Suchergebnisse

We develop an economic model of terrorism. Groups undertake violent activities to change the status quo when they are unable to bring about drastic political change in the face of limited access to economic opportunity. Furthermore, these groups are more likely to resort to terrorist activity when they face powerful policy-making elites who can't be uprooted easily, by legitimate means or otherwise. If, on the other hand, the elite groups currently in power are weak but can't be removed from power legitimately, the dissident groups are likely to initiate rebellion activity, such as civil wars & coups, to take over the rule of the governing elite themselves. In particular, the model exhibits multiple equilibria. For example, one equilibrium can be sustained where groups with limited access to opportunity may find it rational to engage in terrorist activities while policy-maker elites may find it rational not to engage in opening access to these groups. The result is, then, a pattern of reduced economic activity & increased terrorism. An alternative equilibrium can be sustained where access is more abundant & terrorism is reduced. 3 Figures, 19 References. Adapted from the source document.

Abridged conference paper. Success in adapting the GDR's system to changing technologies and international circumstances; view of Soviet economic reform proposals.

We develop an economic model of terrorism. Groups undertake violent activities to change the status quo when they are unable to bring about drastic political change in the face of limited access to economic opportunity. Furthermore, these groups are more likely to resort to terrorist activity when they face powerful policy-making elites who can't be uprooted easily, by legitimate means or otherwise. If, on the other hand, the elite groups currently in power are weak but can't be removed from power legitimately, the dissident groups are likely to initiate rebellion activity, such as civil wars and coups, to take over the rule of the governing elite themselves. In particular, the model exhibits multiple equilibria. For example, one equilibrium can be sustained where groups with limited access to opportunity may find it rational to engage in terrorist activities while policy-maker elites may find it rational not to engage in opening access to these groups. The result is, then, a pattern of reduced economic activity and increased terrorism. An alternative equilibrium can be sustained where access is more abundant and terrorism is reduced.

In investigating their models, economists do not appear to engage much in the activities many philosophers take to be essential to scientific understanding of the world, activities such as testing hypotheses and establishing laws. How, then, can economic models explain anything about the real world? Borrowing from William Dray, an explanation of what something really is, as opposed to an explanation of why something happens, is the subsumption of the explanandum under a suitable concept. One way economic models explain real-world phenomena is by providing explanations-what of such phenomena. In this way, economic models can afford explanations of the world without necessarily involving the activities philosophers take to be integral to scientific understanding of the world, for explanations-what do not necessarily involve the activities in question.