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The theory of public choice is a major link between political science and economic science. It includes economic research into the issue of non- market decision-making i.e. the application of economic analysis to political decision-making. The champions of the theory of public choice have most confidence in the market and the market institutions. They try to explain political decision-making by means of the standards operating on the market. The public choice theory approach is based on the concept of methodological individualism and homo oeconomicus, since individuals try to promote their own interests both on the market and in politics. Theoreticians of public choice investigate voters' behaviour, the roles of politicians, political parties, and interest groups in complex democratic societies. Central for their research is the political process in which voters behave as buyers, politicians as entrepreneurs, while bureaucrats are prone to self-aggrandisement and their ambition is to boost the significance of their office. The theory of public choice emphasises the category of exchange (political exchange) and the catalectic approach to economy. (SOI : PM: S. 100)

The author gives a short account of his broadly-based studies on the theory of public choice and the financing of the public sector in the industrialised countries of the world. In this context, first the definition of the theory of choice an relation to the financing of the public sector is given. Then there is a short review of the evolution of the theory of public choice in the history of human development, with special focus on the latest trends. Then the author explores fundamental principles of public choice in the functioning of the contemporary state and its consequences for the economic and social development of the developed countries. In the end, the author lists the essential requirements regarding the possibility of the implementation of the theory of public choice in the Croatian theory and practice when making the collective decisions regarding the financing of public needs. (SOI : PM: S. 178)

The author looks into the methodological features of public choice theory. On the example of James Buchanan's contribution, he demonstrates the differences between that kind of approach (often dubbed political economy) versus welfare economics and mainstream economics. Unlike welfare economics, which tries to work out the optimal state of allocation and distribution of economic resources by using certain logical rules based on Pareto's principles, or mainstream economics, which tries to identify the improvements in observable economic categories (such as national income or investment consumption), political economy encompasses the process of collective decision-making i.e. politics. In this, the efficacy criterion is t extent of consent (consensus) in collective decisionmaking. On the example of Buchanan's and Tullock's joint contribution in the book "The Calculus of Consent", the author concludes that this paved the way for introducing a legitimate categorial mechanism for investigating the costs of political decision-making into political science. (SOI : PM: S. 88)