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Social and economic inequalities have been a concern in human societies throughout history. In recent years especially wealth and income inequality have been the focus of controversial public, political, and scientific debates. The present thesis seeks to contribute to the ongoing inequality debate by regarding economic inequality from a psychological point of view. Together with Detlef Fetchenhauer, Thomas Schlösser, and Daniel Ehlebracht, I experimentally investigated the psychological determinants and consequences of economic inequality in three different studies. Of the many aspects that inequality comprises, we particularly focused on the association between inequality and justice (Chapter 2 and Chapter 3) as well as its consequences for affects, emotions, and cooperation (Chapter 2 and Chapter 4). In this context, inequality as conceived in Chapter 2 might be most comparable to income inequality because it emerges as a consequence of individuals' performance in a working task. Inequality as conceived in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 might be most comparable to wealth inequality because it is the result of a random assignment to an advantageous or disadvantageous societal position, as is inheritance. Nevertheless, all inequalities examined within this research project are closely related, as they share an economic or monetary basis. In Chapter 2, we experimentally explored the emotional and affective consequences of inequality and their association to justice perceptions. In particular, our participants had to solve effort-based tasks and were assigned to compensation systems referred to as tournament system and equality system. Whereas tournament systems evoked high outcome disparities, equality systems, as they were applied, caused equal outcome distributions. In accordance with prior research (e.g., Schlösser & Fetchenhauer, 2015), we found that the equality system was perceived to be more just than the tournament system. Yet, the effect of the system's justice on affect and emotions was found to be small and both appeared, instead, to be crucially determined by the income and the status of a participant within a given system. For instance, those that benefited from the unequal tournament system perceived the system to be unjust but reported the highest positive affect and the lowest negative affect, anger, and guilt. A possible explanation might be that—within our research paradigm—beneficiaries cannot be hold accountable for the negative consequences of the exogenously determined compensation systems which might detach their justice perceptions and affects as well as emotions. In Chapter 3, we investigated whether a person's personal sensitivity towards justice (i.e., justice sensitivity) predicts equality preferences in democratic systems. Prior research found that unequal distributions are likely to be perceived as unjust (e.g., Deutsch, 1975), hence, we assumed that persons who are truly concerned about the just treatment of others (i.e., other-sensitive persons) hold a genuine preference for equal distributions and low inequality. Persons who show the tendency to predominantly care about a just treatment for themselves (i.e., victim-sensitive persons) were instead assumed to hold no genuine distributional preferences, but rather prefer the degree of inequality within their monetary self-interest. With the help of a so-called welfare state game (e.g., Biniossek & Fetchenhauer, 2007; Lotz & Fetchenhauer, 2012), we measured equality preferences in a democratic decision-making process. Indeed, other-sensitive persons displayed a general preference for low inequality irrespective of whether they financially gained or lost out on that decision. In contrast, victim-sensitive persons preferred either low inequality or high inequality depending on whether the one or the other was in their financial interest. In Chapter 4, we finally investigated the relationship between democratically determined economic inequality and cooperation. Based on previous research which found that in particular endogenously induced inequality harms preconditions for cooperative behavior, such as trust (e.g., Greiner et al., 2012), we assumed that democratically induced inequality hampers cooperation. In accordance with this assumption, we found that groups which previously implemented high inequality through a majority choice displayed relatively low levels of cooperation compared to groups which previously implemented low inequality. In addition, we found that the mechanism driving this effect is likely based on motivated reasoning rather than based on self-selection, similarity, risk, or inequality aversion. These findings suggest that high degrees of inequality harm cooperation in democratic systems. Chapter 5 provides an integrative discussion of the presented empirical research findings, while Chapter 6 suggests possible paths for future research.

Economic inequality has increased considerably in many Western countries and has recently received increasing attention. The gap between rich and poor is now one of the main issues on the policy agendas and is potentially harmful for public welfare when it exceeds a certain threshold. That is why many policy makers are concerned with increasing levels of inequality. Economists should, therefore, provide an objective basis for decision making with regard to redistributive policies. This dissertation contributes to the literature on economic inequality with a special focus on Germany. Conducting analysis of inequality requires a decision on the exact research subject. This is concerned with the underlying concept of economic resources as well as the extent to which the household context is involved. The studies presented in this thesis differ with respect to both dimensions. The main results are briefly summarized here. Chapter 2 addresses the literature on the dispersion of individual earnings and deals with a very specific case of a wage gap by testing for an earnings premium for German members of parliament (MPs) in 2006. The analysis is based on a unique dataset of German MPs and representative German microdata. After controlling for observable characteristics as well as accounting for election probabilities and campaigning costs, we find a positive earnings premium for MPs which is statistically and economically significant. The results are consistent with the citizen candidate model when comparing politicians to citizens occupying executive positions. However, it shrinks to zero when restricting the control group to top level executives. Hence, answering the question whether the pay of MPs is appropriate is not straightforward and, in turn, depends on the appropriateness of the underlying control group. Chapter 3 extends the analysis of earnings inequality beyond the individual level and considers the household context and studies the role of marital sorting on inequality of couple earnings while taking into account labor supply behavior of spouses. I measure the effect of non-random sorting of spouses on inequality across couple households in West Germany from 1986 to 2010 by matching couples randomly to each other and predicting counterfactual labor supply choices. This allows me to quantify the pure effect of sorting in earnings potential rather than observed earnings. Using German microdata as well as a behavioral microsimulation model, I find that the impact of observed sorting on earnings inequality among couples turned from slightly equalizing to slightly disequalizing in recent years, but is generally rather neutral with regard to inequality. However, after adjusting for labor supply choices, I find that sorting in productivity has a much stronger impact on earnings inequality. This is mainly due to positive correlation in earnings potential and increases in female employment that are more concentrated in the upper part of the distribution. From a policy maker's perspective, this result implies a trade-off between policy measures promoting female labor force participation on the one hand and redistributive policies on the other hand. Chapter 4 quantifies the effect of changes in household composition, especially decreasing household size, on the distribution of total household income and pays special attention to the role of the tax and transfer system in Germany. Changes in household formation are associated with income inequality, since economies of scales in household consumption are more and more lost. The case of Germany is of special interest in this respect since the demographic development is, among other things, characterized by a sharp fall in average household size. Using German microdata, we find that the growth of the income gap between 1991 and 2007 is indeed strongly related to changes in household composition. The result for income inequality before taxes and transfers is much larger than the result for inequality indisposable incomes. This means, that the tax-benefit system largely compensates for inequality due to changes in household composition. Hence, the welfare state implicitly provides incentives affecting individual and household choices with respectto living arrangements. Finally, chapter 5 extends the analysis to the stock dimension of economic resources and looks at the joint distribution of household income and wealth at the top and introduces a family of multidimensional measures of affluence. The analysis is concerned with the role of both income and wealth for the top of the distribution. The proposed multidimensional affluence measures allow for the analysis of the extent, intensity and breadth of affluence within a common framework. We illustrate this by analyzing the role of income and wealth as dimensions of multidimensional well-being in Germany and the US in 2007, as well as for the US over the period 1989-2007. Using comparable microdata, we find that, in general, both dimensions are equally important for multidimensional a uence. However, we find distinct country differences with the country ranking depending on the measure. While in Germany wealth predominantly contributes to the intensity of affluence, income is more important in the US.

The book "Capital in the 21. Century" by Piketty (2014) marked the peak of attention for the topic of income inequality and spread awareness on the importance of ongoing research. During my master thesis, I had worked on decomposition methods for labor earnings. Motivated by this development in the literature and first experiences in academic research, I started working on income inequality as a topic for a Ph.D. thesis. The first project developed directly from the question how income inequality in Germany had developed over the last decade. Since 2005, we observed a growing labor market and economic recovery from the recession in the early 2000s. Given these increasing employment opportunities, we analyzed how income inequality developed. Our main finding was that income inequality did not increase further after 2005. On the one hand, within-year employment opportunities compensated otherwise rising inequality in annual labor incomes. On the other hand, income inequality did not decrease at all, because all parts of the income distribution benefited from the economic boom after 2006. The concept of equality of opportunity (EOP) is directly related to income inequality and labor market development. A natural question is the dependence of inequality in adult outcomes on family background and childhood circumstances when working on income inequality and its underlying causes. The literature on EOP divides all potential determinants of adult outcomes in two main categories, circumstances and effort. The former comprise of all factors outside the realm of personal responsibility for which society should not hold people responsible, such as parental education. The latter represents personal choices and effort independent of circumstances. Total equality of opportunity would exist if inequality in adult income depended on effort. As I was interested in income inequality in the household context as well, the second project stemmed from the question how measurement of EOP depends on the partner in a relationship. We found that taking into account the spouse in measuring EOP matters empirically and from a theoretical perspective. A prominent circumstance in the EOP literature is the country of origin. The increasing refugee migration all over Europe and Germany in particular raised the question which opportunities these newly arriving immigrants would face. Working on such timely events has benefits and disadvantages. On the one hand, one is sure to 1 work on the frontier of applied research and social debate. On the other hand, data is scarce and the consequences of events cannot fully be observed immediately. Hence, we started to work on the short-terms effect of increased refugee migration to Germany in terms of employment, crime, and voting behavior. Our analysis indicates a small effect on crime rates, mostly around reception centers and with respect to drug crimes. The results on labor market integration showed an increase in foreign job seekers. The recognition of refugee status is the necessary premise for labor market integration, but not necessarily sufficient. Extensive research has been conducted on the integration of refugees into the labor market and society. However, no consensus has been reached which factors perform best at facilitating job search and employment prospects. Many governments around de world use allocation schemes in order to pre- vent the formation of enclaves. In 2016, also the German government implemented a residency obligation for accepted refugees. The last chapter of my Ph.D. thesis is about the effectiveness of such an allocation scheme in fostering labor market integration and preventing criminal behavior of accepted refugees. Thereby, I combine insights from previous work in the final chapter. So far, I find a small but significantly positive effect of a residency obligation on employment prospects.

Im Jahr 2000 könnte erstmals keines der Transformationsländer Ost-Mittel-Europas mehr einen Rückgang des Bruttoinlandsproduktes verzeichnen. Seit Mitte 1999 hat sich die Wirtschaftslage in allen Ländern verbessert, allerdings von sehr unterschiedlichem Niveau aus. Für die russischen Produktionsbetriebe erwies sich die Rubelabwertung, eine Folge der Währungskrise im August 1998, als zentraler Impuls, für die westlichen MOEL der Wirtschaftsaufschwung in Deutschland. Positiv wirkte sich in den meisten Ländern auch das Sinken des Zinsniveaus aus. ; Reprint from: WIFO-Monatsberichte, Vol. 73, No. 5, May 2000 ; More or less all Central and East European transition countries (CEECs) experienced an economic downturn in 1998, which bottomed out in the winter of 1998-99. Year-on-year GDP data point to decelerated growth in the fourth quarter 1998 and in the first quarter 1999 in a smaller subgroup (Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) and GDP decline in others (the Baltic states, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Romania, Russia). In nearly all CEECs the situation improved in the course of 1999. In Russia, the currency crisis of August 1998 led to substantial depreciation, which in 1999 stimulated domestic production. Regional trading partners of Russia (the Baltic states, Ukraine and to a lesser degree also Bulgaria and Poland) started to recover from the breakdown of Russian demand for their exports. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia profited from an improving business climate in Germany, their most important trading partner. Home-made policies supported the upswing - especially a decline in interest rates in most of the countries, which also helped to keep real currency appreciation moderate. Inflation increased somewhat in the CEECs with lower inflation rates when world market prices for oil started to rise. Inflation in the CEECs is not expected to come down to Western European levels in the immediate future, a fact which will make it difficult to find an adequate interest rate policy. The degree of economic inequality between CEECs is remarkable. Thus, differences in the per-capita GDP are greater in these countries than in the EU. In addition, price levels, recalculated in USD terms, are more divergent between them than between western countries. The year 2000 could become the first year in which CEE economies record no shrinking of GDP. Even Russia has at last entered a path towards growth. Next year, growth could even strengthen and the more successful countries (currently Hungary, Poland and Slovenia) may be able to lower their income gap relative to the EU.

Das Thema Ungleichheit nimmt einen immer größeren Raum in der öffentlichen und medialen Debatte ein. Vor allem in der Zeit vor der Bundestagswahl 2017 zeichneten Studien und die Berichterstattung ein düsteres Bild der Einkommensund Ungleichheitsentwicklung in Deutschland. Der viel zitierte und alarmierend interpretierte Befund, dass die ärmeren 40 Prozent der Bevölkerung seit der Wiedervereinigung kaum reale Einkommenszuwächse verbuchen konnten, stellt sich bei genauerer Betrachtung allerdings als wenig robust heraus. Bei geringfügiger Verschiebung des Startpunkts der Betrachtung und bei einer Berücksichtigung von Stichprobenveränderungen wird aus einem realen Zuwachs von 1 Prozent bereits ein Zuwachs von immerhin knapp 8 Prozent über den Zeitraum der letzten 20 Jahre. Es zeigt sich vor allem, dass in den Zeiten positiver Wirtschaftsentwicklung im vergangenen Jahrzehnt die unteren Einkommensgruppen relativ in gleichem Maß wie die mittleren und oberen Einkommensgruppen am Wohlstand partizipiert haben. Dies spiegelt sich auch in der stabilen Einkommensverteilung seit 2005 wider - nach einem vorherigen Anstieg zwischen 1999 und 2005. Anders als bei der Ungleichheit deutet sich bei der Entwicklung der Armutsgefährdung seit etwa 2010 ein erneuter Anstieg an. Dieser sollte in der Debatte allerdings gesondert beurteilt werden, da er unter anderem mit der Flüchtlingsmigration der vergangenen Jahre zusammenhängt. Insgesamt werden in der Ungleichheits- und Armutsdebatte zunehmend Zeitreihenbrüche unkritisch als tatsächliche Veränderungen dargestellt. Der vorliegende Beitrag wirbt für einen kritischeren Umgang mit den zugrunde liegenden Datensätzen und für Plausibilitätstests. ; The issue of inequality has been receiving more and more attention in public and media debates. This was especially the case in the run up to the 2017 Bundestag elections, when academic studies and reports in the media drew a gloomy picture of how incomes and inequality were developing in Germany. However, the much cited and particularly alarming finding that since reunification the poorest two quintiles of the population had registered hardly any real income growth does not stand up to scrutiny. With a slight shift in the start of the monitoring period and adjustment for changes in the sampling method, what was presented as a real rise of only 1 per cent turns into growth of nearly 8 per cent over the last 20 years. Most importantly, in relative terms the lower income groups have shared the positive economic development of the past decade equally with the middle and upper income groups. This is also reflected in the stable income distribution since 2005. Unlike inequality, the risk of poverty has been on the rise again since about 2010. However, this issue needs to be evaluated separately as it is linked, among other things, with the influx of refugees over the past few years. In general, the debate on inequality and poverty is being increasingly marred by the uncritical representation of discontinuities in the time series as real changes. The present paper promotes a more critical approach to the underlying data sets and advocates the use of plausibility tests.

Ungleichheit ist generell ein Problem für politische Ordnungen, für Demokratien jedoch in besonderem Maße. Und innerhalb der Demokratien wiederum für diejenigen Typen, die auf die Beteiligung ihrer Bürger setzen. Elitekonzepte der Demokratie sind weniger anfällig. Sie können noch mit dem klassischen starken Umverteilungsstaat stabilisiert werden. Partizipationsorientierte Zivil- oder Bürgergesellschaften jedoch sind besonders anfällig gegenüber Ungleichheiten, weil ihnen ein anspruchsvolleres Konzept politischer Freiheit zugrunde liegt, das neben der ökonomischen auch eine umfassende soziale und politisch wirksame Gleichheit voraussetzt. Der Rückbau des Staates ist dann eine logische Konsequenz. Diese Konzepte lassen sich im Widerstreit unterschiedlicher Traditionen von Rousseau bis Rawls und Walzer nachzeichnen. ; Political order is always disturbed by substantial inequalities. Democracies, however, are more vulnerable than nondemocracies. And the more democracies try to become civil societies, the more inequality becomes a burden. Serious citizen participation builds on education, communicative skills and economic prosperity – not of the few, but of the many. Elite concepts of democracy, on the other hand, can handle inequalities among citizens more easily. Social and economic inequality can be solved by monetary transfers in a classic manner. This reduced view on social inequality demands a strong state system. But democratic egalitarianism has a more complex concept of equality. In this sense, every inequality which inhibits political, social or economic participation is unjust and reduces the legitimacy of democratic societies. This combination of liberty, participation, justice and equality goes back to Rousseau and has since been modified by Rawls and Walzer.

Im Verlauf des 20. Jahrhunderts haben Regierungen die Regulierung von Mietpreisen häufig eingesetzt, um insbesondere in Krisenzeiten auch bei knappem Wohnraum Mieten bezahlbar zu halten. Bisherige Forschung hat gezeigt, dass diese Regulierung allerdings mit gesamtgesellschaftlichen Wohlstandsverlusten, Misallokation am Markt und anderen unerwünschten Nebeneffekten wie sinkendem Wohnungsangebot und niedrigerer Mobilität verbunden ist. Dabei wurde allerdings nur selten untersucht, welchen Effekt die Regulierung von Mietpreisen auf ökonomische Ungleichheit hat. Weltweit lässt sich seit den 1980er Jahren ein Wiederanstieg der Einkommensungleichheit beobachten. Während sich bisherige Erklärungen für diese Entwicklung auf das Verhältnis von Kapital- und Lohnwachstum und sozialpolitische Maßnahmen fokussierten, argumentiert dieser Beitrag, dass die bestehenden Erklärungen um eine Wohnungsdimension ergänzt werden sollten. Anhand einer Zeitreihenanalyse wird untersucht, welchen Einfluss Mietpreisregulierung auf Einkommensungleichheit ausübt. Dabei zeigt sich: Die Regulierung der Mieten reduziert die in dem Gini-Koeffizienten ausgedrückte soziale Ungleichheit signifikant und verringert das Vermögens-Nationaleinkommens-Verhältnis. Diese Effekte sind stärker, je strenger die ergriffenen Maßnahmen sind. Mikro-Daten aus verschiedenen Ländern legen nahe, dass die unteren Einkommensgruppen einen größeren Teil ihres Einkommens für die Miete ausgeben, während höhere Einkommensgruppen einen größeren Teil ihrer Einnahmen durch Vermietung erzielen. Werden die Mieten durch staatliche Maßnahmen gesenkt, steigen kurzfristig die verfügbaren Einkommen der unteren Einkommensgruppen, während der Einkommensanteil der bestverdienenden zehn Prozent kurzfristig sinkt. Es ist eine Frage der politischen Bewertung, wie diese Effekte und die bereits bekannten Einflüsse von Mietpreisregulierung auf gesamtgesellschaftlichen Wohlstand und den Mietmarkt abgewägt werden.

Grundsätzliche Überlegungen zur sozialen Ungleichheitsperspektive entwickelt die Autorin in dem Beitrag, in dem sie die Differenzierungspolitiken des englischen und deutschen Hochschulbereiches vorstellt und kritisch in einer konstruktiven Gegenüberstellung kontrastiert. Ein zentrales Anliegen der Autorin ist in diesem Zusammenhang, sowohl historische als auch aktuelle Überlegungen zum Thema sozialer Ungleichheit darzustellen und mögliche Probleme in die Zukunft zu projizieren und somit auch Perspektiven für zukünftige Entwicklungen zu zeichnen. (DIPF/Orig.). ; The object of this study was to analyse the current policies of differentiation in higher education in England and Germany in regard to their consequences for social inequalities. The method consists in a theoretical argumentation based on four basic theoretical conceptions of social inequality in education. The results indicate that the differentiation policies tend to reduce equal opportunity by enforcing social, cultural and economic inequality. This study's conclusion points to further socio-political ramifications of differentiation policy in higher education, such as the increasing significance of secondary education for social stratification, and marketization as a new mode of social stratification in higher education. (DIPF/Orig.).

Der Diskurs um Gestaltungsautonomie und Profilbildung der Einzelschule, um Entstaatlichung bis hin zur Privatisierung des Schulwesens wird vor dem Hintergrund zunehmender sozialer und ökonomischer Segregationstendenzen analysiert. Die sozial ausgleichende Funktion des gesamten Bildungssystems wird gegen neoliberale Trends in Schulpolitik und Schultheorie verteidigt. Dabei wird die Notwendigkeit empirischer Prüfverfahren zur Unterstützung von Chancengleichheit bzw. sozialer Kohäsion bei allen Formen größerer Selbständigkeit der Einzelschule und im privaten Schulwesen exemplarisch begründet. (DIPF/Orig.) ; The discourse on the individual school's autonomy in defining and developing a profile of its own, on a withdrawal of the state up to the privatization of the school system is analyzed against the background of an increasing trend towards social and economic segregation. The entire educational system's equalizing function is defended against neo-liberal trends in school policy and school theory. The need for empirical tests aimed at ensuring equal opportunity or, rather, social cohesion in all forms of school autonomy and in the private sector of the school system is substantiated and exemplified. (DIPF/Orig.)

Für eine Politik, die auf Wohlstand und soziale Mobilität abzielt, stellt die bestehende soziale und wirtschaftliche Ungleichheit eine anhaltende Herausforderung dar. Dabei wird Ungleichheit in der deutschen Bevölkerung vielfach falsch wahrgenommen: Sie wird zwar durchaus als Problem betrachtet; ihr Ausmaß wird aber in wichtigen Aspekten unterschätzt, wie dieses Papier anhand von Befragungsdaten zeigt. Dabei unterstützen große Teile der Bevölkerung eine egalitärere Gesellschaft. ; Current levels of social and economic inequalities are an enduring challenge for policymakers concerned with sustaining high levels of prosperity and social mobility. Understanding which types of inequalities people in Germany regard as important is crucial. Using survey data, this paper presents evidence that misperceptions about inequality among the German population are common. Inequality is perceived as a problem and most respondents would prefer a more egalitarian society. However, people still underestimate the extent of inequality in important ways. This suggests that there is the potential for a policy agenda that emphasizes progressive and egalitarian policies. For such policies to gain public support, they should be tied to information on specific aspects of inequality.

Konfrontiert mit kontinuierlich wachsender Nachfrage nach preiswertem Wohnraum, begann die Regierung Kolumbiens in den 1980er Jahren mit einer neuen privatisierten Wohnungsbaupolitik, die Hauseigentümerschaft ermöglichen und fördern soll. Dazu wurden staatliche Subventionen und spezielle Hypotheken für die unteren Einkommensklassen geschaffen, sowie Preislimits und Steuerfreiabkommen für die privaten Baufirmen eingeführt. Besonders seit der Baukrise zu Beginn des Jahrtausends setzen private Konstruktionsfirmen auf den sozialen Wohnungsbau. Seitdem entstehen massenweise großflächige, standardisierte Wohnsiedlungen an den Rändern Bogotás. Bewohner_innen sind Niedrigverdiener_innen, die zuvor in informellen Siedlungen lebten. Für die staatlich subventionierten Hypotheken, mit denen sie sich einkaufen, müssen Käufer_innen ein festes Arbeitsverhältnis nachweisen, was die Hälfte der kolumbianischen Bevölkerung ausschließt. Basierend auf mit diversen Forschungsmethoden in neun verschiedenen Sozialwohnungsbaugebieten erhobenen Daten, analysieren wir in diesem Artikel die gegenwärtige Wohnungsbaupolitik Kolumbiens und ihre Folgen. Wir argumentieren, dass die neue Politik tatsächlich mehr Menschen Zugang zu Eigentumswohnungen verschafft. Gleichzeitig zeigen wir, dass ohne weiterreichende soziale Reformen die Gefahr besteht, dass sich die isoliert liegenden Wohnsiedlungen in urbane Ghettos verwandeln, die ihre Bewohner_innen weiterhin stigmatisieren. Zugang zu Bildung, Jobs, Kultur und anderen urbanen Ressourcen ist notwendig, um langfristige soziale Mobilität zu ermöglichen bzw. zu garantieren. ; Faced with a growing demand for affordable housing, in the 1980s the Colombian government embarked on a new, privatized housing policy designed to facilitate and promote homeownership. For this purpose, state subsidies and special mortgages for the lower income classes were created, as well as price limits and tax-exempt agreements for private construction companies. Especially since the economic crisis at the beginning of the millennium, private construction companies focus on social housing construction for profits. Since then, large-scale standardized housing estates have sprung up on the outskirts of Bogotá. Residents are low-income earners who previously lived in informal settlements. To access the state-subsidized mortgages, buyers must have permanent employment, which excludes half of the Colombian population. Based on multi-method collected research data in nine different social housing areas, in this article we analyze the current housing policy of Colombia and its consequences. We argue that the new policy actually gives more people access to condominiums. At the same time, we show that without further social reforms there is a risk that the isolated housing estates will turn into urban ghettos that continue to stigmatize their inhabitants. Access to education, jobs, culture and other urban resources is necessary to ensure long-term social mobility.

Income inequality is "the defining challenge of our time", former US President Barack Obama said in a speech in December 2013. Undoubtedly, the financial crisis and the sluggish recovery in its aftermath have increased the attention to rising inequality. This survey addresses the consequences of income inequality for economic growth from a theoretical and from an empirical angle. Both perspectives yield inconclusive results on whether inequality is "good" or "bad" for growth. This poses a problem for policymakers contemplating (e.g. tax) policies aimed at raising or lowering inequality. On the other hand, policies to promote social justice arguably do not need to pass a "do they increase economic growth?" test. Some policy proposals which would reduce inequality are discussed as well.

In May 2010, Chile's membership to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) was approved. It prides itself as the first South American member and for good reason. Conditions were ripe. After the military dictatorship ended, Chile enjoyed political and economic stability with consistent 5% growth over the past 20 years. But despite the great economic success in the country, there are still extensive social im-mobility and economic inequality due to the neo-liberal transformation of the economic and the social system during the military dictatorship under Pinochet (1973-1990). Its application was mainly a political decision of the government. Education was not as-sessed at the time of accession to OECD but Chile identified education as an important issue for further improving the socio-economic conditions of the country and economic development. OECD noted that access to good education in Chile is limited to the wealthy elite because it is expensive and largely privatized. According to the OECD, no country education is as expensive as in Chile. In addition to South Korea, the Chilean school and university sys¬tem has one of the highest private holdings in university and study funding. Only a few scholarships are offered. The study credit system which is privately organized is likewise unaffordable to the masses. On its way to OECD membership, Chile declared to adapt the evaluation data in its edu-cation system to the values of the established OECD member countries. In this way, Chile could compare its education data with the developed countries not only on a regional scale as in the past but worldwide. Innovation and equality of opportunity became the top of the agenda to further drive economic growth, strengthen competitiveness and result in elaboration of solutions for social problems. OECD presented a catalog of recommendations that Chile has tried to implement very actively but not without challenges. The issue at hand is about the extent of the influence of the OECD membership on the ...

Die Einkommens- und Vermögensverteilung hatte sich in Deutschland vor dem Beginn der Finanzkrise zunehmend ungleich entwickelt, seitdem aber ist die Ungleichheit zurückgegangen. Ob Ökonomen beurteilen können und sollen, was eine "richtige und gerechte" Einkommensverteilung ist, bleibt fraglich. Zusammenhänge können allerdings diskutiert werden: Ist Ungleichheit der Preis des Wachstums? Wie ist die Situation in Deutschland im internationalen Vergleich einzuschätzen? Können Einkommen durch soziale Mobilität egalitärer verteilt werden? ; The distribution of income and wealth in Germany grew increasingly unequal until the beginning of the fi nancial crisis. But inequality has not risen in either Germany or Switzerland since 2005. Nevertheless, Germans overestimate inequality . The German gap between reality and perception of inequality is important to investigate, as the subjective assessment of inequality infl uences redistribution preferences. Rising inequality may damage social stability and democracy, but it is unclear whether economists are able to assess a 'proper and just' distribution. Interdependencies are discussed: Does a more equal distribution create negative effects on economic growth? How does Germany rank internationally with regard to distribution? Social mobility rates differ substantially across countries; what are the implications for economic policy?

"Welfare for everyone", according to former chancellor and economics minister Ludwig Erhard, has been the credo of Germany's economic and social policy for the past 60 years. However, Germany is increasingly failing to achieve this objective. Germany is a country of enormous inequality - income, wealth and opportunities are distributed more unequally in Germany than in almost any other industrialised country. This inequality imposes huge economic costs for Germany, as evidenced by lower economic growth and declines in other indicators of well-being. And it has triggered a harmful fight among groups of society for public resources. This fight will further intensify with the dramatic changes Germany is currently undergoing, from demographic change to globalisation to the migration challenge. The main culprit for the high and rising inequality is not a lack of public redistribution of income and wealth, but rather the unusually high inequality of opportunity, through which an ever higher share of citizens is deprived of the chance to develop and use their talents and skills. Such barriers have become massive, beginning already in early childhood.