"—that is to say pure subjects possessors of a perfectly abstract capacity to work—individual agents of a purely subjective power of labor and constrained to sell its use to another to the same extent that they are totally dispossessed of the entirety of objective conditions (means and tools of production, matter to work on) to put to effective work their capacity to work."This is one merit of rereading the 1844 Manuscripts today, a new definition of alienation, one that is well suited to a world in which we are encouraged to see our existence as "kingdoms within a kingdom," separated from nature, history, and society, as our liberation and freedom. Fischbach shows how the reduction to pure subjectivity, a subject without nature, history, or society is subjection, not liberation. However, I would like to close with a different justification, that in the age of the collapse of the three ecologies, to borrow Guattari's term, natural, social, and psychic, we need to take up the problems of the 1844 Manuscripts in a nonhumanist way, to rethink what it means to be part of nature, history, and society.  This is a different sort of theoretical intervention than what Althusser called for, more philosophical, even metaphysical. 

David Boaz


Here we go again. Another "obituary" for libertarianism. While Salon Magazine declares that we all live in a "libertarian dystopia," and a new brand of big‐​government conservatives promise to free the Republican party and American government from their libertarian captivity, Barton Swaim declares in the Wall Street Journal that a new book "works as an obituary" for libertarianism. That's not a characterization that I think the authors—Matt Zwolinski and John Tomasi—would accept of their book, The Individualists: Radicals, Reactionaries, and the Struggle for the Soul of Libertarianism.
Swaim notes that the book surveys many different kinds of self‐​styled libertarians over the past two centuries, and that the authors lay out six "markers" that libertarians share: property rights, individualism, free markets, skepticism of authority, negative liberties, and a belief that people are best left to order themselves spontaneously. Not a bad list, significantly overlapping with the list of seven key libertarian ideas that I laid out in the first chapter of my own book, The Libertarian Mind.
He goes on to argue, following the authors, "In the 21st century, the movement in the U.S. has consisted in an assortment of competing, often disputatious intellectual cadres: anarchists, anarcho‐​capitalists, paleo‐​libertarians (right‐​wing), 'liberaltarians' (left‐​wing) and many others." Somehow he leaves out actual libertarians, such as those who populate the Cato Institute, Reason magazine, the Objectivist world, and much of the Libertarian Party. Indeed, a few lines later he cites the "diversity" of "the priestess of capitalism Ayn Rand, the politician Rand Paul and the billionaire philanthropist Charles Koch"—none of whom would fall into any of the esoteric categories that he suggests make up modern libertarianism and in fact belong to actual libertarianism or its penumbras.
The whole review is ahistorical. Swaim never mentions classical liberalism, the revolutionary movement that challenged monarchs, autocrats, mercantilism, caste society, and established churches beginning in the 18th century. Liberalism soon swept the United States and Western Europe and ushered in what economic historian Deirdre McCloskey calls the "Great Enrichment," the unprecedented rise in living standards that has made us moderns some 3,000 percent richer than our ancestors of 1800. The ideas of the classical liberals, including John Locke, Adam Smith, and the American Founders, are those that animate modern libertarianism: equal rights, constitutional government, free markets, tolerance, the rule of law. Zwolinski and Tomasi say that "what sets libertarians apart is the absolutism and systematicity" with which we advocate those ideas. Well, yes, after 200 years of historical observation and philosophical and economic debate, many of us do believe that a firmer adherence to liberal/​libertarian ideas would serve society well. We observe that the closer a society comes to consistent tolerance, free markets, and the rule of law, the more it will achieve widespread peace, prosperity, and freedom.
Swaim insists that libertarians do not engage "with ultimate questions—questions about the good life, morality, religious meaning, human purpose and so on." He's wrong about that. Adam Smith wrote The Theory of Moral Sentiments. F. A. Hayek stressed the importance of morals and tradition. Ayn Rand set out a fairly strict code of personal ethics. Thomas Szasz's work challenged the reductionists and behaviorists with a commitment to the old ideas of good and bad, right and wrong, and responsibility for one's choices. Charles Murray emphasizes the value and indeed the necessity of community and responsibility. Libertarian philosophers of virtue ethics find the case for limited government to be based on the search for the good life. Swaim would be on more solid ground to say that libertarianism does not presume to tell individuals what to believe and how to live. Separation of church and state and all that. As I wrote in a letter to the Journal (not yet published), Swaim refers to the "studiously amoral philosophy of libertarianism." A popular summary of libertarianism, "don't hit other people, don't take their stuff, and keep your promises," is just the basic morality that allows human beings to live together in peace.
As for his claim that libertarianism is dead, that this book is an obituary, I refer Swaim again to all the people who complain that we're living in some sort of libertarian world. Libertarians often feel depressed; they believe the world is on "the road to serfdom." But in fact the world is far freer in this century than ever before in history. Free markets and free trade, an end to slavery and caste societies, representative government, and the rule of law now govern the Western world and much of the rest. Most of the Cato Institute's website comprises complaints about the malfeasance of the U.S. government. But in the bigger picture, libertarians have had much success. In the roughly 50 years since I started thinking about politics, one could point to such successes as:
the end of conscription in the United States
social, economic, and political equality for women
dramatically lower marginal tax rates
freer trade
deregulation of major industries such as airlines, trucking, communication, and finance
the almost total demise of communism
and the consequent discrediting of socialism and central planning
the reorientation of antitrust policy to a consumer welfare standard
expanded First Amendment protections
expanded Second Amendment protections
the progress of gay rights and gay marriage
growing opportunities for school choice
a slow erosion of the war on drugs
I could go on. None of these are total victories. No ideology achieves all of its sweeping vision, at least not without a military conquest of the government and the ability to rule by decree—and those experiments are nothing to emulate. In various parts of the world bad ideas are back—socialism, protectionism, ethnic nationalism, anti‐​Semitism, even industrial policy. The libertarian challenge is to join with other liberals—Reaganite conservatives, free‐​speech liberals, people who are "fiscally conservative and socially liberal"—to push back against these bad resurgent ideas. But this record of accomplishment is no obituary.

Carson Christiano, CEGA Executive Director, outlines CEGA's top priorities in 2024, designed to expand the way we define and achieve "impact" in the evidence-informed policy ecosystem.Credit: Ronald Cuyan via UnsplashFor fifteen years, CEGA has supplied decision-makers in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) with rich evidence, insights, and tools they can use to identify cost-effective solutions for reducing poverty and improving lives. As we've matured, we have become wiser to the ways in which our efforts may — and may not — be driving meaningful and lasting policy change. In recent years, we have turned the microscope on ourselves, looking closely at our successes and failures and contemplating ways to boost the return on investment in CEGA's work. We are especially proud of the investments we've made to make evidence more cost-effective, more transparent and reproducible, and more inclusive.This year, we're re-committing to driving systematic change in the global development community and expanding our imagination of what our impact can be. Our priorities include:1. Launching new research initiatives in priority areas.As the world continues to contend with overlapping crises, there are several thematic areas where more evidence is urgently needed. CEGA faculty and staff are working to build research agendas and partnerships to support for new work in the areas of Gender & Agency, Conflict & Security, and Forced Displacement. Meanwhile, we are working to ensure that all of our thematic areas address the persistent threat of climate change, which in turn has exacerbated both conflict and forced displacement, especially for marginalized groups — and low-income women and children in particular.2. Building open science infrastructure.A key pillar of CEGA's work is to make evidence better. As such, we're constantly striving to improve the quality and credibility of the data, tools, and analytical methods used to make consequential policy decisions and drive large-scale social impact. This year, we're expanding investments in our Cost Transparency Initiative (CTI), which is developing tools and standards for rigorous intervention costing. We're promoting adoption of the Social Science Prediction Platform (SSPP), which enables timely predictions of social science research, and the Social Science Reproduction Platform (SSRP), which crowdsources and catalogs attempts to assess and improve the computational reproducibility of social science research. We're also excited to contribute a highly collaborative, novel effort to build a comprehensive, open-access, and searchable library of results from social science RCTs in low- and middle-income countries. By consistently documenting study design, intervention features and context, effect sizes, and measures of certainty and credibility, the envisioned Impact Data and Evidence Aggregation Library (IDEAL) will dramatically accelerate the translation of evidence into action by allowing users to quickly and painlessly access relevant information for a given set of studies. Once established, IDEAL will facilitate everything from qualitative systematic review to quantitative meta-analyses, making evidence-based decision-making easier for all across the development research ecosystem.3. Promoting the use of novel data science tools and approaches.CEGA's embrace of multidisciplinary and mixed methods has allowed us to generate new types of insights for decision makers, thus diversifying and expanding the number of tools in their toolkits. For example, the use of novel data sources (like satellite imagery and cell phone metadata) and data science approaches (including applications of AI and machine learning) by CEGA researchers allows them to paint a more complete or accurate picture of what's happening in a given geography or sector than they would relying on traditional data alone. This is particularly important in conflict or climate change-affected countries where household survey or government census data may be woefully out of date or insufficient for high-stakes decision-making. This year, CEGA is scoping new activities and partnerships that elevate the use of AI-based tools by researchers and policymakers for targeting, deploying, and rigorously testing a wide variety of global development solutions.4. Putting ethics and inclusion front and center.We're mindful of our position as a Global North institution working on challenges facing people in the Global South, and are deeply committed to driving both ethics and inclusion in this ecosystem. Our Global Networks program, which has brought over 70 scholars from East and West Africa to the US for semester-long fellowships in impact evaluation since 2012, continues to thrive and expand. This year, we announced a new collaboration with the Partnership for Economic Policy (PEP) to create more training and mentorship opportunities for promising African scholars. At the same time, we're helping to set new standards for ethics in development research, for example by studying the practices and preferences surrounding the returning of research results to communities. And our Collaboration for Inclusive Development Research (CIDR) is examining — using both qualitative and quantitative methods — how the inclusion of African scholars can influence evidence-informed policymaking, and the obstacles that remain in doing so.As CEGA matures and the world around us continues to shift, we're striving to update how we define and articulate "impact" — not only in terms of our investments in research and evidence, but also our investments in methods, training, and research dissemination. In other words, we're beginning to measure success not just by the specific programs or policies that have been informed by CEGA evidence — although that is important of course — but also by the ways in which the entire global development ecosystem has shifted towards the effective use of evidence. This year, we're prioritizing efforts to better track and learn from our past experience and proactively integrating these lessons into our work.At CEGA, we're motivated by the opportunities that lie ahead and stretching our imaginations about the kind of impact we can have. We can't do it alone — we're proud of our collaborations with public, private, and non-profit partners, especially with those in the Global South, and look forward to seeing what we can do together this year (and beyond!) to make global development decision-making more cost-effective, innovative, and inclusive.Innovating for Impact was originally published in CEGA on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

On this day in 1790, the great economist, moral philosopher and social psychologist AdamSmith died. The story is that he was entertaining friends at his home, Panmure House offEdinburgh's Canongate, when he felt unwell, rose and said: "Friends, we will have tocontinue this conversation in another place." He died soon after.It's a nice story, though greatly exaggerated for effect. Adam Smith's religious beliefs are amatter of debate, and it unlikely he believed in an afterlife anyway. Indeed, though he diedseventy years before Darwin's Origin of Species, he was grasping towards an evolutionaryexplanation of why human life, in economics, morality and other areas, seems to serve us ingenerally beneficial ways, without the need for any conscious direction from governmentsor anyone else. As if directed by an Invisible Hand, he wrote, though he knew there was noconscious entity moving that hand. Or Providence, he suggested. How it generated theharmony that F A Hayek would later call spontaneous order was a mystery to Smith, and tohis friend David Hume and other scholars of the age.Smith ordered that, on his death, all his papers should be burned, apart from one essay onThe History of Astronomy. It was not such an uncommon request at the time: people did notwant to be judged on the basis of their random notes and half-though-out jottings. But wewere lucky he spared The History of Astronomy, which is a remarkable essay in thephilosophy of science, advancing a trial-and-error thesis that would not be lost on thetwentieth-century author of The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Sir Karl Popper.The fact that Smith wrote on scientific method demonstrates how wide his interestsand his expertise were. As well as the economics for which he is most remembered today, he alsowrote and lectured on the use of language, on the arts, on justice, on politics and on moralphilosophy. In fact it was his first book on ethics, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, that in1759 made him internationally famous — and guaranteed him a generous income for lifethat would give him the freedom to think about economics and write his 1776 masterpieceAn Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, which he referred to as hisInquiry, but to us is known as simply The Wealth of Nations.In this, Smith offers an explanation of why, in economics, the spontaneous order ideaworks. For centuries, people imagined that the only gainers in any economic transactionwere those who ended up with the money. But Smith noted that their customers benefitedtoo, by getting goods or services that they valued more than the cash. Indeed, the tradewould not happen unless both sides thought they were getting value from it. To maximisethe creation and distribution of value, he concluded, we need to be facilitating freeexchange — not thwarting it with protectionist measures against foreign imports ordomestic regulations on what and how people are allowed to trade.This simple 'system of natural liberty', explained Smith, was what allowed the spontaneoussociety to flourish and raised nations from poverty to prosperity. It enabled individuals tostrive to 'better their condition', and that of their families. By contrast, regulations and lawswere too often laid down by politicians and their business cronies: to promote their owninterests, most generally in opposition to the interests of the working poor.Smith would have regarded a government that controls nearly half the economy, spendingnearly half the nation's GDP — a concept that he introduced to the world on the very firstpage of The Wealth of Nations — as the greatest tyranny. Taxes, he thought, were anotherway in which established interests skew things in their favour and block potentialcompetition. Taxes, he argued, should be as low as possible, should encourage rather thanrestrict free trade and innovation, and should be simple, understandable and convenient topay. One can imagine what he might have thought of a tax code like the UK's, which islonger than The Wealth of Nations itself, and a regulatory rule book that is even longer.When economic freedom, tempered by Smith's moral virtues of prudence, justice,beneficence and self-control, has been allowed to flourish, it has led to the greatestincrease, and spread, of human prosperity. The free trade era of the nineteenth centuryenriched much of the world and brought humanity cheap food and manufactures. Theglobalisation of the twentieth and twenty-first brought nearly all nations into the worldtrading system and thereby pulled a billion people out of dollar-a-day poverty.Adam Smith's intellectual and practical legacy is plain enough. The issue is whether theworld's governments will ever stop frittering it away.

Robert Wade on Zombie Ideas, Being inside the World
Bank, and the Death of Ethics in Economics after the Marginal Revolution







The global
economy is at the core of some of the main issues in contemporary International
Relations. But how do we understand the global economy and what impact does
that have on how we deal with the power politics around it? A fault line seems
to have emerged between those who take economic theory seriously and those who
denounce it for being part of the problem. Informed by his training as an
anthropologist, Robert H. Wade—professor at the LSE—takes a different tack: he
bases his engagement with the way in which Adam Smith has been appropriated to
advocate for a dominant view of 'free markets' on real-world economics and in-depth
accounts of insiders. In this Talk,
Wade—among others—discusses experimentation in international economic
regimes, why the International Financial Institutions don't fight economic
crises, and the powers and perils of being inside the World Bank.




Print version of this Talk (pdf)




What is,
according to you, the biggest challenge / principal debate in current
International Relations? What is your position or answer to this challenge / in
this debate?



If we'd reframe
your question as being more broadly about global studies, I think that one of
the really fundamental questions is how and why it is that the precepts of neoliberalism
have penetrated into every nook and cranny of Western societies, and have
penetrated to a very large extent many non-Western countries.



This has
happened especially, but not only, through the agency of the IMF and the World
bank, which have imbued these neoliberal principles; through the mechanism of
graduate education: children of the elites in developing countries go out to
American, British, other Western universities, and they learn that this is
'true' economics, or 'true' IPE, or 'true' Political Science, and then they
come back and implement these same principles and make them a reality back
home. But across the globe, this even holds for the Nordic countries. In
Iceland and other Nordic countries, from the 1980s, networks of people sharing
a belief in neo-liberal precepts, began to form and sort of place each other in
key positions within the state, and in politics, and built a momentum in this
direction. These precepts have become understood as just natural, as in
Margaret Thatcher's 'there is no alternative'.



I live in the
UK, and the great bulk of the British public really does believe that the
government is just like a household writ large, and the same rules of budgeting
that apply to the household should apply to the state. That when times are
tough the household has to tighten its belt, cut back on spending, and it is
only fair that the government does the same, and if the government does not, if
the government runs a deficit in hard times, then the government is being
irresponsible. And this is a completely mistaken and pre-Keynesian idea, but it
is a 'zombie idea'—that is, however much arguments and evidence may be mounted
against it, it just keeps coming up and up and up, and governments come to
power riding on this zombie idea and a flotilla of related ideas.



The persistence
of this zombie idea is all the more amazing as we just had a global financial
crisis in 2007/8, which would prompt a rethinking of these ideas. But these
neoliberal precepts have been, if anything, more strongly reinforced. In
previous hard times—and obviously the 1930s depression is the exemplary
case—there has been a stronger move towards, what you could call, social
democratic precepts. But not this time! Indeed, even after the crisis, the
whole of the European Union with 500 million people is even more thoroughly structured
on the basis of these ideas. I am thinking of what is popularly known as the Fiscal Compact signed by the EU Member States in 2012, which commits all governments
to balance budgets all the time—that is, first, the structural deficit may not
rise above 0.5 percent of GDP. Second, the public debt may not rise above 60
percent of GDP. Third, automatic financial sanctions are levied on governments
that exceed these two thresholds. Fourth, the whole procedure is supervised by
the European Commission, and this is presented as in the name of sound
budgeting. This package is presented as justified by the proposition that
government is a household writ large. The most elementary principles of
Keynesian macroeconomics show why this is not simply mistaken, but a disaster,
and will keep generating recessionary pressures. It is sold as a kind of excuse
for avoiding to put in place the essential conditions for the monetary union,
namely, a common budget and a sizable transfer mechanism to the regions just as
exists in the United States. But they do not want to do that, but still they
call this agreement 'cooperation', which is all about not cooperation, but
about writing these dictates around this zombie idea written into the very
basic architecture of the EU. Beyond EU politics, it materializes all the way
down to, I don't know, the function of the privatization of the Post Office, it
goes all the way down to the sort of capillaries of how universities are run,
and the incentive systems that have placed upon academics, and there is very
little pushback. The one reason, why I am almost completely delighted about
Jeremy Corbyn's election as the leader of the Labour party, is that this is one
small case of where there seems to be some concerted pushback against these
zombie ideas. The point being that the established Labour party basically
bought into this whole set of neo-liberal ideas. It combined maintaining the
overall structure of inequality in society with more emphasis on providing some
help to the poor, but they had to be hardworking poor.



Yet, one knows
that there can be dramatic changes in the prevailing zeitgeist of norms. One
knows that there can be big changes in the space of a few decades and the
question is can one imagine a scenario in which they might be a big change in
norms back to a more kind of social-democratic direction. So where will this
take place? Because of technological change in the labor market, there is a
real big crisis of employment with many middle-class jobs cut out and
polarization in the labor market. This might then induce a political movement
to have a much bigger change in income distribution than anybody with power is
now talking about. Talk of re-distribution these days is really almost entirely
around redistribution through the state, but the point I would make is that if
there is to be any significant reduction of inequality, especially inequality
at the top, there has to be more attention to changes in market-income
distribution.



Let me explain. The
share of profits in national income has been going up and the share of labor
income has been going down. So we should harness the shareholder structure of
the market to affect a more equal income distribution by enabling a much wider
section of the population to buy into the profit share. At the moment the
profit share goes to senior executives and equity holders, but equity holders
are highly concentrating at the top of the income and wealth distribution. If
equity earners could be spread much more equally, then a much wider section of the
population would get income, while they sleep so to speak. We could institute
something like trusts, whose members could be the employees of a company, the
customers, the neighbors of the company, and the trust would borrow on capital
markets and take out insurance against the repayment of the lending of loan and
then it would buy shares, it would use that borrowed money to buy shares in the
company, and the company would pay out dividends on the shares and then that
dividend income coming out of profits would be distributed to the members of
the trust. That would be a way of getting the rising share of profits in
national income distributed out to the population at large. I particularly like
this metaphor of "earning income while you sleep", since at the moment it is
only the rich people, who are earning income while they sleep. Somehow that facility
of earning income while you sleep has to be made much more widely and available—by
using the market against itself, so to speak.





How did you arrive at where
you currently are in your thinking about International Relations?



I suppose the starting point was really this; my
father was a New Zealand diplomat, so we moved quite often. By that time I was
twelve my parents were posted to Colombo, Ceylon as it was called then. After
having lived just in Western countries, I suddenly encountered at this very
formative age Colombo and Sri Lanka. I was just amazed by that experience; by
the color, the taste, the exoticness, but I was also very struck by how the
many boys at the same age as me, were walking around with no shoes. I particular
remember this boy carrying a baby on his shoulder, the baby looked half-dead
and covered in scabs, and I think it was then I got the idea of just how
unequal the world was. Then at university I studied economics, but I also
visited my parents in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and I got another sense of that
great disparity in wealth and living standards. At this time I had come across
Adam Smith and the wealth of nations question and that helped to encapsulate or
to crystalize my interests. So I wanted to go the Institute of Development
Studies in Sussex and  got enrolled for a
PhD in economics, but en route I spent several weeks in India and during that
time I began to dwell upon just how boring and how useless everything I studied
under the name of microeconomics. I kept thinking of these dreadfully dry
textbooks of marginal cost curves and marginal revenue curves and utility function
and difference curves etc., which I had forced myself to sit exams in. By this
time I had done a little bit of fieldwork, living on Pitcairn Island in the
middle of the Pacific.



When I got back to Sussex after fieldwork I announced
that I wished to not do a PhD in economics, but to do one in anthropology
thinking all the time, that this would actually be more use for understanding
why for example India, where I had been, was so very poor. So that's what I did:
a PhD in anthropology… In some ways I regard that as having been a mistake,
because the sort of mainstream of anthropology is very far away from the Adam
Smith questions. Having done the degree in anthropology, pretty soon I began to
change direction and pay much more attention to the state, to the state
bureaucracy. I went to India and I studied the Irrigation Department and other
related departments. I went to South Korea and I studied state irrigation
agencies and I went to Taiwan and I studied the state more broadly. So I was
kind of moving up from my Italian village, moving kind of up the scale in terms
of state agencies and then the state as a whole.



Then I went to work for the World Bank in the 1980s and
my main reason for doing that was not to do the research the World Bank wanted
me to do, but rather to study the World Bank from the inside as fieldwork. If
in some ways switching to anthropology was a mistake, in other ways it was not,
because I approached those kind of Wealth-of-Nations-questions in a way very
different from how economists approached them. For example when I went to
Taiwan and studied the trade regime, the first thing I did was to go and talk
to people who operated through the trade regime, whereas I noticed that the
published works by economists celebrating Taiwan's free trade regime was based
on what the rules said and what certain government officials told them was the
case. They had never actually talked to
people who traded through the trade regime. If they would have, they would
have learned about all the covert controls that went on such that there was
quite a distinction between the liberal face of the trade regime and the
reality of the trade regime. The reality was that the government was managing
trade in line with industrial policy, but the government absolutely did not
want the world to know that. So all this was kept hidden and I was really
regarded as rather unwelcome visitor—and in fact to this day my book Governing the Market (1990, read the
introduction here) is not well
received in Taiwan. It says the government of Taiwan did a good job of managing
the market, but they want the world to believe that Taiwan is a free trade
country. So that is the kind of intellectual trajectory that I have been on.



So I think that the value of the anthropology PhD was
that it really taught me, in practical terms, the meaning of the
anthropological maxim, which is 'soaking and poking'. To put it another way—I
love this—anthropologists are social scientists, who believe that the plural of
anecdote is evidence. And indeed I place a lot of weight on anecdotes, on
gossip, on the stories people tell, whereas economists would be much happier
reducing, let us say, South Korea's trade regime to one data point in a matrix,
and then compare that data point with, let us say, Malaysia's data point to see
how the trade regimes are correlated with growth, or something like that, and
that is really not my interest.





What would a student need to
become a specialist in IR or understand the world in a global way?



Despite what I've just said, I do think that a graduate
training in economics is very useful, provided one does not believe it. And that is really
difficult, because the socialization pressures are intense: if you do not say
the right things—which are neoliberal type things on the whole—then you will
likely not get a high grade. But I have noticed that economists tend to know
how to think, how to make arguments,
they tend to understand the idea of causality, and that may seem an astonishing
thing to say on my part, because it implies that students coming from other
disciplines are often weak in understanding the very basic ideas of causality,
but that is my experience. I had many students coming from, who knows, IR or
Political Science or Sociology or Anthropology, who clearly do not have much
idea of causality; they can describe things, but they find thinking in terms of
cause and effect, in terms of independent and dependent variables, in terms of
left and right side, they just find it difficult. So I do think that there is a
lot to be said for studying economics, and mastering the maths, provided that
the critical facility is not lost. That is point number one.



Point number two is that I think that there is a huge
premium on doing fieldwork, and the field work maybe in developing countries,
but when I say field work, I don't just mean going out to villages, going out
to see poor people 'over there'. I am talking of fieldwork inside bureaucracies:
to try and understand the culture, the incentive systems that people are
working under—fieldwork at home so to speak, in the countries one comes from. From
the students' point of view, it is clearly much easier to sit in the LSE
library to do the research. So in my marking I give quite a premium to a
student actually doing fieldwork, going out and interviewing, and having the
experience of writing up and interpreting the interviews and somehow fitting it
back into a larger argument—but really few students actually do that, and I
think that that is a real, real big mistake. Mind you, the same risk holds for fieldwork in economics as it does for
studying economics: I encourage students to work for (do fieldwork in,
experience) the World Bank; and several have—but to the best of my knowledge
almost none of them has kept their critical perspective. They really come to
buy into it.





The relations between states are settled
either through diplomacy or warfare. Why would we have to focus on economics to
understand IR?



Because economics—such as
for example balances of payment, surpluses and deficits—set the constraints and
incentives on countries in terms of their relationships with each other. A great
deal of diplomacy is driven by economic pressures: diplomacy to get other
countries to for example open their markets, or to cut deals with countries—'if
you do this, we will do that'—deals that may relate to areas that are rather
different, for instance if you buy more of these of our exports, we will help
you fight such and such country, because the manufactures are in my
constituency.



So, in a way, the way you
framed the question is part of the reason why I react against the discipline of
IR: because it tends to treat diplomacy, war, and so on, as somehow rather
separate from economic pressures, and I see these economic pressures as very
powerful drivers of both of the other two things. As another example, one of
the drivers of the Syrian conflict was that there was an acute drought (like
Weizman observed in Theory Talk #69, red), which meant that many people
were rendered destitute; rural areas flooded into the cities, and the Assad
regime just was—understandably—unable to cope; and large numbers of young men,
concentrated in cities, rootless and with no jobs, just were recruiting fodder for
the Wahhabi sect. I have always thought of economics—not so much as in the
making choices in conditions of scarcity, that is sort of Lionel Robin's definition—in the sense of Alfred Marshal, about how people make a
living, as a very fundamental driver of a lot of what happens in International
Relations.





Pikkety recently published Capital in the
21st Century, causing quite the stir. But why would inequality
between people matter for IR?



Let me comment by invoking
a very contemporary exhibit—the migration crisis in Europe now. Maybe a decade
ago I looked at the figures and if you took the
average income of the EU-15 prior to latest extensions and then expressed the
average income of countries outside of the EU—including sub-Sahara Africa—as a
percentage, then there was a really dramatic falling away of income levels
relative to the EU, in countries all around the EU and whether you took market
exchange rates or purchasing power parity. If you went round to sub-Sahara
Africa and took the average, it was more like two percent in market exchange rates
and seven percent in purchasing power parity; and the 'problem' is that there
is certainly here a rather thin slither of sea between Africa and the promised
land of Europe and to the east there are these great open planes, where armies
can go up and down to the speed of light, so to speak, but people can also move
pretty quickly across these planes.



So all one has to do—and this
might just be only a bit of an exaggeration—if one is on the poor end of this
poverty pyramid is hop across the border and you have a chance at least of
getting a very appreciable increase in living conditions and income, with which
you can then get savings to remit back to home. So the migrations pressures are
just huge. So that is one reason for linking inequality to issues in International
Relations—really fundamental issues, and very very difficult to dissolve.





You've done anthropological fieldwork inside
the World Bank—an institution drawing a lot of criticism from its detractors in
IR. Can you shed some kind of light about what kind of 'animal' the World Bank
is?



First of all, let me say
that at the micro-level—the level of the people you know and the people I know
inside the World Bank—I agree that there are people doing a lot of good work.
But if you look at the organization more generally—the World Bank and also the
IMF—they are clearly instruments mainly of US foreign policy—and any number of
US senators, members of the House, have basically said that. When they are
defending the International Financial Institutions (they often criticize them),
they do so by saying they are important for US foreign policy. And you have to
look at the governance structures to see how it is that the US in particular—but
Western states more generally—have from the beginning, through the very Articles
of Agreement, created a structure which locks in their power, and has made it
very difficult for other countries (including Japan) to significantly increase their
shareholdings. The US has kept the presidency of the Bank and the much less
recognized Number Two position of the IMF, and has used these positions to have
a very strong influence.



Just to illustrate what the
Bank and the Fund do: at the time of the East-Asian crisis—specifically the
Korean crisis in 1997-1998—the IMF mission was in Seoul. The negotiations were
in a hotel there. David Lipton from the US Treasury (and a former student of
Larry Summers who was by then Deputy Secretary) was just down the corridor of
where the negotiations took place, and every so often the IMF people would walk
out of the negotiations and consult with David Lipton, then come back in and—as
Paul Blustein reports in his book called The Chastening—often said
something rather different from what they had been saying before they consulted
with David Lipton.



Just to take another
example, the US being able to appoint the president of the Bank—to appoint a
person known personally to the Treasury Secretary or to the Secretary of the
State, or both—is really of great value: when there is a 'trustful relationship'—or
a relationship of dependency, the president being dependent on those who
appointed him in the Administration—it is possible for those people in the Administration,
or people close to them, to just ring up the president of the Bank, and talk in
a very informal, confidential, trustful way about what is happening in Latin
America, or what is happening in the Middle East, and what the US thinks the
Bank should or should not be doing in those places. Larry Summers appointed a
protégé of his to one of the regional development banks, and this person—who is
very senior in the bank—told me that Larry would frequently ring him, while he
is being driven home in the evening from the Treasury, just to have a chat
about how things were going in her region, and to pass on suggestions about
what the Bank should be doing there, and to get intelligence from her about
what was happening in the region, and so on. The point is that, making these
personal connections is of immense value, but at the same time, the US
Congress, in particular, is very much against having a big Bank against allowing
a capital increase for the World Bank—so that the bank could, as it should be
doing, increase its lending for infrastructure investment ten times. It is just
a complete scandal how little the Bank has been lending for the past 20 years
or more for infrastructure, for roads and power stations and so on. The US does
not want the Bank providing socialistic competition with the private sector: it
says these things are for the private sector to do, and the Bank has to take
care of poverty, because the private sector is not interested in poverty.



So the US wants to keep the
presidency of the Bank, it wants to keep, secondly, its unique veto right on
the big decisions, such as decisions on whether to increase the capital base—but
provided those two things are met it does not care that much about the Bank. In
the case of the Fund, the US is also very powerful, but of course the Europeans
have a bit more relative power. Right now I think the world is in an even more dangerous
sort if financial condition than might appear, because the IMF is acutely short
of secure or guaranteed lending resources, so if there is to be another round
of crisis—as I think is entirely likely within the next five years—the Fund
depends upon borrowing short-term from member countries, like on six months
terms, but member countries can say 'no', and that means that the Fund's
ability to fight crises is quite constrained. The Fund should implement what
was agreed in 2010 by all the member countries represented on the board of the
IMF: to roughly double the quote of the guaranteed lending resources, that is,
resources the countries actually hand over to the Fund, over which they
actually give up country control. All the relevant capitals ratified it with
one exception—the US—because Congress refused because the individual barons,
who are not under that much party discipline, each said to the Treasury: 'look,
the question of the IMF is of zero significance to my electorate, so if you
want my vote on the IMF, you have to give me things that I want like projects
in my constituency and so on'. The Treasury added up the demands of the people,
whose vote had to be won, and it considered those demands were just way, way,
way over the top. As long as a Democrat is in the presidency, while the House
is controlled by Republicans the world is sort of held hostage to this. Beyond
this example, this actually entails a structural problem: the US blocking or
producing a gridlock in international organizations, because the Congress is
hostile to international organizations, because Congress sees it to imply a
loss of US sovereignty. The only way to end this gridlock is to end the US veto
in the Fund and the Bank, but the problem is that the US can veto any measures.



One response of the big
developing countries is to create bypass organizations—such as the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Banks, such as the new Development Bank, such as the
Contingent Reserve arrangement the BRICs have established, and then a growing
number of sort of regional development banks. And I think that that is a good
thing, but it does raise questions about coordination, about who is looking
after, if you will, the global interests, global issues such as climate change.
In short, we need a genuine World Bank, rather than the American-Bank-in-the-World
we have today.



You engage thoroughly with economics and
economic theory. Now there seem to be two kinds of critical approaches to
economics in IPE: one criticizes its rationality as flawed, and another buys
into its rationality but attempts to point out where actual policy gets it
wrong. Where do you stand in this?



If you take the example of
how the EU attempted to impose fiscal rules on Greece, you see a notion of
rationality which draws upon these very primitive notions that I referred to
right at the beginning, where the government is just a household writ large,
and the same set of rules that apply to the budgeting of the household must
apply to the government as well. Here, the assumption is that any macroeconomic
proposition must have microeconomic foundations, that it must be derivable from
propositions about microeconomic agents acting in this sort of self-maximizing
way, and if you cannot derive macroeconomic propositions from those micro
foundations, then there is something unreliable, un-rigorous about your macroeconomics.
So what are then the sources of these micro-economic assumptions?



This leads us to one
fundamental and almost completely unaddressed weaknesses of economics can be
traced back to the Marginal Revolution in the late 19th
century. From that moment onwards, there has been an attempt to model economics
on physics, and that was very explicit on the part of people like Pareto and
Walras, and Jevons, early Marginalist thinkers. They even drew up tables with
terms of physics, like velocity, on one side, and then corresponding terms in
economics on the other. That had a huge benefit in terms of the 'science' of
economics, because it cut economics loose from Adam Smith's and other classical
economists' preoccupations with issues of morality and ethics. Adam Smith
thought his most important book was not the Wealth of Nations but his Theory of Moral Sentiments, on which he was working,
revising yet again, when he died. For Smith, economics and morals were never
separate worlds, but intimately related. So for him, the Theory of Moral
Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations were just twins. The point
about the marginalist revolution, and the embrace of physics as the model, was
that it cut economics free of all that sort of subjective stuff about values. So
economics after the marginalist revolution set off with the assumption that not
production, but the movement of individuals in markets engaged in trading with
each other became the center of gravity of economics. Making the study of exchange
rather than the study of production central was analogous to, say, Boyle's Law
in physics. Boyle's Law in physics explained the
movement of molecules in gasses, as a function of the pressure applied to the
gas. So why did they make that analogy?



The point of likening of
individuals in microeconomic actions with molecules in gasses was the
following. Everybody knows that we do not apply any consideration of
ethics or moral sentiments to the movement of the molecules in gas, so neither should
we apply any notions of ethics or moral sentiments to the movements of
individuals in market exchanges. And that was the way that all considerations
of ethics, of morality were just removed from economics. I for instance asked the
question to well-known American growth theorist, as we were walking down the
street in Providence at Brown University: 'is it moral for people to freeride?'
And he said, 'yes of course, provided they do not break the law'. So ethics and
questions of morality have been almost completely expunged from economics in a
way that would horrify classical economists including Smith; and a particular idea
of rationality has been an important part of cleansing economics from those
moral considerations. George DeMartino, editor of the Oxford Handbook of
Professional Economics Ethics which just appeared has a wonderful phrase to
capture this—'econogenic harm': the harm built into the way that economics,
professional economists work.





Haven't specific fields, like development
economics—a field you engage with yourself—advanced to overcome these
weaknesses in economic theory?



Let me root my answer again
in observations about the linkages between theory and practice, for it is in
practice that economic theory really does its work and its politics becomes
visible. It always amazes me we have had a development industry in place for
roughly the past 70 years with vast numbers of people, organizations, money all
orchestrated underneath this umbrella of development; yet if you go back and
read what the early writers about development and economic growth said—I am
thinking of people like Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, Myrdal, Hirschman, Prebisch, but also Moses Abramovitz. If you go back and look
at what they were saying, it seems to me that we have not advanced all that
much. Sure, we have advanced a lot in terms of econometric techniques, but in
terms of substance we have not. One conclusion I draw from that is that it is
really important that international regimes—for example, World Bank and IMF
loan conditions, but also WTO regimes—give room for experimentation, because it
is really not the case that 'there is no alternative'. This Washington
Consensus agenda has clearly not been effective in accelerating production,
upgrading it, and production diversification, or export upgrading, or export
diversification. So, there should be written into the regimes a lot of room for
experimentation. But this isn't there because of the political origin of these
regimes; because of what western countries want for the rest world, namely, to
open the rest of the world to their markets.



In the 80s there were a lot
of experts in industrial development in the World Bank and they did good work,
promoting industrial growth and investment in productive infrastructure. But
then Anne Krueger came in as chief economist, and brought in a whole lot of
people with her—who, like here, were arch-neoliberals. The industrial growth
people were invited to find employment elsewhere, or to rebrand themselves as
experts in who knows what, environmental assessment, primary education, or good
governance. There was no room for them. This also fitted well with some bad
experiences the Bank had had with investing in infrastructure. It had gotten
into a lot of trouble with large-scale infrastructural interventions such as
roads and dams and the like from, especially, US NGOs mobilizing Congress—which
then put pressure on the Treasury and so on. My lament throughout this whole
conversation has been that we seem to have become just locked into this
direction that was set in the 1980s, and it is very difficult to see what kind
of economic catastrophe would be necessary to give a sufficient shock to
reroute the global system of economic governance.



So after the 1980s, the
Bank sort of backed off and began saying that development, economic
development, was about poverty reduction—the slogan of the Bank became, 'our
dream is a world free of poverty'. You can understand that shift partly in
terms of pulling out of the concern with production to get into safe territory,
but also because poverty reduction seemed to sort of take care of inequality,
because you reduced inequality to poverty—to the poor 'over there', and we can
feel good about helping them; but we do not want talk about inequality, which
involves us, because then there is the question of justice of our income.



But then the most recent
turn is that we're seeing a renewed push for infrastructure in the World Bank
and western development agencies. I think that you can link this recent
infrastructure push to uncertainty about the sources of economic growth. In the
West there is a real question about sustaining economic growth without housing
bubbles and stock market bubbles—in other words, without endogenously building
financial instability. There may well be a similar sort of issue in terms of
the growth of developing countries.





Last question. Adam Smith seems to be
constantly present in your work as a critical interlocutor. How come?



I kind of engage in a
critical debate with Adam Smith, but especially with people today, who believe
his ideas. I often start to frame arguments in terms of his famous 40 word
summary of the causes of the relative wealth of nations, which he actually
wrote in 1755, which is to say long before the first edition of the Wealth
of Nations. I will just tell you what these 40 words say, and then I will
tell you the significance of them. He said:



'Little else is
requisite to carry a state to the highest degree
of opulence from the lowest
barbarism than peace, easy taxes, and tolerable
administration of justice; all the rest being
brought about by the natural course of things.'



So I am struck by how today
many economists say or imply that this is essentially right; you need some
qualifications of course, but essentially that is the nub of it. You might have
to translate peace, easy taxes, tolerable administration of justice into more
modern terms, but that is the essence of it. For example, Gregory
Mankiw—Professor of economics at Harvard, former chair of the National Council
of Economic Advisers during the Bush administration, and author of a very
popular textbook in economics—said in the Wall Street Journal in 2006: Adam Smith was right to
say that – and then he gave the 40 word quote. The renowned economists Timothy
Besley and Torsten Persson wrote Pillars of Prosperity, which also
begins with Smith's 40 words, and they even see the book as a kind of
elaboration, but in that same kind of spirit, of Smith's basic idea. So my
point is that these ideas are still current; they are still the sort of front
of a lot of neoliberal thinking. I am just astonished these ideas all these
centuries later remain so powerful. I have had at the back of my mind the idea
of organizing an international competition to provide a contemporary 40 word
statement, which is sort of equivalent to Smith's, which would obviously have
to be of a more global character, encompassing the globalized world economy.







Robert Hunter Wade worked at the Institute of
Development Studies, Sussex, 1972-95, World Bank, 1984-88, Princeton Woodrow
Wilson School 1989/90, MIT Sloan School 1992, Brown University 1996-2000.
Fellow of Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton 1992/93, Russell Sage
Foundation 1997/98, Institute for Advanced Study, Berlin 2000/01. Fieldwork in
Pitcairn Is., Italy, India, Korea, Taiwan. Research on World Bank
1995-continuing. Author of Irrigation and Politics in South Korea (1982), Village
Republics: The Economic Conditions of Collective Action in India (1988,
1994), Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government
in East Asia's Industrialization (1990, 2003). Latter won American
Political Science Association's award of Best Book in Political Economy, 1992.



Related links





Faculty profile at LSE
Read Wade's The Piketty
phenomenon and the future of inequality (2014, real-world economics review)
here (pdf) 
Read Wade's Capitalism
and Democracy at Cross-Purposes (2013, Challenge) here (pdf) 
Read Wade's Rethinking
Industrial Policy for Low Income Countries (2007 ADB Conference paper) here
(pdf) 
Read Wade's Bringing the
State Back In (2005, IPG) here (pdf) 
Read Wade's Is
Globalization Reducing Poverty and Inequality? (2004, World Development)
here (pdf) 
Read Wade's Creating
Capitalisms (Introduction to 2003 book 'Governing the Market') here (pdf) 


Print version of this Talk (pdf)

 Elizabeth Anderson is always an interesting author for me to read because as much as we are both concerned with the same issues, namely,  the politics of work, and the domination of the work ethic over our lives, we approach these issues from fundamentally different philosophical perspectives. Anderson is for the most part working on these issues from within the liberal tradition, construed broadly, while my approach is framed in large part by the traditions of Marxism and Marxist Spinozism. Determination is negation, as Marx cited Spinoza as saying, and it is through reading Anderson that I get a deeper sense of my own philosophical commitments and perspective.Anderson's latest book is, as the title and subtitle make clear, about the work ethic and how it has been reworked by neoliberalism. Her critique is in some sense an immanent one, demarcating a division between a progressive and conservative work ethic. In some sense this division draws a line of demarcation that can be traced back to such thinkers as John Locke. It is a question of asking who or what was being referred to when Locke argued that, "God gave the world to men in common…He gave it to the use of the industrious and rational (and labor was to be his title to it) not to the fancy or covetousness of the quarrelsome and contentious." Where the quarrelsome and contentious that Locke was arguing against the lower classes, the rabble, who begged rather than worked, or were they the landed gentry and aristocratic classes, that lived off of their inheritance rather than laboring? Anderson makes the claim that it is as much the latter than the form, that the central line of demarcation in Locke's writing is between idle and industrious and this line of demarcation cuts against the wealthy as much as the poor. As much as Locke can be understood as arguing for inequality and the accumulation of a few, it is only because those few are proven to be more industrious. Anderson rejects the interpretation put forward by C.B. Macpherson and others that Locke is developing the philosophical foundations for capitalism. For her the line "turfs my servant has cut" is less a symptom of an emergence of wage labor than a residue of the disappearing world of indentured servitude. Locke is positioned as a starting point of a division between the progressive and conservative work ethic, a disagreement "within economic liberalism," as Anderson puts it.  As she argues, "The progressive work ethic includes the virtues of industry, saving for investment, and prudential planning. As a secularized ideal, it aims to bring the rewards of following the work ethic from the next life into this one." In contrast to this the conservative work ethic focuses on work itself as a source of discipline primarily for the poor and working classes. The meaning of the work ethic does not end or begin with Locke. After Locke it continually vacillates between its progressive meaning, critical of the idle rich as much as the unemployed, and its conservative meaning, focused on the idleness of the poor. Caught between these two interpretations is the question of how unemployment is understood, is it structural, an effect of the capitalist division of labor, or is it an individual issue, a failure of resolve, dedication, and industriousness? As Anderson writes, "Poor law reforms at turn of the seventeenth century had been drafted partially in response to the discovery of a large class of poor who were neither the impotent deserving poor (unable to work) nor the able-bodied underserving poor (unwilling to work). This third class of poor--the "laboring poor" for whom Adam smith had great sympathy, and Burke such contempt--consisted of the involuntary under- and unemployed."In other words, namely Hegel's (cited above) the problem of capitalism is that of the rabble. By and large the response to the rabble, to those able to work but unable to find work, has been to double down on the "ideology of the conservative work ethic." Anderson defines ideology as follows, "By 'ideology' I refer in part to a set of explicit beliefs that rationalize some social or political ideal and its associated institutions and policies. I also refer to a system of representations, cognitive biases, attitudes, emotional and epistemic dispositions, and values embodied in the social practices associated with those ideologies."In the conservative work ethic it is work itself that becomes the central ideology. Work, wage labor, is ideological when it is in excess of its economic function. As Anderson writes, "British welfare reform and famine-relief policies in the nineteenth century reflected the key features of poverty policies informed by the conservative work ethic. They offer extremely stinting levels of relief, typically insufficient to enable recipients to escape poverty, and sometimes even to survive. They observe the principle of "less eligibility," insuring that recipients, even if blamelessly unable to work, are worse off than the lowest paid worker. They prefer to condition relief on the performance of wage labor, even if the recipient's activities would better promote social welfare directed to education, self-employment, or dependent care. Work requirements are often imposed without regard to their interference with recipient's ability to fulfill duties provide direct care for dependents."Following Anderson's understanding of ideology, it is possible to say that the conservative work ethic is attached to the idea of work as discipline and virtue, what Hegel understood as the ethical and formative dimension of work.  In some sense this ideological dimension is at tension with the economics of work, as workhouses and even modern work programs prove to be more costly than just giving people what they need to survive. It is not always in tension, however, and the overall emphasis on work as discipline and virtue has proven to be a beneficial tool of discipline and control--this is part of what Anderson means by neoliberalism. As with her earlier book on the corporation, one is left wondering where Marx fits into this divide between progressive and conservative work ethics. In some sense Anderson sees Marx as the most radical of the advocates of the progressive work ethics, "from each according to their abilities to each according to their needs" can be understood as a statement of a general imperative of productivity and industriousness. Marx went further than Mill and other advocates of the progressive work ethic in that he thought that a realization of this ideal would mean eliminating private property and markets. Anderson generally interprets Marx through the lens of Lenin and even Stalin rereading the young Marx discussion of labor as a human activity as a testament to productivity as an ideal.  Her exclusion of any other aspect of Marx, of an anti-work Marx gets the strangest dismissal. As Anderson writes,"This view draws inspiration from nascent attempts of revolutionary workers to spontaneously organize society, as in the Paris Commune of 1871, and the soviets (workers' councils) of Russia's February Revolution. However, these attempts were rapidly crushed wherever they appeared. For this reason I shall set it aside."It is a strange formulation, and if I wanted to follow through with the symptomatic reading of Locke linked to above (and expanded upon here), one could argue that she takes repression, a historical and political process,  to be a refutation, a philosophical argument. It is a confusion of defeat and failure, to draw on a distinction made by Michael Hardt in his latest book.  When it comes to all of the other positions considered, from Adam Smith to the Levellers and Diggers, Anderson considers their argument, how they understand work, its value, and its ethic. When it comes to Marx, or at least a strain of Marxism understood as a radical critique of work, another factor is introduced, how they were defeated. There arguments and positions are refuted not in theory but in the practice of history.  Of course one could argue that such a dismissal of the revolutionary tradition is almost required to be discussed in the circles of the New York Times, NPR, etc. Lest that seems too harsh I should add that I appreciate Anderson's attempt to revive the reputation of Eduard Bernstein, to at least be open on her commitment to Marx as part of liberal project of reform even if, at the moment she makes that choice, she sets aside the radical tradition of Marxism for the odd reason of its repression. More could be said about this, much more, but in closing I would like to say that she misses perhaps the most important aspect of Marx's critique of capitalism and his most important point about ideology. The true "highjacking" of the work ethic is the idea of capitalist productivity itself in that it identifies as productive, as valuable, primarily that which produces surplus value, and not that which is aimed or oriented towards human needs. What Anderson calls the "progressive work ethic" is predicated on the idea, often unstated, that work, wage labor, always fulfills some social need. Capitalism refutes this daily, not just in dismissing the important work of care, as Anderson acknowledges, but in elevating pernicious and harmful work to value creating activity. A work ethic presupposes a connection between work as an activity and some social good as a result, and that does not exist under capitalism. 

Hamas's surprise bloody attack on Israel on October 7, 50 years plus one day since the October 1973 war, and the massive Israeli military response in Gaza has dominated media coverage regionally and globally for the past two plus months.American mainstream media for the most part has avoided a serious discussion of the Hamas context, the "root causes" of the conflict, the long-term implications of Israel's indiscriminate bombing of Gaza, the morality, ethics, legality, and proportionality of the Israeli massive military operations in Gaza, and the diminishing stature and credibility of the United States among Arab and Muslim publics. The Hamas ContextHamas (Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya—Islamic Resistance Movement; the acronym means Zeal) emerged in 1987 in the West Bank and Gaza under the Israeli occupation after the first Palestinian Intifada as an alternative to the secular PLO. Israel, Jordan, and a few other Arab states were concerend about the growing strength of the PLO's secular nationalist ideology and thus initially supported Hamas's creation. Like other local Sunni Islamic political parties and movements — for example, PAS in Malaysia, Refah and AKP in Turkey, the Islamic Action Front in Jordan, and the Islamic Movement in Israel — Hamas was grounded in the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood.Hamas's political program and charter focused primarily on resisting the occupation and the state of Israel. Hamas never followed the Wahhabi Salafi radical Tawhidi doctrine of Islam emanating from Saudi Arabia. In most of its history, Hamas, unlike al-Qaida and ISIS, never subscribed to or practiced global jihad against the perceived enemies of Islam. Its operational context has always been Palestine and its leaders have always been Palestinians. Many of them spent years in Israeli jails where they learned Hebrew. Most of Hamas's political leaders are currently in exile in different Middle Eastern countries, especially in Qatar with whose leadership they maintained close relations.Hamas also comprises a political wing, which over the years participated in governing institutions in the West Bank and Gaza, and a military wing (Qassam Brigades) that has built a fighting force and planned and executed military operations against Israel. Hamas is not a monolithic group, which reflects the reality of Palestinian society in Gaza and the West Bank.Hamas's charter rejects the existence of the State of Israel in Palestine, but its political wing has engaged with Israel, especially since 2007, on pragmatic matters that affect the Palestinians' daily lives in Gaza and has shown a willingness to accept a two-state solution. Beginning in 2017, Hamas began to move slowly toward accepting a possible two-state solution to the conflict, implying recognition of Israel. Hamas leader Musa Abu Marzouk affirmed this position in a recent interview with the Washington based Al- Monitor but soon after tried to walk it back, claiming it was taken out of context.Israel, the U.S., and most other Western countries for years viewed Hamas as a local militant nationalist religious movement. And in order to further the cause of the two-state solution and undermine Israel's claim that there was no unified Palestinian interlocutor to negotiate with, some Palestinian leaders and Arab countries, particularly Qatar, suggested that the U.S. designate Hamas as a foreign terrorist organization, which it did in the late 1990s. After the Hamas election victory in Gaza in 2006, which incidentally was another intelligence failure, some important factions within Hamas sought a pragmatic engagement with Israel on such issues as labor, the power grid, water, fishing, and commerce. Some analysts within the U.S. government at the time judged that reaching out to the pro-engagement faction within Hamas would serve Israeli and U.S. national interests. Unfortunately, Israeli and U.S. policymakers rejected that judgement.Hamas's jihadism moves globalIsrael's goal of eliminating Hamas as a movement is unattainable. Liquidating the current military leaders of Hamas will bring a new cadre of leaders to the top. Hamas, like other resistance organizations, has developed leadership succession plans that go down to second, third, and fourth tiers. American and Israeli intelligence agencies for the most part have focused on the first tier with scant knowledge of the leadership tiers below that.Israeli and American policymakers have also yet to focus on the transformation of some of Hamas's military leaders shifting from a local, nationalist, religious ideology resisting the Israeli occupation and calling for a Palestinian state into a global jihadist ideology. If such a transformation takes root, Hamas would essentially move away from the Muslim Brotherhood ideology to a radical, Wahhabi Salafi jihadist paradigm. Extremists within the Wahhabi paradigm do not accept the existence of a Jewish state in Palestine.Much of the jihadist radicalization of many Hamas leaders, including Yahya Sinwar, occurred in Israeli jails. Although some were recruited by Israeli intelligence services, especially the Shin Beit, as assets and collaborators; others became more radicalized and secretive. Palestinian economic, social, and political dehumanization in Gaza and the West bank, together with Israeli hubris about its military power and presumed penetration of Palestinian society, have led many Palestinian activists, including within Hamas, to adopt a narrative of jihadism grounded in Wahhabism, al-Qaida, and ISIS. It's highly unlikely that Hamas's political leaders would be allowed to participate in any discussions about postwar Gaza unless the whole Hamas movement, including the military wing, jettisons the global anti-Jewish jihadist paradigm and returns to its local, anti-occupation resistance posture.The way forwardThe most recent public opinion poll in the West Bank and Gaza shows a significant rise in Hamas's popularity in both areas with nearly 90% calling on Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian Authority president in Ramallah, to resign. The poll, which was conducted between November 22 and December 2, finds that Palestinians view Hamas as the most legitimate group in the West Bank and Gaza.The path forward encompasses two crucial steps that are essential for a resolution of the conflict. First, the wider conflict must be viewed in the context of the political, security, economic, and human rights aspirations of both peoples between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea.Second, Washington must engage government and community representatives from Israel, the Palestinians, Arab states, the EU, and the U.N. in a serious, initially private, conversation about the long-term political status of Palestine that goes beyond Hamas and the current PA regime in Ramallah.This might sound like a pipedream, but we see the alternative in Gaza — and it is ugly.

 This post is illustrated by some of the promo work I have done for the bookI have commented before, more than once even, that the intersection of Spinoza and Marx is less a position, something like Spinozist Marxism, than a field of intersecting problems and questions. In some sense it is possible to even map out the way in which different Marxists draw from different elements of Marx (and Spinoza) creating different articulations of the relations which intersect with different problems in the critique of capitalism. For Louis Althusser the important parts of Spinoza are the critique of the imagination (found in the Appendix to Part One of the Ethics), the theory of the different types of knowledge (IIP40Schol), as well as "God is the immanent, not the transitive cause of all things" (IIP18). Of course such a list begins to reflect divisions and tensions in Althusser's writing: the imagination is integral to his theory of ideology, immanent causality to his understanding of structure and the mode of production, while the different types of knowledge persists throughout Althusser's writing as a kind of philosophy of philosophical practice. While for Frédéric Lordon the central thesis of Spinoza is less epistemological or ontological than it is anthropological. It is the centrality of desire, "as the very essence of man, insofar as it is determined from any affection, to do something," coupled with the fundamental misrecognition of that desire, the fundamental illusion of a free choice which leads the infant to believe it freely wants milk, and more to the point, the worker to believe that he or she freely wants to work. For Etienne Balibar the central thesis is perhaps Proposition 37 of Part IV of the Ethics, and more importantly its two demonstrations which map out the constitution of a real, or rational, and imagined, or affective basis of sociality.  We could also flip this formulation, asking not what aspect, or proposition from Spinoza plays a central role, but what problem from Marx. Ideology can already be seen to be the answer in the case of Althusser (and a different way in Lordon and Balibar), while for Antonio Negri the connection passes through production, through the question of what does it mean to think of history and society as something that is produced and reproduced through our action and lives. A different focus on labor, or praxis can be found in André Tosel, whose work is an attempt to think through what it means to think of praxis as poeisis and poeisis as praxis, making as doing and doing as making. This Marxist problem if fundamentally informed by the Spinozist idea that every finite thing, every mode, acts, or rather operates in and through other modes.The list goes on, and one could map out a whole set of definitions of Spinozist Marxism which would be different intersections of propositions and problems from each.  The question I have been thinking about is given this field in which every position has already in some sense been occupied how is it possible to make a new intervention. Or put differently what particular proposition and what particular problem does The Double Shift: Spinoza and Marx on the Politics of Work articulate, or think together. If I had to pick one I would say that it is the famous, or infamous Proposition 7 from Part Two, "The the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things." Of course this claim is something that every interpretation of Spinoza must ultimately wrestle with, and one could chart out the various neo-Spinozisms in terms of how they make sense of the identity and difference of things and ideas, bodies and minds. To be more specific I would say that it is a matter of thinking this as a formulation of ideology. As I write in the book,  "...Grasped in terms of a post-Spinozist social theory, it is possible to argue that Spinoza's formulation can productively paired with Marx's assertion of the identity of consciousness and life. Ideas and the imagination, like bodies and desires, must be grasped in terms of both of their internal striving, their consistency, and of their finitude, their determination. Contrary to a long-standing bias in the history of philosophy to treat ideas and things as two fundamentally different orders of reality, Spinoza posits a fundamental identity of thought and existence—, an identity that, paradoxically, makes it possible to grasp their points of divergence and intersection. Of course, as I have already argued, the very idea of ideology necessarily presupposes a difference as well as an identity; in order to be the ruling ideas, the concepts and narratives that rule ideas must be different from the experience and conditions they rule over in order to be the ruling ideas, but, at the same time, they must be produced by those conditions. There is a limited efficacy of true ideas insofar as they are true; ideas do not have effects on their own, but require conditions in order to exist and be disseminated. Spinoza's assertion regarding true ideas can be understood as a mirror image of Marx's claim regarding ideology. As Étienne Balibar describes the structure of ideology in The German Ideology,"The ideological mechanism, which can equally be read as a social process, will come to be seen as an astonishing conversion of impotence into domination: the abstraction of consciousness, which is an expression of consciousness's incapacity to act in reality … becomes the source of power precisely because it is "'autonomized." Contrary to his critical contemporaries, such as Feuerbach and Stirner, who believed in the power of ideas, and thus the weapon of criticism, Marx underscores that ideas only have power, only have effects, under particular material conditions that give some no time to think and others the means to spread and disseminate their ideas. Ideas have a causality that is not derived not from them as ideas, but from the social relations that produce and circulate them."First this has to be thought of in terms of identity, ideas are nothing other than the existing relation between things, the different material relations expressed differently. In other words, to quickly allude to something that the book develops over a few pages, the idea that there is ethical and moral worth to work, that have "grind" mindset, are the key to not only material success but spiritual worth as well, is nothing other than the material conditions, precarity, gig economy, and so on, rendered in ideal or conceptual forms. A person who feels that their self value and self worth can be measured in terms of how much they work is nothing other than the consciousness of labor power itself. In other words, the order and connection of ideology is the same as the order and connection of exploitation. Just as Spinoza argues that desire is nothing other than an idea of our appetite, the body's needs in mental form, our ideas about work, which make it the key to worth and self-value, are nothing other than our position within the economy in material form. (This is something central to another Marxist/Spinozist thinker, Franck Fischbach, who has argued that the conditions of intellectual life are the same as that of material life. As Fischbach writes, "If it is true that 'the production of ideas, of ideas, representations and consciousness (...) is the language of real life" then the production of ideologies, of inadequate representations, is the language of life incomplete, inadequate, and mutilated." Mind and body are two different ways of grasping the same thing. 

Such a formulation seems crude, deterministic, and in some sense more vulgar than the most vulgar of materialisms; it posits us all as spiritual automatons whose thoughts and ideas do nothing more than express, in a different attribute, what is already given in our material condition, in the relations of bodies. Things are complicated quite a bit by subsequent propositions which assert that only a body can affect or determine a body and only an idea can affect or determine an idea. The assertion of identity, ideas and things, mind and body, as two different ways of looking at the same thing, has as it paradoxical corollary the assertion of difference, mind and body as two fundamentally different ways of acting and reacting, each with their own causal orders and connections that are entirely independent. This is a particular dense metaphysical knot of identity and difference, but I am more interested in how it plays out practically, politically, as a way of thinking about ideas and bodies, base and superstructure Much could be said about the way this plays out in Spinoza's text, especially in Part IV of the Ethics, to underscore the limited efficacy of the true insofar as it is true, of the way in which ideas cannot change the world without becoming lived in bodies. As I argue in the book (following Tosel) Spinoza's formulation makes it possible to think of the particular double determination of ideas and bodies. That each are in some sense determined by being reflections of the same thing, the same relations, but are also determined in a particular manner by other ideas or other bodies. In other words, returning to the problem of the book, as much as the centrality of work as that which give people meaning and value can be understood to be just capitalism rendered into an idea it is also an effect of a long series of transformations within the realm of ideas from the protestant revolution onward. To put it bluntly the response to the long debate between Marx and Weber, between material determination and cultural history, is quite simply, "Why Not Both." Although to be honest I am more interested in the way this makes it possible to understand the present than debates in intellectual history. "via GIPHYTo quote The Double Shift again: "As I have argued, these two aspects are, in some sense, two different ways of looking at the same thing, the same social relation, grasped in terms of bodies and their coordination and minds and their automation. However, they also function in different ways of understanding the orientation of desire. In the first, it is imposed through necessity; as selling one's labor power becomes the only condition of survival, living is aligned with making a living through wage labor. Wage labor appears to be the only way to make a living because all other ways are effaced. The constraints of society appear less as particular institutions, regimes of accumulation, and social relations, but as the way things must be; their historicity and contingency are effaced in the present order. This structural condition is supplemented by an ideological dimension insisting that not only that one must one identify with their job, find their passion in their labor, but that such a condition is also to be actively desired. Having to work, to dedicate oneself entirely to work, is presented twice, as it were—once as a necessary condition for survival and the second time as aspiration integral to one's identity. To frame it according to the division of work and action, we could argue that work is defined as both production and action, both as the constraint of necessity tied to survival and something freely undertaken to identify and distinguish oneself. The particular double determination in capitalist society is one in which work vacillates between a necessary fact of life to an object of desire, from making a living to finding meaning. The often-asked question,  "What do you do for a living?" vacillates between these two senses; at once,, it indicates something of necessity, of one's economic situation, and freedom, one's supposedly chosen path in life. It is both what one has to do and who one is. Work as necessity and work as subjectivity, as body and as mind, do not just coexist as two different ways of grasping the same thing, but are subject to their own logic of alternation as material necessity and ideological meaning reinforce and also undermine each other." Double determination makes it possible to think at once of our particular "bondage," to use Spinoza's term, caught both in a set of material relations, namely capitalism, that reduce us to labor power, and intellectual traditions which express the same conditions through the ideological terms of morality, responsibility, and individuality. Transformation entails transforming each. There is a limited efficacy of criticism so long as it just remains criticism (of course the corollary is that there a limited efficacy of practice as practice). It is a matter of linking together the transformation of material conditions and intellectual concepts, or, what people used to call Praxis. 

This year, CEGA was recognized by the American Economic Association (AEA) for our efforts to promote diversity and inclusion in the field of economics and within our center. In this post, Maya Ranganath, Associate Director of Global Networks and Inclusion, reflects on CEGA's inclusion strategy, pointing to unequal power dynamics in global development research and discussing how CEGA ensures that our work — externally and internally — is consistently aligned with our core values.CEGA Fellows, from left to right: Jaah Mkupete, Fola Aina, Hellen Namawejje, Caroline Sitienei Koech, Arnold Musungu, Ojiri Enahoro Innocent, and Muthoni Ng'ang'a, alongside Maya Ranganath at PacDev 2024 | Credit: CEGAAt CEGA, we regularly reflect on what it means to produce evidence for decision-makers in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) from our position at an elite academic institution in the United States. In recent years, we have increasingly focused on how scientific narratives are "owned" by privileged groups and have updated our diversity, equity, inclusion, and justice (DEIJ) strategy to address this dynamic. While inclusion has always been core to CEGA, we have consistently updated our strategies to match evolutions in the development research ecosystem.CEGA's theory of change centers our DEIJ goals: our third pillar is to "make the evidence ecosystem more inclusive." We pursue three interlocking objectives in support of this:To center the voices of underrepresented groups — including researchers, decision-makers, and study participants in LMICs — in social science research and policy debates.To ensure that rigorous evidence exists to help decision-makers in LMICs address injustices in society.To create a diverse and welcoming community at CEGA, respect and reflect the communities in which we live and work, and encourage the broader evidence-informed policy ecosystem to seek the same.We pursue these objectives by investing in LMIC scholars and institutions, supporting inclusive and equitable research, promoting ethics in research, diversifying our networks and team, and creating an environment where our staff and researchers feel a sense of belonging. Below we highlight some of the most important aspects of our DEIJ strategy.Investing in LMIC Scholars and InstitutionsSince 2008, CEGA's Global Networks initiative has bolstered the leadership of scholars from Africa, South Asia, and other low-income regions by equipping them with the tools, skills, networks, and funding they need to thrive. We organize short-course workshops, host semester-long fellowships, and provide extensive follow-on support. To date, CEGA has hosted 85 scholars at UC Berkeley, Northwestern University, and virtually. The fellowships provide the opportunity to audit relevant courses, present work in seminars, apply to competitive funding calls, receive mentorship, and network with faculty members and students. These scholars have received nearly $2 million in grant funding to promote their independent research activities and mainstream of development research globally. Program alumni started the Network of Impact Evaluation Researchers in Africa (NIERA) in 2018, an independent organization of former fellows that works to advance decision-focused evaluations in sub-Saharan Africa.Importantly, the capacity-strengthening support we provide to LMIC scholars is designed to meet the demand for training and mentorship in the short- and medium-term. Longer term, we are eager to support the transfer of ownership of these types of programs to LMIC institutions, to leverage their growing capacity and resources to train and mentor the next generation of African scholars.As a learning organization, CEGA is committed to pursuing open inquiry and debate about the barriers to — and opportunities for — inclusion across the evidence-informed policy ecosystem. Through our Collaboration for Inclusive Development Research (CIDR), we are working with NIERA to develop an evidence-based theory of change for inclusion that delineates which stakeholders are best placed to add value at various stages of the research-to-policy pipeline.Supporting Inclusive and Equitable ResearchMany research approaches in development economics reinforce Western notions of "epistemic superiority" over indigenous ways of knowing. CEGA has long encouraged an inclusive approach and a plurality of methods and disciplines that, together, make our research more accessible and more relevant to a broader range of stakeholders. While we continue to prioritize the use of impact evaluations where feasible and appropriate, we also support studies that leverage quasi-experimental methods, qualitative methods, data science, and mixed-methods approaches.As a re-granting institution, we recognize our power to fund research equitably and inclusively and support research that challenges unequal power structures. Our research granting policy formalizes how and when research teams should consider DEIJ criteria when awarding new grants. Typically, when evaluating research proposals, we include criteria that assess the diversity of the research team and of the larger portfolio. We have also developed a "co-authorship statement" with our grant awards outlining how researchers should be credited for their contributions, encouraging greater equity within research teams.CEGA prioritizes research activities that address persistent inequities and injustices in society. This means moving beyond sub-group analysis and conducting research with transformational potential for traditionally disadvantaged groups. For example, CEGA recently established a "Gender & Agency" theme to support gender transformative research aimed at dismantling harmful power structures and promoting gender equity. Additionally, our domestic-facing portfolio, the Opportunity Lab, hosts an initiative on "Racial Equity in the Labor Market," which examines the role of state and federal wage and employment policy in reducing racial disparities and promoting greater equity of economic opportunity in the United States.CEGA's Berkeley Initiative for Transparency in the Social Sciences (BITSS) works to democratize the way social science is produced, scrutinized, and shared by realigning incentives for knowledge generation and use. For example, the BITSS catalyst program invests in scholars from LMICs to encourage transparent and reproducible research. Tools and standards that foster open access to data, code, and published research make it easier for LMIC researchers to access and advance new research. Additionally, the Social Science Prediction Platform (SSPP) provides a tool for sourcing input from community members, amplifying local knowledge, and helping to inform better research.Diversifying our Network and TeamCEGA continues to pursue a more diverse staff and network of affiliates. We have audited and refined our hiring processes, writing more inclusive job descriptions, disseminating them to diverse institutions, and developing a more equitable interview process. While the work of diversifying our organization will never be "finished," our efforts have yielded some progress: currently, 27% of our staff come from underrepresented backgrounds (as defined by UC Berkeley), up from 9% only three years ago. To track our progress, we conduct annual demographic surveys with staff, measure staff perceptions of the Center's equity and inclusivity, and enable anonymous feedback mechanisms. Meanwhile, we recently revamped our compensation framework to ensure that staff of different backgrounds are compensated equitably and transparently. We also audited and adapted our affiliate nomination process to ensure it is equitable and conducive to a diverse network. Importantly, we maintain a variety of staff forums to discuss our positionality in development research and reflect on current events in our communities.CEGA's DEIJ work is managed by a dedicated working group that I lead as the Associate Director of Global Networks and Inclusion, and guided by an internal DEIJ strategy and set of key performance indicators. We are energized by the AEA's recognition of our efforts over the years, while acknowledging that we have a long way to go to achieve our DEIJ goals. In this spirit, we welcome your comments and feedback on our approach. We further commit to sharing our learnings, including our challenges and failures, openly and transparently. Please stay tuned for more updates on DEIJ in the near future.CEGA's Award-Winning Approach to Promoting Diversity and Inclusion was originally published in CEGA on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

 I once contemplated getting my favorite Spinoza proposition as a Vanity Plate In the past few months, longer even, but before the recent wave of student occupations (more on that later), I have found myself in the grips of a kind of depression that stems in part from what can only be described as a gap between theory and practice. How this works is like this, all day, or at least part of it, I read books, and get into discussions understanding how the world works, and what could be done to change it and yet the world goes on unchanged, or, more to the point, it just seems to get worse and worse. (I will let the reader fill this in with whatever ecological, political, or economic calamity that comes to mind) The disconnect between the classroom and the world creates not just division but despair.This has brought me to think about the limitations of philosophy. Perhaps the most famous statement about the limitations of philosophy comes from Karl Marx. The eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach states, "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it." Philosophy, philosophical interpretation, and action, change are positioned on either sides of a great divide. Many have read Marx's own work across this divide, placing the early texts, 1844 Manuscripts, The German Ideology, etc., on one side, as interpretations, and The Communist Manifesto and Capital on the other, as attempts to change the world. The result of this is that Marx is not really Marx when he is philosophical, if you except the standard reading that Marx's early work is heavily influenced by Feuerbach and Hegel, and when he is Marx, he is no longer writing philosophy, but I digress. More to the point, Marx's formulation articulates a division between interpretation and action that is pervasive, shared by many who have never read Marx or care to. It is the divide between theory and practice, thinking and doing. At the same time Marx's formulation is easily critiqued, the very opposition it erects is unstable and seems to almost unravel itself. Is it not also an interpretation, of philosophy, the world, and what it means to transform something? Where does Marx's own formulation fall on the divide it erects between interpretation and transformation Moreover, can transformation take place without interpretation? As André Tosel writes, "It is not enough to transform the world. We still need to understand this transformation to prevent it from following its course blindly. A transformation of the world and of oneself without understanding this transformation is blind. An understanding of the world and of oneself without transformation is empty." Tosel corrects Marx by invoking, or parodying Kant (which explains but does not justify his use of the terms "blind"), it is not a matter of interpreting or changing, but of informing one by the other.Tosel's correction is framed in light of another element of Marx's thought, one more often associated with the second side of the divide, the historical or practical side. It is in Marx's writing on the history of capitalism that he puts forward the important idea that under capitalism not changing, staying the same, is not an option. Whereas previous societies, previous modes of production sought to stay the same, to reproduce themselves, capitalism is in the paradoxical position of reproducing itself while constantly revolutionizing everything else. I am referring of course to Marx's formulation that capitalism is defined by ruthless transformation of everything, as Marx puts it famously in the Manifesto, "Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind."Tosel has a lot to say about this formulation both in terms of its claim as theory, of the idea of capital as a transformation of social meaning, but also what this means for thinking about capitalism in practice, what this ruthless modernization has done to society. With respect to the latter, he often uses the term, from Gramsci, "passive revolution" to describe the way in which capital has remade the world, reduced every value to exchange value, and every relation to market relations. Capitalism is very much a "blind transformation" to use Tosel's formulation. This is something that Alain Badiou puts well in his little book The Century. The twentieth century was in part marked by grand utopian projects, by the idea of creating a "new man," these projects announced themselves as transformations that were also interpretations. In their wake we now have transformations without interpretations. To use Badiou's example, genetic engineering offers a massive change on what it means to be human but one that is without any utopian promise. As Badiou writes, "This is because such a change does not correspond to any kind of project. We learn of its possibility from newspapers; that we could have five limbs, or be immortal...In short, we are living through the revenge of what is most blind and objective in the economic appropriation of technics over what is most subjective and voluntary in politics."I am reading Badiou more for the polemic than the ontology here, and would argue that what he and Tosel offer to Marx's famous formulation is that the task of changing the world has to be understood in relation not to some static and fixed reality, but an ongoing transformation that is all the more pernicious in that it takes place without a plan or project. Seems like an appropriate clip: Dr. Malcolm as BadiouThis brings us to my second formulation of the limits of philosophy, one of my favorite propositions from the Ethics, IVP1. "Nothing positive which a false idea has is removed by the presence of the true insofar as it is true."What this means can be clarified (as is often the case) by the Scholium that follows. Spinoza begins by talking about the longstanding image of enlightenment and understanding, the sun, "For example, when we look at the sun, we imagine it to be about two hundred feet away from us. In this we are deceived so long as we are ignorant of its true distance; but when its distance is known, the error isremoved, not the imagination, that is, the idea of the sun, which explains its nature only so far as the body is affected by it. And so, although we come to know the true distance, we shall nevertheless imagine it as near us. For as we said in IIP35S, we do not imagine the sun to be so near because we are ignorant of its true distance, but because the mind conceives the sun's size insofar as the body is affected by the sun. Thus, when the rays of the sun, falling on the surface of the water, are reflected to our eyes, we imagine it as if it were in the water, even if we know its true place."It always seems strange to me that Spinoza does not mention another more important division between the sun as an object of knowledge and as an object of the imagination, namely the idea that the sun orbits the Earth, appearing to rise and set. This was not only the contested object of Spinoza's lifetime (shaping Descartes thought), but perhaps the best example of the persistence of an imagination past the knowledge that would dispell it. To this day we still talk about sunrise and sunset. (which is maybe why flat Earthers never went away. They are simply asserting what the imagination, the effect of the sun on the body tells them.) As Spinoza goes onto clarify: "And so it is with the other imaginations by which the mind is deceived, whether they indicate the natural constitution of the body, or that its power of acting is increased or diminished: they are not contrary to the true, and do not disappear on its presence. It happens, of course, when we wrongly fear some evil, that the fear disappears on our hearing news of the truth. But on the other hand, it also happens, when we fear an evil which is certain to come, that the fear vanishes on our hearing false news. So imaginations do not disappear through the presence of the true insofar as it is true, but because there occur others, stronger than them, which exclude the present existence of the things we imagine, as we showed in lIP 17."That imaginatry images and representations persist long after they have been intellectually unmasked is in some sense the central ethical problem of the Ethics, it is why "we see the better but do the worse." What we know or think is often not as powerful as what we imagine. The political problem of Spinoza could be understood as the question as to how do we make the true not just an object of contemplation, something we think but do not do, but make it as something actually lived, an ideal which is embodied in our practices and our institutions.  Spinoza's idea of the limited efficacy of the true, or the need for an idea to become something not just thought but lived, is not without its corollary in Marx. As Marx writes in the Introduction to the Philosophy of Right, "The weapon of criticism cannot, of course, replace criticism of the weapon, material force must be overthrown by material force; but theory also becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped the masses." This is a different understanding of the role and limitation of philosophy, less a stark divide between interpreting and changing than the beginning of a question of how do ideas become material, become effective.Our society does not much believe in ideas, let alone ideals. The modern university is in some sense an education in the ineffectivity of ideas. There is plenty of exposure to ideas, but the unwritten subtext of this exposure and education, is "do not take any of this seriously." Any teacher of philosophy is asked how will these ideas apply to real world, and every student in philosophy is asked what are you going to do with that? These questions are framed against a world in which what really matters, what really governs, is the ceaseless and unthinking transformation of capital, a transformation that takes place without ideas, or with only one, with the idea that anything makes a profit is good. All ideas that deviate from this are at best distractions and at worse harmful.Which brings me to perhaps the only thing to break me from this despair of the ineffectivity of thinking, the recent wave of actions and occupations in protest of the bombing and extermination of Palestinians in Gaza. Before the crackdowns on protests at Columbia, Emory, UT Austin, and elsewhere, there was USC's decision to cancel the graduate speech of Valedictorian Asna Tabassum. I remember learning that she minored in resistance to genocide. It seems absurd to expect students to study genocide and not speak out in the face of genocide. I wonder how many students at the occupations all over the nation are in some sense seeking the same thing, to translate what they have come to think into an action that is consistent with it, refusing the university's imperative "to argue, but obey the dictates of the endowment, donors, and corporate interests," an imperative that reduces all arguments and debates to bullshit because they are disconnected from any realization. Such an interpretation probably gives too much credit to the right's position that universities are dominated by critical race theory, Marxism, and other intellectual bogeymen. All those students at the occupations are probably not minoring in genocide studies. More importantly it overlooks an important aspect of occupations, a thread connection 2010 and 2011 to the current wave of occupations, the occupation library and teach in. The occupations are not just sites of practice, attempts to put theory into practice, but also attempts to understand the world, and most importantly to wrestle with ideas and histories excluded from the curriculum. I wonder how many people at the occupation are trying to just make sense of the images they have seen on various screens, namely, the destruction and death in Gaza that has gone on for months now, not just unhindered but aided by most of the world. It seems to me that the occupations are not some disruption of the university's normal function, but an attempt to fulfill what should be the mission of university: to think and live critically. At this moment in time, they are the university. 

 There are many different answers to the question of what Marx and Spinoza have in common, theories of ideology, materialism, naturalism, and so on, to name a few that have been discussed on this blog. To this list Margherita Pascucci adds that perhaps what Spinoza and Marx have in common is the common itself. This is is claim put forward in Potentia of Poverty: Marx Reads Spinoza (part of the Historical Materialism series, currently it is only out as a hardcover, but it will be out from Haymarket in the Spring). In making such a claim Pascucci focuses on the intersection of not just Marx and Spinoza, but the way in which they both assert in different ways, the primacy of the epistemology and ontology of relation. As Pascucci writes, "The commodity in Marx and the common notion in Spinoza are both defined through an other. This 'other' which defines them is the common among two or more things. In the case of the commodity, this common has a character of abstraction--it disappears at a certain point; in the case of common notions, this common is something material, that which, common to a body and other bodies, brings the trace of relation and allows for knowledge."As they used to say in graduate school, lets unpack this claim. First, we have the common notion in Spinoza, the second kind of knowledge, beyond the imagination. As Spinoza writes in Proposition 37 and 38 of Part Two of the Ethics:P37. What is common to all things, and is equally in the part and in the whole, does not constitute he essence of any singular thing.P38 Those things which are common to all, and which are equally in the part and the whole, can only be conceived adequately. Common notions are understood in terms of both their genesis and their logic. In terms of their genesis let us begin with the simple and most basic encounter, walking around in the house in the dark I bang my shin against something, I do not know what. This is an encounter marked by pain and confusion, by the affects of sadness and hate. Those affects give shape to what could be called the inadequate ideas in which how something affects me and what something is are confusedly muddled in my scream of "ow, shit! what the fuck?" In that encounter there is still something in common, something that can be conceived adequately, I know something about my body, its materiality, and about whatever I ran into in the dark. I know that it is matter too, it has density and hardness. This commonality is incredibly general, but it is the basis for the construction of other common notions. Later, in Proposition 40, Spinoza contrasts common notions, which do not define the essence of any singular things, with the universal. The universal is attempt to define the essence of a singular thing, to understand what quality defines humanity, as rational or political animal, or even featherless biped. However, the problem with this particular essence is precisely the variability of particulars. As Spinoza writes, "But it should be noted that these notions are not formed by all in same way, but very from one to another, in accordance with what the body has been more often affected by, and what the mind imagines or recollects more easily. For example, those who have more often regarded men's stature with wonder will understand by the word man an animal of erect stature. But those who been accustomed to consider something else will form another common image of men--for example that man is an animal capable of laughter, or a featherless biped, or a rational animal."In contrast with a universal burdened with an often unstated particularity we have the common as that which is common to all and particular to none.Okay, what does this has to do with the commodity? Here one only has to think of Part One of Capital.  Value can only be expressed in relation. This is the point of all those formulations about linen and coats. As Marx writes, "The value of linen as a congealed mass of human labour can be expressed only as an 'objectivity' [Geganständlichkeit], a thing which is materially different from linen itself and yet common to the linen and other commodities." There are a lot of jokes, and memes, about the laborious process Marx goes through to show two things: first, that the value of a commodity cannot be shown through itself, a coat is worth a coat is tautology, and that the value any commodity can be expressed through any other commodity. As much as this section seems to go on a bit too long, and with unnecessary precision, its fundamental point, a point that comes out in relation to Spinoza, is worth stressing, and that is that the common, the relational is there even at the heart of capitalism. In capitalism commodities relate even if we remain isolated as subjects of freedom, equality, and Bentham.This brings us back to Pascucci's point, that the difference between the commodity and the common notion is that while the common notion is common to all and in the part and the whole, both my shin and the end table (or whatever I ran into) have extension and mass, value of the commodity is not common to all materially, but is abstracted from it. This abstraction underscores the brief, all too brief discussion of money that takes place in Capital between the general form of value and the famous section of commodity fetishism. Money is of course the general equivalent, it is why we do not go around expressing the value coats, tea, and corn, in the form of linen. Money is the materialization of the abstract idea. As Balibar writes in his little book on Marx, "Money is then constantly reproduced and preserved by its different economic uses (unit of account, means of payment, being hoarded or held in 'reserve' etc.) The other side of this materialization is, then, a process of constant idealization of the monetary material, since it serves immediately to express a universal form or an 'idea."Here is the difference this difference makes. I often think of the opening section of Capital as Marx asking a question that we do not ask in daily life: how are two disparate and different commodities equivalent? We do not ask this question because it presents itself as already answered. Money is the answer. Money is the condition of the equivalence of the disparate and distinct. This is another reason as to why I think that Marx's commodity fetishism section covers the same problem as the Appendix to Part One of the Ethics. In other words, the common, the commonality of labor is obscured in the fetish of the money form. This is not a consideration, much less a review, of the entirety of Pascucci's book. I have not even gotten into the discussion of poverty and subjectivity, parts that I have some serious questions about, but her reflections on the common in Spinoza and Marx not only sheds light on a different commonality between the two, one that ultimately sheds light on the common itself.