Egalitarianism
In: New problems of philosophy
1860 Ergebnisse
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In: New problems of philosophy
'Pragmatist Egalitarianism' argues that a deep impasse plagues philosophical egalitarianism. It sets forth a conception of equality rooted in American pragmatist thought - specifically William James, John Dewey, and Richard Rorty - that successfully mediates that impasse
In: Bloomsbury Ethics
In: Bloomsbury Ethics Ser.
FC -- Half title -- Bloomsbury Ethics -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Preface -- 1 Luck egalitarianism and some close and distant relatives -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 What is luck egalitarianism? -- 1.3 What is attractive about luck egalitarianism? -- 1.4 Three important luck egalitarians: Dworkin -- 1.5 Three important luck egalitarians: Arneson -- 1.6 Three important luck egalitarians: Cohen -- 1.7 Other distributive views -- 1.8 Summary -- 2 Why equality? -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Formal equality -- 2.3 Equality of human beings -- 2.4 Williams on the idea of equality -- 2.5 Rawls on range properties -- 2.6 Respect and opaqueness -- 2.7 A different proposal -- 2.8 Summary -- 3 Luck -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Different kinds of luck -- 3.3 Thin luck -- 3.4 Thick luck -- 3.5 Independent notions of luck -- 3.6 How much luck is there? -- 3.7 Constitutive luck -- 3.8 Option luck versus brute luck -- 3.9 Neutralizing luck and equality -- 3.10 Bad luck versus good luck -- 3.11 Summary -- 4 Equality of what? -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Welfare -- 4.3 The specification objection -- 4.4 The disability objection -- 4.5 The offensive preference objection -- 4.6 The expensive and snobbish tastes objections -- 4.7 The non-instrumental concern objection -- 4.8 Dworkin's resourcist view -- 4.9 Sen's capability metric -- 4.10 Summary -- 5 Telic and deontic luck egalitarianism -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Some distinctions -- 5.3 Telic versus deontic and the scope of equality -- 5.4 The levelling down objection -- 5.5 Telic egalitarianism and the levelling down objection -- 5.6 Deontic egalitarianism and the levelling down objection -- 5.7 Egalitarian responses -- 5.8 Summary -- 6 The scope of luck egalitarianism -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Whole lives -- 6.3 Generations.
In: Theoria: a journal of social and political theory, Band 61, Heft 140
ISSN: 1558-5816
This is a new interpretation and analysis of John Rawls's leading theory of distributive justice, which also considers the responding egalitarian theories of scholars such as Richard Arneson, G. A. Cohen, Ronald Dworkin, Martha Nussbaum, John Roemer, and Amartya Sen. Rawls's theory, Kaufman argues, sets out a normative ideal of justice that incorporates an account of the structure and character of relations that are appropriate for members of society viewed as free and equal moral beings. Forging an approach distinct amongst contemporary theories of equality, Rawls offers an alternative to egalitarian justice methodologies that aim primarily to compensate victims for undeserved bad luck. For Rawls, the values that ground the most plausible account of egalitarianism are real equality of economic opportunity combined with the guarantee of a fair distribution of social goods. Kaufman's analysis will be of interest to scholars and advanced students of political theory and political philosophy, particularly those working on justice, and on the work of John Rawls.
Through an analysis of the different dimensions of equality, this book provides a critical introduction to recent philosophical work on egalitarianism, discussing the central questions associated with each of the major debates about egalitarian justice.
In: Ethics & international affairs, Band 29, Heft 3, S. 269-276
ISSN: 1747-7093
In: Philosophy & public affairs, Band 31, Heft 1, S. 5-39
ISSN: 0048-3915
Achieving social equality has been an important aim of modern democratic societies. Yet the process has engendered debate about the nature of equality and the consequences of its application. Why is equality valuable? What kind of equality should be aimed for? When is inequality justified? Should a principle of equality apply globally? The book assesses and links the different dimensions of equality and asks whether recent writing on the topic has the philosophical substance and political force traditionally associated with egalitarian thought.
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 70, Heft 1, S. 136-150
ISSN: 1468-2508
In: Journal of comparative family studies, Band 10, Heft 3, S. 315-329
ISSN: 1929-9850
In: Analyse & Kritik: journal of philosophy and social theory, Band 28, Heft 1, S. 89-94
ISSN: 2365-9858
Abstract
In this short commentary on Ken Binmore's Natural Justice I primarily examine the relationship between mainstream egalitarian theories and Binmore's approach. I argue that Binmore uses key concepts in non-standard ways. As a result, he doesn't engage enough with the views he criticises.
In: Political studies, Band 36, Heft Dec 88
ISSN: 0032-3217
Considers the alleged incompatibility between individual autonomy and the achievement and subsequent maintenance of an egalitarian society. Argues that it is only where an egalitarian society is in place that a like autonomy can be exercised by each citizen. Discusses the 3 main grounds that have been advanced to show there is such an incompatibility. (Abstract amended)
In: Behavioural public policy: BPP, Band 8, Heft 2, S. 403-408
ISSN: 2398-0648
AbstractIn this paper, I reflect on the implications that ultimatum and dictator game experiments might have for public policy and for the debates over egalitarianism. Experiments suggest that people are more inclined to redistribute when outcomes are influenced by luck than effort. This can create difficulties for public policy when people hold contrasting views over whether luck or effort determine outcomes. The results also appear to play into forms of luck egalitarianism. However, they may also be consistent with an alternative understanding of egalitarianism as the impulse to have rules that treat people equally.
In Justice and Natural Resources: An Egalitarian Theory (2017), Chris Armstrong proposes a version of global egalitarianism that – contra the default renderings of this approach – takes individual attachment to specific resources into account. By doing this, his theory has the potential for greening global egalitarianism both in terms of procedure and scope. In terms of procedure, its broad account of attachment and its focus on individuals rather than groups connects with participatory governance and management and, ultimately, participatory democracy – an essential ingredient in the toolkit of green politics and policy-making. In terms of scope, because it does not commit itself to any particular moral framework, Armstrong's theory leaves the door open for non-human animals to become subjects of justice, thus extending the realm of the latter beyond its traditionally anthropocentric borders. I conclude that these greenings are promising, but not trouble-free.
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